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ABSTRACT 
An analysis of the dynamics of industr ial relations in Queensland in 
the reconstruction years af ter World War II is the principal concern of this 
thesis. Broadly speaking, the years 19'f6 to 1952 define the reconstruct ion 
period. Austral ian Labor Party governments under the premiership of E.M. 
Hanlon occupied the treasury benches during this t ime. The thesis explores 
the nature and performance of the Labor party's model of industr ial peace; 
the origins, character and consequences of two of the most signif icant 
industrial disputes in Austral ian industrial relations history which occurred in 
Queensland in the reconstruction years; the responses of the Labor party and 
other groups to these disputes; and the philosophies and policies of organised 
Capi ta l . A l l of these matters are examined against the background of a 
detailed analysis of the internat ional , national and local social, pol i t ical and 
economic context . 
The Introduction specifies in greater detai l the purposes and themes 
pursued in this thesis. I t draws at tent ion to issues of fundamental importance 
to the Labor party, the Austral ian Communist Party, trade unions and 
employer organisations. I t also contains a l i terature review and a broad 
statement of the methodological principles which have guided the study. 
Chapter 1 defines the internat ional and national context , while Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 employ a part ly themat ic , part ly chronological approach to 
i l luminate the local po l i t i ca l , social and economic context of developments in 
industr ial relations in Queensland in the reconstruction period. Chapter tf 
provides an analysis of the Labor party's preferred model for the conduct of 
industr ial relationships. I t investigates the policies of the Queensland 
Industrial Court , the government's industrial relations legislation and the 
responses wi th in the labour movement to the performance of this a rb i t ra t ion-
legislat ion model in the early postwar years. 
Four chapters are then devoted to a discussion of the f i rs t major 
challenge in almost twenty years to the Labor party's policy of industr ial 
peace. At ten t ion is focussed on the causes, course, character, consequences 
and significance of the 19'f6 Meat Industry Dispute. Chapter 5 argues that 
this dispute can only be understood in terms of the industrial relations history 
of the meat industry, and only when the aspirations and beliefs of all those 
concerned with industrial relationships in the industry are taken into 
account. Chapter 6 t races the development of an increasingly wide and 
complex dispute. It reveals changes in the objectives and tact ics of the 
participants over t ime. Chapter 7 continues in this vein. It documents the 
efforts by the unions to seize the initiative in the dispute and provides a clear 
picture of the roles played by the government, the employers, the press and 
the Communist party. Chapter 8 examines the impact of the dispute on the 
various parties. It looks at its effect on union at t i tudes to direct action, 
especially to long, industry-wide strikes. It discusses employer moves to 
consolidate their gains from the dispute as well as the lessons learned by the 
Communist party. A principal outcome of the dispute was the decision taken 
by the Labor party to intervene in the internal affairs of trade unions by both 
organisational and legislative means. The chapter argues that the 
development of official Labor party industrial groups in Queensland, and 
several aspects of a major revision to The Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act, must be understood as responses to the meat dispute. 
The 19't8 Railway Dispute is analysed in the same general fashion. 
Chapter 9 emphasises the importance of an historical perspective in 
understanding both the outbreak and course of the dispute. It pays particular 
at tention to the role of the Communist party, union at t i tudes to the 
Queensland Industrial Court and the government's wages policy during 1947. 
Chapter 10 explores the nature of the dispute and charts the development of 
what came to be an ideological crusade. Chapter 11 looks a t both the 
immediate and longer term consequences of the dispute with an emphasis on 
the conclusions drawn by the Communist party, and Labor party decisions to 
expand its industrial group organisation. The broad pattern of Labor party 
responses to the challenges to its industrial peace policy is considered in 
Chapter 12. 
The importance of employer philosophies and policies in an 
understanding of the texture of industrial relationships is recognised in 
V 
Chapter 13. The Conclusion offers interpretative comment on the 
significance of the issues raised throughout the thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines several major themes in the industrial relations 
history of Queensland in the period of reconstruction after World War II. 
Much of the dynamics of industrial relations in this period can be explained in 
terms of a passionate commitment to a vision of industrial peace on the part 
of the Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.) government, as well as sections of the 
trade union movement and certain employer organisations. In this best of all 
possible worlds, there was no place for the strike, the lock-out and other 
forms of direct industrial action. Instead, a court of law, established 
specifically to decide mat ters of industrial relations, would dispense industrial 
justice. 
For decades this vision had been the foundation of all A.L.P. thought 
in Queensland on industrial relations principles and policy. With the exception 
of three years during the Great Depression, A.L.P. governments held office in 
Queensland from 1915 to 1957. One of the principal legislative acts of the 
first of this long line of governments was to pass an Industrial Arbitration Act 
...to establish a system that will entirely do away 
with the industrial dislocation and disruption that 
has occurred from time to time in the past under 
the more imperfect system which has prevailed. It 
is desired to reach the objective of a permanent 
and lasting industrial peace. 
During the debate on this legislation, E.G. Theodore, the minister for Public 
Works in the T.J. Ryan government, told the Legislative Assembly: 
We...are endeavouring to do away with strikes 
entirely. I think that under this measure strikes 
will decline and go entirely out of favour. Probably 
we shall never hear of strikes or lockouts, but if 
there is a strike, then we have the machinery here 
to get the parties together to settle their 
differences amicably. 
1. Queensland Parliamentary Debates (Q.P.D.) 120 (1915-1916):577. 
2. Q.P.D. 123 (1916):449. 
In the following decades, Labor politicians extolled the virtues of arbitration 
on every appropriate occasion. The minister for Labour and Industry in 1932 
was certain that the Labor party's arbitration system - the best in the world -
would ensure that the 
...seeds of discontent which must inculcate in the 
minds of the working class people a spirit of 
discontent, revolt, and revolution 
would fall on barren soil. 'Direct action' the minister said 'is a form of 
revolution'.-^ The redoubtable W. Forgan-Smith, premier from 1932 to 1942, 
thought that 'economic war' between those who owned the 'instruments of 
industry' and those who sold their labour was unworthy of a civilized 
society. In 1945, the minister for Labour and Employment in Frank Cooper's 
government had no doubts that arbitration had stood the test of time as the 
most effective way of securing that tranquil s ta te of industrial peace. ' ' 
The Labor government led by Edward Michael Hanlon from March 
1946 until January 1952 did not, however, enjoy industrial peace. There 
occurred in this period, by whatever standards, two of the largest industrial 
disputes in Queensland as well as in Australian industrial relations history. 
They left an indelible mark on the whole fabric of industrial and political 
relationships in Queensland during the reconstruction years and beyond. 
A comprehensive enquiry into these disputes, the 1946 Meat Industry 
Dispute and the 1948 Railway Dispute, is thus one central feature of this 
thesis. Matters addressed in this section of the analysis include the causes of 
strikes and lock-outs, the nature of these forms of conflict, the role of the 
s ta te in industrial conflict, the industrial relations policies of employers and a 
3. Q.P.D. 162 (1932):2013. 
4. Ibid., p.2057. 
5. Q.P.D. 184 (1944-1945):2226. 
6. A statist ical description of industrial disputes in Queensland is 
contained in the tables in Appendix 1. 
belief in certain quarters which, in its most crude form, asserted that 
members of the Australian Communist Party were responsible for industrial 
disputation. The outcome of this analysis is the first scholarly t rea tment of 
the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute. New material , furthermore, of relevance to 
the 1948 Railway Dispute is integrated with what is already available, and an 
interpretation of this body of evidence is offered which far transcends the 
limits of the previous knowledge of the dispute. 
Both disputes were indigenous to Queensland. They were not parts of 
wider disputes the origins of which were to be found in other s ta tes . They 
occurred in arguably two of the state's most economically important 
industries. They were disputes which should never have happened if one 
believed the rhetoric about arbitration which leaders of political and 
industrial labour had never grown tired of espousing over a period of thirty 
years. 
The rhetoric was, however, an accurate guide to the response of the 
Hanlon government, and the A.L.P. in general, to these challenges to the 
sacred policy of industrial peace. The Labor party defended this policy with a 
vigour which bordered on the fanatical. As an organisation, it established 
official industrial groups to counter any militant tendencies within the 
leadership and membership of Queensland trade unions. The A.L.P. saw its 
industrial groups as agents of industrial peace in the labour movement. Any 
union official, communist or not, or any Labor party member who refused to 
accept the policy of industrial peace could expect to be opposed by the 
groups. 
This interpretation of the reasons for the establishment of the 
industrial groups in Queensland corrects a deficiency in the previous l i terature 
which has uncritically asserted the view that the groups were set up in 
Queensland for basically the same reasons as they were in the other s ta tes . 
Before the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute overtures from the Catholic Social 
Studies Movement (the Movement) to the A.L.P. in Queensland proposing the 
establishment of official Labor party industrial groups as an anti-communist 
force in the trade unions were rejected in favour of an existing ant i-
communist policy. The A.L.P. was content with this s tate of affairs until the 
outbreak of the meat dispute which the Labor party interpreted as part of a 
communist challenge to the arbitration system. Only then was it receptive to 
a cleverly argued case by the Movement in favour of direct A.L.P. 
intervention in the internal affairs of trade unions. 
In government, the Labor party resisted and sought to break labour 
strikes. It amended The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act with the 
specific objective of containing labour militancy. It established a special 
bureau within the Queensland Police Force in 1948 to gather intelligence on 
the activities of militant trade union officials. It also fought to prevent the 
extension of federal awards in Queensland and it supported those principles 
and practices of the Queensland Industrial Court which were directed against 
strikes. 
The Queensland Industrial Court occupied a key position in the Labor 
party's pursuit of industrial peace. Hopes for an end to industrial struggle 
rested to a major degree on its actions and policies. The court, however, was 
confronted with major problems during the reconstruction years. The meat 
and railway disputes challenged its raison d'etre. On these and other 
occasions many union leaders and ordinary unionists a t the very least doubted 
its relevance with some going so far as to question its legitimacy. It was 
during this period that the court also had to come to terms with the growing 
influence in Queensland of determinations made by the commonwealth 
arbitration authorit ies. The reconstruction years, moreover, saw the 
beginning of a process of disillusionment with the court within the mainstream 
of the labour movement in Queensland which gradually accelerated to become 
an important ingredient in the A.L.P. split in 1957. 
Despite the Labor party's public emphasis on the role of the industrial 
court as the pacemaker in industrial relations reform, most of the major 
changes in conditions of employment in the years of postwar reconstruction 
were initiated by the government through parliamentary legislation. These 
advances occurred in fields such as sick leave, the length of the working week 
and long service leave. Often these changes were made by a government 
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displeased at certain features of the court's practices and policies. This 
apparent willingness to override court decisions not in accordance wi th 
government policy contr ibuted to a longer term tendency wi th in the labour 
movement to approach the government f i rs t on matters of major industr ial 
reform and to relegate the court to a somewhat secondary posit ion. 
The reconstruction period af ter the Second World War was a period in 
which employer organisations asserted, wi th renewed and sometimes 
desperate vigour, the relevance of a private capital ist economy to postwar 
Austral ia and the central importance of a 'harmony and partnership' model of 
industrial relations. They were especially fear fu l of the implicat ions of fu l l 
employment for labour discipline and commitment . The employers fe l t 
threatened by the forces of the le f t , part icular ly when manifested in 'new 
order' ideal ism, and especially by a confident, vocal and relat ively powerful 
Communist party. 
In the early years of postwar reconstruct ion, the Communist party 
believed that the tide of history was on i ts side. A series of major industr ial 
disputes was interpreted as conf i rming the party's analysis of postwar pol i t ical 
real i t ies in Austral ia. I t was the experience of these disputes - the 1945 Steel 
Strike in New South Wales, the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute, the 1946 
Transport Dispute in Vic tor ia , the Victor ian Metal Trades Dispute of 1946-47, 
and the 1948 Railway Dispute, which helped lead the party into its most 
' revolut ionary' phase and, u l t imate ly , to defeat on the coalf ields in 1949. 
Unlike the Labor government or the employers, the Communist party saw 
industr ial conf l ic t as a creat ive experience which exposed the class character 
and explo i tat ive nature of work and society in general under Capi ta l ism. The 
communists rejected arb i t ra t ion as nothing but an instrument of oppression of 
the working class. The result was more than just a war of words between the 
Communist party on the one hand and the Labor government and private 
employers on the other. The reconstruction years saw the Communist party 
involved in a number of b i t ter industr ial and pol i t ical confrontat ions over the 
arb i t ra t ion pr inciple. 
There were, of course, forces of t radi t ion and cont inui ty which 
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influenced the pattern of industrial relationships during the period. For many 
trade unions, life in the reconstruction years had much in common with that in 
earlier t imes. Even allowing for full employment and greater prosperity, 
these unions continued to accept the policy of industrial peace, strongly 
supported arbitration both in principle and in practice and maintained their 
close affiliation with the A.L.P. 
The Hanlon years had a certain watershed quality about them, 
nevertheless, despite the continuity and relative sameness of industrial 
relationships for some in the early postwar period. The challenge to, and the 
defence of, the Labor party's policy of industrial peace, the impact of a 
revamped ideology on employer industrial relations perspectives, the influence 
of, and reactions to, the Communist party at the height of its powers and full 
employment, all occurred at a time of new order idealism, a debate over the 
structure of Australian society and growing Cold War tensions in international 
affairs. Together they delineate the period of the Hanlon Labor government 
in Queensland as deserving serious attention in the writing of Australian 
industrial relations history. 
There has not been a great deal written about industrial relations in 
Queensland during the period of postwar reconstruction. There is no other 
integrated analysis along the lines a t tempted in this thesis. There is, of 
course, a growing scholarly interest in the reconstruction years. This has, 
however, concentrated on Australia-wide perspectives and issues. 
It is noteworthy just how little academic attention has been paid to 
some of the principal industrial disputes in Australia. This certainly applies in 
the case of the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute, and to a lesser, although still 
major, extent to the 1948 Railway Dispute. The neglect of the meat dispute 
is almost total . There has been but one previous effort to discuss what must 
rank as one of the most severe conflicts in Australian industrial relations 
history. As part of his history of the Australasian Meat Industry Employees' 
Union (A.M.I.E.U.), Terrence Cutler presented a broad assessment of the 
principal features and overall significance of the meat dispute. ' His general 
conclusions are not contradicted in this thesis. Cutler's discussion of the 
dispute, however, occupied only a relatively small part of his work. He did 
not investigate the background nor the dynamics of the conflict. There were 
but some brief references to the aftermath of the dispute and to its longer 
term significance. 
In some other investigations of Queensland industrial relations history, 
the meat dispute has rated a small mention to the extent it was seen as having 
a bearing on the principal mat ters under investigation. Kenneth Knight 
offered an explanation of Hanlon's policy towards the dispute in his portrait of 
the premier,° and Joy Guyatt included a short account in an analysis of the 
impact of trade unions on the Queensland political process. Richard 
Shearman referred to the dispute in passing as part of the background to the 
1948 Railway Dispute. ^^ His analysis, however, seriously overstated the 
importance of the Communist party in the conduct of the dispute. Jim 
Beatson drew attention to the meat dispute during an exploration of the 
struggle between the Communist party and its opponents in Queensland, 
7. T.A. Cutler, 'The History of the Australasian Meat Industry 
Employees' Union: A Study of the Internal Dynamics of a Labour 
Organisation' (Ph.D. diss.. University of New South Wales, 1976), 
pp.295-303. 
8. Kenneth W. Knight, 'Edward Michael Hanlon: A City Bushman,' in 
Queensland Political Portraits 1859-1952, eds. D.J. Murphy and R.B. 
Joyce (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1978), pp.448-451. 
9. J. Guyatt , 'Trade Unions and the Australian Labor Party in Queensland 
1947-1957' (M.A. diss.. University of Queensland, 1971), pp.102-104, 
212,213. 
10. R. Shearman, 'The Politics of the 1948 Queensland Railway Strike' 
(B.A. diss.. University of Queensland, 1973), pp.22-24. 
11. James Beatson, 'Communism and Public Opinion in Queensland 1939-
1951: An Explanation of Queensland's Vote in the 1951 Anti-
Communist Referendum' (B.A. diss.. University of Queensland, 1974), 
pp.52-54. 
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while G.R. Stewart 's regional perspective saw the dispute in terms of the 
12 development of industrial relationships in the Lake's Creek meatworks. 
Greater attention has been devoted to the 1948 Railway Dispute. 
Margaret Cribb -^  and Richard Shearman have contributed detailed studies, 
while Tom Sheridan, ^^ Robin Gollan, ^^ Kenneth Knight, '^^  Joy Guyatt ^^ and 
Phillip Deery have looked at it in the context of other investigations. This 
thesis offers different perspectives to those presented by Margaret Cribb on 
issues such as the importance of non-economic factors in explaining the 
causes of the railway dispute. Richard Shearman's work is a mixture of 
12. G.R. Stewart , 'An Analysis of Industrial Relations at the Central 
Queensland Meat Export Company Works at Lake's Creek, 
Rockhampton, 1945-1965' (B.A. diss.. University of Queensland, 1978). 
13. Margaret Cribb, 'State In Emergency: The Queensland Railway Strike 
of 1948,' in Strikes. Studies in Twentieth Century Australian Social 
History, eds. John Iremonger, John Merritt, Graeme Osborne 
(Sydney: Angus and Robertson in association with The Australian 
Society for the Study of Labour History, 1973), pp.225-248. Margaret 
Bridson Cribb, 'Ideological Conflict: The 1927 and 1948 Strikes,' in 
Labour In Power. The Labor Party and Governments in Queensland 
1915-57, eds. D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce, and Colin A. Hughes (St. 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980), pp.382-405. 
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valuable insights and material which borders on propaganda,^^ while that of 
Knight and Guyatt is essentially descriptive. Sheridan's account highlights 
certain features of the dispute of particular relevance to the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union. The contributions of Gollan and Deery are important in 
that they seek to reveal how the Communist party saw the significance of the 
railway dispute. The connections between communist assessments of the 
dispute and Communist party strategy and tact ics in the 1949 Coal Strike are 
particularly well established by Deery. Gollan locates both the dispute and 
communist interpretations of its significance within a broader framework 
which deals with the evolution of the Communist party in Australia. 
All previous accounts of the 1948 Railway Dispute rely on a relatively 
limited range of sources. The records of the Amalgamated Engineering Union 
a t Ipswich, of the Communist party a t the Mitchell Library and those of the 
commissioner for railways in Brisbane have not been consulted. The results 
are analyses which are nowhere as wide or penetrating as they could well have 
been in areas of integral importance to an understanding of the dispute. 
In the l i terature which concerns the A.L.P. industrial groups, little 
at tention has been paid to their rise and impact in Queensland. Only Richard 
Shearman^ has appreciated that the Labor party sanctioned the 
establishment of official industrial groups in trade unions during 1946, 
although Joy Guyatt has drawn attention to efforts by the Australian Workers' 
Union (A.W.U.) in 1946 to encourage the Labor party to set up an organisation 
to counter ' . . .anti-A.L.P. activit ies of waterside workers... ' . Nowhere, 
however, have the links been established between the 1946 Meat Industry 
Dispute and the Labor party's decision, taken in July 1946, to create official 
industrial groups in selected trade unions. This vitally important consequence 
of the meat dispute is addressed in some depth in this thesis. 
20. See, for example: R. Shearman, 'The Politics of the 1948 Queensland 
Railway Strike' pp.104,122. 
21. Ibid., p.20. 
22. J . Guyatt , 'Trade Unions and the Australian Labor Party in Queensland 
1947-1957'p.50. 
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The Hanlon government's industrial relations legislation has a t t rac ted 
relatively little a t tent ion. E.I. Sykes has traced the evolution of The 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, and has also commented on other 
legislation which had a bearing on conditions of work.^^ He made, however, 
no a t tempt to place this legislation within a wider political and industrial 
context. Regarding the administration of the Act, D.J. Murphy has 
emphasised the importance of a growing disillusionment with the performance 
of the Queensland Industrial Court as an ingredient in the A.L.P. split in 
1957. Although he recognised that this dissatisfaction had reached significant 
proportions by 1952, he did not analyse the development of this situation. 
Murphy also drew particular at tention to 
. . . that unresolved debate about the central problem 
of how far Labor governments should go in 
legislating directly in the labour area and how 
much ihey should leave this to the Arbitration 
Court.^^ 
For the Hanlon government, however, this was less of a dilemma than Murphy 
has suggested. As a general rule, the court was allowed great latitude in its 
work as long as the government approved of the final result. If it did not, 
then legislation was used to ensure the implementation of the government's 
industrial relations policy. 
The principles and practices of the Queensland Industrial Court in the 
reconstruction period have been the subject of little academic scrutiny. E.I. 
Sykes has remarked on the anti-strike policies of the court, but there is no 
other previous l i terature of substance in this general area. The same can be 
said about the existence of specific material on employer industrial relations 
23. E.I. Sykes, 'Labour Relations - Law,' in Labor In Power eds. D.J. 
Murphy, R.B. Joyce, and Colin A. Hughes pp.236-245. 
24. D.J. Murphy, 'Labour Relations - Issues,' ibid., pp.265,267. 
25. Ibid., p.260. 
26. E.I. Sykes, 'Labour Relations - Law,' p.240. 
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policies and philosophies. Much valuable work, however, has been done on 
employer mat ters which, although not specifically directed towards 
Queensland circumstances, is nevertheless of considerable relevance. The 
77 
analysis of the Institute of Public Affairs presented by J.R. Hay, ' and the 
more general and widespread discussions of employer industrial relations 
policies conducted by R.W. Connell and T.H. Irving, ^ and Jim Hagan, ^ 
clearly belong to this category. 
In common with all historical studies, certain themes, questions and 
issues have been selected for analysis in this thesis. It is impossible to 
examine every aspect of industrial relations in Queensland in the early 
postwar years: a choice clearly had to be made. The thesis thus explores the 
performance of the arbitration system; industrial relations legislation; the 
causes, nature and significance of two long and intensely bitter industrial 
disputes; the role of the Communist party in shaping the pattern of industrial 
relations in the reconstruction years; the implications of the Labor party's 
commitment to the goal of industrial peace; the rise and activit ies of the 
A.L.P. industrial groups in Queensland; and the actions and philosophies of 
employers as they strove to contain labour militancy and to secure their place 
in the postwar world. These themes were selected in the belief that , by 
subjecting them to systematic analysis, it would be possible to generate 
further insights into why governments in Australia adopt a strongly 
interventionist approach to industrial relations, why the A.L.P. as an 
organisation and in government is generally hostile to labour strikes, how the 
Communist party participated in, and interpreted, major industrial 
confrontations, the origins and dynamics of significant industrial disputes, and 
the nature and formation of employer industrial relations policies. A 
contribution to the deeper understanding of these and related questions and 
issues can enrich considerably the writing of Australian industrial relations 
27. J.R. Hay, 'The Institute Of Public Affairs And Social Policy In World 
War II,' Historical Studies 20 (October 1982): 198-216. 
28. R.W. Connell and T.H. Irving, Class Structure in Australian History 
(Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1980), pp.288-292. 
29. Jim Hagan, The History of the A.C.T.U. (Melbourne: Longman 
Cheshire, 1981), pp.72-79,2l6-220. 
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history. 
The thesis has been organised and structured in a way which, it is 
hoped, facilitates an illuminating and comprehensive examination of these 
mat te r s . Attention has already been drawn to the Labor party's 
uncompromising faith in the virtues of industrial peace, and its unswerving 
belief that the compulsory arbitration system and industrial legislation 
provided the best possible means of regulating industrial relationships. The 
Labor party was determined to preserve the arbitration system against any 
challenge. This is the point of departure for any proper understanding of 
government policy towards industrial disputes, and industrial relations 
generally, during the periods of Labor rule in Queensland. 
The thesis devotes several chapters to an investigation of the 
dimensions of the international, national and local social, economic and 
political circumstances which had a bearing on the nature of industrial 
relationships in Queensland in the reconstruction years. This is followed by an 
examination of several features of the Labor party's arbitration-legislation 
model as it operated in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This traditional model 
was urged upon workers as the desirable alternative to direct industrial action 
in the postwar labour markets , and it therefore seems appropriate to examine 
the industrial court 's major principles and decisions, the general level of 
confidence in the court exhibited by the labour movement, the type of 
industrial relations legislation brought down by the Hanlon government and 
the extent to which the Labor party saw legislation and arbitration as 
substi tutes. 
The analysis then turns to an examination of the first of two major 
challenges in the 1940s to the Labor party's policy of industrial peace. The 
causes, nature, consequences and significance of the 1946 Meat Industry 
Dispute are the subject of detailed scrutiny. The second of these challenges, 
the 1948 Railway Dispute, is investigated in a similar manner. In both cases, 
the research into the disputes was guided by the argument that all dimensions 
of industrial conflict may be complex and also difficult to define. It is, by the 
same token, one of the tasks of historical scholarship to discover the truth of 
such generalisations in specific and significant instances. The research 
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reveals that, in the particular case of the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute, the 
generalisations of the theorists are applicable. The causes of the dispute, for 
example, were complex and numerous, and in Chapter 5 an effort is made to 
define the precise nature of these causes, and to discuss them within an 
appropriate historical framework. 
In the case of the 1948 Railway Dispute, a painstaking sifting of a 
massive volume of union, government, industrial court and political party 
documents reveals that the causes of the dispute were somewhat less complex 
than an a priori perspective might have suggested. Once the dispute erupted 
into a full-scale withdrawal of labour and a retaliatory lock-out, however, the 
nature of the 1948 Railway Dispute became extremely complicated, and can 
only be fully appreciated within the wider local, national and international 
context. 
Having considered both the meat and railway disputes in some detail, 
the analysis enquires into the responses of the Hanlon Labor government to 
these profound breaches of its policy of industrial peace. Here it is suggested 
that the formation of official A.L.P. industrial groups, legislative changes, 
political support for the anti-strike policy of the industrial court and a 
determination to assert a traditional states' rights view on industrial relations 
all need to be understood within the context of the Labor party's absolute 
determination to enforce its policy of industrial peace in Queensland. 
Industrial relations history, by its very nature, demands that 
comprehensive attention be given to the policies, philosophies and practices of 
employers both at the workplace and in the wider political framework. This 
principle has helped guide the content and construction of the chapters in this 
study which deal with the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute and the 1948 Railway 
Dispute. But there is also a need to consider the beliefs and actions of 
employers in general, to the extent this is possible, and in something wider 
than just the context of industrial disputes. The final chapter in the analysis, 
therefore, presents a study of employer ideologies and policies as they were 
expressed at the employer organisation level in the reconstruction years. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SOCIAL, 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT, 19'f6-1952 
16 
The issues and events analysed in this thesis belong to the period of 
reconstruction after World War II. It was a turbulent period in both 
international and Australian affairs. In Asia and elsewhere colonial peoples 
continued or commenced their drive for national independence, while Russia 
and the United States of America strove to expand their spheres of 
international influence. References to the Cold War and the Nuclear Age 
rapidly became a part of the conventional political vocabulary. The United 
Nations was established, and efforts were made to reform the international 
monetary system. It is only within this wider context that the nature of 
contemporary political, economic and social developments in Australia can be 
fully understood. This chapter, therefore, seeks to define the essential 
features of these circumstances and to relate them to the themes debated 
throughout the study. 
Three days after the defeat of Japan on 17 August 1945, the 
Indonesian nationalists proclaimed their independence from Holland. The 
Dutch government, however, did not recognize this unilateral declaration and 
moved to re-establish its administration in the archipelago. Australian 
involvement in the subsequent independence struggle, a t a number of levels, 
was almost inevitable. Many Australian service personnel were in Indonesia, 
while virtually all of the Dutch colonial administration and thousands of 
Indonesian seamen had obtained refuge in Australia when Japan occupied the 
islands in 1942. Within the Labor party government under Ben Chifley, and 
parts of the wider community as well, there was considerable sympathy for 
the nationalist cause. According to Russel Ward 
...many Australians, probably the majority, felt 
that the Indonesian people were just as entitled as 
others to independence and self-government, 
especially at the end of a war fought supposedly to 
ensure such basic human rights. Many too, 
believing that the 70,000,000 Indonesians were 
I. This discussion of the Dutch-Indonesian element in the international 
context is based on: Russel Ward, A Nation For A Continent rev.ed. 
(Melbourne: Heinemann Educational Australia, 1983), pp.288-289; 
L.F. Crisp, Ben Chifley. A Biography (Melbourne: Longmans, Green 
and Co Ltd, 1963), pp.292-293. 
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bound to win in the end, thought i t would be to 
Australia's interest to support their struggle and so 
earn the goodwill of her nearest neighbour. 
Enthusiastic support for the Indonesian nationalists came from several 
trade unions, notably the Waterside Workers' Federation (W.W.F.) and the 
Seamen's Union. Between 1945 and 1949, when the Dutch f inal ly recognised 
the Indonesian Republic, a series of boycotts and black bans e f fec t ive ly 
prevented the movement of Dutch personnel, supplies and arms to the 
considerable advantage of the nationalists. 
There was, however, signif icant opposition in Austral ia to the pol i t ical 
and diplomatic support given by the federal government to the Indonesians, 
and to the direct act ion of the trade unions. Within the labour movement in 
Queensland, for example, the issues of race and Communism formed the basis 
of attacks on the mar i t ime unions and the Trades and Labour Council (T.L.C.) 
which organised food, money and shelter for seamen and other Indonesian 
refugees. These attacks painted the supporters of the nationalists as t ra i tors 
to White Austral ia, and suggested that opposition to the re-establishment of 
Dutch hegemony in Indonesia, and the nationalist revolution i tsel f , was 
'communist- inspired'. The profound divisions wi th in the Queensland labour 
movement over the mat ter of Communism, which had existed since the 1910s, 
were deepened in the early postwar years by conf l ic t over Indonesia. The 
dimensions of this conf l i c t , however, can only be properly understood when 
seen in the context of the emerging Cold War. 
By 1946, hopes of world peace on the basis of the Teheran and Yal ta 
agreements were fading rapidly. The formal end to these hopes was contained 
in Winston Churchil l 's Fulton speech on 5 March 1946 in which he spoke of an 
'iron cur ta in ' descending in Europe. Between 1946 and 1952, internat ional 
events were interpreted in Austral ia largely within a Cold War f ramework. In 
1947 and 1948, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia moved clearly into the 
Soviet orb i t . These developments intensif ied the Cold War, and exacerbated 
2. Ward, A Nation For A Cont inent, p.288. 
an already virulent anti-communism in Australia. Important features of the 
1948 Railway Dispute in Queensland can only be fully discerned when it is 
appreciated that the dispute coincided with the momentous events in 
Czechoslovakia. At the same t ime, the strength of the revolutionary armies 
in China had increased to the point where, in October 1949, the Chinese 
Peoples' Republic was proclaimed. The bitter arguments in Australia over 
recognition of the new regime in Peking both reflected and intensified ant i -
communist sentiment. These arguments, together with postwar communist 
activity in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as well as in 
Greece and the Middle East, helped spread the idea of a rampaging, 
monolithic world Communism.-^ On the other hand, members of the 
Australian Communist Party believed that developments on the world stage 
confirmed that history was on the side of the forces of progress, and their 
confidence in the correctness of their historic mission grew accordingly. 
International changes between 1945 and 1949 clearly contributed to 
both optimistic expectations in communist ranks in Australia, and to the 
creation of a climate of opinion which was extremely favourable to those 
within and outside the labour movement whose avowed aim was the 
destruction of communist influence on any and all aspects of Australian 
society. The hysterical anti-communism of the late 1940s, fueled by the Cold 
War and rapidly changing international relations, is an important part of the 
explanation for the rise and impact of the Catholic Social Studies Movement 
and the A.L.P. industrial groups in Queensland and elsewhere in Australia 
during the reconstruction years. 
In Australia, this fierce onslaught by the forces of domestic and 
international anti-communism came to a head when the government of R.G. 
Menzies introduced the Communist Party Dissolution Bill for debate in the 
national parliament at the end of April 1950. The debate took place against 
the background of the Korean War which began in June of that year. The war 
3. Ibid., p.294. 
4. See Chapter 12. 
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did nothing to reduce the anti-communist orthodoxy in Australian political 
debate, rather the reverse occurred. The participation of Australian troops in 
the struggle rendered any opposition susceptible to a t tack from nationalistic, 
anti-communist quarters, while the general character of the war assisted the 
maintenance of an environment supportive of the industrial and political 
activit ies of the Movement and the industrial groups. The Communist party 
was well and truly on the defensive. 
The Korean War was, however, of wider significance for Australian 
industrial relations than simply its impact on Labor and national politics. The 
boom in international commodity prices occasioned by the war, especially in 
wool, helped accelerate inflation in Australia to the point where the price 
level in 1950-51 rose 20.7 per cent, and in 1951-52, it rose 16.6 per cent . The 
great pressure within the trade union movement for the indexation of margins, 
for wage rises and, later , the resistance to the decision of the Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to abandon quarterly cost of living 
adjustments to the basic wage, all need to be evaluated within the context of 
the Korean War inflation. 
The character of the national context, which helps explain the 
dynamics of industrial relations in Queensland in the reconstruction years, was 
particularly influenced by the circumstances of the Second World War. During 
the first two years of the war, the federal government's economic policy was 
designed to sustain Australian overseas forces, and to provide and maintain a 
supply of primary products to Britain. As the Japanese threat to Australia 
increased during 1942, however, the objectives of this policy changed with a 
new and urgent emphasis being placed on building up the armed forces, and in 
maximising the production and construction of munitions, war equipment and 
strategic defence works. Darwin was bombed in February and March 1942; 
the la t ter month also saw Japanese bombing raids a t places on the far north 
coast of Queensland, and in July, it was Townsville which experienced raids on 
three successive nights. 
The fall of Singapore in February 1942 shattered what for many 
Australians were the critical assumptions underpinning both their domestic 
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and world views. The realisation that Britain no longer possessed the capacity 
to provide defence protection posed '...the greatest challenge to the initiative 
and determination of the political parties and the public that they had ever 
been required to encounter' . This challenge was met by the federal A.L.P. 
government under John Curtin when, in 1942, it made a historic appeal to the 
United States of America for men and treasure to sustain Australia in the 
face of what appeared to be a possible Japanese invasion. Australia soon 
became the key area in the preparation of an Allied counterat tack against the 
Japanese in the Pacific and, ultimately, Japan itself. 
As the direct threat of a Japanese invasion receded during 1942, new 
priorities came to dominate wartime economic policy. An increasing and 
major emphasis was placed on the production of supplies - particularly food -
for the Australian and Allied forces operating in the Pacific, as well as for 
Britain, and this meant a reallocation of resources from activities such as 
munitions manufacture and the construction of strategic facilities. An 
example of this was the diversion of some materials and factory capacity 
from munitions to the production of agricultural and food-processing 
machinery. This third phase in national economic policy continued until the 
end of the war. 
The pattern of resource allocation occasioned by the second and third 
phases of wartime economic policy meant that many items of civilian 
consumption were heavily rationed. The decision to implement a 
comprehensive rationing scheme was taken early in 1942, and by the end of 
that year the supply of a wide range of commodities including clothing, tea, 
meat , butter and sugar was severely limited.^ Petrol, spirits and beer were 
typically difficult, often impossible, to obtain. Even after the Allied victory 
5. P.H. Partridge, 'Depression And War, 1929-50,' in Australia, A Social 
And Political History, ed. Gordon Greenwood (Sydney: Angus And 
Robertson, 1955), p.344. 
6. On wartime rationing and its maintenance after the defeat of Japan, 
see: H.C. Coombs, Trial Balance (Melbourne: Macmillian, 1981), 
pp.12-22; Ward, A Nation For A Continent, pp.252,253,271,298,302; 
Cribb, 'State In Emergency,' pp.228-230. 
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over Japan in August 1945, federal government fears of inflation meant that 
rationing of many commodities such as clothing, meat and petrol was 
continued for several years, contributing perhaps to increased feelings of 
resentment and hardship, as well as impatience, among the civilian population 
and recently demobilised service personnel anxious to participate in the bet ter 
times which they had been promised would come after the war. 
Rationing was not the only device used to effect a reallocation of 
national resources to the war effort. There was a wide range of controls over 
virtually every aspect of economic activity. Under the National Security Act, 
regulations were promulgated covering mat ters such as Economic 
Organisation, Female Minimum Rates, Coal Mining Industry Employment, 
Industrial Peace, Prices, Capital Issues and Man Power. In terms of its 
employment effects, this mobilisation of resources meant a diversion of 
labour from all non-military purposes to the production of war-related goods 
and services and to the ranks of the armed services. From the middle of 1943, 
however, the third phase of national economic policy required a significant 
reversal in the direction of these earlier movements of labour with greater 
emphasis being placed on rural industry as well as building and construction. 
The proportion of working women engaged in the defence forces and 
in the production of military requirements increased markedly during the 
Second World War. Similar changes in the pattern of female employment 
occurred in transport, communications and rural industry. V/hile the 
percentage of males over fourteen years of age in the workforce during the 
war rose some 10 per cent , however, the corresponding increase for women 
was a relatively modest 4.4 per cent . This suggests that the principal impact 
of the war on the female paid workforce concerned its occupational 
distribution rather than its relative size.*^ The national government, in the 
periods of acute labour shortage, sought to encourage women to work in 
several industries deemed essential to the prosecution of the war. The 
The figures discussed in this paragraph are calculated from data 
contained in: Commonwealth Grants Commission. Report No. 12. 
(Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1945), p. 18. 
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National Security (Female Minimum Rates) Regulations were, for example, 
designed to a t t r ac t women to those industries by fixing rates of pay a t levels 
higher than was normally the case in peacet ime. The extent to which the 
experience of the war raised women's expectations concerning their longer 
term role in the workforce is a mat ter of some contention. The advances in 
pay, responsibilities and participation between 1939 and 1945, nevertheless, 
provide at least a partial key to understanding the considerable pressure in the 
reconstruction years for the general application of the equal pay concept or, 
at the very least, for the maintenance and extension of the principles 
contained in the Female Minimum Rates Regulations. 
During the war, a most deep and lasting impression on Australian men 
and women was made by full employment. The unemployment of the interwar 
period, never less than 10 per cent, had disappeared by 1943. Many 
Australians, however, believed this to be a transient phenomenon, soon to 
disappear once the special circumstances of the war gave way to the 
restoration of peacetime conditions. There was, nevertheless, a widespread 
refusal to accept that a return to the days of the Depression was necessary or 
inevitable. A fierce determination to prevent a continuation of the economic 
and social injustices of the 1930s certainly dominated the thinking of many in 
the labour movement. 
By the end of 1945, the degree of forebearance necessary for the 
success of the government's postwar reconstruction policy was at risk. The 
willingness of individuals and groups to suppress the pursuit of self-interest 
was being sorely tested as the wartime spirit of sacrifice rapidly evaporated 
in the early months of peace. Working men and women were impatient to 
enjoy the fruits of a favourable labour market (some also had old scores to 
set t le with their employers). A sense of urgency was apparent within the 
ranks of Labour: get in early - it might not last. 
8. The principal elements of this policy were the rehabilitation of 
service personnel, full employment, the improvement of the physical 
and social environment, and participation in the construction of a new 
international economic order. Coombs, Trial Balance, p.27. 
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There was no shortage of industrial reforms on the agenda of the 
labour movement in Queensland. High on the list were demands which 
emphasised leisure as a condition of work: the forty hour week, rest periods, 
annual leave, a ban on systematic overtime and penalty rates for Sunday 
work. Institutional change was also sought. Proposals designed to accelerate 
the work of the Queensland Industrial Court were popular as were suggestions 
aimed a t strengthening the influence of the trade unions. Restrictions on 
employers in the interests of job security together with equal pay were also 
advocated. The Depression years and the period of war were the gestation 
period for these claims. The circumstances of these times had, however, 
prevented their realisation. Now, in the closing months of 1945, many seemed 
within Labour's grasp. They were nothing more than instalments of the new 
order which had been promised so often during the war. 
This wartime promise was a political and industrial reality of 
considerable significance in the early postwar years. It originated in the fears 
of Australia's wartime leadership that civilian support for the war was 
lagging. In order to secure greater community identification with the war 
effort '..., commitments to a bet ter world after the war, became a feature of 
Q 
official propaganda'. The initiative in defining the shape of a bet ter society 
did not, however, rest exclusively with the propagandists. Nor was the federal 
A.L.P. government of John Curtin motivated entirely by considerations of 
wartime morale when it held out the hope of a postwar Australia marked by 
social reform, economic justice and greater ega l i t a r ian i sm.^ Whatever their 
propaganda value, the government saw these goals as important ends in 
themselves and was prepared to take positive steps to achieve them. 
Other strands of labour opinion also offered visions of the postwar 
new order. Security of employment was a high priority. Some placed their 
9. Ibid., p.23. 
10. Ibid., pp.24,30. 
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faith in Keynesian economics to correct the tendency of a capitalist market 
economy to stabilise at levels well below full employment. Others sought a 
reduction in the capitalists ' rights to hire and fire. The war years saw a 
revival of interest in parts of the labour movement in extending the 
managerial powers of Labour. In certain quarters, Fabian ideas on worker 
control proved popular while in some industries wartime conditions had proven 
favourable to the efforts of those who were traditionally concerned to 
I 9 
challenge managerial prerogatives. For some in the labour movement the 
new order meant restructuring Australian society in accordance with the 
principles of democratic Socialism. There were others who saw the new order 
in terms of Marxian prescriptions for the just society. The various models of 
postwar Australian society debated within the labour movement thus ranged 
from a classless, socialist society to one which accepted the basic structure of 
Capitalism yet insisted on a greater measure of social and economic justice. 
In the later war years, conditions in the labour market seemed to be 
moving in favour of Labour. A combination of factors, however, prevented 
workers from exploiting their enhanced bargaining strength to the full. In the 
interests of wartime production, union leaders, particularly those who 
belonged to the Communist party, strove to prevent strikes and other forms of 
direct industrial action. The A.L.P. government of John Curtin used the 
National Security (Economic Organisation) Regulations to contain wage rises 
and to stabilise prices especially those which formed the basis of cost of living 
adjustments to wage rates . 
The federal government in 1943 committed itself to the maintenance 
11. Editorial. Real Plan For National Unity Against Fascism 
Maryborough Trades and Labor Council, 22 September 1941; 
Editorial. What Do The Workers Want After The War Maryborough 
Trades and Labor Council, 20 February 1945; Conference of Unions, 
Ipswich Trades and Labour Council. Sub-committee on the war effort 
in Ipswich. Report 23 December 1941; Amalgamated Metals, Foundry 
and Shipwrights' Union (A.M.F.S.U.) files. Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
Eighteenth Queensland Labor-in-Politics Convention. Agenda 
(Brisbane: Worker Print, 1944), p. 10. 
12. The Queensland meat industry was a case in point. 
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of a full employment economy in peacetime. By May 1945, a blueprint for the 
I -J 
implementation of this policy had been developed. The government was 
well aware, however, of the inflationary possibilities in a full employment 
economy in which private consumption had been restrained for a period of 
years. The maintenance of wartime controls over wages and prices was thus 
seen as essential to prevent rampant inflation undermining the transition to a 
• •!• 14 
civilian economy.^^ 
The broad picture of the Australian economy in the reconstruction 
years was one of full employment of all resources; significant inflationary 
pressures; severe shortages of basic inputs such as coal, steel and pig-iron; 
and shortages of consumer goods, all set against a background of unsettled 
international economic cond i t ions .^ At the end of the Second World War, the 
immediate tasks confronting governments were the demobilisation of the 
armed services and the placement of ex-service personnel, together with 
people previously engaged in war industries, in civilian occupations. 
Demobilisation proceeded rapidly - between August 1945 and June 1946, some 
70 per cent of the services was discharged. There was an abundance of job 
opportunities as the process of rehabilitation and conversion of industry to 
peacetime purposes accelerated in response to heavy demands for producer 
and consumer goods in both the public and private sectors. 
Nature did not favour the early efforts at reconstruction. The 
drought, which had afflicted much of Australia during the war years, 
continued during 1945-46 frustrating hopes for significant increases in rural 
production. Things were not much bet ter in extract ive industry where 
difficulties in increasing coal output left export orders unfilled, and severely 
13. Full Employment in Australia (Canberra: Commonwealth Government 
Printer, 30 May 194 5). The development of the full employment 
policy is discussed in Coombs, Trial Balance, chapter 1. 
14. Full Employment in Australia p . l 8 . 
15. This analysis of the Australian economy is based on: Commonwealth 
Grants Commission. Report various issues (Melbourne, 
Commonwealth Government Printer). 
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hampered the production of basic steel and pig-iron. In the public sector, 
considerable expansion in outlays took place in the areas of housing, land 
set t lement and social services. 
By late 1946 it was abundantly clear that labour shortages would 
constitute a major obstacle to economic recovery and growth. Throughout the 
entire nation only 30,000 people were unemployed while vacancies stood a t 
some 70,000. Booming factory production in the industrial centres 
compounded the already great difficulties experienced by rural industry in 
a t t rac t ing labour. The short to medium term prospects for an improvement in 
the labour supply were not promising. A decline in the birthrate during the 
Depression years was reflected in a fall in the numbers in the 15-19 years age 
group, while young people were inclined to remain at school longer than in 
pre-war t imes. Under these circumstances, the federal government 
announced plans to increase the labour force by means of a large-scale 
immigration programme. In its early stages, however, this initiative, in 
common with international trade generally, was hindered by a serious shortage 
of shipping. 
The centrepiece of the Chifley government's reconstruction strategy 
was the economic controls developed during the war. Professor Crisp has 
explained the rationale underlying this policy of maintaining the regulatory 
structure: 
Consumer rationing in staple foodstuffs and other 
commodities like petrol, subsidies, price and rent 
control, wage-pegging, import licensing, control of 
exports, exchange and capital issues...were to be 
relaxed only when and insofar as general economic 
conditions allowed of relief without inflation and 
social injustice. 
In the case of the exclusive income taxation powers it had acquired from the 
s tates during the war, however, the government was determined to retain 
them as a permanent addition to the federal parliament's economic armoury. 
16. Crisp, Ben Chifley, p.301. 
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In 1946, the uniform taxation arrangements were given statutory expression. 
The economic controls also provided insurance against adverse 
developments in the internat ional arena. In the early postwar years, external 
constraints l imi ted the capacity of the Austral ian economy to respond to 
pent-up domestic demand. The rapid conclusion of American lend-lease 
arrangements shortly af ter the Japanese surrender precipi tated a world-wide 
dollar shortage, and a balance of payments crisis, which severely hampered 
the recovery of internat ional t rade. The slow revival of Brit ish manufactur ing 
industry f rustrated Austral ian desires for a rapid resumption of imports of 
machinery and other capital equipment v i ta l to an expansion of domestic 
industries. The dollar shortage and in f la t ion in the United States ruled out 
America as an al ternat ive source of capital goods, and, from mid-1947, 
imports from that country were subject to restr ict ions. Rising export prices 
for Austral ian products, and a part ial l i f t ing of the wage-pegging regulations 
in late 1946, also challenged the government's ef for ts to achieve non-
inf lat ionary growth in the Austral ian economy. During 1947, the need for 
decisive federal government direct ion of economic af fairs appeared even 
more urgent in the face of persistent, and seemingly well in formed, reports of 
possible recession in several countries, most notably in the United States of 
Amer ica. Such speculation reinforced the fears of many Australians that , 
regardless of any world-wide developments, the domestic postwar boom would 
prove to be short- l ived, and that a return to the conditions of the 1930s was a 
dist inct possibil i ty. 
Internat ional trading d i f f icu l t ies eased somewhat in 1948 although 
dollars were st i l l at a premium. American spending on European recovery 
st imulated world demand for food, f ibre and fue l . Owing to bouyant export 
prices, rural incomes in Austral ia were in excellent condit ion, although 
problems in obtaining labour and materials were st i l l severe. By mid-1948, 
the economy was operating at the l imi ts of i ts capacity. Inf lat ionary 
pressures were rising. Apart f rom an improvement in the terms of t rade, 
record levels were achieved in employment, government and private recurrent 
and capi tal expenditure, and foreign investment. The rapid expansion of 
secondary industry placed enormous demands on available supplies of fuel and 
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power, and exacerbated the already critical shortages of resources available 
for primary production. Industries producing materials vital for construction, 
and for maintenance work deferred during the war, were finding it especially 
difficult to a t t r ac t labour. The government's response was to offer assisted 
passages to European migrants on the condition that they work where directed 
for a period of two years after their arrival. Great faith was placed in the 
capacity of this scheme to allievate the acute shortages of labour in general, 
and particularly in the timber, coal and steel industries. 
High levels of export income, wage increases and a vigorous expansion 
in public and private investment aggravated inflationary tendencies during 
1948-49. Index numbers showing the movements during the period in both 
internal and external prices, as well as in wage rates, are presented in the 
following table. 
AUSTRALIA: SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
19/^6-47 to 1951-52 
(1946-47 = 100) 
19^^6-47 1947-48 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 
Wholesale price index 
Retail price index 
Export price index 
Male wage index 
100 
100 
100 
100 
111 
106 
139 
110 
127 
117 
164 
123 
144 
128 
189 
134 
172 
146 
322 
161 
210 
179 
233 
197 
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission. Report 
various issues, (Melbourne: Commonwealth 
Government Printer). 
Although the availability of consumer goods was improving, due in no small 
degree to rising imports, ext reme difficulties continued to be experienced in 
increasing the supply of coal, steel, building materials , houses and power to 
appropriate levels. Expectations in early 1949 that a slow-down in export 
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earnings would ease inflation were dashed some few months later when, 
following Britain, the Australian pound was devalued relative to the American 
currency. The devaluation, as well as stimulating the export sector, 
contributed directly to a rise in the domestic inflation ra te . 
In the second half of 1949, some advances were made in the 
production of coal, pig-iron, steel and building materials . This, however, did 
li t t le to stem the inflationary tide. The social and economic needs of 
immigrants added to the pressure on resources. By 1950, the task of postwar 
rehabilitation was far from complete, and with governments and private 
entrepreneurs anxious to maintain a high rate of investment, serious shortages 
of labour, capital equipment and basic materials continued unabated. The 
impact of the September 1949 devaluation on the domestic price level had 
been anticipated by government advisors. What they could not predict, and 
what rendered their calculations wildly inaccurate, was the outbreak of the 
Korean War in June 1950. The sudden increase in the demand for strategic 
materials produced a rapid rise in world prices which soon forced up inflation 
rates in a number of countries including Australia. Between June 1949 and 
December 1950, wholesale prices in Australia rose by more than 25 per cent . 
Inflation continued to pose a major challenge to economic policy in 
1951 and 1952. This inflation, unlike the experience of the 1945-50 period, 
was accompanied by a weakening in several segments of the labour market 
and a reduction in the rate of economic growth. Increases in domestic 
production and imports of manufactured goods enhanced the availability of 
consumer goods, but supply problems persisted in the areas of building 
materials , coal, pig-iron and steel. The federal government sought to break 
the inflationary spiral in the 1951 budget. Taxation was increased and the 
government budgeted for a large surplus. Monetary policy was also brought 
into play by means of credit restrictions and a re-introduction of controls over 
capital issues. Interest rates on commonwealth and semi-governmental loans 
were raised. The Loan Council agreed to tight restrictions on new borrowings 
for s tate public works and, in the face of a continued weakening in the 
balance of payments, the government was ultimately forced to introduce 
import control measures. These fiscal, monetary and stabilisation policies 
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assisted in reducing the pressure cooker atmosphere in the economy. The 
slowdown in state developmental expenditure meant that more labour was 
available for employment in the iron and steel industry which also benefited 
from significant increases in coal production. Export prices for several 
commodities, particularly wool, exhibited little of the wild fluctuations 
experienced during the Korean War boom. Towards the end of 1952, 
substantial improvement occurred in the balance of payments, and in external 
reserves, while a number of Australia's trading partners, principally Britain, 
seemed to be having some success in reducing inflation. There were, 
therefore, grounds for cautious optimism that inflation in Australia could soon 
be brought under control. 
The postwar reconstruction plans of the Chifley government implied 
that the trade unions accept a policy of wage restraint as an essential 
component of its efforts to tackle inflation directly by means of price 
control. The development of an economic strategy which required a virtual 
wage freeze took place despite decisions taken at the 1943 A.L.P. Federal 
Conference to the effect that within the first six months of peace, a forty 
hour week would be introduced by legislation, the wage-pegging regulations 
would be repealed, and the basic wage would be increased. These 
commitments were simply ignored by the federal government in the early 
reconstruction years, and union efforts to force their implementation were 
actively resisted. Chifley and his ministers claimed lack of constitutional 
power on the wages and hours issues, even though some respectable legal 
opinion thought the mat ter far from settled. Tom Sheridan has argued that 
Chifley also 
...sought to divert the unions' energies into the 
arbitration system. There, the ponderous pace of 
decision-making adopted in the face of labour's 
new-found bargaining strength was even further 
slowed by the Serbonian bog of legalism which 
17. Tom Sheridan, 'Australian Trade Unions And Postwar 
Reconstruction'. This paper was read at a Postwar Reconstruction 
Seminar held at the Australian National University in 1981. pp.11, 
15,16. 
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centred around the question of the arbitration 
system's jurisdiction in the face of the 
government's intrusive network of economic 
'Regulations'....^^ 
Sheridan concludes that , although the unions ultimately succeeded by 
means of various power and transport strikes, as well as the 1946-47 Victorian 
Metal Trades Dispute, in having the wage-pegging regulations severely 
modified, gains in this and in other areas of immediate interest to working 
people in the first few years of peace were 'dearly bought'. It is against the 
background of widespread union anger at arbitration system delays; 
resentment at the wage-pegging regulations; puzzlement at the apparent 
resistance of A.L.P. governments to workers obtaining their fair share of the 
rewards of victory; and growing disillusionment at the slow pace of the new 
order's arrival, that major industrial disputation occurred in Queensland in 
1948. This massive conflict had its origins in a campaign begun in June 1947 
by several unions with members employed in the railway workshops in 
Queensland to obtain a flow-on of the wage increases won in the Victorian 
Metal Trades Dispute. This campaign culminated in the 1948 Queensland 
Railway Dispute, a dispute whose character was, to an important degree, an 
expression of contemporary international and domestic economic, social and 
political changes. 
The industrial relations atmosphere in the early postwar years was, to 
say the least, combustible. Broadly speaking, between 1945 and 1947, nearly 
I q 
5.5 million working days were lost in 2,796 disputes throughout Australia. '^  
Tom Sheridan describes the picture as one '...of an aggressive work force 
launching its industrial offensive in the general context of public 
sympathy'. Professor Crisp points out that elevated levels of industrial 
18. Ibid., p. 18. 
19. A detailed statistical analysis of industrial disputes is provided in 
Appendix 1. 
20. Tom Sheridan, 'Labour V. Labor: The Victorian Metal Trades Dispute 
of 1946-47,' in Strikes. Studies in Twentieth Century Australian 
Social History, pp.180,181. 
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disputation were a feature of capitalist economies in general during periods of 
recovery after major wars, and that the position in Australia after World War 
II was somewhat less spectacular than in certain other countries. Both Crisp 
and Sheridan provide further perspective with their arguments that the 
industrial unrest of the post World War I years was significantly greater than 
for the corresponding period after World War II. It was nevertheless the 
case that industrial disputes in Australia were at historically high levels 
between 1945 and 1949, and that governments, both state and national, saw 
them posing a dire threat to the process of economic recovery and 
development in the reconstruction years. 
There was, however, little consensus between the two levels of 
government on the means appropriate to containing industrial disputes. 
Chifley was greatly concerned by strikes, as well as heavy labour turnover and 
absenteeism, but the provisions of the federal constitution severely limited his 
options. It was partly for reasons to do with this inability to control various 
manifestations of industrial conflict that the A.L.P. federal government 
decided in 1946 to conduct a referendum designed to give the national 
parliament constitutional power over terms and conditions of employment. 
This proposal, however, offended some very tender sensibilities in certain 
state governments, nowhere more so than in the A.L.P. government in 
Queensland under the leadership of E.M. Hanlon. Such a prickly response 
needs to be understood within the context of a steady expansion of central 
government powers over economic and social life which was a feature of the 
federal experience in Australia. This trend was opposite to that desired, and 
expected, by the framers of the constitution in the 1890s. In its written form, 
the constitution seemed to preserve states' rights; in practice, however, it 
appeared that a progressive erosion of these rights threatened to reduce the 
states to mere vassals of the central authorities. 
The states had been deeply angered by the revolution in public finance 
which occurred in 1942. As part of its wartime fiscal measures, the A.L.P. 
government under John Curtin passed legislation excluding them from the 
21. Crisp, Ben Chifley, pp.344,345. Sheridan,'Labour V. Labor,'p. 181. 
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field of income taxation. Although they challenged the constitutional validity 
of the legislation, the High Court decided that it was consistent with the 
general taxation powers available to the national parliament under the 
constitution. As already noted, the Chifley government decided in 1946 to 
make uniform taxation a permanent feature of the fiscal landscape.^^ 
By late 1946, then, the defenders of s tates ' rights, especially in the 
smaller s ta tes , were in no mood to support a major extension of federal 
powers in the industrial relations area. The '...chronic nervousness on the part 
of the States concerning Commonwealth aggression and dictation... ' , which 
Professor Partridge saw was '...one of the permanent ingredients of federalism 
in Australia;...' -^ had been aroused by the debate over uniform taxation, and 
was certainly at least partly responsible for the defeat of the referendum 
proposals which sought greater industrial powers for the commonwealth. It 
would not be an exaggeration to say that , in the light of the uniform taxation 
experience, postwar A.L.P. governments in Queensland re-dedicated 
themselves to the preservation of s tates ' rights. This had profound 
implications for commonwealth-state relations in general in the 
reconstruction years, and in particular for the Chifley government's efforts 
between 1947 and 1949 to alter the pattern of industrial relations regulation 
in the economically vital Australian coal industry.^^ 
With his a t tempts to expand federal powers over industrial relations 
thwarted, Chifley looked to institutional innovation as the means of 
containing the postwar strike wave. The Conciliation and Arbitration Act was 
amended in 1947 to establish a body of conciliation and arbitration 
commissioners to handle the dispute set t lement process, and whose award 
determinations were not subject to appeal. Each commissioner was given 
exclusive jurisdiction over certain awards or industries. The powers of the 
judges of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration were 
22. Partridge, 'Depression And War,' pp.38l-387. 
23. Ibid., p.382. 
24. See Chapter 12. 
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limited to deciding mat ters of major economic and social significance such as 
the basic wage, standard hours, female minimum wages and paid leave. 
Chifley hoped that these amendments, by simplifying and reducing the formal 
and legalistic elements in the conciliation and arbitration system, would usher 
in a period of reduced industrial t e n s i o n s . ^ 
One of the first and most important decisions made under these new 
arrangements concerned increases in marginal rates of pay in the Federal 
Metal Trades Award. Chief Conciliation Commissioner G.A. Mooney, in the 
closing months of 1947, restored margins in this major award to historic 
levels. Tom Sheridan remarks that 'For the metal unions as a whole the 1947 
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award's wage relativities were always to remain the ideal... ' . In seeking to 
extend these gains to metal workers in the Queensland public sector, however, 
the unions soon found themselves embroiled in a bitter dispute with the 
Hanlon Labor government. It came to pass that this dispute was one of the 
largest and one of the most violent in Queensland industrial relations history. 
It was a dispute, moreover, that assumed both a short and longer term 
77 
significance far beyond what could have been imagined at the end of 1947. 
The 1946 referendum was held in conjunction with the first peace-
time federal elections. R.G. Menzies, for the Liberal party, sought to 
persuade the e lectorate to accept an industrial relations policy which made 
strikes and lock-outs illegal; required federal union officials to be elected in 
ballots supervised by the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration; and which promised penalties for those who breached the 
industrial law. Menzies argued that the A.L.P. federal government had failed 
to prevent industrial disputation, and, although the Chifley government won a 
comfortable victory at the polls, it was apparent that industrial relations 
issues, particularly the mat te r of strikes, had returned to a prominent place 
25. Crisp, Ben Chifley, pp.347,348; Hagan, The History of the A.C.T.U., 
p.218. 
26* Sheridan, 'Labour V. Labor,' p.223. 
27. See Chapters 9, 10 and 11. 
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on the national political agenda. It was obvious that the anti-Labor parties 
intended to blame the A.L.P. for the inconvenience and loss associated with 
strikes at every opportunity. It was, furthermore, equally obvious, given the 
Country party's call for legislation banning the Australian Communist Party, 
that this assault was to be reinforced by persistent claims that the postwar 
strike wave was inspired and directed by 'communist agitators ' against whom 
the Labor party was unwilling to ac t . 
Despite this, however, in the immediate period after the elections it 
seemed that the Chifley government would enjoy a relatively favourable 
political climate in the foreseeable future. There was, nevertheless, concern 
in Queensland A.L.P. circles at aspects of the election result. The party had 
failed to win a majority vote in the Senate elections in Queensland, indeed a 
swing against the A.L.P. had seen its Senate vote drop to 42.6 per cent, while 
in the elections for the House of Representatives, a senior federal minister 
28 from Queensland, F.M. Forde, had lost his seat . 
A dramatic change in national politics was triggered by events which 
occurred in 1947. On 16 August, Chifley announced that the government had 
79 decided to nationalise the private banks. The response to this radical move 
was immediate; the opposition was sustained and intense. Russel Ward 
described the reaction in the following terms: 
As people realised that the incredible was 
happening, that an Australian Labor Government 
was actually taking a large step towards the 
implementation of its professed socialist policy, 
the numbness gave way to jubilation in the minds of 
some citizens and to hysteria in the minds of 
others.^^ 
28. Ward, A Nation For A Continent, pp.276,278,279. 
29. The bank nationalisation issue has been discussed by many scholars. 
For a representative sample, see: Crisp, Ben Chifley, pp.182,251,325-
340,373; Hagan, The History of the A.C.T.U., p.74; Ward, A Nation 
For A Continent, pp.292-295. 
30. Ward, A Nation For A Continent, p.293. 
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For the next two years, the Labor party in Australia was under siege. 
The banks and their political and business allies, especially in the media, 
launched a massive counterat tack against the Chifley government in 
particular and the A.L.P. in general. Protest meetings and petitions were 
organised; a constant barrage of media propaganda was maintained; and bank 
employees walked the s t reets , and accosted customers during the course of 
business, canvassing support for the offensive against the government. 'Many 
swinging voters were effectively frightened into believing that Chifley,...and 
the whole Federal Government were dupes or allies of Communism'. 
The medical profession was no less hostile to the A.L.P. than were the 
financiers. The doctors historically has resisted efforts by governments of 
whatever political persuasion to construct any semblance of a national health 
scheme in Australia, and in 1944 they returned to the barricades to oppose the 
provisions of the Curtin government's Pharmaceutical Benefits Act. They 
succeeded in having the act declared ultra vires the constitution by the High 
Court. Efforts by Chifley between 1947 and 1949 to build a health scheme on 
the basis of the 1946 social service amendment to the constitution suffered 
the same fate.-^^ By the end of 1947, the federal A.L.P. government thus had 
several of the most powerful institutions and interest groups in the country -
the banks, the medical profession, the media, various community and service 
organisations, and much of the business community - ranged against it . 
Professor Crisp has argued that the a t tempt to nationalise the banks 
greatly assisted the mobilisation and consolidation of the forces opposed to 
the Chifley government. The Liberal and Country parties were deluged with 
funds. Powerful supporters rallied to their cause. Throughout Australia, the 
morale and spirits of the opposition parties recovered quickly after the 
electoral defeat in 1946 as the rapidly changing federal political scene saw 
31. Ibid. 
32. Crisp, Ben Chifley, pp.315-318; Ward A Nation For A Continent, 
pp.269,292. 
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the A.L.P. being forced more and more on the defensive. Labor party 
governments and organisations at the state level, moreover, were clearly not 
spared the ferocious and constant a t tack which was directed in the first 
instance at their national counterparts . Any explanation of the Hanlon 
government's efforts to suppress the 1948 Queensland Railway Dispute, for 
example, needs to take account of these volatile and threatening 
circumstances. 
The Chifley Labor government was resoundingly defeated in the 
federal elections of 1949. Connell and Irving argue that Menzies was able to 
build the bank nationalisation issue '...into a general campaign against 
rationing and government controls as a foretaste of socialist dictatorship; and 
the Labor cabinet went down to defeat. . . , hardly knowing what had hit it ' . 
Crisp, too, acknowledges Menzies' skill in crafting a political message which 
equated Communism with Socialism and Socialism with the A.L.P. In the 
context of Cold War images of a monolithic, imperialistic Communism, 
buttressed by the victory of the communist forces in China and by the high 
profile activit ies of members of the Communist party in the 1949 Coal Strike, 
this message made a powerful appeal to the hearts and minds of many 
Australian voters. 
The new Liberal-Country party government wasted little time 
implementing its campaign promise to ban the Australian Communist Party. 
In April 1950, the Communist Party Dissolution Bill was introduced into the 
national parliament. This legislation became the focal point of Australian 
political debate for the next two years. The A.L.P., a t both the national and 
s tate levels, was bitterly divided over whether it should use its senate 
majority to delay the passage of the bill. In October 1950, the federal 
executive of the party instructed the parliamentary party to pass the bill. 
Given the overwhelming degree of anti-communist opinion within the 
33. Crisp, Ben Chifley, p.340. 
34. Connell and Irving, Class Structure, p.291. 
35. Crisp, Ben Chifley, pp.370,374. 
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Queensland branch of the Labor party, it comes as no surprise that delegates 
to the executive from the northern s tate were enthusiastic advocates of this 
line of action. 
With the support of several trade unions, the Communist party 
challenged the constitutional validity of the Communist Party Dissolution Act 
in the High Court. In March 1951 the court, by a six to one majority, declared 
the act unconstitutional. The government then sought and was granted a 
double dissolution of the federal parliament and, in the ensuing elections, it 
secured control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. A bill 
granting approval for a constitutional referendum seeking power to legislate 
in respect of the Communist party was passed, but in September 1951, by the 
narrowest of margins, the e lectorate declined to alter the constitution. It is 
significant, however, that in Queensland a healthy majority of voters endorsed 
the proposal. Within this environment of an anti-communist public opinion, 
the continuing Cold War (and its somewhat warmer expression in Korea), and 
widespread pressures for political conformity which accompanied the national 
turmoil over the proposal to outlaw the Communist party, the A.L.P. 
industrial groups in Queensland, with their avowed anti-communist mission, 
were able to prosper. The pinnacle of the groups' success and influence was 
•3/T 
reached in the charged atmosphere of the early 1950s. 
With the change of government in 1949, private employers in 
Australia breathed a collective sigh of relief. Broadly speaking, they believed 
that the Chifley government was determined to implement a socialist 
economic and welfare programme. Crisp described the tangible basis of 
employer concern: 
In the years from 1944 to 1949 [Chifley] ...was the 
prime mover (or one of the prime movers) in the 
re-establishment...of a Commonwealth Shipping 
Line, the establishment of a Stevedoring Industry 
Board..., the founding of a public aluminium ingot 
industry, the constitution of a public whaling 
industry and the provision for a public monopoly of 
36. See Chapter 12. 
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atomic energy raw materials . His Government 
legislated for nationalised television..., joint 
Commonwealth-State governmental supervision of 
the N.S.W. coal industry..., the launching as a 
national enterprise of the Snowy Mountains Hydro-
Electric Scheme, and the compulsory 
acquisition...of the private overseas 
telecommunications services.. . . It also enacted the 
nationalisation of internal and Australian-owned 
sections of overseas airlines, and...the private 
banks.^ ' 
These initiatives, together with new order sentiment, a relatively strong 
Communist party and an industrially aggressive workforce, meant that 
employers were on the ideological back foot in the early postwar years. 
During the reconstruction period, however, employer ideologists 
constantly argued that the most effective way of achieving a bet ter material 
standard of living was through a capitalist market economy. A system of 
private enterprise was '...indispensible in the provision of a bet ter material 
•30 
and social life for the community...'.-^^ Employers linked their interests to 
the aspirations of working men and women for security and material 
improvements. Private enterprise institutions were advanced as necessary 
conditions for wealth and prosperity. There was a number of sufficient 
conditions as well, many of which had to do with industrial relations 
desiderata. 
The key element in the industrial relations policy advocated by 
employers was the concept of a harmony of interests in industry. 
37. Crisp, Ben Chifley, p.251. 
38. Looking Forward. A Post-War Policy for Australian Industry 
(Melbourne: Institute of Public Affairs, Victoria, 1944), p. 13. The 
Institute of Public Affairs (I.P.A.), which had branches in most of the 
s ta tes , was an employer research and propaganda organisation. The 
importance of this document is stressed by R.W. Connell and T.H. 
Irving. It ' . ..formulated a new political position for business,... ' 
Connell and Irving, Class Structure, p.334. 
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Little advancement will be possible unless both 
employers and employees, and especially the 
leaders of industry and labour, give practical 
recognition to the truth that industry, in all its 
aspects, is fundamentally a partnership; that , as 
partners, both sections stand to benefit from hard 
work and efficient practices which lead to 
increased production.^° 
There were, however, s tr ict limitations on what was meant by such a 
partnership. Labour was not to be a partner with Capital when it came to 
making managerial decisions. Such decision-making was to remain the 
exclusive preserve of the employers. The partnership model contained other 
dimensions. Employees ought to exhibit trust and confidence in their 
employers. They should respect 'worthy leadership'. There ought to be no 
class antagonism or warfare nor should Labour initiate any form of industrial 
conflict.'*^ 
Employer industrial relations policy stressed means by which greater 
efficiency could be achieved. Emphasis was placed on consultative councils, 
factory commit tees and house magazines through which employees could 
understand 'better ' the motives and purposes of their employers. This was a 
classic example of the human relations school of industrial psychology in 
action: 'bet ter ' communication with employees was seen as leading to 'better ' 
understanding of (and sympathy with) the goals of employers which, in turn, 
produced 'improved' industrial relations.^^ Incentive payments were essential 
in enhancing efficiency. So were profit-sharing schemes which were credited 
with the additional virtue of increasing the commitment of workers to the 
values of a capitalist society. Efficiency also depended on the conditions of 
work, housing, health, security, opportunities for promotion and education. 
Increased annual leave, reduced hours of work, improved working conditions, 
the provision of sporting facilities, educating workers in the principles of good 
39. Looking Forward p.57. 
W. Ibid., pp.57,63,72. 
41 . Ibid., pp.59,60. 
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nutrition, special assistance for housing, company welfare and superannuation 
schemes, assistance for vocational training and promotion according to merit 
were all advocated to the extent they contributed to greater efficiency.^ 
Employers believed that the trade unions ought to abandon traditional 
practices designed to protect their members against fluctuations in 
employment, great disparities in the distribution of income, long hours and 
unhealthy working conditions. The interwar period, according to the 
employers, had seen a progressive amelioration of these injustices, and with 
the dedication of government to full employment and the universal 
recognition that working conditions ought to be readjusted in the interests of 
physical health, the need for such practices was fast diminishing. Unions also 
needed to recognise a wider social responsibility. They ought to sacrifice 
policies such as the setting of maximum production times and the 
specification of conditions to be observed in the performance of certain 
tasks. They should give up their insistence on craft and trade demarcations. 
All of these 'restrictive practices ' acted as a brake on efficiency and 
therefore limited production to the detriment of the whole community. -^  
Compulsory unionism was rejected by employers as a violation of the 
principle of freedom of association. They nevertheless accepted the principle 
that industrial disputes ought to be settled by a process of compulsory 
arbitration while a t the same time regrett ing '...its tendency to create a spirit 
of division and opposition between the two main partners in industry'. One 
major advantage of the arbitration system was its contribution to 'control in 
industry' which resulted in a measure of 'industrial justice and peace'. 
Industrial justice, however, did not mean the application of the principle of 
equal pay for women. This would pose a threat to 'the institution of the 
family', the maintenance of which was, above all else, vital to the future of 
Australia. Employers thus had a vision of Australian society in the postwar 
42. Ibid., pp.55,56,60-63. 
43. Ibid., pp.51,52. 
44. Ibid., pp.52,53. 
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period. It was a vision, however, which many in the labour movement did not 
share. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE QUEENSLAND SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL CONTEXT, 1890 TO THE EARLY 19*0s 
44 
As well as international and national influences, local issues and 
traditions defined the context of industrial relations in Queensland in the 
reconstruction years. The nature of, and relationships between, the 
organisations of political and industrial labour were particularly important. 
These bodies included the Parliamentary Labor Party (P.L.P.), the Queensland 
Central Executive of the A.L.P. (Q.C.E.), the Executive Committee of the 
Q.C.E. (often known as the inner executive), the Australian Workers' Union, 
other trade unions (some of which were affiliated to the A.L.P.), the Trades 
and Labour Council, and the Australian Communist Party.^ Of prime 
significance also were the time-honoured approach of Queensland Labor 
governments towards matters of industrial peace and conflict, the pattern of 
economic change and development, and the rural orientation and values of 
2 
much of the population. 
During the 1880s the halting, sporadic and uncertain development of 
trade unionism in Queensland of the previous thirty years was replaced by a 
greater purpose and direction. Several craft unions had been established by 
the mid-1880s, and they achieved a degree of closer unity with the formation 
of the Brisbane Trades and Labour Council in 1885. The impulse to organise 
industrially, however, was stronger in the rural workforce. Miners, shearers 
1. The Q.C.E. was the administrative wing of the A.L.P. The supreme 
rule and policy-making body was the Labor-in-Politics Convention 
held every three years. For virtually the whole of the period during 
which research for this thesis was being conducted, the records of the 
A.W.U. were closed. It was only possible to examine some very brief 
and sketchy Executive Minutes. The precise detail of the A.W.U. 
impact on industrial relations and politics in Queensland, therefore, 
cannot be examined. 
2, The following discussion of the early development of the labour 
movement in Queensland is based on: 
W. Ross Johnston, The Call Of The Land (Brisbane: The 
Jacaranda Press, 1982), chapter 8; D.J. Murphy, 'Trade 
Unions,' R.J. and R.A. Sullivan, 'The London Dock Strike, the 
Jondaryan Strike and the Brisbane Bootmakers' Strike, 1889-
1890,' R.J. Sullivan, 'The Maritime Strike, 1890,' R.J. and 
R.A. Sullivan, 'The Pastoral Strikes, 1891 and 1894,' in The 
Big Strikes. Queensland 1889-1965, ed. D.J. Murphy (St. 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983), pp. 33-99. 
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and pastoral workers generally were receptive to new ideas concerning the 
position of Labour in a capitalist society, while their economic experiences as 
the boom of the 1880s lost momentum further nourished the spirit of 
unionism. 
Growing dissatisfaction with the apparent ineffectiveness of the 
Brisbane Trades and Labour Council came to a head in 1889 when the council 
proved unable to mobilise support for printers in Brisbane who were striking 
against the employment of non-union labour. The council was dissolved and 
reconstituted as the Australian Labour Federation. It was hoped that this new 
body would help overcome regional and other barriers to cooperation and 
coordination, but it soon became obvious that the rural workers' unions were 
unwilling to cede much of their autonomy to a city-based, 'federal' 
organisation. The bush-city rivalry, so characterist ic of the Queensland 
labour movement in subsequent years, was present in large measure at the 
very beginnings. An additional element, which could only exacerbate the 
potential for division, was also present. The city-based unions were relatively 
small and often craft oriented. The bush unions, on the other hand, were large 
conglomerations of unskilled and semi-skilled working men and women. Their 
membership was widely dispersed over the length and breadth of a sparsely 
settled and far flung primary producing s ta te . Considerations of size, skill 
and geography were thus of singular significance in defining the nature of 
trade unionism in Queensland. 
In the area of policy, the Australian Labour Federation placed high 
priority on the preservation of the eight-hour day, winning seats in parliament 
and obtaining 'fair and reasonable' wages and working conditions. In the 1890s 
the federation was engaged in several industrial struggles with employers over 
principles the most important of which was the closed union shop. Early 
victories, such as occurred in the Jondaryan Dispute, gave especially the bush 
•3 
unionists '...a dangerously inflated notion of their industrial strength'.-^ This 
did not last for long. According to R.J. Sullivan, a rude awakening occurred in 
3. R.J . and R.H. Sullivan, 'The London Dock Strike, the Jondaryan Strike 
and the Brisbane Bootmakers' Strike, 1889-1890,' p.59. 
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the wake of defeat in the Maritime Strike of 1890: 
An era of optimism among labour leaders in 
Queensland was ended by the strike. Until this 
struggle there had been great confidence in the 
strength of the unions and their capacity to 
accomplish a re-ordering of society. The 
strike...taught labour officials to think more 
closely about means and less idealistically about 
ends. For many, a stronger political organisation 
seemed to offer a solution. 
Major reverses in the labour movement's fortunes attended further 
humiliating losses in the great pastoral strikes of 1891 and 1894. The 
Maritime Strike had weakened the structure of unionism, and the pastoral 
disputes seemed to seal its fate. Between 1891 and 1895, the numbers of 
trade unions, their membership and their finances declined alarmingly. An 
important consequence of the disputes of the 1890s, with significant longer 
term implications for the nature of the broad labour movement in Queensland, 
was the reinforcement of 'a pragmatic gradualism' in the approach of many 
political and industrial labour leaders: 'The experience of the strikes 
confirmed their faith in political rather than direct action, in arbitration and 
conciliation rather than the strike'.-^ 
The 1890s saw the emergence in Queensland of what ultimately 
became known as the Australian Labor Party. Ross Johnston argues that it 
was not simply a union-based party, rather it drew into coalition with Labour 
a wider range of interests represented by previously independent political 
organisations such as the People's Parliamentary League.° Partly for this 
reason, the Labor party rejected the concept of class as the basis of political 
mobilisation. The 'party for all the people' rallying cry was a feature of its 
rhetoric and philosophy throughout its four decades of government in 
4, R.J. Sullivan, 'The Maritime Strike, 1890,' p.77. 
% R.J. Sullivan and R.A. Sullivan, 'The Pastoral Strikes, 1891 and 1894,' 
pp. 97,98. 
6. Johnston, The Call Of The Land, p.l 19. 
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Queensland. 
A potential for serious dissention between political and industrial 
labour in Queensland was also apparent in the 1890s. Each group sought to 
dominate the other in a battle for power within the labour movement. 
Throughout the decade, Labor politicians '...had taken a stand increasingly 
independent from the organised union movement and in particular from the 
Australian Labour Federation'.' This tension between the political and 
industrial wings of the labour movement (to say nothing about the internal 
fissaparious tendencies which threatened union solidarity) continued to be of 
major significance for the dynamics of industrial relations in Queensland in 
subsequent decades. 
Between 1891 and 1915, certain important changes occurred in the 
structure of Queensland unionism. In December 1891, two of the major 'bush' 
unions, The Queensland Shearers' Union and The Queensland Labourers' Union 
combined to form The Amalgamated Workers' Union. Fourteen years later. 
The Amalgamated Workers' Union joined with the pastoral union in the 
southern states, The Australian Workers' Union, to become the Queensland 
branch of the A.W.U. Miners in north Queensland established The 
Amalgamated Workers' Association in 1907. Its membership expanded rapidly 
to include a wide variety of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and in 1913 it 
merged with the A.W.U. Significant developments in union organisation also 
occurred in Brisbane. A Trades and Labour Council was re-established in 1904 
but disbanded in 1910 to become the Metropolitan District Council of the 
Australian Labour Federation. The Australian Labour Federation, however, 
subsequently collapsed owing to its ineffectiveness in the 1912 Tramway and 
General Strike. In 1914 unions associated with the Trades Hall set up the 
Brisbane Industrial Council. Murphy observed that 'Queensland now had two, 
sometimes competing, centres of union power:...'. 
7* Ibid., p.l20. 
I* Murphy, 'Trade Unions,' p.37. 
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Although in the formative years of the 'bush' unions their leaders had 
not eschewed direct industrial action, by the end of the first decade of the 
twentieth century their overwhelming concern was to pursue rank and file 
interests through the methods of parliamentary politics. John Armstrong has 
argued that men such as E.G. Theodore and William McCormack, both future 
premiers of Queensland, worked tirelessly to effect '...the organisation of 
workers into unions for the deliberate purpose of gaining their support for the 
Q 
Parliamentary Labor Party...'.'^ The revival of unionism in Queensland began 
with the formation of The Amalgamated Workers' Association. By 1915 union 
membership was three times what it had been in 1911. One of the prizes 
union leaders hoped to win from the political process was legislation 
establishing a system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration. The defeat 
of the Tramway and General Strike of 1912 so soon after a morale-boosting 
victory in the 1911 Sugar Strike reaffirmed the faith of many union leaders in 
the virtues of an arbitration system, and 'By 1916, most union officials 
supported the thesis that conciliation and arbitration could replace 
confrontation and strikes'.^^ 
In May 1915, the A.L.P. led by T.J. Ryan won a majority of the seats 
in the Queensland Legislative Assembly. The labour movement, for the first 
time, had effective access to the legislative process, and little time was lost 
in passing an Industrial Arbitration Act which enshrined the industrial 
relations principles many unionists had embraced since at least the 1880s. 
The A.W.U. was in the vanguard of support for this legislation. One of its 
founders and senior officers, E.G. Theodore, who had entered parliament in 
1909, held the labour relations portfolio in the Ryan government. It was 
Theodore who piloted the Industrial Arbitration Act through the Legislative 
Assembly. The Act provided for an industrial court and industrial magistrates 
as the principal institutions in an arbitration system which its supporters 
hoped would eliminate the rude conflict between Capital and Labour in favour 
9. Armstrong, 'The Sugar Strike, 1911,' p.lOO. 
10* Murphy, 'Trade Unions,' pp.38,39. 
11. See the Introduction for the general objectives of the Act. 
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of a permanent regime of industrial peace in Queensland. 
The establishment and practical success of an arbitration system were 
crucial to the industrial interests of the A.W.U. With a large, diverse, 
geographically widespread and usually unskilled membership, the A.W.U. was 
in no position to win its demands through direct industrial action. Defeats in 
several important strikes early in its history had convinced the A.W.U. that 
Capital, particularly when supported by the state, possessed vastly superior 
resources than Labour in any industrial confrontation. It was vital, therefore, 
for Labour to hold government in order both to deny employers access to state 
power in disputes, and to develop and maintain a means whereby disputes 
could be resolved in a way which did not depend on the relative power of the 
contending parties. 
The preferred model for the design of this counterweight to the 
resources of Capital was based on conciliation and arbitration concepts which 
had been influential in trade union thought for many years. The A.W.U. well 
understood, however, that unless it could be certain that the A.L.P. would 
maintain a permanent commitment to the arbitration ideal, and that unless 
the A.L.P. could enjoy a virtual guarantee of electoral success, all of its hopes 
for arbitration would come to naught. 
The first of these requirements meant that the A.W.U., and its allies 
in other unions of relatively powerless workers, control as far as possible the 
Labor party's policy-making, administrative and legislative machinery. The 
second meant the preservation of a coalition of interests which would 
constitute an impregnable electoral base. The coalition which the 
organisational, political and industrial wings of the A.L.P. strove so hard to 
nuture and preserve during the rise to power and years of Labor rule in 
Queensland was an alliance between urban workers, rural workers, small 
farmers and small businessmen. 
Historians of the labour movement in Queensland are generally agreed 
that the A.W.U. was able to exercise a considerable, probably a dominating, 
influence over the direction of A.L.P. policy at least until the end of Hanlon's 
so 
premiership. The A.W.U. drew its political strength from its size and the 
nature of its organisation. In a state which had a highly unionised 
workforce,^2 the A.W.U. was truly a Goliath in a sea of Davids. The 
A.W.U. was the only general union in Queensland. Its membership was 
occupationally diverse and worked throughout the length and breadth of the 
state. It enrolled miners, sugar workers, pastoral and other agricultural 
workers, bridge builders, road makers and transport workers to name but a 
few. The A.W.U. dominated unionism in primary industry^^ which provided 
over a quarter of the workforce in Queensland with its livelihood. When 
compared with the rest of Australia, people in Queensland lived and worked to 
a far greater extent in rural localities and in the provincial towns. The 
A.W.U. thus had a major presence and impact throughout Queensland. 
The size and organisation of the A.W.U. gave it wealth and an 
administrative structure of great importance to the A.L.P. The A.W.U. was a 
source of generous funds and other resources during election campaigns, it 
paid substantial affiliation fees to the A.L.P., and its officers and facilities 
often formed the Labor party's infrastructure in non-metropolitan areas. The 
domination by the A.W.U. of the rural and provincial branches of the A.L.P. 
allowed it a significant role in deciding who would represent the Labor party 
in parliament as well as the composition of the Labor-in-Politics Convention. 
The sheer size of the union also guaranteed it a powerful delegation in its own 
right at the convention. It was not surprising, therefore, that the A.L.P. in 
Queensland maintained a firm, some might even have called it fanatical, 
commitment to the principles of conciliation and arbitration. 
This is even less surprising when it is appreciated that the arbitration 
12. One of the major reasons for this was the practice of the Queensland 
Industrial Court of inserting preference clauses in its awards. 
13. See Table 1 and Table 2 in Appendix 2 for the position in the 
reconstruction years. 
14. Mining and quarrying are included in the definition of primary 
industry. 
15. See Table 3 and Table 4 in Appendix 2 for the position in 1947. 
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system also had a crucial role to play in preserving the coalition of workers, 
farmers and small business upon which the Labor party's electoral success 
depended. There was always the potential for industrial conflict within this 
alliance which, if it got out of hand, could have lost the A.L.P. votes and 
possibly the treasury benches. One of the tasks of the industrial court and the 
industrial magistrates was to minimise any friction which could threaten the 
stability of the coalition. The political role of the court, in other words, was 
to hold the balance between the city and the bush, between the urban worker 
and the interests of primary industry, and, in general to deliver the benefits of 
industrial peace to the community as a whole which the Labor party told the 
electorate was the principal and lasting blessing of the conciliation and 
arbitration system. 
For many in the labour movement the arbitration system thus held the 
key both to industrial progress for those sections of the workforce who 
possessed little bargaining strength vis-a-vis their employers, and to the 
continued stability of the political coalition by whose grace the Labor party 
governed in Queensland. There was, therefore, always a profound tension 
between those who advocated the legitimacy of direct industrial action and 
those who insisted that adherence to the principles of arbitration ought to 
govern all aspects of industrial behaviour. From the latter perspective, it was 
vital that any and all ideas and practices hostile to the concept of industrial 
peace and the sanctity of the arbitration system, at the very least, be 
prevented from exercising any meaningful impact on Labor party and Labor 
government industrial relations policy, and, if possible be eliminated 
completely from the wider industrial and political agenda. Serious account 
needs to be taken of this tradition when the activities of the A.L.P. industrial 
groups in the 1940s and 1950s in Queensland are being assessed and 
evaluated. 
The essential character of the legislation enacted by Labor 
governments in Queensland to secure industrial peace was reflected in The 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act which the Forgan-Smith 
16. See Chapter 12. 
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government passed in 1932. The principal arbitration institution provided for 
in the Act, the Queensland Industrial Court, was presided over by a judge of 
the Supreme Court. It enjoyed both a wide jurisdiction by virtue of an 
extremely generous definition of an 'industrial matter', and far-reaching 
powers in that it could frame and enforce specific awards, issue general 
rulings and deal with offences against the Act. Successive Labor governments 
were not, however, prepared to allow the court an unfettered role. Certain 
concepts such as the basic wage (on which the court could pronounce general 
rulings) were defined in the Act as were certain minimum standards in the 
area of working conditions. 
Unions could only obtain access to the arbitration system by becoming 
registered whereupon they assumed the status of a corporate entity. Ted 
Sykes has argued that 'On the whole, the basic pattern was that to be found in 
the federal act and the acts of such other states as adopted the court system 
rather than the wages board one'.^' Sykes points out, however, that the 
legislative provision for a system of preference in employment to unionists 
was a 'distinctive Queensland feature'. * It is also worth keeping in mind that 
when the Chifley government decided in 1947 to place greater emphasis on 
conciliation commissioners in federal arbitration, the Hanlon government in 
Queensland declined to follow this departure from the 'court' system. As far 
as the specific question of strikes was concerned, the Queensland Industrial 
Court was equipped with a wide range of powers which included the right to 
declare a strike a breach of an award and to order an immediate resumption 
of work. The court's authority was supported by a series of penal and other 
sanctions. 
The doctrine of industrial peace, however, was not accepted in all 
quarters of the broad labour movement in Queensland. Whether for reasons of 
philosophy, pragmatism, or both, some politicians and unionists held that 
conflict in industry was a necessary dimension of industrial relations in a 
17. Sykes, 'Labour Relations - Law,' p.241. 
18, Ibid. 
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capitalist economy. They believed, moreover, that such conflict was an 
integral part of the process of effecting social, political and economic 
change. The doctrines espoused by the Industrial Workers of the World, for 
example, were influential during and shortly after World War I, especially in 
the meat industry and in sections of the railways. Syndicalist concepts also 
had a longer term impact in that they informed to a degree the demands of 
many meatworkers during the first major strike in Queensland in the 
reconstruction period after the Second World War. 
The advocates of direct industrial action were typically also staunch 
admirers of a full-blooded Socialism which they believed Labor governments 
should implement at every possible opportunity. On both counts they were 
received with suspicion and hostility by the A.W.U.-A.L.P. forces and their 
political and industrial allies. This was particularly noticeable during the 
1920s. In 1922 many of the Brisbane based unions managed to forge a certain 
degree of organisational unity with the establishment of the Brisbane Trades 
and Labour Council located in the Trades Hall. It would be a gross over-
simplification to say that the A.W.U. headquarters in Elizabeth Street and the 
Trades Hall in Edward Street were monuments to the polarisation of political 
and industrial philosophies in the Queensland labour movement since unions 
who rejected direct action in favour of arbitration belonged to the Brisbane 
Trades and Labour Council, and unions of a distinctly syndicalist bent were 
affiliated with the A.L.P. There was nevertheless sufficient truth in the 
observation to render it something more than just an empty cliche*. 
By the early 1920s dissatisfaction especially in union ranks with the 
performance of the Labor government had reached significant dimensions. 
This dissatisfaction arose in the context of a weakening of the Queensland 
economy and public finances to which the government led by E.G. Theodore 
responded by dismissing certain employees, especially in the railways, by 
reducing the pay of public servants, and by seeking a basic wage reduction 
from the industrial court . A reduction of five shillings was granted in 1922. 
Further disillusionment greeted a noticeable reduction in the reforming zeal 
of the P.L.P. Many in union ranks thought Labor in power was rather too 
ready to make peace with Capitalism and to seek an accommodation with it 
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by abandoning any thought of hastening the arrival of Socialism. Under these 
circumstances, the issue of the location of ultimate control over the actions 
of Labor politicians flared once again. 
The forces opposing both the economic policies and the ideological 
direction of the Theodore government were led by the Australian Railways' 
Union (A.R.U.). Whereas the P.L.P. advanced a programme of slow, careful 
reform and adherence to the principles of arbitration, the A.R.U. leadership 
embraced the concepts of industrial unionism, direct action and workers' 
I 9 control of industry.^^ The tensions between these fundamentally different 
perspectives left their mark on the 1923 Labor-in-Politics Convention. The 
government did not particularly enjoy this experience. A motion calling on it 
to restore the five shillings basic wage reduction was defeated by a mere two 
votes, while a potentially embarrassing A.R.U. proposal to give the Q.C.E. 
power to interpret the party platform, and to instruct members of the P.L.P. 
regarding its implementation, was avoided only after a face-saving formula 
was devised by W.J. Riordan, the president of the A.W.U. 
By the end of 1923 there was, within the A.L.P.-A.W.U. coalition, a 
distinct '...hardening of attitudes towards communists, syndicalists, [and] 
militants...and those theorists who wanted the Labor party changed from a 
working man's party committed to reform through constitutional means, to a 
revolutionary socialist party'.^^ For their part, the A.R.U. and its supporters 
maintained strong pressure on the government over the wage reduction issue 
and the conduct of economic policy in general. In 1924 the government 
seemed on the brink of disaster when Theodore initially refused to implement 
a P.L.P. resolution in favour of legislation to introduce the forty-four hour 
week. A compromise which saw the legislation passed in October 1924 
'...spurred the militants to concentrate on the wage restoration issue, although 
19, Cribb, 'Ideological Conflict: The 1927 and 1948 Strikes,' p.383. 
20. D.J. Murphy, 'Organisation, Structure and Finance,' in Labor in Power, 
eds. D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce, and Colin A. Hughes, p.l6. 
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for the ARU leaders, the stakes were much higher - the undisputed leadership 
21 
of the industrial labour movement'."^^ 
The political battle over economic policy, and the question of control 
within the parliamentary, organisational and industrial spheres of the labour 
movement was joined on the industrial front in the 1925 Railway Strike. The 
strike lasted for a week, and resulted in a victory for the railway workers. 
The government agreed to several demands, the most important for the longer 
term being to fix the basic wage, and to restore previous reductions in public 
service salaries, by legislation. Such action brought a storm of criticism from 
the press, employer organisations and the parliamentary opposition parties. 
The Labor government was castigated for, so the arguments went, abandoning 
a long-standing policy that industrial matters be decided by the processes of 
arbitration; abdicating its authority in favour of a strike committee; 
undermining the authority of the industrial court; and failing to suppress an 
illegal strike. This storm of protest touched some very tender spots in a 
Labor party which accepted as an article of faith the importance of the 
arbitration system, and which was extremely sensitive to charges that it had 
acted in a constitutionally unacceptable manner. Subsequent Labor 
governments in Queensland were determined never to repeat this experience 
of 1925 when industrial pressure forced a government to legislate on the 
matter of wages. 
In the short term, it appeared the A.R.U. had achieved pre-eminence 
in the trade union movement as a result of the strike. As Margaret Cribb 
observes, however, '...within the labor movement..., particularly in the PLP 
and the QCE, there were those who wished to see the ARU's challenge to the 
supremacy of the parliamentary party put down firmly'.^^ They did not have 
long to wait. In the wake of the 1925 Railway Strike, Theodore's successor, 
W.N. Gillies, was replaced as premier by W. McCormack, one of Theodore's 
lifelong friends, and a former general secretary of the Amalgamated Worker's 
21. Anne Smith, 'The Railway Strike, 1925,' in The Big Strikes. 
Queensland 1889-1965. ed. D.J. Murphy, p.l64. 
22. Cribb, 'Ideological Conflict: The 1927 and 1948 Strikes,' p.389. 
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Association, vice-president of the A.W.U., speaker of the Legislative 
Assembly between 1915 and 1919, and cabinet minister since 1919. 
McCormack was a tough, resourceful and no-holds-barred politician, a man 
whose character and commitment to truth, beauty and Queensberry rules was 
shaped by his early experiences in spreading the gospel of unionism amongst 
the miners and rural workers in northern and western Queensland. High on his 
list of priorities as premier was to avenge the P.L.P.'s humiliation at the 
hands of the A.R.U. in 1925, and, in general to defeat once and for all any 
'militant' tendencies within the Queensland labour movement. 
The refusal of the A.R.U. leaders, G. Rymer and T. Moloney, to sign 
an anti-communist pledge gave McCormack the opportunity of removing the 
union from any position of influence in the Labor party's policy-making 
processes. In November 1925, Rymer and Moloney were expelled from the 
Q.C.E. of the A.L.P. They, along with other A.R.U. delegates, were also 
refused their places at the 1926 Labor-in-Politics Convention, and even a 
subsequent unconditional signing of the anti-communist pledge -^  did not 
persuade the Q.C.E. to reinstate them. Having secured a political victory 
over the A.R.U. and its allies, which Murphy argued signified '...the end of the 
radical period for Labor in Queensland',•^^ McCormack sought an industrial 
triumph as well. The occasion was provided by The South Johnstone Strike of 
1927. 
This strike arose over the issue of preference in re-employment for 
sugar mill workers in North Queensland. Developments in the dispute 
eventually involved the railways. Members of the A.R.U. and several other 
unions honoured a black ban on the South Johnstone mill, the focal point of 
the dispute. Upon his return from an overseas trip, McCormack realised the 
golden opportunity afforded by the strike to curb the industrial influence of 
the A.R.U. In late August 1927, he ordered the dismissal of all A.R.U. 
23. For full details, see: K.H. Kennedy, 'The Anti-Communist Pledge 
Crisis,' in Labor in Power, eds. D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce, and Colin A. 
Hughes, pp.369-381. 
24. Murphy, 'Organisation, Structure and Finance,' p.21. 
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members, their re-employment being subject to signing an undertaking to obey 
all instructions issued by the commissioner for railways. When legal advice 
cast doubt on the government's power to take such action, McCormack simply 
extended the lock-out and the conditions for re-instatement to the entire 
railway service. Divisions within and between the unions involved in the South 
Johnstone Strike soon gave McCormack his victory: railwaymen, including 
members of the A.R.U., returned to work on the government's terms. The 
repressive handling of the South Johnstone Strike by a Labor Government left 
a bitter taste in the mouths of many Queensland railwaymen. They did not 
forgive or forget easily. Memories of 1927 helped stiffen their resolve some 
two decades later when another Labor government adopted in many ways 
similar tactics in the 1948 Queensland Railway Dispute. One of the most 
popular rallying cries in this savage conflict was 'Remember McCormack!'. 
In assessing the longer term significance of developments in the broad 
labour movement during the 1920s, Margaret Cribb has argued that 
...the struggle in this decade which developed 
between the AWU-government alliance and the 
more radical elements in the labor movement set a 
pattern in Queensland for relations, both industrial 
and political, between a Labor government and the 
militant unions for many years to come;.... 
In the short term, however, there were to be no relations between a Labor 
government and trade unions in Queensland. On 17 May 1929 the McCormack 
government suffered a stunning defeat at the polls. The A.L.P. lost sixteen 
seats, with the speaker and three ministers amongst the casualties. A 
Country and Progressive National Party government, under the premiership of 
A.E. Moore, assumed control of the parliament. Shortly after the elections, 
McCormack resigned the leadership of the P.L.P., his place being taken by 
William Forgan-Smith who represented the northern seat of Mackay in the 
Legislative Assembly, and who enjoyed close links with the A.W.U. 
25. Cribb, 'Ideological Conflict: The 1927 and 1948 Strikes,' p.398. 
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With the defeat of the A.L.P. government, the labour movement lost 
the capacity to ensure that the performance of the arbitration system was 
consistent with the industrial welfare of unionists and the wider political 
interests of the Labor party. In three short years, the Moore government 
changed several important features of the arbitration system to the 
substantial detriment of the labour movement. The forty-four hour week was 
revoked as were rural arbitration awards; shearers and miners, as well as 
government employees, were removed from the jurisdiction of the industrial 
court; and the power of the court to grant preference in employment to 
unionists was abolished. These policies struck at the very heart of organised 
Labour in Queensland. To many influential figures in both the trade unions 
and the Labor party, the lessons of this experience were obvious: the A.L.P. 
must be returned to government at the first opportunity, and in future 
whatever steps were necessary had to be taken to ensure the continued 
electoral success of the party in Queensland. 
In the industrial relations area, the period of the Moore government 
was clearly one of considerable cost to the labour movement. In retrospect, 
however, the short period of parliamentary opposition looked very much like a 
blessing in disguise. Out of office between 1929 and 1932, the Labor party in 
Queensland was spared the onerous task of responding to the problems of what 
were arguably the worst years of the Great Depression. The tensions over 
these matters which split the Labor party and Labor governments elsewhere in 
Australia were of relatively little significance in Queensland where the party 
also enjoyed the politically advantageous position of being able to allocate 
blame for the tragic circumstances of the Depression to the policies of the 
Country and Progressive National government. According to Brian Costar, 
the difficulties and hardships of the Depression, combined with the experience 
of the political wilderness, were also responsible for a tendency for greater 
harmony within and between the representatives of industrial and political 
labour in the early 1930s. The performance of the Moore government, 
moreover, especially in the industrial arena, put a priceless political asset into 
26, B.J. Costar, 'Labor and the Depression,' in Labor in Power, eds. D.J. 
Murphy, R.B. Joyce, and Colin A. Hughes, pp.411,418. 
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the hands of trade union and A.L.P. leaders. In both the short and longer 
term, they justified cautious and gradual economic, industrial and social 
policies to those of their own members who wished to hasten more quickly 
along the path of reform, on the grounds that to do otherwise invited electoral 
defeat and a return to the dark days of tory rule. 
The A.L.P. in Queensland was returned to office at the 1932 
elections. The party's organisational wing wasted little time in seeking to 
nullify what it saw as internal threats to the continued survival of the Labor 
government. Denis Murphy discussed this in terms of '...a further hardening of 
attitudes towards trade union militants , the militants were to be 
squeezed out of any influential roles in the party'.^' The major device used in 
this vendetta was a new set of rules governing expulsions from, and re-
admissions to, the A.L.P. Previous policy in this area had left these matters 
in the hands of the party's branches. In 1934, this decentralisation of control 
was terminated and the Q.C.E. siezed the right to administer the new rules. 
The Labor party was simply not prepared to give a voice to those who 
embraced Socialism, workers' control, or direct action in the conduct of 
industrial relations. Advocates of such ideologies in the A.L.P. who wished to 
retain their membership were clearly tempting fate. 
The hostility of the P.L.P.-A.W.U. forces to strikes was clearly 
apparent in the debates at the 1938 Labor-in-Politics Convention over the 
relative virtues of direct action and arbitration as methods of securing a more 
favourable distribution of income for Labour. M.P. Hynes, the minister for 
Labour, insisted that arbitration and direct action were incompatible, and 
warned that the government would only allow the benefits of the arbitration 
system to those unionists who were prepared to abandon direct action. '* The 
premier, William Forgan-Smith, saw direct industrial action as 'anarchic in 
character', and those who participated in strikes as being 'prepared to force 
their will on the community in an unlawful way,...'. Such a situation had to be 
27. Murphy, 'Organisation, Structure and Finance,' p.27. 
28. A.L.P. Official Report of the Sixteenth Queensland Labor-in-Politics 
ConvenTion (Brisbane: The Worker Newspaper, 1939), p.51. 
resisted for no organised society could afford '...to submit to threats of force 
29 
against the public interest'. Forgan-Smith made it perfectly clear that the 
industrial wing of the labour movement was expected to submit all industrial 
disputes to the arbitration authorities: 
Where force is threatened I regard that as a 
challenge to organised society and organised 
government, and particularly is that the case where 
legal processes are provided by an organised State 
to deal with those matters.^^ 
These sentiments were given legislative expression in the 1938 State 
Transport Act which included a clause originally contained in anti-strike laws 
passed by the Moore government in 1931. The clause gave the government the 
power to declare a state of emergency and almost unlimited authority during 
such periods. Ross Fitzgerald has argued that a prime object of this 
legislation, and the organisational and rule changes within the A.L.P., was the 
31 
containment of labour strikes. A similar pattern characterised the Labor 
party's response to the industrial upheavals which occurred in Queensland in 
1946 and 1948. 
The 1930s saw both a consolidation of, and a growth in, the already 
significant influence of the A.W.U. in the affairs of the A.L.P. One of 
William Forgan-Smith's closest political confidants was C.G. Fallon, the north 
Queensland district secretary of the A.W.U. In 1933, he assumed the position 
of state secretary of the A.W.U. when W.J. Riordan resigned to accept an 
appointment to the bench of the Queensland Industrial Court. This marked 
the beginning of a period stretching until the early 1950s in which '...the Labor 
29. Ibid., p.54. 
30. Ibid. 
I L Ross Fitzgerald, From 1915 to the Early 1980s; A History of 
Queensland (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1984), 
pp.90,91,96. 
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party was effectively controlled by an alliance of the parliamentary leader 
and the secretary of the A.W.U.'.^ The pre-eminent position of the A.W.U. 
in the Labor party's policy-making process was further enhanced by a 1932 
Labor-in-Politics Convention decision to increase the maximum number of 
convention delegates any union could accredi t . Not surprisingly, the A.W.U. 
was the only union in Queensland whose membership was large enough to allow 
it to benefit from this change in the rules. 
The growth of the political power of the A.W.U. in the 1930s also 
owed much to the weakened position of most other trade unions in Queensland 
who were reeling from the savage blows struck by the Depression. A sharp 
fall in A.L.P. membership robbed the branches of much of their vitality and 
the party was forced to rely even more on the organisational resources of the 
A.W.U. Difficult economic circumstances were also responsible for a 
reduction in the number of unions affiliated with the A.L.P. which further 
diminished the likelihood that any anti-A.W.U. faction could emerge and 
survive. Declining membership in many affiliated unions meant a lessening in 
their representation in the councils of the A.L.P., and, when union 
membership showed signs of recovery after 1932, it was the A.W.U. which 
benefited the most. In general, the majority of trade unions were seriously 
•3-3 
weakened as a consequence of the unemployment of the 1930s, a condition 
from which they did not fully recover until the war years and the period of 
postwar reconstruction. 
The late 1930s and the period of the Second World War saw the 
appearance of ever-widening cracks in the facade of unity presented by the 
labour movement for much of the Depression decade. This impression of 
unity, however, should not be exaggerated. The A.R.U., one of the largest and 
industrially most significant trade unions, remained outside the Labor party; 
the Lang Plan had its adherents in several Labor party branches and in some 
32. Costar, 'Labor and the Depression,' p.407. 
33. An extended discussion of how the A.W.U. consolidated its hegemony 
in the A.L.P. in the 1930s is to be found in: Costar, 'Labor and the 
Depression,' pp.420-426. 
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trade unions; certain unionists and branch members fought a rearguard, but 
ultimately unsuccessful, action to commit the A.L.P. to the implementation 
of a socialist programme; and sectarian bitterness between Protestant and 
Catholics erupted in the late 1930s with the formation of the Protestant 
Labour Party. When compared with the divisiveness of the Queensland labour 
movement in the 1920s and the position in some other states in the 1930s, 
however, the degree of apparent disunity in Queensland was relatively minor. 
From 1938 the picture began to change. 
Ross Johnston has drawn attention to signs of increasing 
disillusionment within the industrial wing of the labour movement at the 
Labor party's dictatorial methods, its suppression of dissent, its rejection of 
Socialism in favour of 'small-time' Capitalism, its dedication to rural values, 
and its policy of gradual and moderate reform in social and economic 
affairs.-^ Fallon and Forgan-Smith, however, were not especially concerned 
with these rumblings of discontent. In 1939, the A.W.U. broke a decade of 
affiliation with the T.L.C, complaining of inadequate representation on a 
body which, it alleged, was becoming 'communist-dominated'. A fierce hatred 
and rejection of any person or idea which could in any way, however tenuous, 
be even vaguely linked with 'Communism' was a feature of the Labor party's 
political attitudes in Queensland. There was no room for subtlety or 
sophistication in the approach. Denis Murphy has observed that 'The clear line 
between indigenous radical and socialist thought,..., and communist ideology 
was rarely sought'.^^ 
Profound disagreements over the legitimacy of 'indigenous radical and 
socialist thought', and over the tight discipline exercised in the parliamentary 
and organisational wings of the A.L.P. by Forgan-Smith and Fallon were 
brought to the surface and exacerbated in the early years of the war by a 
bitter controversy concerning the participation of Labor party members in the 
Australian Soviet Friendship League and its subsidiary bodies. In September 
34. Johnston, The Call Of The Land, pp.167,169. 
Murphy, 'Organisation, Structure and Finance,' p.38. 
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1941, the Q.C.E. ruled that A.L.P. members could neither belong to, nor take 
part in, any 'aid to Russia' activities. Several individual trade unions and the 
T.L.C. rejected the ban as did a number of Labor party branches and two 
members of the P.L.P., G.C. Taylor and G.H. Marriott. The upshot of this 
dispute was the expulsion of several branches together with Taylor and 
Marriott from the A.L.P. This challenge to the power and authority of the 
A.W.U.-P.L.P. coalition thus failed, but the resentment at the philosophical 
direction and oligarchic nature of the A.L.P. did not dissipate as a result, 
rather it widened and deepened, especially in trade union circles. 
36. For full details, see: M.G. Sullivan, 'The Expulsion of George 
Cuthbert Taylor,' pp.445-453, and Ian Moles, 'The Expulsion of Tom 
Aikens,' pp.454-462, in Labor in Power, eds. D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce, 
and Colin A. Hughes. 
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Between 1941 and 1944, several important unions severed their 
affiliation with the A.L.P. Murphy argues that in many cases they left 
because of '...their opposition to the authoritarian actions of the Q.C.E. and 
particularly those of Forgan Smith and Fallon'. Included in the ranks of those 
who broke with the Labor party were the A.M.I.E.U., the Amalgamated 
Foodstuffs Union, the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, the 
Federated Engine Drivers' and Firemen's Association (F.E.D.F.A.), the 
Waterside Workers' Federation, the Printing Industry Employees' Union and 
the Vehicle Builders' Employees' Federation (V.B.E.F.). Several members of 
the P.L.P. expressed deep concern at this development and lamented the loss 
of a 'close brotherly feeling' between the industrial and political wings of the 
labour movement. Proposals were put before the caucus in late 1942 
suggesting the creation of a committee consisting of representatives of the 
P.L.P., A.W.U. and T.L.C-affiliated unions to explore ways and means of 
promoting closer unity within the labour movement. A similar resolution was 
endorsed at the 1944 Labor-in-Politics Convention. All of these initiatives 
were, however, ignored by the Q.C.E. 
The politicians behind these moves were by no stretch of the 
imagination advocating that the Labor party change its policies and 
philosophies to accommodate the socialist, syndicalist, direct action or 
workers' control impulses emanating from various parts of the trade union 
movement. What bothered them was an apparent complacency on the part of 
the party's managers in the face of certain political forces which, if allowed 
to develop unchecked, so they feared, could ultimately threaten the position 
of the A.L.P. in Queensland politics. Closer unity between political and 
industrial labour was seen as a part of a necessary response to these forces 
which included the growing influence of the Communist Party, and the revival 
of non-Labor urban politics in the shape of the Queensland Peoples' Party 
(Q.P.P. - the forerunner of the Liberal party in Queensland). In November 
1945, the P.L.P. expressed deep concern at the administration of the party. 
1. Murphy, 'Organisation, Structure and Finance,' p.43. 
2. P.L.P. Minutes 3 December 1942, P.L.P., Parliament House, Brisbane, 
p.7. 
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and bluntly accused the Q.C.E. of failing to maintain a close liaison between 
all sections of the A.L.P.: 'This applies particularly to the industrial wing 
with which no close contact is being kept'.-^ Despite this, however, there is 
little evidence that the Q.C.E. shared the sense of concern and urgency 
expressed by its cri t ics, a t any rate not until Queensland was engulfed by the 
1946 Meat Industry Dispute. In the early months of the postwar 
reconstruction years, at tent ion in the Labor party in Queensland was focussed 
rather more upon the accession of its new parliamentary leader, Edward 
Michael Hanlon. 
On 6 March 1946, the Parliamentary Labor Party elected E.M. Hanlon 
to succeed F.A. Cooper as Premier and Chief Secretary, and Vice-President of 
the Executive Council. The Courier-Mail highlighted the contrast between 
Cooper and the new premier: 
Mr Cooper brought to the Premiership tac t , 
amiability, skill in parliamentary tact ics , suavity in 
debate, and appreciation of the dignity of his 
office....His successor is a more forceful 
personality. Mr Hanlon had to work hard and fight 
hard for promotion in his party....In political 
combat he has a hotter temper and rougher ways 
than Mr Cooper,... 
Hanlon had served a long apprenticeship in the labour movement. His trade 
union activity included organising for the Queensland Railway Union and 
participation in the 1912 Brisbane General Strike. He saw active duty in 
France in World War I. For a time he was a small businessman. He won the 
Brisbane metropolitan seat of Ithaca for the A.L.P. in 1926, and as minister 
for Health and Home Affairs during the 1930s earned a reputation as a man 
holding high humanitarian ideals through his contributions to the development 
of Queensland's hospital and welfare services. 
Hanlon's international vision was informed by a belief in the 
3. P.L.P. Minutes 14 November 1945, pp.1,2. 
4. The Courier-Mail 7 March 1946. 
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importance of the British Commonwealth, (he referred to Britain as the 
'homeland'), while at the same time he stressed the need to cultivate and 
maintain the friendship of the United States of America. He was a strong 
advocate of the White Australia ideal, while socially was something of a 
'wowser' if his disapproving attitudes towards gambling and drinking were any 
guide. Hanlon was a Roman Catholic and staunchly anti-communist. He 
regarded the nuclear family as the basic unit of society. Hanlon broke with 
the Labor party's political tradition in Queensland to the extent that he had no 
formal links with the A.W.U. The A.W.U. was well represented in successive 
Hanlon cabinets, but not to the overwhelming extent of previous times. 
Hanlon, as with Cooper and Forgan-Smith, maintained a close working 
relationship with C.G. Fallon, a relationship which was only broken (although 
not always without strain) upon the latter's death in 1950. Margaret Cribb has 
described Hanlon as 
...one of a series of tough, autocratic leaders of the 
A.L.P. in Queensland whose policy and belief was 
moderate and gradual reformism and unswerving 
support for the arbitration system.^ 
Denis Murphy noted Hanlon's ease with a 'ringing fundamentalist agrarian 
rhetoric'^ which testified to the predominance of rural values in Queensland 
political debate. 
A belief in the intrinsic superiority of rural life was deeply ingrained 
in Queensland social and political culture. To an important degree this was 
simply an expression of the fact that Queensland was a primary producing 
state whose population was spread widely over a very large area. The rural 
ethos, however, rested on more than just economic foundations. It was felt 
that men and women were brought closer to God and the mystical forces of 
life by working with the plough, the axe and the horse. William Forgan-Smith 
articulated well the essential features of this ruralism when he told the 
5. Cribb, 'State In Emergency,' p.248. 
6. D.J. Murphy, 'Agriculture 1932-57,' in Labor in Power, eds. D.J. 
Murphy, R.B. Joyce, and Colin A. Hughes, p.213. 
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parliament 
I take the view that, no matter how much 
secondary industry may be established in 
Queensland, this State will continue for all time to 
be largely a primary producing state. It is 
desirable that this should be so. Primary 
production is the natural occupation of mankind. 
No one would desire for this state the industralised 
type of civilisation which exists in many countries 
today,' 
while ten years earlier, E.G. Theodore had maintained that 
No one has a greater claim to be regarded as a 
worker than the man who tills the soil, and no one 
is more entitled to participate in shaping the policy 
and governing the affairs of this State than the 
members of that great and influential class.^ 
Throughout the period of Labor governments in Queensland, this rural 
ideology provided an important element in the development of economic, 
social and political policies. In the 1920s, for example, an elaborate structure 
of primary industry regulation was erected;^ the 1930s saw emphasis being 
placed on the expansion of the dairying and sugar industries; production of 
food for wartime purposes dominated the period from 1940 to 1945; and in 
the postwar years the Hanlon government encouraged increased agricultural 
production, often by means of public investment in irrigation schemes, support 
for the small farmer and the large Peak Downs project designed to produce 
food for export to Britain. Whatever assistance was given to secondary 
industry seemed very largely designed to aid the development of processing 
plants for rural produce, and as a means of absorbing rural workers made 
redundant by technical improvements in agriculture and other primary 
7. Q.P.D. 161 (1932): 1731. 
8. Quoted in Johnston, The Call Of The Land, p.165. 
9. Johnston, The Call Of The Land, p. 165; Douglas Blackmur, 'The 
Primary Industries of Queensland 1919-1929. A Study In Policy' 
(B.Econ.diss., University of Queensland, 1965). 
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By and large, historians seem agreed that the economic policy pursued 
by Labor governments in Queensland at the very best involved something less 
than half-hearted efforts at furthering the cause of secondary industry, and 
was directed principally at the maintenance of a large rural population, the 
expansion of the numbers of small farmers, and the decentralisation of 
industry. Arguments based on defence considerations and rural 
fundamentalism in support of this perspective outweighed any contrary 
economic analysis. 
The Labor party's adherence to rural values was warmly endorsed by 
another pillar of Queensland society, the Roman Catholic Church. Historians 
who have explored the political process in Queensland under A.L.P. 
governments have highlighted the strong links between the Labor party and 
the Catholic church, particularly in the period up to the early years of the 
Second World War. James Jupp has argued that 
Catholicism in the A.L.P....has meant the Irish 
Tammany politics which made Victoria and 
Queensland a pale imitation of Huey Long's 
Louisiana between the wars.... Until the formation 
of Catholic Action in 1937 'Catholic Influence' 
simply meant 'lodge politics' played out by the 
Hibernians, the Holy Name Societies and a seedy 
parade of...politicians whose record is often best 
forgotten. Men like Scullin shine out against this 
murky background, in which the darkest patches 
centred around the Lang party, the Richmond and 
Collingwood city councils and the Queensland state 
government.^ 
Ross Johnston suggested that Queensland was effectively governed by a 
triumvirate in the 1930s and early 1940s consisting of the premier, W. Forgan-
Smith, the secretary of the A.W.U., C.G. Fallon, and Archbishop Duhig of the 
10. Johnston, The Call Of The Land, pp.167,170,171,181-184. 
11. James Jupp, 'Their Labour and Ours,' in Australian Politics: A 
Reader, ed. H. Mayer (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1966), p.239. 
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Catholic church, while Ross Fitzgerald explained Queensland politics in 
terms of an 'AWU-ALP-Catholic alliance' and described Labor's style of 
administration as 'bordering at times on clerical fascism'.^-^ 
In keeping with the general precepts of Catholic social doctrine, the 
Catholic church in Queensland was strongly opposed to Socialism and 
Communism. Duhig was a firm (and practical) believer in the virtues of 
private enterprise, and had little time for the experiments with state 
Socialism conducted by the early Labor governments in Queensland. Catholics 
in Queensland, as in the rest of Australia, were predominantly of Irish origins 
and typically working class people who constituted a strong basis of support 
for the A.L.P. The church both monitored and influenced the attitudes and 
values of its members through the parish clergy. It was able to exert a 
further impact on politics and administration through those of its flock who 
held senior posts in the public service, in the police force and in the Labor 
party. Men at the pinnacle of the A.L.P. during the period of this study who 
were practicing Catholics included E.M. Hanlon and C.G. Fallon, as well as 
the rising stars in the P.L.P. during the 1940s, J.E. Duggan and V.C Gair. 
In such a hospitable environment, the development and growth of the 
Catholic Social Studies Movement in Queensland during the 1940s was 
assured. The avowed purpose of the Movement was the elimination of 
communist power in trade unions and Labor party branches, and from 1943 the 
Movement established cells in several of these organisations which it believed 
were influenced or controlled by members of the Communist party. For 
certain tactical reasons, the Movement decided in late 1945 to use its 
influence within the Labor party to bring about the creation of official A.L.P. 
groups within the trade unions in particular through which the Movement cells 
could, it was believed, operate more effectively. 
12* Johnston, The Call Of The Land, p.l67. 
13, Fitzgerald, From 1915 to the Early 1980s, pp.95,101. 
14. See Chapter 12. 
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Given the profound hatred of the Communist party felt by the 
'A.W.U.-A.L.P.-Catholic alliance', it comes as some surprise that the Labor 
party in Queensland was initially disinclined to respond positively to this 
pressure. It is all the more surprising in view of the stepped-up campaign 
against anything even remotely connected with Communism which began with 
the expulsions of Taylor and Marriott as the Labor party reacted angrily to 
the growing political and industrial popularity of the Communist party after 
Russia entered the Second World War on the side of the Allies. Other 
elements in this campaign included the investment of considerable funds by 
the A.W.U. in anti-communist propaganda; a sustained effort to persuade the 
federal conference of the A.L.P. not to lift the ban on the Communist party 
imposed by a non-Labor government in 1940; and calls for Labor party 
supporters to participate more actively in union affairs to 'fight the 
Communists on their own grounds'.^^ One might have reasonably imagined 
the Labor party extending a warm welcome to the Movement proposal for the 
establishment of official A.L.P. industrial groups as a new and bold initiative 
in the anti-communist crusade. Such, however, was not the case. 
The A.L.P. in Queensland seemed well satisfied with its existing 
tactics in opposing the communists in the trade unions and elsewhere, despite 
the protests from certain quarters in the P.L.P. and from several branches 
whose membership contained a significant Movement component. It was only 
when certain major trade unions flouted the Labor party's firm and 
uncompromising commitment to the maintenance of industrial peace in the 
1946 Meat Industry Dispute and the 1948 Railway Dispute that the inner 
executive of the Q.C.E. decided it would establish, and then extend, a formal, 
official industrial group structure 'for the purpose of furthering the interests 
of the A.L.P.' in the trade unions.^^ The evidence^' reveals that the official 
Labor party industrial groups were set up in Queensland to challenge any and 
15. P.L.P. Minutes 10 May 1944, p.4. 
16. Executive Committee, Q.C.E., A.L.P. Minutes 8 July 1946, Labor 
House, Brisbane, p.2. 
17. See also Chapter 12. 
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all opponents of industrial peace in the labour movement including, of course, 
members of the Communist party who were seen by the Labor party as 
typically constituting the principal threat to the achievement of industrial 
tranquility. Evidence of the origins of the official industrial groups in 
Queensland is consistent with the observations made by Professor L .C Webb 
in 1954 that 
The industrial groups are commonly regarded as a 
counter to Communist influence in the unions -
which no doubt they are. But recent statements by 
Labour leaders put the groups in a somewhat 
different light. Dr. Evatt has said that group 
control of the unions is necessary to ensure that 
future Labour governments will not be 
embarrassed, as Mr. Chifley's government was in 
1949, by the indiscipline of trade unions;.... 
There is some evidence that 'the indiscipline of trade unions' in 
Queensland, expressed in a series of strikes between 1945 and 1947, the most 
significant of which was the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute, was costing the 
Labor party votes it could ill afford to lose. In the 1944 state elections the 
A.L.P., although it retained government, won a mere 44.7 per cent of the 
1 9 vote, while three years later its share dropped to 43.6 per cent.^^ Ross 
Johnston noted that this erosion of support '...was attributed partly to the 
anxiety of the community over the rise of industrial activity'.^^ In this 
context, the potential of an official Labor party fighting force within the 
unions to steer them along the path of 'industrial discipline' appealed greatly 
to the hierarchy of the A.L.P. in Queensland as it grappled with the labour 
militancy of the early reconstruction years. 
18. L.C. Webb, 'The Australian Party System,' in Readings In Australian 
Government, ed. Colin A. Hughes (St. Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1968), p.340. 
19. For detailed figures on voting patterns, see: Graeme Vaughan 'The 
1977 election: maintaining the 1974 realignment,' in Politics in 
Queensland. 1977 and beyond, eds. Margaret Bridson Cribb and P.J. 
Boyce (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1980), pp.234-238. 
20. Johnston, The Call Of The Land, p.l70. 
73 
Labour militancy was not the only political-industrial issue 
confronting the Labor party at this time. On a more speculative level, it 
could also be suggested that the establishment of A.L.P. industrial groups in 
Queensland was in part an organisational response by the inner executive of 
the Q.C.E. to the profound disquiet in the caucus which had been simmering 
ever since 1941 over the revival of the non-Labor parties; over the growing 
industrial appeal of the Communist party and its victories in local government 
and state polls; and over the fragmentation represented by breakaway Labor 
groups in north Queensland, the embarrassing electoral success of the former 
Labor parliamentarians Taylor and Marriott, and the refusal of many unions to 
seek or renew affiliation with the Labor party. The mood of the caucus was 
not improved by the poor result for the A.L.P. in the 1944 state elections 
when, compared with the 1941 outcome, its vote declined by some 6.7 per 
cent to 44.7 per cent, the lowest it had been since T.J. Ryan had won 
government in 1915 with the exception of 1929 when the Labor party had been 
unceremoniously defeated. At the end of 1945, the anger and disillusionment 
within the P.L.P. was approaching boiling point. Against this background, it 
may not be entirely fanciful to suggest that the events of the 1946 Meat 
Industry Dispute convinced the inner executive of the Q.C.E. that it would 
have to intervene in the internal affairs of trade unions in Queensland in order 
to arrest what it saw as the drift in the labour movement's political as well as 
industrial discipline and attitudes. 
The 1948 Queensland Railway Dispute shattered any beliefs within the 
A.L.P. that the existing industrial group structure was capable of 
guaranteeing a trade union movement prepared to foresake direct industrial 
action. The Labor party responded by strengthening and extending the 
industrial group organisation. Within a short time, men associated with the 
groups and/or the Movement had come to dominate the commanding heights 
of the A.L.P. in Queensland. By the end of 1949, all members of the inner 
executive were strong supporters of the industrial groups, while several also 
belonged to the Movement. In the P.L.P., Hanlon and his cabinet endorsed 
without reservation the activities of the groups, with the deputy premier, V.C. 
Gair, the most prominent Movement member of the caucus. Denis Murphy has 
observed that this extension of grouper/Movement influence within the A.L.P. 
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saw the collapse of the balance between the P.L.P., the A.W.U. and the 
7 I 
Trades Hall unions in the composition of the inner executive.''^ When A .C 
Milton from the Transport Workers' Union (T.W.U.) died in February 1948 he 
was replaced on the executive by T.W. Rasey, a politician with strong 
Movement connections. Equally well connected was A. Cole, the secretary of 
a small railway union not affiliated with the T.L.C, who took his seat in 
December 1949 after Harry Harvey from the Miscellaneous Workers' Union, 
and T.L.C. president, was appointed to the Queensland Industrial Court. From 
1950 to 1956 the Trades Hall unions were not represented at all on the inner 
executive. This was symptomatic of the deteriorating relations between the 
Labor party and sections of the trade union movement which was becoming 
more and more apparent in the later years of Hanlon's premiership. 
From 1948 an increasingly prominent feature of political life in 
Queensland, and in the rest of Australia, was a resurgence of proposals to ban 
the Communist party. The debate was joined by a wide range of organisations 
which included the Returned Services League, employer organisations, the 
Liberal and Country parties, several churches and the Labor party. Opinion 
within the Queensland A.L.P. was savagely opposed to the communists. Rank 
and file hostility was expressed through resolutions calling on the state 
government to frame anti-communist legislation, to suppress the communist 
press, and to appoint a Royal Commission to enquire into the 'subversive' 
nature of the Communist party.^^ While it officially supported the 'No' 
campaign in the 1951 anti-communist referendum, the Q.C.E. put little heart 
into the struggle. Substantial numbers of Labor party members and affiliated 
unions defied party policy by conducting a thinly disguised 'Yes' campaign, and 
in December 1951 the Q.C.E. displayed its true colours when it decided to ask 
the A.L.P. federal executive to reconsider its ban on the Movement's 
newspaper, News Weekly, which had supported the Liberal party's bid to have 
21, D.J. Murphy, 'The 1957 Split: "A Drop in the Ocean in Political 
History",' in Labor In Power, eds. D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce, and Colin 
A. Hughes, pp.487,488. 
22. Executive Committee, Q.C.E., A.L.P. Minutes 7 September 1949, 
p.9; 22 September 1949, p.l3; 14 October 1949, p.25. 
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23 the referendum carried. "^  
From the late 1930s the industrial influence of the Communist party 
grew in Queensland. Members of the party won official positions in a range of 
specialist and craft unions affiliated with the T.L.C. These included the 
Federated Ironworkers' Association (F.I.A.), the Building Workers' Industrial 
Union (B.W.I.U.), the Seamen's Union, the Queensland Colliery Employees' 
Union, the Operative Painters' and Decorators' Union, the Amalgamated 
Society of Carpenters and Joiners, the W.W.F., and the A.M.I.E.U. By the 
early 1940s the policy of the T.L.C. was determined by trade union members 
of the Communist party in alliance with 'militant left-wing' unionists such as 
Mick O'Brien of the A.R.U. 
This industrial strength was complemented by a rapid rise in the 
Communist party's membership after Russia entered the war in 1941. While it 
was outlawed between 1940 and 1942, the party's Australian membership stood 
at some 4,000. By the end of 1942, membership had risen to 16,000 and in 
August 1945 it numbered in excess of 20,000. In the later war years, the 
Communist party tasted electoral success in north Queensland. Victories in 
local government elections heralded an even more significant triumph when a 
staunch supporter of the A.R.U., a former A.L.P. member, and Rhodes scholar 
Fred Paterson won the state seat of Bowen in 1944. 
When Germany attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 the 
character of the Second World War changed in the eyes of much of the 
Australian Communist Party's leadership from an 'imperialist' struggle to a 
democratic war of independence against Fascism.^^ The party's industrial 
relations policy from this time aimed at maximising production. Communists 
in the unions strove to prevent absenteeism and strikes. Cooperation between 
management and employees was stressed. With the defeat of Japan in August 
23. Executive Committee, Q.C.E., A.L.P. Minutes 14 December 1951, p.5. 
24. Alastair Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia. A Short 
History (Stanford University, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1969), pp.81-83. 
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1945, however, this policy underwent a rapid and radical transformation. 
In the later months of 1945 the Communist party advocated the rapid 
fulfilment of many of the industrial demands which the Australian workforce 
had placed on its agenda in the 1930s and during the war years. It argued the 
working class could expect little material improvements from governments or 
from the arbitration tribunals and that only by properly organised direct 
action could significant industrial gains be made. There were signs that 
working men and women needed little encouragement in this direction. Strike 
activity rose throughout Australia culminating in the 1945 Steel Strike in New 
South Wales.^ A new ingredient in the shape of Communist party tactics and 
policies was present in many of these disputes. 
The communist industrial relations model postulated the existence of 
several strong unions able to secure important industrial gains by direct 
action. Direct action was not, however, to be seen purely in these terms: it 
had ramifications in the wider political context as well. The Communist party 
believed that workers would learn valuable political lessons from their 
participation in industrial struggles. They would appreciate from first-hand 
experience the class nature of a capitalist society; they would learn who were 
their friends and who were their enemies; and they would come to appreciate 
the need for fundamental change in the social structure without which the 
emancipation of working men and women could not occur. For the 
communists, organised industrial conflict was an essential and integral part of 
the process of effecting social change. 
The communists believed that one of the principal impediments to the 
realisation of working class goals was the influence of the 'right wing' in the 
A.L.P. The right wing, moreover, inhibited the development of a united front 
25* This dispute has been extensively analysed by Tom Sheridan. T. 
Sheridan, 'A Case Study in Complexity: The Origins of the 1945 Steel 
Strike in New South Wales,' Labour History, no. 41 (1981), pp.87-109; 
Tom Sheridan, 'Aspects Of Decision Making In A Monopoly: BHP And 
The 1945 Steel Strike,' Australian Economic History Review 22 (1982): 
1-27; T. Sheridan, 'The 1945 Steel Strike: Trade Unions, The New 
Order and Mr. Chifley,' Labour History, no. 42 (1982), pp.1-26. 
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with in the labour movement, part icular ly at an o f f i c ia l level . Such uni ty, 
however, was '...the condit ion for v ic tory of the working class over the forces 
of react ion' .^° The r ight wing thus had to be exposed and discredited - i ts 
influence on the policies of Labor governments had to be destroyed. The 
Communist party believed that i ts own popularity and the apparent willingness 
of many unionists to engage in protracted industr ial struggle, on occasions 
against A .L .P. governments, were indicative of a le f tward tendency in 
working class pol i t ical at t i tudes. By the early months of 1946, parts of the 
Communist party leadership were expressing cautious optimism that , i f 
handled correct ly , a continuation of this trend could see the party in a 
position to challenge the A .L .P . for the pol i t ical leadership of the Austral ian 
working class. 
The Communist party knew fu l l well that i ts bid to play a positive and 
important role in bringing about major economic and pol i t ical change in 
Austral ia would not go unchallenged. I t was wel l aware of the pol i t ical and 
industrial act iv i t ies of 'Cathol ic Ac t ion ' , and i t needed l i t t l e reminding of the 
Labor party's immutable opposition to say nothing of that exhibited by 
business interests and other pol i t ical parties. There were, fur thermore, 
internal problems and d i f f icu l t ies due, in part , to these external pressures. 
Throughout the reconstruction years, the Communist party's top echelon 
complained that the lower level leadership and rank and f i le in the branches 
and in the factor ies on occasions found i t d i f f i cu l t to understand and to 
implement policies developed and enunciated by the party's theoreticians and 
tact ic ians. ' Such problems imposed very real constraints on the Communist 
party's abi l i ty to achieve i ts industr ial and pol i t ical objectives, and served as a 
t imely reminder that , despite i ts democratic central ist st ructure, the party 
was far f rom monol i thic when i t came to translat ing principles and rhetor ic 
into pract ical and e f fec t ive campaigns. 
26. R. Dixon, 'Reformism And The Fight For The United Front, ' 
Communist Review, no. 58 (1946), p.163. 
27. See, for example: Communist Party of Austral ia (C.P.A.). Central 
Commit tee Plenum. Speech by L. Donald 20-22 February 1948, M.S.S. 
2389 1(8), Mi tchel l L ibrary (M.L.), pp.1,2. 
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In 1946, the Australian Communist Party decided against seeking 'an 
Australian way to socialism' in favour of following 'attitudes and beliefs held 
by the Comintern before its dissolution'.^'' Consistent with this approach was 
the party's forecast of a collapse of the postwar boom and a return to the 
economic conditions of the 1930s. This sincerely held belief added a sense of 
urgency and mission to its work. The party was determined to take whatever 
political and economic steps were necessary to put Australian workers in a 
better position to resist the inevitable economic crisis than had been the case 
during the Great Depression. By late 1946, the Communist party had 
hardened even further its opposition to the right wing in the A.L.P., a process 
which continued throughout 1947 during which, in the communist 
interpretation of events, the Labor party was increasingly prepared to 
compromise Australian sovereignty in the interests of British and American 
Capital. In Queensland, the Hanlon government's 1946 legislation designed to 
increase state control over the internal affairs of trade unions,^" and its 
opposition to wage increases, were seen by the Communist party as ample 
evidence of both the Labor party's desire to mould a tame and compliant 
workforce to serve foreign business enterprises and its 'class collaborationist' 
tendencies. The movement of the Communist party to a position of extreme 
'leftism',-^^ with a concomitant intensification of attacks and criticism 
levelled at the A.L.P., was all but complete by the closing months of 1947. 
This development, and the Labor party's predictably hostile reaction, defined 
an important part of the political context of the 1948 Railway Dispute in 
Queensland. 
The Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was established in 
Moscow in October 1947. The significance of this for Australian communists, 
according to Alastair Davidson, was that since the Cominform '...appeared to 
replace the Comintern as the center of international guidance for the 
communist movement, the... [Australian Communist Party] leaders chose 
28. Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia, pp.99,100. 
29* See Chapter 8 and Chapter 12. 
30* Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia, p. 100. 
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voluntarily to follow its directions...'.-^^ The Cominform argued that world 
politics needed to be understood in terms of the interaction between two 
power blocs. These consisted on the one hand of an anti-imperialist bloc led 
by the Soviet Union and dedicated to peace, while on the other an imperialist 
bloc led by the United States of America sought to promote new wars 
particularly against colonial peoples fighting for liberation and 
independence. On the question of Communist parties achieving political 
power, the Cominform argued that there was an alternative to violent 
revolution followed by a dictatorship of the proletariat . A socialist society 
could also be established through the creation of a 'people's democracy' by 
means of a 'people's front'.-^^ 
These perspectives made a deep impact on communist thought in 
Australia. Attention was focused on the methods by which a people's front 
could be developed. As members of the central committee of the Communist 
party met in Sydney in February 1948, it seemed that the Queensland Railway 
33 Dispute, then at its height, in many respects seemed to show the way. The 
events and experiences of this major strike also exerted a profound influence 
on the policies adopted at the party's 15th National Congress held in May 
1948. The circumstances, conduct and outcome of the dispute helped 
convince the Communist party that the time was ripe for it to mount an 
industrial and political offensive-^^ as a crucial first step in the construction 
of a people's front in Australia.^^ 
Within the space of eighteen months, however, the Australian 
Communist Party, far from holding the initiative in national political affairs, 
was on the defensive. Its enthusiastic involvement in the 1949 Coal Strike, 
31. Ibid., pp.101,102. 
32. Ibid., p . l02. 
33. See Chapter 11. 
34. Davidson, The Communist Party of Australia, p. 102. 
35. Ibid. 
against the background of the Cold War and the gains being made by 
communist forces in China, aroused its opponents to even greater fury than 
they had displayed in the early reconstruction years. The Labor party 
industrial groups were making significant inroads into communist strength in 
the trade unions, while in 1950 and 1951 the Communist party found itself 
fighting for survival in the face of the legislative and constitutional assault 
launched by the Menzies' government. 
As well as these developments in the political arena, the nature of 
industrial relations in Queensland in the reconstruction period was influenced 
by economic circumstances. During the Second World War an outstanding 
feature of Queensland's economic performance was a rapid expansion in 
primary production and associated industries in response to defence 
requirements. From 1943, an increase in the historically slow pace of 
manufacturing development took place, most notably in the areas of strategic 
works, shipbuilding and other engineering. After the war, labour shortages, a 
scarcity in capital equipment and severe competition for essential materials 
limited the growth in secondary industry particularly in the new and expanding 
areas of building materials, chemicals, industrial metals, machinery, textiles, 
food processing and furniture making. In a very real sense, however, the 
economic health of Queensland was a hostage to the forces of nature. The 
early reconstruction years saw the persistence of drought conditions which 
had obtained in parts of the state for several years. Crop yields, pastoral 
production and flocks were hard hit especially early in 1946. 
Some relief from the drought occurred between September 1946 and 
May 1947. The rains, however, came too late to assist the depressed pastoral 
industry. The 1947 wool-clip was the lowest in a decade. Drought and re-
stocking meant less than buoyant conditions in the cattle and meat 
industries. Dairying was in a similar position, while the sugar industry 
produced the lowest standard of cane in some fifteen years. The drought 
finally broke in late 1947. The 1947-48 season consequently saw record yields 
in several commodities, particularly cereals. The pressure of both 
international and domestic demand resulted in record prices for primary 
produce and the negotiation of an International Wheat Agreement, and long-
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term contracts for meat and butter, promised greater predictability and 
stability in overseas markets. Rural incomes received a continuing boost from 
1948 as wool prices surged to higher and higher levels. 
Poor seasonal conditions for cattle reduced the capacity of the meat 
industry to respond to the favourable developments in international trade in 
1948-49. The sugar industry, on the other hand, benefited from good weather 
and an improved labour supply which saw a record production of good quality 
cane. These conditions continued during 1949-50 but, in common with most 
other Queensland primary industries, the sugar industry was badly affected by 
abnormally heavy rains during 1950-51. The 1951-52 season saw climatic 
factors move from one extreme to the other. Severe drought devastated the 
pastoral and agricultural industries, all of which posted major decreases in the 
volume of production and, in some cases, in the value of production as well.-^° 
Happier circumstances prevailed in coal mining and in secondary 
industry. The output of black coal reached record levels in 1951-52 and 
capped an impressive period of expansion in the industry which had been under 
way since 1948. Supplies of building materials improved to the extent that 
certain controls were relaxed by the government. As well as industries 
associated with housing, secondary industry in postwar Queensland expanded 
in the areas of clothing manufacture and light engineering. There was, 
however, little heavy industry and few prospects for its development. 
The state of Queensland in 1945, 1946 and 1947 is of special concern 
to this analysis since the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute and the 1948 Railway 
Dispute took place within a context of difficult economic and social 
conditions.-^' The end of the war saw the demobilisation of thousands of 
service personnel anxious for a return to normal community life. The process 
36. The index numbers in Table 5, Appendix 2 show the trends in primary 
and secondary production in Queensland during the reconstruction 
years. 
37. The discussion of these conditions is based on: Cribb, 'State In 
Emergency,' pp.228-231; Johnston, The Call Of The Land, p.l69; 
Fitzgerald, From 1915 to the Early 1980s, pp. 104-110,122. 
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of reintegration produced a degree of social and industrial tension as many 
within the civilian workforce feared a loss of jobs to people discharged from 
the services. They resented the priority given by government to the re-
employment of ex-servicemen and women and argued that the war had been 
fought on two fronts - in battle and in the factories and farms. They were 
unconvinced that sacrifices made in armed service were deserving of any 
greater recognition than those made in the years of struggle to maximise 
wartime production. 
Queensland had become a vast military base during 1942-43. 
Brisbane, the principal garrison city, was developed as a major supply and 
repair facility for Allied forces. Its population increased rapidly with the 
influx of personnel from the armed forces, auxiliary forces, and construction 
corps. Throughout Queensland, the Civil Construction Corps built emergency 
hospitals, docks, factories, air strips, service camps, and oil installations. 
Hundreds of miles of defence roads were also laid, and the major centres, all 
of which had been fortified, such as Brisbane, Rockhampton, and Townsville, 
were ringed by Australian and Allied army camps. 
The civilian population in Queensland did not particularly enjoy the 
experience of large numbers of foreign troops, particularly Americans, living 
in their midst. Initially greeted as 'saviours', the presence of American 
servicemen was increasingly perceived as a mixed blessing when the economic 
and social implications of their arrival became more and more apparent. 
Military requirements for food and water put an additional strain on already 
inadequate resources, and prostitution and venereal disease increased 
significantly. Rumors of depraved behaviour by servicemen did little to allay 
civilian unease at what many saw as serious moral decay in their 
communities. The situation was even less improved by an increasing tendency 
for violent confrontations between American and Australian troops. Margaret 
Cribb cites figures which show that by the time the last American base in 
Queensland was vacated at the end of January 1947, some 2,290,757 American 
servicemen had passed through Brisbane alone. In weighing the longer term 
significance of these events, Cribb concludes 'It is understandable,..., that the 
stationing within the state, on however temporary a basis, of such large 
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numbers of troops should disrupt the pattern of civilian life and create social 
tension'. Ross Johnston supports and adds to this assessment: 
During World War II political problems [in 
Queensland]...were,..., increasing. Queensland had 
missed out on much of the industrialization that 
had occurred around Australia. Being indirectly in 
the front line it had suffered the traumas of 
insecurity. Its life-style had been disrupted by the 
passage of thousands of troops, including American 
servicemen, and its general development had 
slackened to zero. The end of the war left these 
unresolved problems festering.^^ 
Rationing and black markets detracted further from the quality of life 
in Queensland in the early years of peace. Sacrifices willingly made during 
the war were now increasingly resented. Queensland, especially in the central 
and northern regions, depended greatly on other states for urgently needed 
supplies of virtually all manufactured products. Throughout 1947 in 
particular, the coastal shipping service, the vital link in the transport of 
desperately needed essential materials to the remote areas, was in disarray. 
Industrial dispute upon industrial dispute was a feature of labour relations on 
the waterfront in Sydney, Newcastle and Melbourne. Even when ships were 
able to sail, the majority of their cargoes were often left on the wharves. 
Margaret Cribb outlined the grim implications for people in Queensland: 
The non-delivery of essential materials...made it 
most difficult to provide the jobs needed for ex-
servicemen and to keep established businesses 
operating. Some industries were forced to reduce 
their staffs, while in others workers remained 
idle. Local authorities were unable to launch 
public works projects, as a continuous flow of 
materials could not be assurred....at the end of 
April 1947 more than half the total registered 
unemployed in the whole country were in 
Queensland.-^ 
38. Johnston, The Call Of The Land, p. 169. 
39. Cribb, 'State In Emergency,' p.231. 
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In the early months of peace, economic, political, social and industrial 
conditions in Queensland, and in the rest of Australia, were, to say the least, 
in a state of considerable flux. Many organised interests were mobilising their 
resources in the belief that profound challenges and opportunities would be a 
feature of the postwar world. The level of ideological debate as well as the 
extent of discussion over the fundamental nature and direction of society was 
perhaps more intense and widespread than at any other time in the twentieth 
century, with the possible exception of the period from 1916 to 1920. A 
feature of the postwar labour markets was the existence of relatively 
powerful sections within a workforce which was anxious to participate in the 
benefits of a more just and prosperous society which had been promised so 
often during the war. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE A.L.P. ROAD TO INDUSTRIAL PEACE. 
ARBITRATION AND LEGISLATION 
86 
In spite of this restlessness and the enhanced bargaining strength of 
employees across a wide spectrum of industry, during the reconstruction years 
the Australian Labor Party in Queensland expected, indeed demanded, that 
unionists adhere to its traditional policy of industrial peace, and that they 
abide by the principles of compulsory arbitration in deciding industrial 
relations matters. The Labor party offered what it passionately believed was 
a vastly superior alternative to direct action. Workers in Queensland were 
told that the arbitration system provided the key to industrial progress. There 
was, therefore, no need to sacrifice industrial peace in the pursuit of advances 
in wages and conditions of work. The Labor party placed great faith in the 
capacity of the arbitration system to secure its industrial relations objectives, 
and, in fact, some of its wider political objectives as well. The Queensland 
Industrial Court's mode of operation, and its principles and decisions were thus 
of vital significance to a workforce which, in the early months of peace, 
clearly held high expectations of both the government and the arbitration 
institutions. 
The Labor party's rhetoric stressed that the pattern of industrial 
relationships in Queensland ought to be determined by the industrial court. 
The state ought to assume a largely passive role: 'It is considered that 
legislative action is unnecessary to regulate industrial matters excepting 
where anomalies or evils beyond the jurisdiction of the Court exist'. Labor 
governments, however, were traditionally never prepared to stand aside in this 
manner. From its inception. The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
required the court to consider certain matters when making its judgments. 
What distinguished one Labor government from another was the rate at which 
these requirements were extended. The period of the Hanlon Labor 
government was marked by a willingness to use a variety of legislative 
pressures on the arbitration system to ensure that the government's industrial 
relations objectives were achieved. The speed and direction of change in 
industrial relations were determined politically: the arbitration system was 
but part, albeit an important part, of this process. 
1. T.A. Foley to J.J. Healy, 6 August 1943, correspondence files, P.L.P., 
Parliament House, Brisbane. 
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There was, however, one major area in which successive Labor 
governments hoped and prayed they would not have to intervene. Rhetoric 
and reality corresponded most closely when it came to the determination of 
wages. Ever since a Labor government in 1925 had acknowledged the strength 
of internal party pressures, and had fixed the basic wage in Queensland by 
legislation, its successors resisted with all their might subsequent demands 
that the basic wage be set by the parliament. Despite widespread belief 
within the community and in government circles during 1946 and 1947 that the 
basic wage was grossly inadequate, the Hanlon government staunchly 
maintained this policy. 
The government justified its policy that the industrial court was the 
appropriate body to determine the Queensland basic wage, and wages 
generally, on both technical and political grounds. It argued that the court 
was more competent than the parliament to obtain and analyse the relevant 
information. Moreover, if the practice of varying the basic wage by 
legislation was established, then political parties would be tempted to include 
promises regarding the basic wage in their election campaigns. Political 
expediency would outweigh important economic considerations. If a Labor 
government established such a practice, workers could generally expect 
sympathetic legislation, but in the event of a non-Labor government coming 
to power, there would be no convention or tradition to restrain it from 
reducing the basic wage by direct legislation. There may also be times when 
circumstances demanded a decrease in the basic wage. A Labor government, 
however, would find it politically difficult to exercise this economic 
•3 
responsibility if to do so required legislation.^ 
The Hanlon government, in common with all previous Labor 
administrations, may well have wished to stand at one remove from wage 
2. Minister for Labour and Employment and Mines to J.J. Ryan, 18 
November 1946, A/9884, Queensland State Archives (Q.S.A.), 
Brisbane. 
3. T.L.C Deputation to V.C. Gair. Notes 17 October 1947, A/9894, 
Q.S.A., pp.5,6. 
determination but, as the analysis of the 1948 Railway Dispute will show, it 
was vitally concerned with both the quantum of wage increases awarded by 
the court and the principles which guided its decisions. In all major cases, 
such as those dealing with the basic wage or the Public Service Award-State, 
the public service commissioner put the government's views to the court. 
There were three major basic wage cases during the period of this 
study. They were heard in 1946, 1948 and 1950. In 1946, the government 
supported an immediate increase in the state basic wage principally in the 
hope that thereby industrial peace would be restored: 
...the existing wage standards have brought about 
industrial discontent which, in turn, must militate 
not only against maintenance of production but 
against increased production. 
The matters of production and industrial peace were stressed. 'The key to 
national well-being and industrial security is production, goodwill and 
wholesome co-operation in industry.' The court was told, furthermore, that 
wage rates should be at levels which would attract labour to Queensland.^ 
The government adopted an apparently more neutral stance in the 
1948 basic wage hearings. The public service commissioner, however, made 
much of the fact that the Queensland basic wage had a greater real value than 
that of any other state tribunal or that of the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration. The commissioner seems to have been implying 
to the court that at the very least it ought not disturb the existing 
relationship between the Queensland and other basic wages, and that perhaps 
it even ought to consider a policy of reducing the advantage in purchasing 
power enjoyed by the Queensland basic wage. 
What was possibly implicit in 1948 became explicit in 1950. The 
public service commissioner told the court that the state basic wage ought to 
4. Transcript case nos. 303 and 304 of 1946, office of the industrial 
registrar, Brisbane, pp.140,141,151,152. 
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be the same as the commonwealth basic wage for Brisbane. The commissioner 
argued that this was clearly the logical outcome of applying the wage fixing 
principles enunciated by the court in recent years.^ Although no conclusive 
evidence can be adduced, it is worth speculating that the government's 
position in the 1950 basic wage case suggested that its wages policy was 
placing rather less emphasis than previously on a t t rac t ing labour to 
Queensland and rather more on encouraging the inflow of domestic and 
foreign capital . 
In the period 1946 to 1952, the court's wage fixing policy was designed 
to achieve equality between the remuneration of employees working in the 
same industries in Queensland under both s ta te and federal awards, to contain 
wage rises and to effect an improvement in the position of relatively low paid 
employees under Queensland awards. The court hoped to create favourable 
circumstances for employers to expand and/or establish in Queensland, to 
make a contribution to the control of inflation in Australia and to redistribute 
income to the lowest paid employees. Rates of pay in the Mechanical 
Engineering (War Loading) Award-State were brought into line with those 
prevailing in the Federal Metal Trades Award in September 1947. Similar 
decisions were taken in respect of some other important awards. These 
decisions meant that the federal basic wage became the basis of wage rates in 
several important Queensland awards.° As a result, the superiority enjoyed by 
certain occupations under Queensland awards over rates in similar federal 
awards disappeared. This process was completed in 1950 when the court 
adopted the federal basic wage as the standard for all Queensland s tate 
awards. It argued that the original reason for the difference in favour of the 
Queensland basic wage had disappeared. This original reason involved the 
5. Transcript case nos. 282 of 1948, 296 and 298 of 1950, office of the 
industrial registrar, Brisbane, p . l 6 1 . 
6. Transcript case no. 295 of 1947, office of the industrial registrar, 
Brisbane, pp.2,5. 
7. For some t ime, the s ta te basic wage was four shillings higher than the 
federal basic wage for Brisbane and seven shillings higher than the 
federal basic wage for the rest of Queensland. 
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failure in the late 1930s by the federal court to make adequate provision in its 
basic wage for the higher level of prosperity in Queensland when compared 
with other states.° 
Apart from cost of living adjustments, the basic wage in Queensland 
awards was increased on only two occasions: in December 1946 and December 
1950. In the 1948 basic wage case, the court refused to increase the basic 
wage beyond what was necessary to allow for increases in the cost of living. 
It was unwilling to increase the Queensland basic wage in the absence of any 
changes in the federal basic wage. The court wished to preserve the equality 
between the rates in several state and federal awards which it had so 
painstakingly implemented in 1947. Under Queensland industrial legislation, 
any increase in the basic wage raised the general level of wages to the same 
extent. The court also saw its rejection of any increase in the Queensland 
basic wage as contributing to the containment of inflation in Australia: 
movements in the Queensland basic wage would trigger demands for similar 
increases in federal awards and in the awards of other state tribunals. 
From 1948 to October 1950, the court declined to hear union 
applications for a further review of the Queensland basic wage. The court 
argued that the matter of the federal basic wage was before the 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, and that, until a 
decision was forthcoming, it was not prepared to take any unilateral action in 
respect of the Queensland basic wage.^^ The court was not prepared to allow 
a situation to continue in which its basic wage had a greater purchasing power 
than the basic wages set by other tribunals. Despite its 1948 decision which 
was designed to secure uniformity between real basic wages throughout 
i , Basic Wage - November 1950. Judgment of the President, Mr. W.J. 
Riordan and Mr. T.E. Dwyer Queensland Government Gazette 
(Q.G.G.), 7 December 1950, p.2428. 
9. Basic Wage - April 1948. Judgment Q.G.G., 26 April 1949, p.l358. 
10. Ibid., p.1359. 
11. Basic Wage - November 1950. Judgment of the President, Mr. W.J. 
Riordan and Mr. T.E. Dwyer p.2427. 
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Australia, the court's own figures revealed that this had not occurred when 
real basic wage levels in Brisbane were compared with those in Sydney and 
Melbourne. Its decision in 1950 to equate the Queensland basic wage with the 
federal basic wage for Brisbane involved a further attempt to rectify this 
position.^^ This decision was based on a belief that a higher real basic wage 
in Queensland would discriminate against employers in Queensland, 
I -3 
particularly those involved in competition with firms in other states.^'^ 
The court's policy of indexing the basic wage for changes in the cost 
of living protected the lower paid employees against the effects of inflation 
and afforded some limited protection to the higher paid groups as well. The 
court was not, however, prepared to index margins despite frequent pleas 
from the unions. In 1948, the court instituted a policy of ensuring the 
minimum rate of remuneration in its awards was above the basic wage. It 
anticipated the minimum wage concept which was first introduced into 
federal awards in 1966. The court's desire to favour the relatively lower paid 
employees was also reflected in its refusal to grant union claims for 
percentage increases in award rates. The introduction of a minimum wage 
concept was forced on the court as a consequence of its policy of freezing the 
Queensland basic wage in the period from 1947 to 1950. It could not, under 
these circumstances, improve the position of relatively low paid workers by 
increasing the basic wage. The only avenue open to the court was to place the 
low paid workers on a margin above the basic wage. The effect was to 
prevent a rise in the general wage level while at the same time reducing the 
gap between the highest and lowest rates of pay in Queensland awards. 
Another area in which explicit distributional principles were 
considered by the court concerned female wage rates. These principles were 
to be found in both The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act and in the 
court's interpretation of these statutory provisions. The Act provided that: 
It*. Ibid., p.2429. 
1%. Ibid., p.2428. 
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while 
The basic wage of an adult male employee shall be 
not less than is sufficient to maintain a well-
conducted employee of average health, strength, 
and competence and his wife and a family of three 
children in a fair and average standard of 
comfort,.... 
The basic wage of an adult female employee shall 
not be less than is sufficient to enable her to 
support herself in a fair and average standard of 
comfort,.... 
These definitions implied that the paternalistic nuclear family ought to be 
recognised as the basic social unit. The Act also provided that: 
The same wage shall be paid to persons of either 
sex performing the same work or producing the 
same return of profit to their employer.^^ 
When taken together, however, these clauses in the industrial code 
meant that equal pay was a logical impossibility. Even if margins for skill 
were set as being the same for both men and women in a particular 
occupation, the basis on which male and female basic wages were computed of 
necessity meant a lower basic wage for females than for males. This did not 
escape the attention of various women's groups. The Australian Federation of 
Business and Professional Women's Clubs petitioned the government to amend 
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act to require that the basic wage 
and rates of pay for all occupations be determined regardless of the 
employee's sex.^-' The submission, however, was not taken very seriously. 
Public service comment was not sought as was the usual practice when 
matters of industrial relations significance were put to the government. Not 
a great deal more attention was given to a request from the League of Women 
Voters that the government remove all dimensions of sex discrimination from 
14. The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts, 1932 to 1946 
(Brisbane: Government Printer, 1947), pp.16,22. 
15. Audrey Turner to E.M. Hanlon, 8 November 1948, batch 259A, 'Equal 
Pay for Equal Work', premier's department, Brisbane. 
Queensland regulations and statutes. 
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16 
The government's official response on the question of equal pay was to 
argue that the relevant provision in the arbitration act empowered the 
industrial court to award it in appropriate cases. Equal pay was not entirely 
alien to Queensland industrial practice. It was enjoyed by musicians, 
chemists' assistants, physiotherapists, resident medical officers in hospitals, 
dentists and tram conductors. Interpretations of the Act by the court, 
however, meant that equal pay was more an industrial rarity than a reality in 
Queensland. 
In May 1951, the court rejected an application by the Federated 
Clerks' Union for equal pay.^° It endorsed the views expressed some thirty-
two years earlier by the then president of the court, Mr Justice T.W. 
McCawley. Mr Justice McCawley had interpreted the reference in the Act to 
'the same work' to mean 'the same in kind, quantity, and quality', and in 
applying this interpretation in the case of teachers, had argued that male and 
female teachers did not do the same kind of work on grounds that modern day 
1 9 
critics (and experience) would deem were fundamentally sexist. "^  In 1919 the 
concept of 'women's work' was explicitly adopted and it continued to underpin 
70 wage fixing practices in Queensland for many decades thereafter. 
16. M. McLean to E.M. Hanlon, 1 September 1950, batch 259, 'Status of 
Women', premier's department, Brisbane. 
17. Minister for Labour and Industry to Joyce Slater, 24 April 1950, 
A/9902, Q.S.A. 
18. Clerks and Switchboard Attendants' Award-State. Judgment 
Queensland Industrial Gazette (Q.I.G.), 30 June 1951, p.221. A similar 
claim in respect of the same award had been made and rejected in 
1946. 
19. Judgment - Teachers' Claim Q.I.G., 10 January 1920, p.l4. 
20. Further evidence on this can be found in the following sources: Milk 
Distributing Depot Award - South Eastern District. Judgment Q.I.G., 
31 December 1951, p.536; Transcript case nos. 303 and 304 of 1946, 
pp.33,35,36. 
94 
The court decided in 1951 that the minimum rates for females in 
certain awards should be seventy-five per cent of the minimum rate payable 
to adult males.^^ The industries to which this decision applied were those 
which had been regulated until the end of 1949 under the National Security 
(Female Minimum Rates) Regulations. The court, however, was unwilling to 
establish the same relationship between the male and female basic wages in 
Queensland, although for some years it had followed a policy of steadily 
raising the female basic wage relative to that for males. In 1950 it increased 
the female basic wage to sixty-six per cent of the male rate.^^ 
A major issue for the court was the extent to which over-award 
payments should be taken as a guide in subsequent award variations. Unions 
frequently argued that prevailing market rates ought to be incorporated into 
the award structure. At times, some awards did come close to being paid 
rates awards. As a general rule, however, the court was not prepared to be 
guided by the market in the determination of minimum rates of pay unless it 
could be proved that a majority of relevant employers was paying over-award 
rates to the bulk of their employees in all classifications.^-^ Under the court's 
wage fixing principles, employees in industries which were considered of 
above-average prosperity were granted loadings in their awards.'^^ By the 
same token, wage rises and/or improvements in conditions were refused if the 
court believed that they could lead to unemployment in particular 
industries, or if the economic viability of a firm and/or industry appeared to 
21. Woollen Textile Manufacturing Award-South-Eastern Division. 
Judgment Q.G.G., 22 December 1951, p.l830. 
22. Basic Wage - November 1950. Judgment of the President, Mr. W.J. 
Riordan and Mr. T.E. Dwyer p.2429. 
23. Mechanical Engineering Award-State. Judgment Q.G.G., 6 January 
1953, p.30. 
24. Abattoir Award-Brisbane; Meat Export Award-State. Judgment 
Q.I.G., 30 June 1948, p.957. 
25. Building Trades Award-State. Judgment Q.G.G., 5 January 1953, p.l6. 
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be threatened.^^ 
Despite frequent submissions by union advocates, the industrial court 
constantly rejected the concept of an automatic flow-on to Queensland 
awards of improvements in wages and/or conditions granted in other 
77 jurisdictions. Some account was, nevertheless, taken of developments in 
the awards of other tribunals, particularly in the federal arena and those in 
New South Wales and South Australia. In some instances, the court was 
concerned to prevent the interstate migration of labour which it feared could 
have occurred if rates in certain Queensland awards lagged too far behind 
those in similar awards of other state tribunals. '^  Equity considerations also 
influenced the court to assess periodically the relationship between 
Queensland award rates and those paid to similar occupations under awards in 
other states. Many union leaders were convinced, however, that the rates in 
Queensland awards were often lower than those in comparable interstate 
awards. Angry accusations that Queensland was a low wage state were 
frequently made, especially in the late 1940s. Such an industrial relations 
atmosphere was an ingredient in the outbreak of serious industrial disputes in 
1947 and 1948. The reaction of the court to these severe criticisms was to 
insist that what mattered was the purchasing power of the wage, and that on 
this account, real wage rates in Queensland compared more than favourably 
79 with those in other states.' '^ 
In dealing with the structure of each of its awards, and the 
relationships between them, the court resisted attempts by union advocates to 
26. Mount Morgan Limited Award-Gold and Metalliferous Mining; Mount 
Morgan Limited Award-Mount Morgan Limited. Judgment Q.I.G., 30 
June 1951, p.223. 
27. Wheaten Milling Award-Southern Division. Judgment Q.I.G., 31 
December 1948, p.2069. 
28. Transcript case no. 35 of 1948, office of the industrial registrar, 
Brisbane, pp.46-48. 
29. Abattoir Award-Brisbane; Meat Export Award-State. Judgment 
Q.I.G., 30 June 1948, p.957. 
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30 
establish a pattern of automatically maintained relativities. There were, of 
course, certain rules governing relativities which the court had adopted of its 
own volition. The wage rates of the salaried staff in the railway service, for 
example, were specifically related to those of the salaried staff in the public 
service as a whole, and in general terms '...this Court's awards have been very 
carefully built up over the years on a system of comparison, thus achieving a 
measure of balance between awards'.^^ Nevertheless, members of the court 
saw their capacity to develop and maintain a particular pattern of consistency 
within and between Queensland awards being inhibited as a result of the 
appointment in 1947 of federal conciliation commissioners with the power to 
fix marginal rates in federal awards. The court was concerned at this 
development. It pointed out that decisions in respect of margins by various 
conciliation commissioners '...have resulted in the creation of an anomalous 
32 position so far as many sections of industry in Queensland are concerned'. 
During a time when it was coming to terms with the implications of the 
growing influence of federal arbitration decisions, the court greeted these 
further institutional changes with little pleasure. 
The growth of various types of penalty payments under federal awards 
encouraged the A.W.U. to lodge a claim in 1948 for a general ruling in favour 
of the concept of penalty rates for weekend and shift work. The concept was 
not unknown in Queensland. It was, however, confined to a very few awards, 
the Railway Award-State being the only major one to which it applied. In 
March 1949, the court declined to extend the principle to all its awards, but 
indicated that it would consider applications on a case by case basis. The 
court made it clear that, with the exception of very special cases, such 
applications were only likely to succeed when they involved workers in 
industries engaged in continuous shift work. Nevertheless, as a matter of 
government policy, the principle of weekend penalty rates as exemplified in 
30, Railway Award-State. Judgment Q.G.G., 2 July 1949, p.63. 
31, Regional Electricity Boards Award-Professional And Clerical 
Employees. Judgment Q.G.G., 6 July 1949, p.93. 
32, Basic Wage-April 1948, Judgment p.l358. 
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the Railway Award-State was conceded during the hearing to crown 
employees. The court intimated that it would accept variations to public 
service awards reached by consent agreements.^-^ This 1949 case saw a 
significant extension of the penalty rates concept in the field of public sector 
employment. 
Accelerating inflationary pressures in the early 1950s were 
responsible for consistent appeals to the government to protect real 
incomes. Unions and Labor party branches favoured an expansion of the 
functions of the industrial court to include responsibility for price control and 
a general extension of the scope and impact of controls over prices. The 
government, however, believed it was futile to apply such proposals to what in 
many respects was an open economy in terms of both interstate and 
international trade. A national price control scheme, the government 
suggested, could possibly provide the answer. Working class organisations 
were informed that there was little any state government could do in the area 
of price control beyond that already being achieved in Queensland. At the 
same time, they were chided for failing to act in their own best interests: 
We know that the workers of Australia in general 
are to blame. In 1948 they decided, when a 
referendum was submitted to them on the question, 
not to allow continuance of Commonwealth [price] 
control. Further, the workers of Australia returned 
an anti-Labour Federal Government which has 
declared its opposition to Commonwealth [price] 
control.-^^ 
During the Hanlon years, concern within the mainstream of the labour 
movement at the performance and attitudes of the industrial court increased 
to politically significant dimensions. As long as the criticism was largely 
confined to left-wing quarters, it was easily dismissed, but reservations 
concerning the court were increasingly expressed across a wide spectrum of 
33. Weekend and Shift Work Penalty Rates. Application for General 
Ruling. Judgment Q.G.G., 22 April 1949, p.l334. 
34. Attorney-General to S.J. Bryan, 3 July 1951, A/9854, Q.S.A. 
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labour opinion. Tensions between the court and several unions were 
heightened by the meat and railway disputes as well as a tramway dispute in 
1949. Relations between some railway unions and the court deteriorated even 
further when bitter complaints were made to the minister for Labour and 
Industry in 1949 involving allegations that the court, at the behest of the 
railway department and without consulting the unions concerned, altered one 
of its judgments after it had appeared in the Queensland Government 
Gazette.^^ 
If the court had set out deliberately to antagonise the railway unions 
it could not have chosen a better means. This was the second time in the 
space of two years it had acted in this way. The mood of conservative critics 
of the court was not improved when, in 1951, it fined officers of a small 
railway union for disobeying its order that they refrain from giving effect to 
their members' decision to participate in a strike which had been endorsed in a 
secret ballot. In a flurry of angry correspondence the union reminded the 
government of a 1950 Labor-in-Politics Convention decision which had 
approved of such authorised strikes, and called upon it to refund the fines.-^° 
An unsympathetic government, however, responded with a stern lecture on the 
obligation not to strike which, it claimed, unions accepted on becoming 
37 
registered in the industrial court. 
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act was amended in 1948 
to increase the maximum size of the court from three to five. This decision 
was taken by the government to counter the criticism that the court took too 
much time to render its judgments. This criticism had been levelled often 
during the 1930s and reached a crescendo in 1947 and 1948, particularly at the 
35. Deputation from various railway unions to the minister for Labour and 
Industry. Notes 20 April 1949, A/9893, Q.S.A., pp.1,2,3,5. 
36. Secretary, Queensland Railway Station-masters', Assistant Station-
masters', and Night Officers' Association to J. Donald, 6 June 1951, 
correspondence files, P.L.P. 
37. Minister for Labour and Industry to J. Donald, 15 August 1951, 
correspondence files, P.L.P. 
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time of the railway dispute. The most influential critic was the A.W.U. In 
March 1948, it asked Hanlon to increase the size of the court to the extent 
necessary to expedite its work. The A.W.U. claimed that an increasing 
number of awards, many of them complex, together with other 
responsibilities, was proving too heavy a workload. The court, according to 
the A.W.U., was unable to conduct sufficient inspections to become familiar 
with changing industrial practices, advocates were given too little time to 
present their cases and judgments were reached too slowly. The spectre of 
the federal arbitration authorities increasing their influence in Queensland 
• 2 0 
under these circumstances was raised. 
The decision to increase the maximum size of the court was taken 
39 
against the advice of the minister for Labour and Industry. Gair believed 
that allegations of delay against the court were part of a Communist party 
campaign to discredit arbitration. He refused to accept that the extent of the 
criticism could be justified.^^ Hanlon, however, was politically more astute 
than his minister. He appreciated that the complaints against the court came 
from a wide cross-section of labour opinion. The deputation from the A.W.U. 
was only one of many contacts Hanlon made with union leaders during 1948 on 
the vexed subject of the court's speed in attending to award matters. 
The appointment of an additional member to the bench in 1949, 
however, did little to reduce allegations that the court was often slow in 
delivering its judgments on union claims. Labor party branch and union 
submissions to the government often argued that the court could, for example, 
38. Deputation from the Annual General Meeting of the Australian 
Workers' Union to the premier. Notes March 1948, A/9893, Q.S.A., 
p.l . One extra member was appointed to the court in 1949. This was 
the president of the T.L.C, Harry Harvey. 
39. Deputation from The Queensland Employers' Federation to V.C. 
Gair. Notes 6 January 1950, A/19145, Q.S.A., p. l . 
40. V.C. Gair to J, McCarthy, 15 March 1948, A/19145, Q.S.A. 
41. E.M. Hanlon to V.J. Cooper, 15 March 1948, batch 536, 'Industrial 
Matters', premier's department, Brisbane. 
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convene quickly to issue restraining orders against strikes, but seemed unable 
on occasions to apply itself with the same dedication to claims for award 
variations.^^ The court was not always particularly helpful in answering such 
charges. Whether through sheer arrogance or utter exasperation with what it 
regarded as years of unfounded criticism, the court in 1952 refused to inform 
the minister for Labour and Industry of the reasons for a delay in publishing 
its judgment on several important award matters.^^ 
The decision taken by the court in 1950 to eliminate the superiority 
enjoyed by the state basic wage over the federal basic wage in Queensland did 
little to improve the court's standing. It was greeted with dismay and anger 
within union ranks. The unions, furthermore, had waited for over two years 
for an adjustment to the basic wage, a delay which in itself did little to 
enhance the court's prestige. The final result drew condemnation and bitter 
protests from even industrially meek sections of the labour movement.^^ 
An undercurrent in many of the attacks on the court suggested that it 
was biased in favour of employer interests. Rank and file miners at Mt. Isa in 
the early 1950s, for example, contrasted an apparent lack of action by the 
court when their employer retrenched two hundred employees as a protest 
against a court decision with what they believed would have been the court's 
response if they had taken strike action when disappointed with certain court 
judgments.'^^ By late 1952, the official view that 'The Queensland Arbitration 
Court has always enjoyed a reputation for a sympathetic attitude towards the 
employee,....'^^ did not correspond particularly closely with perceptions 
42. W. Barker to S.J. Bryan, 15 May 1952; A. Jones to J. Donald, 25 July 
1952; A/9893, Q.S.A. 
43. Industrial Registrar to The Under Secretary, Department of Labour 
and Industry, 23 July 1952, A/9893, Q.S.A. 
44. S.J. Haigh to V.C. Gair, 13 December 1950, A/9894, Q.S.A. 
45. Norm Smith to V,C. Gair, 8 January 1952, A/9902, Q.S.A. 
46. Department of Labour and Industry. Typescript 12 May 1950, A/9853, 
Q.S.A., p,7. 
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within many quarters of the labour movement. 
Questions of bias in the court certainly interested the minister for 
Labour and Industry. V.C. Gair, however, seemed more impressed by 
employer concerns in this area than by union complaints. He was at some 
pains to reassure Queensland employers that if a vacancy on the bench 
occurred it would not be filled by anybody with a trade union background. 
Gair was sympathetic to employer suggestions that unless 'balance' was 
maintained in the court's personnel, investor confidence would wane with 
deleterious effects on the flow of capital into Queensland. The minister also 
pledged that he would continue to resist union pressure for the appointment of 
conciliation commissioners similar to what obtained in the federal and New 
South Wales jurisdictions. 
Legislation on industrial matters had an important role to play in the 
Labor party's alternative to direct action. Several amendments to The 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act in 1946 addressed significant issues 
in the area of working conditions. Some of them were rather gentle 
indications to the court, others were firm instructions, that the government 
desired faster progress in certain areas. The former category included annual 
leave for continuous shift workers, sick leave and rest pauses. The gentle hint 
took the form of a legislative indication of the minimum standard which the 
government hoped the court would apply. The government did not, however, 
strip the court of its powers of ultimate discretion on these matters. 
The court's discretion in the area of wrongful dismissal was extended 
in the 1946 amending legislation. It made optional a previous mandatory 
requirement that the court order the reinstatement of any employee which it 
found had been dismissed or discriminated against for engaging in union 
activity or seeking the benefits of an award. The government would not, 
however, extend the protection in the Act against wrongful dismissal. This 
was despite long-standing submissions from the Australian Journalists' 
47, Deputation from The Queensland Employers' Federation to V,C, 
Gair, Notes 6 January 1950, pp.2,4. 
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Association calling for legislation to prevent any discrimination in 
48 
employment on the grounds of actual or intended public or political activity 
and requests from several unions during the meat dispute that employer rights 
to hire and fire be curtailed. As a general principle the government supported 
the court's exercise of its powers 'To define and declare the relative rights 
and mutual duties of employers and employees....' " in a way which preserved 
traditional managerial prerogatives.^^ 
In some cases the 1946 amendments allowed the court no discretion. 
The government's decisions to add show day to the list of holidays which 
attracted double time for any work performed, to introduce two weeks annual 
leave for most employees, to require payment for any untaken leave upon 
dismissal, to grant severance pay and to insist that the court determine 
immediately any notified dispute were presented as firm instructions to the 
court which it was obliged to follow to the letter. 
The Hanlon government legislated for the forty hour week in 1947. 
Prior to this, successive governments had staunchly resisted what was 
arguably the industrial reform most sought after by the labour movement in 
Queensland. Some twelve years had elapsed since the prime minister at the 
time, J.A. Lyons, canvassed the views of state premiers on the International 
57 Labour Office convention on the forty hour week.-^ Labor governments in 
Queensland took the view that any reduction in the standard working week 
48. P.J. Wallace to The Acting Under Secretary, Department of Labour 
and Employment, 14 February 1944, A/9884, Q.S.A. 
49. The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts, 1932 to 1946 p.l5. 
50. Minister for Labour and Industry to J. Donald, 30 October 1952, 
correspondence files, P.L.P. 
51. Other arrangements existed in the cases of casual, piece-work and 
continuous shift employees. 
52. G.F. Pearce to The Premier of Queensland, 31 August 1935, A/9884, 
Q.S.A. 
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should be introduced on an Australia-wide basis. They feared that a 
unilateral introduction of the forty hour week would result in a flight of 
capital or a lack of incentive for industry to locate and/or expand in 
Queensland.^^ Equally distasteful was the possibility that such unilateral 
action might encourage employers to seek federal award coverage. Unless a 
reduction of working hours occurred on a national basis, Queensland Labor 
governments believed that the forty hour week could only come into state 
awards as a result of a case by case determination by the industrial court. 
The policy of the court was to grant a forty hour week if employment would 
be increased and employers could afford it.^^ During the war years, Labor 
governments continued to resist the pressure for the forty hour week on the 
additional grounds that this would pose a serious threat to the defence 
effort.^^ 
The first postwar Labor-in-Politics Convention was held in Townsville 
in February 1947. Under the guidance of the premier, E.M. Hanlon, it decided 
that: 
As the Government of Queensland has consistently 
supported the establishment of a national 40-Hour 
Week before the Federal Arbitration Court, 
Convention urges the Queensland Government to 
amend its Arbitration Act to establish a standard 
40-Hour Week for the State of Queensland in the 
event of the Federal Court failing to do so.^' 
This appeared to mark a quite radical departure from previous policy. This 
was, however, more apparent than real. 
53. Frank A. Cooper to M. Healy, 15 February 1946, batch 165, '40 Hour 
Week', premier's department, Brisbane. 
54. Daily Standard 22 June 1936; The Telegraph 11 February 1946. 
55. The Courier-Mail 20.22 July 1937. 
56. The Courier-Mail 19 February 1941. 
57. A.L.P. Official Record of the Nineteenth Queensland Labor-in-
Politics Convention (Brisbane: The Worker Newspaper, 1947), p.30. 
104 
The conditions which Labor governments had laid down as 
prerequisites for legislation to reduce the working week were all but fulfilled 
by early 1947. The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court had 
declared in favour of the forty hour week principle in October 1946. The 
Queensland government, therefore, was confident that the forty hour week 
would be introduced into federal awards. The New South Wales government, 
furthermore, had announced that the forty hour week would apply to awards in 
that state as from 1 July 1947. Moreover, a not insignificant proportion of 
the workforce in Queensland was already working a forty hour week. 
Labour supply considerations influenced the government in favour of 
the forty hour week. Its economic advisors warned that if Queensland did not 
match the decisions taken by New South Wales and the federal court then 
'...the effect on the labour supply available in this State will be most 
serious'. The government was also assured that there was little economic risk 
in introducing the forty hour week. Business was well able to afford it, costs 
in industries which produced internationally traded goods were comfortably 
below those of competitors, other industries were protected from import 
competition by virtue of the tariff while prosperity and productivity in 
Queensland compared more than favourably with the position in other 
s t a t e s . ^ On 16 September 1947, the minister for Labour and Industry, V.C. 
Gair, placed a bill before the Queensland parliament to give the Queensland 
Industrial Court the discretion to reduce the standard working week to forty 
hours without loss of pay from 1 January 1948. Despite the great pressure for 
this change which had come from the labour movement for many years, the 
bill nevertheless encountered a stormy passage in the caucus. 
The major point of contention concerned the continuation of a 
provision in the Act which specifically reserved the determination of the 
maximum numbers of working days and hours in any week in the case of 
certain occupations to the discretion of the court. The occupations in 
question were domestic servants, railway gatekeepers, employees on coastal, 
bay and river vessels, employees on farms who cared for stock as well as 
58. Forty Hour Week. Typescript September 1947, A/9884, Q.S.A., pp.4,5. 
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musterers and drovers. The Act also provided that the court could refuse to 
award the standard working week if it decided that this would cause 
substantial unemployment or otherwise prejudice the community in general. 
Members of the A.W.U. section within the Parliamentary Labor Party were 
disappointed and annoyed that the benefits of the forty hour week legislation 
were not to be passed on automatically to certain categories of primary 
industry employees many of whom formed the backbone of their 
constituencies. They sought to persuade the party that the court should be 
stripped of its discretion in deciding the extent of the forty hour week.^° 
Despite caucus support for this argument, it was ignored by the cabinet."^ 
Extensive amendments were made in March 1952 to The Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act. On four important matters, long service 
leave, sick leave, payment for statutory holidays and holiday pay, previous 
judgments by the court were overruled. Applications to the court in 1950 for 
long service leave in the private sector were consistently refused. A 
comprehensive long service leave scheme applied to virtually all crown 
employees, but only consent awards contained long service leave provisions 
applicable to employees outside the public sector. The major union groups 
decided early in 1951 to abandon further approaches to the court in favour of 
a campaign to persuade the government to introduce long service leave by 
legislation. The first step was taken by the T.L.C. in March 1951; shortly 
afterwards, the A.W.U. raised the issue with the government. 
59. P.L.P. Minutes 10 September 1947, pp.2-6. 
60. For an explanation of the reluctance of governments in general to 
regulate employment conditions in primary industry to the same 
extent as in other industries, see: Howard Gill, 'Land, Labour or 
Capital: Industrial Relations in the Australasian Primary Sector,' The 
Journal of Industrial Relations 23 (June 1981): 141,145,157,159,160. 
61. Minister for Labour and Industry to General Secretary, Trades and 
Labor Council of Queensland, 23 March 1951, A/9889, Q.S.A.; 
Minister for Labour and Industry to Branch Secretary, Australian 
Workers' Union, 4 April 1951, A/9887, Q.S.A. Denis Murphy wrongly 
attributes the introduction of long service leave to the Gair 
government. Murphy, 'The 1957 Split: "A Drop in the Ocean in 
Political History",' p.491. The long service leave policy was decided 
before Hanlon took leave of absence on 30 August 1951. 
106 
The campaign was well orchestrated. The pressure from the principal 
trade union bodies was reinforced by an avalanche of correspondence from 
A.L.P. branches throughout the state calling on the government to act without 
delay on the matter of long service leave. There was, however, resistance 
within the public service to this groundswell of opinion. Some of the 
government's advisors believed it was inappropriate to deplete the labour 
force by the introduction of long service leave. Developments in New South 
Wales and in the federal arena, however, proved decisive. The New South 
Wales government brought down long service leave legislation which applied 
from 1 July 1951, while the federal government empowered the 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to consider applications 
67 for long service leave in federal awards. 
On 11 September 1951, the parliamentary draftsman commenced the 
preparation of a bill which contained the government's long service leave 
proposals. From this date replies by ministers to the continuing stream of 
letters calling for long service leave contained much favourable 'nodding and 
winking' on the subject. Well after the bill was in the hands of the 
parliamentary draftsman, however, the A.W.U. continued a not too gentle 
pressure on the government to legislate for long service leave. In November 
1951, the A.W.U. Queensland branch secretary wrote to the minister for 
Labour and Industry: 
...relative to the making of provision for Long 
Service Leave, my Union feels that this is a 
particular matter that should, under no 
circumstances, be delayed. It entailed a long 
discussion at the Union's last Delegate Meeting, 
and I feel that it should not cause further anxiety 
at the forthcoming Delegate Meeting which will 
commence on 10 January next. 
I do trust that the Government, in its wisdom, will 
see fit to proceed with an amendment of the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act to 
provide for Long Service Payment, and thus avoid 
62. Assistant Under Secretary, Department of Labour and Industry to The 
Minister. Memorandum9 August 1951, A/9889, Q.S.A. 
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unnecessary discussions in future concerning this 
matter. 
Perhaps this apparent ignorance of the government's plans was indicative of a 
less than intimate state of communications between the cabinet under the 
acting premier"^ V.C. Gair and the senior officials of the A.W.U. A more 
likely explanation for this heavy-handed approach is that the A.W.U. was 
aware of the government's legislative proposals and was determined to 
maintain the pressure to prevent any last minute changes of heart by the 
politicians. 
The long service leave amendments to The Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act allowed the court no room for interpretation save on a few 
minor matters. This course of action was adopted because the government 
was less than pleased with the court's implementation of other important 
policies. One such policy concerned sick leave. The 1946 legislation had 
indicated the government's desire that all award employees be entitled to at 
least one week's sick leave for every completed year of employment with an 
employer. Employers, however, were not bound to make payment for more 
than two weeks' sick leave in any one year. The court was, nevertheless, 
explicitly empowered to award more generous sick leave conditions if it so 
desired. 
All claims for sick leave in excess of that suggested in the legislation 
were subsequently refused by the court. This policy caused much soul-
searching within the government. Legal advice left no doubt that the court 
could, if it wished, award whatever period of sick leave it considered 
appropriate. By 1950, the A.W.U. was no longer prepared to tolerate the 
63. Branch Secretary, Australian Workers' Union to The Minister for 
Labour and Industry, 21 November 1951, A/9887, Q.S.A. 
64. E.M. Hanlon took leave of absence from his duties as premier, on the 
grounds of indifferent health, at the end of August 1951. He died on 
17 January 1952. 
court's a t t i tude. I t launched a vigorous campaign to have what appeared to be 
a recalc i t rant and unsympathetic court brought into l ine. Public service 
advice on the appropriate response was divided. The public service 
commissioner urged restraint and reminded the government of i ts pol i t ica l 
rhetoric which emphasised the court's independence and freedom to exercise 
its discretion. Legislative act ion would mean reject ing a decision of the fu l l 
bench. The department of Labour and Industry, on the other hand, 
supported the A .W.U.^ ' In the short t e rm , the government accepted the 
public service commissioner's advice.^° The A.W.U. , however, was not to be 
denied. With the support of the Elect r ica l Trades Union (E.T.U.), i t continued 
to press the mat ter unt i l the government f inal ly agreed to legislate for a more 
generous sick leave ent i t lement . 
The March 1952 legislat ion also swept aside two fur ther court 
decisions. In some parts of Queensland industry, i t was the practice to stand 
down employees without pay over the Christmas-New Year period and/or to 
discharge employees during December only to re-employ them the fo l lowing 
January. The employers' objective in most cases was to avoid payment to as 
many workers as possible for the three statutory holidays which fe l l during the 
period when many establishments closed down their operations. Early in 1951, 
both the A.W.U. and the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners 
asked the court to protect their members from such practices. The 
applications were, however, dismissed. Some months ear l ier , the court had 
also decided that employers were ent i t led to calculate holiday pay on the 
basis of award rates and not a t the rate of pay actual ly enjoyed by an 
employee. 
65. Minister for Labour and Industry to Branch Secretary, Austral ian 
Workers' Union, 21 August 1950, A/9887, Q.S.A. 
66. Public Service Commissioner to The Secretary for Labour and 
Industry, 2 October 1950, A/9887, Q.S.A. 
67. Assistant Under Secretary, Department of Labour and Industry to The 
Minister. Memorandum 25 August 1950, A/9887, Q.S.A. 
68. Minister for Labour and Industry to Branch Secretary, Austral ian 
Workers' Union, 19 October 1950, A/9887, Q.S.A. 
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The trade union movement in Queensland was not, however, prepared 
to live with these decisions. Appeals were made to the government calling on 
it to use its legislative powers to rectify the situation. With strong support 
within the public service, the unions' submissions struck a responsive chord in 
the cabinet. These legislative actions by the government in March 1952 
reflected a fundamental reality in Queensland Labor politics. No Labor 
government could be indifferent to the policies of the industrial court: they 
had too crucial an impact on the government's efforts to improve material 
living standards whilst maintaining industrial peace for the court to be given 
carte blanche in deciding the pace and direction of change in Queensland 
industrial relationships. 
In the early postwar years, moreover, the capacity of the industrial 
court to exert any influence at all in respect of certain groups in the 
workforce was called into serious question. In the tinder dry industrial 
relations atmosphere of the time, it seemed more than likely that the 
institutions designed to contain manifestations of industrial conflict could be 
confronted with perhaps their most significant challenges in several decades. 
And so it proved to be. A decisive test of the arbitration system in 
Queensland was not long in coming. On 7 March 1946, the employees in a 
bacon factory on the outskirts of Brisbane struck work to force their employer 
to reinstate four recently dismissed workmates. This apparently minor 
dispute ignited an explosive mixture of new order idealism, traditional 
industrial and political hatreds and Labor party determination to enforce its 
traditional policy of industrial peace. 
69. The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts, 1932 to 1948. 
Proposed Amendments A/9889. Q.S.A. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE 1946 MEAT INDUSTRY DISPUTE 
background 
Ill 
One of the longest and most bitter disputes in Australian industrial 
relations history began on 29 March 1946 when the Australasian Meat Industry 
Employees' Union in Queensland called on its entire membership to strike 
against the bacon factories and meat export companies. The dispute lasted 
fourteen weeks. Before it was over the Hanlon Labor government, other trade 
unions, the Chifley government, the Queensland Trades and Labour Council, 
the Communist party and the Queensland Industrial Court had become 
embroiled. In one way or another, few people in Queensland escaped its 
effects. 
The dispute mirrored and aggravated postwar tensions in Australian 
society. It was responsible for the formation of A.L.P. industrial groups in 
Queensland, it influenced the subsequent industrial and political policies of 
the Communist party, it saw the Hanlon government mount a desperate and 
sustained effort to defend the arbitration principle; and it created pressures 
which were to contribute to the A.L.P. split in Queensland some eleven years 
later . 
The A.M.I.E.U. and the managements of the meat companies and 
bacon factories also joined issue over the nature and extent of managerial 
prerogatives. Traditional notions of the rights of Capital vied for supremacy 
with concepts of worker control of industry which had their origins in the 
syndicalist tradition of many rank and file meatworkers, and which were 
powerfully reinforced by wartime promises of a postwar new order in 
Australia. The dispute also saw a struggle over whether industrial gains won 
by the A.M.I.E.U. under exceptional wartime circumstances were to continue 
1. The meat companies were The Central Queensland Meat Export 
Company Ltd (C.Q.M.E.), Queensland Meat Export Company Ltd 
(Q.M.E.), Thomas Borthwick (5c Sons (Australasia) Ltd (T.B.A.), Swift 
Australian Company Pty Ltd (S.A.C.) and the Queensland Meat 
Industry Board (Q.M.I.B.) which was a statutory authority. The bacon 
factories were operated by Foggitt Jones Pty Ltd, J .C. Hutton Pty 
Ltd, Queensland Co-Operative Bacon Association Ltd, Darling Downs 
Co-Operative Bacon Association Ltd, Warwick Bacon Co. and the 
North Queensland Co-Operative Bacon Association Ltd. 
2. A.M.I.E.U. Committee of Management. Secretary's Report 1942, 
A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane, p.4. 
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in peacet ime. 
The meat industry made a significant contribution to the Queensland 
economy. It accounted directly for 2.04 per cent of the workforce. The 
industry was decentralised with meatworks located near the major ports along 
•3 
the coastal strip. Between the First and the Second World War, the meat 
slaughtering industry in Queensland underwent considerable structural 
change. Several meatworks were closed, some large companies acquired 
t reatment plants from smaller operators, and, in 1931 an element of public 
enterprise was added when the Queensland government purchased the Cannon 
Hill works of Swift Australian Company Pty Ltd which subsequently became 
the Brisbane Abattoir. The control of this meatworks was exercised by a 
statutory authority known as the Queensland Meat Industry Board. The 
Q.M.I.B. did not, however, acquire stock on its own account, slaughter it, and 
then sell the finished products. The Brisbane Abattoir killed on behalf of 
private entrepreneurs. 
By 1934, both the export and domestic trade had become dominated 
by three immensely wealthy and powerful overseas corporations: Thomas 
Borthwick and Sons, Vestey Brothers and Swifts of America. In 1914, ten 
separate companies had between them operated fourteen meatworks. Over a 
period of twenty years, the picture changed radically: four companies 
operated but six meatworks by the mid-1930s. Both federal and state 
government legislation regulated aspects of the Queensland meat slaughtering 
industry. The commonwealth parliament passed the Meat Export Control Act 
in 1935 under which the Australian Meat Board was constituted and 
empowered to issue export licences, and to deal with such things as shipping, 
freight and insurance contracts , sales promotion and research. The 
Queensland government also exercised some control over the performance of 
the industry through the Q.M.I.B. whose statutory tasks included regulating 
3. Major works were located at Ross River (Q.M.E.), Alligator Creek 
(S.A.C.) and Merinda (T.B.A.) in North Queensland, a t Lake's Creek 
(C.Q.M.E.) and Gladstone (S.A.C.) on the central coast, and in the 
Cannon Hill area of Brisbane (T.B.A., Q.M.I.B.). There was also a 
number of bacon factories and meat preserving works found mainly in 
the Brisbane region and at Toowoomba, Warwick and Mareeba. 
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the preparation of meat products for the Brisbane market . 
Coordination between the meat slaughtering companies on issues such 
as government price control, quality, availability of transport and particularly 
on industrial relations mat te r s , was effected through the Queensland 
Meatworks' Companies Committee (Q.M.C.C.) which had been established in 
1910. Decisions of this committee were not, however, binding on the 
individual companies, although the pressures for closer unity increased as the 
industrial strength of the A.M.I.E.U. grew during the Second World War. The 
Meat and Allied Trades' Federation of Australia had little influence on the 
development of industrial relations policy in the industry, and, although the 
Q.M.C.C. affiliated with the Queensland Employers' Federation (Q.E.F.) in 
1945, efforts by the peak employer body to offer industrial relations advice to 
the meat companies were typically greeted with an unmistakeable coolness. 
The economic prospects of the meat industry in the war years and 
early postwar period were decidedly ambivalent. On the demand side of the 
picture, its fortunes looked bright. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, 
the British government contracted to purchase all available supplies of meat , 
and in 1944 it signed long-term agreements which promised a welcome 
element of stability and predictability in the export t rade. Despite this, 
opinion within the industry held that postwar international markets would still 
present significant competitive challenges owing to innovations in both the 
processing and marketing of meat products. 
The position on the supply side of the ledger was, however, far from 
encouraging. Between 1941 and 1946, the meat companies were frustrated by 
both man and nature in their efforts to supply the burgeoning Australian and 
international markets . The production of sufficient stock was severely 
inhibited by massive drought conditions and by the desperate shortage of rural 
labour. The movement of stock from the stations and farms to the various 
meatworks was often delayed by serious shortages of transport. At the 
4. Kenneth F. Walker, Australian Industrial Relations Systems 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), 
pp.250,251. 
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abattoirs , continuity of production was far from guaranteed. At every step in 
the slaughtering process, members of the A.M.I.E.U. exacted revenge for past 
wrongs, asserted greater control over the production process, and pressured 
the meat companies to concede significant improvements in wages and 
conditions. The companies' problems did not, however, end there. On many 
occasions the export of meat was halted by a complete lack of shipping. The 
combined effect on production of several of these difficulties is shown in the 
following table. 
MEAT PRODUCTION, AUSTRALIA AND 
QUEENSLAND, 1938-39 to 1944-45 
(000 Tons) 
Year Australian Queensland Queensland Production 
Production Production as a percentage of 
Australian Production 
1938-39 966 252 26.09 
1939-40 950 248 26.10 
19f;0-4l 965 245 25.39 
1941-42 1027 254 24.73 
1942-43 1057 263 24.88 
1943-44 1043 250 23.97 
19(^1^.1^5 984 234 23.78 
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission. Report various 
issues, (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer). 
Towards the end of 1945, the meat companies, faced with the 
prospect of favourable, but nevertheless competit ive, international and 
domestic markets , could see only one major threat to their profitability. This 
was the industrial behaviour of members and officials of the A.M.I.E.U. The 
union and the companies had fought a never-ending industrial relations batt le 
since the early 1900s, and during the war the tide had turned to the 
considerable advantage of the meatworkers. With the defeat of Japan, the 
A.M.I.E.U. showed no signs of retreat ing from its aggressive industrial policy, 
indeed, it seemed ready to launch further assaults on the economic front as 
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well as on the citadels of managerial power. By early 1946, the meat 
companies had decided that the time had arrived to call a halt to the 
A.M.I.E.U.'s ambitions, and to roll back its recent gains in conditions and 
influence over the work process. 
Although the A.M.I.E.U. was by far the principal union involved in the 
1946 Meat Industry Dispute, other unions drawn into the fray included several 
small unions in the building trades, the Seamen's Union, the Federated Clerks' 
Union (F.C.U.), the Amalgamated Engineering Union (A.E.U.), the Australian 
Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (A.F.U.L.E.), the Storemen and 
Packers' Union (S.P.U.), the Queensland Colliery Employees' Union (Q.C.E.U.), 
the E.T.U., the F.E.D.F.A., the F.I.A., the A.R.U., the T.W.U. and the 
W.W.F. As a broad generalisation, members of the W.W.F. in Queensland 
had few inhibitions over seeking industrial gains through both direct action 
and participation in the arbitration system. They were unimpressed by 
arguments that the benefits of arbitration should be conditional upon a 
rejection of strikes and other forms of direct industrial action, believing 
instead that the judgments of arbi trators depended in the final analysis on the 
industrial strength of those appearing before them. The union was a strong 
supporter of the T.L.C. the secretary of which, Mick Healy, was a member of 
the W.W.F. In common with Healy, several of the union's officials belonged to 
the Communist party although it would be wrong to assert that the union was 
in any sense rigidly 'controlled' by the communists. In the 1940s there was a 
measure of internal resistance to the industrial and political direction in 
which the communists wished to lead the union, and the W.W.F. was one of the 
first unions in Queensland to come under the scrutiny of members of the 
Movement. It would, nevertheless, be fair to say that the bulk of the union's 
membership actively supported a direct action stance in industrial affairs and 
a 'left-wing' perspective on mat te r s political. 
The nature of only the more important unions in the meat dispute will 
be discussed here. The general character of the A.E.U., A.F.U.L.E., 
A.R.U. and F.I.A. is outlined in Chapter 9. 
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The W.W.F. and the A.L.P. had, a t best, an uneasy relationship. The 
union's fluctuating affiliation with the Labor party reflected the changing 
balance over time between, on the one hand, its profound dislike of the nature 
of the party and its policies in Queensland and, on the other, its recognition 
that isolation denied its members any say at all in Labor politics. In the early 
postwar years, the former sentiments were predominant, largely owing to the 
Labor party's vendetta against the aid to Russia movement during the war, 
and its support, in September 1945, for the use of Dutch troops to act as 
strike-breakers when members of the W.W.F. in Brisbane ceased work in 
solidarity with the nationalist revolution in Indonesia. 
Relationships between the T.W.U. and the A.L.P. were, in contrast , 
exceedingly close. Its general secretary, A.C. Milton, was a member of the 
inner executive of the Q.C.E. from 1941 until his death in 1948, and was vice-
president from 1944. He was replaced on the inner executive by T. Rasey, an 
alderman on the Brisbane City Council, who had been a T.W.U. official for 
many years. The union was also affiliated with the T .L .C , but its rank and 
file, and most of its officers, did not subscribe to the 'militant, left-wing' 
industrial and political at t i tudes expressed by most T.L.C. leaders and many 
other affiliated unions. One of these other unions was the Q.C.E.U., although 
even in this case, the generalisation can be taken too far. While the Q.C.E.U. 
numbered several communists in its hierarchy, and while most of its members 
had no reservations about the virtues of direct industrial action, it maintained 
a long affiliation with the A.L.P. and was traditionally reluctant to take strike 
action in support of workers in other industries. A Labor parliamentarian 
represented the Q.C.E.U. on the Q.C.E., and rank and file miners were quick 
to assert their independence if called upon to implement union policies of 
which they did not approve. The Q.C.E.U. was, moreover, a strategically 
important union in a society whose industrial and domestic life depended 
overwhelmingly on a regular and plentiful supply of coal. 
The A.M.I.E.U. was organised into three districts: the northern based 
on Townsville, the central based on Rockhampton and the southern based on 
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Brisbane.^ There was also a branch execut ive, ' and a committee of 
management upon which each of the districts had representation. At the 
national level, each branch of the A.M.I.E.U. sent delegates to a federal 
council of the union. Attitudes among (and within) the branches towards the 
proper role of the council, however, differed markedly. A.J. Neumann, the 
Queensland branch secretary, was an enthusiastic and constant advocate of a 
strong federal s t ructure. This view encountered powerful opposition in other 
s tates . The opposition was based on a tradition of branch autonomy, and 
reinforced by jealousy a t the dominance of the Queensland branch in federal 
A.M.I.E.U. affairs especially during the 1930s and early 1940s. Officials such 
as W.W. Pirie in South Australia held serious fears over the possible extension 
of federal awards in the meat industry, and favoured continued alliegance to 
the respective state industrial tribunals. Proposals in 1945 for the 
establishment of a full-time federal office a t t rac ted further opposition from 
those who believed they were ' . . .part of a communist plot to gain control of 
the union by manipulating its federal structure ' . 
According to Terry Cutler, certain 'left-wing' members and officials 
from Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland (such as A.J. Neumann) had 
met in 1945 and had decided '...on a concerted a t tempt to strengthen the 
federation, primarily to counter the conservative influence of the New South 
q 
Wales branch leadership'. Cutler concludes that the advocacy of closer 
federal ties by left-wing officials '...rallied the more conservative branches in 
opposition'. As well as New South Wales, these branches included 
6. The secretaries were W. Quinn, L.G. Haigh and R. Dixon, and they 
administered the affairs of 1759, 2383 and 4164 members respectively 
which went to make up a total Queensland membership of 8306. 
7. The branch executive consisted of a branch president, vice-president, 
treasurer and secretary. At the beginning of 1946 these offices were 
occupied by H. Field, W.E. Mansfield, J . Thornton and A.J. Neumann. 
8. T.A. Cutler, 'The History of the Australasian Meat Industry 
Employees' Union: A Study of the Internal Dynamics of a Labour 
Organisation' p.339. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid. 
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Newcastle and South Australia. 
Differences existed between A.J. Neumann and his supporters in 
Queensland, and officials in other s ta tes , over the relative virtues of direct 
industrial action as opposed to participation in the processes of arbitration. 
Nowhere was this more manifest than in the profound philosophical 
differences between W.W. Pirie and A.J. Neumann. On all counts, Neumann 
held opposite views to those embraced by Pirie: 
By temperament disposed towards executive 
management of the union, Pirie strongly defended 
the performance of arbitration tribunals as 
preferable to rank and file action over industrial 
demands. Loyal to [King], Queen and 
Commonwealth, Pirie was instinctively ant i-
communist, providing an archetype of the 
protestant supporter of ALP Industrial Groups. ^ ^ 
By the end of the Second World War, there was thus little chance that the 
A.M.I.E.U. federal council could mobilise the union's total resources if any of 
its branches became embroiled in any major industrial confrontation. The 
council was constitutionally too weak and, in any event, too divided along 
personal, strategic and ideological lines for it to become an effective weapon 
in the potential batt les which many, in the Queensland branch at least, 
thought were just over the horizon. 
The regional and ideological considerations which, in the national 
sphere, prevented the creation of a strong federal organisation were also 
apparent a t the s ta te level. Within the Queensland branch, there were always 
officials and members alike who strove for the resolution of disputes through 
constitutional channels. This brought them into conflict with the advocates of 
a vigorous industrial unionism. Tensions were further exacerbated in the 
1920s and 1930s by the growing strength of the branch executive relative to 
that of the district councils in administrative and policy mat ters . During the 
war years, the ideological ferment was kept alive by the medical aid for 
Russia controversy and over agitation for the opening of a second front in 
11* Ibid., p.320. 
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Europe. Although there was widespread endorsement with the Queensland 
branch of the A.M.I.E.U. for the concept of a second front, and for the 
Australian-Russian Medical Aid to Soviet Russia Association, there was 
significant opposition, especially from members and officials who supported 
the A.L.P.'s declaration that the Australian-Russian Association (and other 
pro-Soviet groups) were proscribed organisations. 
Manifestations of disunity within the union over matters such as these 
occurred to some extent along geographic lines. Ever since the early 1930s, 
the northern district, true to its radical political tradition, had boasted a high 
proportion of members and officials who belonged to the Communist party. 
The central district, on the other hand, was administered by a leadership 
which advocated little in the way of fundamental social, political or economic 
change. The Rockhampton area was, furthermore, one of the cradles of the 
Catholic Social Studies Movement in Queensland. By the end of 1945, the 
Movement was well established in several local union and Labor party 
branches. The southern district had more in common with the central than 
with the northern district as far as the political profile of some of its leaders 
was concerned. The southern district secretary, R. Dixon, was a member of 
the A.L.P., a staunch anti-communist, and was little impressed by Neumann's 
advocacy of a political and industrial agenda which was distinctly syndicalist 
in character and tone. 
The A.M.I.E.U. was not an industry union. Although its members 
performed all of the tasks associated with meat slaughtering such as grading, 
freezing, trimming, sawing and knife work, other unions were responsible for 
the clerical, maintenance, construction, engine-driving and coal-handling work 
needed to operate a meatworks. There was thus ample opportunity for 
members of the A.M.I.E.U. to come into contact with other unionists in the 
course of a normal day's work. This contact, however, was not always 
amicable. After sustained efforts between 1913 and 1916 by certain A.W.U. 
and A.M.I.E.U. officials to effect an amalgamation between their two 
organisations, relations ultimately soured, and by 1919 both unions were often 
engaged in demarcation disputes, especially in the northern meatworks. 
This parting of the ways between the A.M.I.E.U. and the A.W.U. was 
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an expression of wider fissiparous tendencies within the Queensland labour 
movement which were as significant at the end of the Second World War as 
they were at the conclusion of the First World War. By the end of 1916, the 
A.W.U. (and other like-minded unions) had moved away from any original 
dedication to militancy in the direction of parliamentary politics and reliance 
on the arbitration system. At the same t ime, the A.M.I.E.U. emphasised the 
virtues of a vigorous industrial unionism marked by collective bargaining with 
employers, and a suspicion that Labor politicans were prone to sacrifice 
working class principles and interests in a desperate search for compromise 
with Capitalism and personal aggrandisement. The extent to which relations 
between the A.M.I.E.U. and the A.W.U. had deteriorated since the heady days 
of the proposed amalgamation can be measured in terms of the meat union's 
warning to workers in other s ta tes in the mid-1930s that the A.W.U. '...should 
be prevented from spreading its tentacles of rotten influence that it has been 
1 7 
able to obtain in this State ' . 
Less than cordial relations obtained between the A.M.I.E.U. and the 
Federated Clerks' Union whose members on occasions during strikes 
performed work normally done by the A.M.I.E.U. The meatworkers were also 
contemptuous of the decided reluctance of the various unions in the railways, 
with the exception of the A.R.U., to engage in direct action either on their 
own account or in support of other workers in dispute. In various meatworks, 
the A.M.I.E.U. and the F.E.D.F.A. had a long history of demarcation 
struggles. At the peak council level, the A.M.I.E.U. maintained a close 
affiliation with the T.L.C. 
The A.M.I.E.U. had a radical tradition. Its industrial objectives and 
strategies found inspiration in anarcho-syndicalism. The union sought to 
control the selection and performance of the meat industry labour force. A 
policy was maintained whereby the union decided which of its members would 
fill the employers' labour requirements and at each meatworks a union board 
of control determined who would work overtime and the pace of the work as 
12, Secretary, A.M.I.E.U. Disputes Committee to the Manager, Labour 
Daily Newspaper Co., Sydney, 25 February 1935, deposit D l , 
A.M.I.E.U., Wollongong University Archives (W.U.A.), Wollongong. 
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well as handling local disputes. Boards of control, moreover, '...were 
admirably suited to the perfecting of on-the-job strategies, especially 
1 3 
sabotage and the application of go-slow tactics'. 
Certain features of the product, and the organisation of production, 
rendered 'on-the-job' industrial action particularly effective. A typical 
meatworks was organised into departments and within each department there 
was considerable specialisation of labour. The successful processing of meat, 
a highly perishable commodity, required an uninterrupted flow of the carcass 
from each task and department to the other. Live cattle, moreover, could not 
be held for long without the risk of disease or deterioration in quality. A go-
slow, organised absenteeism, or sabotage in one section could, therefore, 
seriously disrupt the whole process of production together with shipping and 
other transport arrangements. Both the threat and execution of these tactics 
gave the A.M.I.E.U. considerable bargaining strength especially in the peak 
killing periods. 
These inroads into their managerial prerogatives were bitterly 
resisted and resented by the meat companies. They were constantly on the 
lookout for opportunities to destroy the boards of control and to eliminate and 
prevent any control by the A.M.I.E.U. over the labour supply. Despite the 
provisions in the first Meat Export Award-State (1918), which allowed the 
unions to decide who was employed in the meat industry, the companies found 
a willing ally in the Queensland Industrial Court. Commencing in 1919, and 
during the 1920s, the court progressively withdrew its recognition of the 
union's control over the meat industry labour supply and instead sanctioned 
and extended managerial rights to decide employment policy. 
The point of principle was debated and decided in 1921. After having 
sympathised with meatworkers who suffered abnormally high unemployment 
during the 1921 season owing '...to the determination of the meat export 
companies and the growers to wait for more favourable prices...', the 
13. Terrence Cutler, 'Sunday, Bloody Sunday,' in Strikes. Studies in 
Twentieth Century Australian Social History, eds. John Iremonger, 
John Merritt and Graeme Osborne p.86. 
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president of the court, Mr Justice McCawley decided '...that the employers 
must, for the efficient carrying on of their business, have reasonable freedom 
of choice of the Union employees available'. This freedom would assist the 
companies to obtain 'better discipline' and 'better work' because now 
'...employees will know that they are not independent of the employers in the 
matter of obtaining employment'. McCawley decided that preference in 
employment was to be given to financial members of the A.M.I.E.U. and other 
relevant unions; that the unions supply the employers with a list of all 
members who had registered for work; that the employers indicate to the 
unions which of these members were to be offered employment; that the 
unions notify these people that their services were required; and that the 
union issue each of them with an employment certificate. 
This decision struck at the A.M.I.E.U.'s industrial strength. The union 
was determined, nevertheless, to maintain what control it could over the 
engagement, dismissal and performance of its members despite the loss of this 
legal support. In the years between 1922 and the Second World War, it 
achieved a degree of success in this regard at a number of works through the 
use of various forms of 'on-the-job' industrial pressure. Under the wartime 
circumstances of a tight labour market, regulations which drastically 
restricted employer rights to hire and fire and the vital importance of the 
meat industry in the overall war effort, the A.M.I.E.U. managed to re-
establish a major degree of control over the meat industry labour force. 
Despite the award, it was, for example able to enforce the 'last on, 
first off principle of employment in certain meatworks. These rather special 
wartime advantages enjoyed by the A.M.I.E.U. complemented its considerable 
industrial strength which derived from the fact that the structure and 
organisation of the meat industry rendered it particularly vulnerable to 
various forms of strike action. 'On-the-job' tactics have already been 
discussed but the threat of complete closure of some or all meatworks was 
taken seriously by the companies because the industry was capital-intensive. 
Kenneth F. Walker estimated that, in the early 1960s, after appropriate 
14. Meat Export Industry-State. Judgment Q.G.G., 10 January 1922, 
p.m. 
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adjustments for seasonal factors, the value of fixed capital per employee in 
meat slaughtering considerably exceeded that for all factories in 
Queensland.^ The industry in 1946 was conducted in but six meatworks, thus 
making it relatively easy for the A.M.I.E.U. to control either a strike at all or 
at some of these locations. If the union could prevent the employment of non-
union labour, then either a partial or a general strike in the industry would see 
significant capital assets lying idle with the meat export companies in 
particular having to bear a heavy burden of fixed costs. In case of a major 
strike in the Queensland meat industry, the companies did not have the option 
of using interstate t rea tment works. The huge distances from the cat t le areas 
to these plants meant that transport costs together with the risks of disease 
and loss of condition rendered any such enterprise an impossible proposition. 
The A.M.I.E.U., moreover, was well entrenched in the interstate works. 
The ability of the union to control the mat ter of non-union labour in 
any dispute depended to a degree on the extent of the conflict. If an all-out 
strike occurred at a particular plant, then there was some potential for the 
employment of non-union labour drawn from the ranks of farmers' sons, the 
unemployed and members of other unions. This potential was, however, 
reduced in those areas where the meatworks dominated the local community. 
Considerable pressure not to 'scab' could be brought to bear in such 
circumstances. In the case of a statewide meatworks' strike, however, the 
task of replacing the 8,000 or so members of the A.M.I.E.U. with non-union 
labour was just not feasible in view of the numbers and skills involved to say 
nothing of strategic considerations such as transport and accommodation. 
Fundamental differences over the nature, purpose and legitimacy of 
the arbitration system were responsible for a historically poor relationship 
between the A.M.I.E.U. and the industrial court . The court's endorsement of 
managerial prerogatives enraged the A.M.I.E.U. This was not limited to 
protecting the right to hire and fire, rather the court provided a general 
defence against the efforts by the A.M.I.E.U. to extend the managerial powers 
of Labour. As late as December 1945, the court told the A.M.I.E.U. that 
15. Kenneth F. Walker, Australian Industrial Relations Systems 
pp.251,252. 
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there was no authority in the award or 'anywhere else' for it '...to usurp the 
functions of the management...'.^" 
The A.M.I.E.U. was prepared to use whatever means would yield 
industrial gains for its membership. This pragmatic view meant that the 
union's tactics involved selecting the appropriate blend of direct action and 
participation in the processes of arbitration. Generally speaking, however, 
there were few within the ranks of A.M.I.E.U. officials who did not see direct 
action, or at the very least the threat of direct action, as being the essential 
ingredient in efforts to maintain an advantageous position in industrial 
relations with the meat industry employers. The A.M.I.E.U. believed that 
the Queensland Industrial Court's decisions depended on the relative industrial 
strength of the contending parties and not on any intrinsic qualities in the 
1 9.. arguments placed before it. ® The court, on the other hand, did little to 
conceal its disapproval of gains made by the A.M.I.E.U. through direct 
industrial action: as a general rule it regarded only those improvements 
obtained through arbitration as being justified and legitimate. 
The A.M.I.E.U. felt a keen sense of injustice over what it regarded as 
severe and unfair treatment by the industrial court when it administered its 
policy of wage reductions in 1931 during the early part of the Depression. For 
over a decade, the union waged a campaign designed to secure the restoration 
of the '8s. depression cut'. Part of this battle was a major dispute at the 
Brisbane Abattoir in 1935 during which the union left no doubt as to what it 
thought motivated the members of the court: 'Instead of basing their 
decisions on living standards, they base them on profit standards. Thus the 
19 Court openly proclaims its lickspittle service to the employers'. 
The abuse levelled by the A.M.I.E.U. was returned on occasions by 
16. Meat Export Award-State. Judgment Q.G.G., 5 January 1946, p.l3. 
17, The Meat Industry Journal of Queensland March 1946, pp.4,5. 
18, A.M.I.E.U. Federal Council. Minutes 12-15 November 1945, deposit 
Dl, A.M.I.E.U., W.U.A., p.33. 
19. The Meat Industry Journal of Queensland March 1935, p.3. 
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members of the court, especially during the war years. A predictably angry 
reaction greeted an accusation that the A.M.I.E.U. had used 'Hitler tactics' in 
its quest for a restoration of the eight shillings depression cut. The 
suggestion also provoked renewed claims that the court was not impart ial ,^ 
whilst in May 1942, the court referred to certain policies of the A.M.I.E.U. as 
71 
'subversive activities'. During the hearing of this case, there occurred a 
celebrated clash between Sir William Webb, the president of the court, and 
A.J. Neumann over the germanicised spelling of the latter's surname, together 
with Sir William's charges that A.M.I.E.U. officials and rank and file were 
disloyal.^^ 
This outburst, and others, caused considerable anger across a broad 
spectrum of trade union opinion in Queensland and led to attempts to have Sir 
73 William removed from his post. -'^  Needless to say, amicable relations at a 
personal level between Neumann and the bench were not enhanced by events 
such as these. The position deteriorated even further when, still smarting 
under the most recent of Webb's attacks, Neumann told a conference in 
Sydney in May 1943, chaired by E.J. Ward, minister for Labour and National 
Service in the Curtin government, that it was impossible to obtain industrial 
justice in Queensland.^ 
The A.M.I.E.U. believed that the court harboured a desire to 'get 
square' for the union's wartime activities. In September 1945, Neumann spoke 
of the union's aggressive industrial tactics which it had pursued since late 
20. G. Keyatta to Arthur Jones, 5 August 1941, correspondence files, 
P.L.P. 
21. Meat Export Award-State. Judgment Q.G.G., 23 May 1942, p. 1892. 
22. Transcript case nos. 125 and 126 of 1942, office of the industrial 
registrar, Brisbane, p.l . 
23. B. Claxton to H.H. Collins, 22 April 1943, correspondence files, P.L.P. 
24. F.A. Cooper to John Curtin, 17 June 1943, Prime Minister's 
Department, correspondence files, multiple number series, third 
system, 'Industrial Disputes in Meat Industry: 1943-1945', 
Commonwealth Record Series (C.R.S.), A461, item E351/1/4, 
Australian Archives (A.A.), Canberra. 
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1943, in particular of the success in obtaining a war loading in the meat 
industry. 
In forcing our success it has been quite obvious that 
we have further developed bitter feelings by the 
Court to this Union, as not only did we force the 
Court to grant our claim, but we encouraged other 
Unions...to take the same action. The employers' 
advocates in the Court have repeatedly drawn the 
Court's attention to this fact. We are in for the 
cane from the Court at the very first opportunity it 
has to administer it to u s . ^ 
Relationships between the A.M.I.E.U. and Labor governments in 
Queensland were brittle. The union was especially annoyed at the consistent 
refusal of successive governments to intervene with direct support in its 
campaign to restore the eight shillings depression cut, so much so that on one 
occasion the northern members decided to challenge the minister for Labour 
and Industry in a pre-selection ballot for his Townsville seat. The union's 
deep desire to be represented on the Q.M.I.B. also received an unsympathetic 
response from Labor governments which resisted strongly any and all 
proposals which contained even the slightest hint of union job control. ' The 
union was especially irked by the cabinet rejection in September 1945 of its 
request to be included in a delegation to the United States of America to 
investigate the latest techniques in meat processing and marketing. The 
A.M.I.E.U. condemned such attitudes as a refusal to take workers 'into the 
scheme of things', indeed, this meant the rejection of '...the very thing we 
have been told was going to be done to make for a better and more contented 
29 
new world, after the war'. 
These specific instances of bad blood were manifestations of a 
25. A.M.I.E.U. Committee of Management. Report 10-17 September 
1945, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane, p.4. 
26. F.J. Elleary to P. Carney, 4 March 1935, deposit Dl, A.M.I.E.U., 
W.U.A. 
27. A.J. Neumann to V. Gair, 17 March 1942, correspondence files, P.L.P. 
28. The Meat Industry Journal of Queensland September 1945, p.8. 
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historically tumultuous relationship between both the organisational and 
political wings of the A.L.P. and the A.M.I.E.U. in Queensland.^^ For the 
Labor party's part, the A.M.I.E.U. was tainted with syndicalist influences and, 
later, by the emergence of the Communist party as a powerful force within 
the union. The A.L.P., furthermore, was embarrassed and angered by the 
consistent refusal of a major trade union such as the A.M.I.E.U. to renounce 
the strike and other forms of direct industrial action in favour of participation 
in the arbitration system. The A.M.I.E.U. harboured a bitter resentment at 
the action of the Labor government of T.J. Ryan in assisting the employers in 
1917-18 to force the union under the jurisdiction of the Queensland Industrial 
Court. Despite this, and despite its general antagonism to 'reformist' politics, 
the A.M.I.E.U. nevertheless maintained an affiliation with the A.L.P. in 
Queensland until 1941. The early years of the Second World War, however, 
saw relationships between the A.L.P. and several trade unions, including the 
A.M.I.E.U., strained to breaking point. 
The circumstances of this split had much to do with the growth and 
consolidation of communist influence in certain Queensland unions. According 
to Terry Cutler, ' . ..the growing enthusiasm for, or a t least tolerance of, 
communism with the A.M.I.E.U. precipitated some conflict with the A.L.P. 
3f) during the war years'. This conflict arose over the Labor party's rejection 
of Communist party efforts to forge closer links between the two parties; 
over the Labor party's refusal to accede to A.M.I.E.U. suggestions that it 
direct its preferences to communist candidates in parliamentary elections; 
and over the Labor party's proscription of several pro-Soviet organisations and 
its subsequent expulsion of those branches and politicians who refused to abide 
by this edict . In such an atmosphere, the A.M.I.E.U., along with various other 
unions, felt disinclined to reaffiliate with a party which seemed to '...have the 
31 damned impertience to tell the workers' organisations to go to blazes,.. . ' . 
29. For full details, see: Cutler , 'The History of the Australasian Meat 
Industry Employees' Union: A Study of the Internal Dynamics of a 
Labour Organisation' pp.117,129,131,151,152,167,175,182,183,189, 
198,229,233,234,238,262. 
30. Ibid., p.273. 
31. The Meat Industry Journal of Queensland November 1942, p.3. 
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Wartime exchanges between the A.M.I.E.U. and the employers saw 
each accusing the other of disloyalty to the war effort. The union accused the 
graziers and the companies of restricting supplies in order to force up prices, 
referring caustically to '...the meat strike on the part of the producers in the 
37 industry'.-^ The meat and bacon companies also attracted the union's wrath 
over their attempts to restrict access of organisers to the plants, a belief that 
they were exploiting child labour and a general feeling that the employers had 
'torn up' industrial agreements when it suited them. 
In the favourable wartime labour market, the A.M.I.E.U. was able to 
obtain significant improvements in wages and conditions. Many of the 
improved conditions, over and above those set down in the relevant awards, 
were obtained as a result of negotiations between the union and individual 
employers in which the use of on-the-job pressure played no small part. This 
was especially the case from the beginning of 1944. In the early years of the 
war the union had adopted a 'peace in industry' policy which many officials 
believed was subsequently exploited by the meat company managements. 
Accordingly, in November 1943, it was decided to '...throw in the employers 
33 camp the fear of what we are going to do from now on'.-^ -^  
The companies saw the A.M.I.E.U. as a disruptive influence. They 
accused it of flouting the decisions of the Queensland Industrial Court, and of 
fomenting go-slows and strikes. Indeed, the go-slow tactic was held by at 
least one major company to be a 'subversive act', and it requested the 
commonwealth government to put an agent into its plant '...to gain evidence 
of organized methods of slowing down'.-'^ In May 1941 each of the major 
meat exporters threatened the A.M.I.E.U. with a total lock-out '...until such 
time as a written assurance is given...that work in future will be carried out 
32. A.M.I.E.U. Committee of Management. Minutes November 1943, 
A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane, p.78. 
33. Ibid., p.67. 
34. W. Bennett to Sir George Knowles, 22 May 1942, Attorney-General's 
Department special files, 'Industrial Unrest at Queensland Meat 
Export Co. Ltd. Townsville 1942', C.R.S. A467, item 90, bundle 89, 
special file 42, A.A. 
129 
normally and without interrupt ion under the terms of the Award' . 
A t the suggestion of the Queensland Industrial Court , a meeting 
between the meat companies and the A.E.U. , F.E.D.F.A. and the A.M. I .E.U. 
was held in June 1944 to iron out their dif ferences. In return for the 
companies agreeing to a substantial war loading, and to investigate fu l ly and 
correct a range of union complaints, the unions gave an undertaking that their 
of f ic ia ls would 
...take steps to give every assistance by co-
operation wi th the managements to correct 
unauthorised lapping, general slowing down of work 
by day-wage employees, the refusal of many men 
to work reasonable over t ime, and in reducing 
absenteeism. The Unions wi l l restore 
const i tut ional methods in the handling of all 
complaints. The Unions also agree to provide the 
necessary labour for week-end kil l ings during peak 
periods, and to permit ta l ly and contract employees 
to be engaged for overt ime work in departments at 
rates applicable to those departments, and to fu l ly 
adhere to the conditions set down in the Award and 
exist ing Agreements.-^ 
During the ensuing twelve months, however, the meat companies 
became more and more convinced that the A.M.I .E.U. was not keeping i ts part 
of the bargain. ' The companies, therefore, decided they would no longer 
enter into direct negotiations wi th the A.M.I .E.U. and that in fu ture, they 
38 
would insist that all industr ial matters be determined by a rb i t ra t ion .^ " A 
35. Agent for T. Borthwick & Sons (A/sia) L t d , The Central Queensland 
Meat Export Co. L t d , Queensland Meat Export Co. L t d , Swif t 
Austral ian Co. Pty L td to A . J . Newman, 28 May 1941, deposit D l , 
A.M. I .E.U. , W.U.A. 
36. A . J . Neumann, R. Leggat, W. Ruscoe, T. Lewis to the Industrial 
Registrar, 7 June 1944, E220/372 A.M.F.S.U. deposit, Austral ian 
National Universi ty Archives of Business and Labour (A.N.U.A.B.L.) , 
Canberra. 
37. Meat Export Companies and A.M.I .E.U. Conference. Minutes 17 
September 1945, A.M. I .E.U. , Brisbane, p . l . 
38. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 30 Apr i l 1945, deposit D8, Q .M .C .C , W.U.A., p . l . 
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similar policy was adopted by the Q.M.I.B. The board was also determined to 
stamp out practices such as early finishing and absenteeism which it was 
forced to tolerate during the war. 
The A.M.I.E.U. was nothing if not confident in its enhanced industrial 
strength. In 1945, it proposed that the Q.M.I.B. accept a comprehensive 
seniority scheme. The board, as part of a general hardening of employer 
attitudes towards the union, unceremoniously rejected the demand.^^ The 
A.M.I.E.U. was not, however, prepared to let the matter rest: it fully 
intended that this particular campaign would be taken up once again early in 
1946. 
The frustration and bitterness which the meat export company 
managements felt towards the A.M.I.E.U. was shared by those in the 
Queensland bacon factories and meat preserving works. During the war, they 
had expressed deep concern at the influence of boards of control, the use of 
the go-slow and other forms of the strike weapon, frequent claims for wage 
increases through increased war loadings and the practice of organisers 
entering works as they pleased. The bacon factory managements resented the 
propaganda efforts of employees who belonged to the Communist party. They 
also accused the A.M.I.E.U. of employing absenteeism as an industrial 
pressure tactic, and in general, of having exploited the war to force a wide 
range of concessions. 
During the war, however, employers laid the foundation of a united 
response to the A.M.I.E.U. An increasing degree of coordination of the 
industrial relations policies of the bacon factory managements was effected 
by E.H. Coneybeer, the industrial advisor to the Queensland Bacon Curers' 
Association. This task was not easy as the traditional tendency of individual 
managements to negotiate unilaterial agreements with the A.M.I.E.U. had to 
be overcome. Towards the end of 1942, Coneybeer warned the bacon 
companies: 
39. Conference at the Brisbane Abbatoir. Minutes 20 August 1945, 
A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane, pp.7,8,10-13. 
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If the individual employers are to make agreements 
without consulting the Association or myself, as 
Industrial Adviser, then the industry cannot hope to 
be adequately protected industrially....The 
Association deals with the Union and not the 
individual employees and the Union will have to 
deal with the Association and its industrial adviser 
and not the different managers.'^^ 
The bacon factories were in a state of considerable uncertainty 
regarding their economic future in the closing months of 1945. During the 
war, the commonwealth government had acquired much of the output of 
pigmeat products at remunerative prices, but on 10 October 1945, the federal 
minister for Commerce and Agriculture informed the industry that the 
government was unable to give a specific guarantee regarding its future 
beyond 30 September 1946. This announcement came shortly after a 
government decision to reduce the prices paid for those pigmeats which it had 
purchased to satisfy service demands, and from October 1945 these demands 
began to decline rapidly. 
The bacon companies thus were faced with a speedy return to prewar 
conditions and to a civilian market in which competition was 'very keen'. In 
the light of these circumstances, a bacon factory executive echoed the 
sentiments of the industry in general when he forecast that '...the position 
from January 1946 on will be definitely insecure'. These rapidly changing 
economic conditions occurred against the background of a major strike in the 
bacon industry which the A.M.I.E.U. had conducted in mid-1945 as a protest 
against certain decisions of the industrial court. As 1945 drew to a close the 
bacon factories thus saw their economic prospects threatened by 
developments in the markets for their products and in the policies and 
strategies pursued in the labour market by the A.M.I.E.U. As a result, the 
bacon companies were ready for a showdown with the A.M.I.E.U. 
40. E.H. Coneybeer to The Manager, Darling Downs Co-Operative Bacon 
Association Ltd, 17 September 1942. A copy of this letter is in the 
possession of the author. 
41. Manager, Canning & Processing Division, Hutton &: Foggitt Jones to 
E.H. Coneybeer, 9 October 1945. A copy of this letter is in the 
possession of the author. 
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As the war drew to a close, the A.M.I.E.U. turned more and more 
towards thinking about the nature of postwar Australian politics and society 
and the likely place and fortunes of the union in the peacetime world. This 
thinking, in common with that of many Queensland unions, was heavily 
influenced by wartime assurances that Australian society would see the 
dawning of a new order in the years after the defeat of Fascism. Such 
promises, based in part on wartime propaganda, were vague, and were 
interpreted by many groups in the labour movement to embrace their own 
particular hopes and objectives. Full employment, security of employment 
and a reduction in working hours were, however, frequently cited as industrial 
goals of fundamental importance by numerous trade union leaders. 
In addition to supporting these aims, the A.M.I.E.U. saw the new order 
as involving other dimensions of change. A major element in the A.M.I.E.U. 
interpretation of the promise of a new order was its traditional vision of 
worker control of industry. Many in the A.M.I.E.U. also hoped that the new 
order would involve the emergence of a socialist Australia. It was, 
however, widely believed in the union that such hopes for the future would not 
be achieved without a struggle. 'The fight now would be with the employing 
class, instead of with the International militarists'.^ 
Some senior officials in the A.M.I.E.U. had come to the view by the 
end of 1945 that a major industrial dispute in the Australian meat industry 
was all but inevitable. At the union's federal council meeting in Melbourne in 
November, A.J. Neumann spoke of '...the coming days of struggle between the 
employers and the Union'.^'' This was seen by the A.M.I.E.U. federal 
secretary as but part of a larger battle for supremacy between Socialism and 
42. A.M.I.E.U. Committee of Management. Secretary's Report 1942, 
deposit Dl, A.M.I.E.U., W.U.A., p.4. 
43. A.M.I.E.U. Committee of Management. Minutes November 1943, 
deposit Dl, A.M.I.E.U., W.U.A., p.22. 
44. A.M.I.E.U. Committee of Management. Report 10-17 September 
1945, p.l . 
45. A.M.I.E.U. Federal Council. Minutes 12-15 November 1945, p.l6. 
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Capitalism both in Australia and on the international level.'^^ The tone of his 
remarks were apocalyptic. His analysis was supported by H. Sharman from 
Victoria, who argued that the large foreign-based meat companies, which 
dominated the Australian industry, had provoked a number of industrial 
disputes in Argentina and elsewhere in order to discover '...the best methods 
of defeating the workers in even the best organised Unions in any country'. 
Sharman also drew attention to the development of closer 
organisational links between the meat companies and employer organisations 
whose policy it was 'to fight the workers'. The development of more 
sophisticated records systems by the meat companies and their increasing 
emphasis on securing the services of industrial officers was evidence that they 
were '...tightening up their systems of industrial control, to effectively deal 
with every phase of employment;...'. Sharman warned his interstate comrades 
that these changes indicated clearly the future course of employer industrial 
relations policy in the Australian meat industry: 
When the employers do make up their minds to 
attack us, they intend to practically wipe us out as 
an organisation....therefore no stone should be left 
unturned to help us to strengthen our organisation, 
to meet and defeat this highly probable attack.... 
none of the States...could possibly be strong enough 
to withstand the impending attack under our 
present form of organisation.^ 
The 1945 New South Wales Steel Strike, which lasted for over three 
months, was an event of major significance for the A.M.I.E.U. It confirmed 
many of its worst fears. The strike saw a sustained contest over the extent of 
managerial rights to decide production methods and employment policy in the 
New South Wales steel industry. Allegations that a unionist was victimised 
were prominent in contemporary union accounts of the struggle. The dispute 
was also interpreted in union circles as part of a campaign by the Broken Hill 
Proprietary Company to crush the strong union organisation which had 
46. A.M.I.E.U. Federal Council. Federal Secretary's Report 12-15 
November 1945, deposit Dl, A.M.I.E.U., W.U.A., p.5. 
47. A.M.I.E.U. Federal Council. Minutes 12-15 November 1945, p.27. 
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developed in its plants and those of its associated companies during the war 
48 years. ° 
In Queensland these judgments were shared within the leadership of 
the A.M.I.E.U. The events of the steel dispute were seen as confirming the 
distinct possibility of a general postwar employer offensive against militant 
unions. The 1945 Steel Strike was '...the first round of the struggle between 
the monopolies and the trade unions for postwar supremacy'. The 
A.M.I.E.U. believed the meat companies were keen to provoke similar strikes 
in the industry. Prolonged strikes could seriously weaken, perhaps destroy, 
the union. With either result, the tide of wartime gains by the A.M.I.E.U. in 
wages, conditions and authority could be turned back, and future claims would 
be that much easier to resist. The union also thought the employers wished 
to precipitate a series of general strikes in order to discredit the A.L.P. 
federal government and to bring about its defeat at the 1946 federal 
elections.^ 
Deeply concerned at these developments, the A.M.I.E.U. served notice 
that it would not tolerate any employer efforts to discriminate against its 
members: '..., where anything resembling victimisation takes place, then the 
whole resources of the Union will be used to protect the victimised 
member;...'. At the Trades and Labour Council level as well, concern was 
expressed at what was seen as a growing tendency of employers to dismiss 
employees for union activity. In January 1946, the T.L.C. warned that such 
victimisation would attract vigorous opposition and resistance from the 
48. T.L.C. Minutes 30 October 1945, T.L.C, Brisbane, p.5. 
49. A.M.I.E.U. Committee of Management. Report 10-17 September 
1945, p.4. 
50. Branch Secretary to G. Bolt, 28 September 1945, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
51. A.M.I.E.U. Committee of Management. Report 10-17 September 
1945, pp.6,15,16. 
52. The Meat Industry Journal of Queensland October 1945, p.l . 
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The A.M.I.E.U. knew it would be powerless to resist any employer 
offensive unless it could secure control over the anarchistic industrial 
behaviour of its membership. Practices such as absenteeism, late arrivals, 
early finishing, unauthorised rest pauses and unilateral direct action would 
provide the companies with virtually unlimited opportunities to embroil the 
union in defensive struggles which it would find often difficult, often 
impossible, to win. In September 1945, the A.M.I.E.U. instructed its branches 
and boards of control to eliminate these rank and file activities.^^ It also 
moved to secure a centralised means of controlling industrial disputes: 
...this Committee of Management takes the stand 
that no case for strike action on any plant will 
suffer, because of time being allowed for the Union 
to give full and careful consideration and plan what 
action is the correct one to take, and therefore in 
the overall vital interests of the future welfare of 
the organisation, instruct that no stoppage take 
place on any works, irrespective of the grounds, 
until such times as the governing body of the 
Union, in the district concerned, has dealt with the 
dispute, and decided on the course of action to be 
taken.^^ 
There were further reasons why the A.M.I.E.U. wished to avoid 
defensive struggles with the meat companies. The union intended to 
concentrate its resources on winning a range of industrial benefits in the 
immediate postwar period. As early as November 1943 the committee of 
management decided to seek a forty hour week for all sections of the meat 
industry, four weeks' paid annual holidays and two weeks' sick pay each year 
as a tangible first instalment of the new order. During 1945 this log of claims 
was extended to include the provision of improved canteens and other 
53. T.L.C. Minutes 23 January 1946, p.2. 
54» Branch Secretary to R. Dixon, L.G. Haigh, W. Quinn, 27 September 
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amenities at the various meatworks, payment for statutory holidays and the 
merging of war loadings into general wage rates . The meat industry 
employers, however, refused to discuss these claims with the A.M.I.E.U. 
In August 1945, the A.M.I.E.U. decided to make one more effort to 
lure the employers to the negotiating table: if this failed, or if the 
negotiations were unsatisfactory, the alternative was a campaign of direct 
action. The employers met with the union in September. Much of the 
meeting was devoted to vitriolic exchanges over the 1944 agreement: little 
time was spent on the log of claims. The A.M.I.E.U. nevertheless promised 
improved cooperation in the future. The union felt able to give such an 
undertaking as it was (probably unjustifiably) confident its membership would 
accept the policies laid down by the committee of management but a few 
weeks earlier. In view of these assurances, the meat companies agreed to a 
further conference in January 1946. On the surface it appeared that a s ta te 
of industrial peace might reign in the postwar Queensland meat industry. This 
was, however, nothing but an illusion. It was shattered within the space of a 
few months. 
Two disputes over managerial prerogatives erupted at the Lake's 
Creek meatworks in November 1945 and January 1946. The right to control 
the labour supply, to decide the rate of production and the authority of boards 
of control were the issues of principle involved. Moreover, the A.M.I.E.U. 
believed that the November dispute was a clear case of a major company 
58 
at tempting to involve it in a defensive action. The meat companies in 
general closely observed both of these disputes and concluded that the 
A.M.I.E.U. was, despite its assurances, unable to control its members and 
unwilling to abandon the use of direct action: the union's promises of 
September were for all intents and purposes empty. 
55, Ibid., p.5. 
57. Meat Export Companies and A.M.I.E.U. Conference. Minutes 17 
September 1945, p.3. 
58r A.M.I.E.U. Branch Executive. Minutes 12 December 1945, A.M.I.E.U., 
Brisbane, p.2. 
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These conclusions were reinforced when, in the opening weeks of 
1946, the A.M.I.E.U. launched its plan to consolidate and extend the seniority 
principle in every section of the meat industry. After relatively short strikes, 
it obtained comprehensive seasonal seniority agreements at the Redbank 
Meatworks and the Brisbane Abattoir in February 1946. These agreements 
embodied the 'last on first off principle. Seniority represented an important 
means by which some security of employment could be guaranteed. To a 
generation of meatworkers who had experienced the Depression of the 1930s, 
and who worked in an industry where employment was variable at the best of 
times, the victories at the abattoir and at Redbank gave substance to the 
promise of a new order. The meat companies, bacon factories and meat 
preserving works, however, greeted these formal seniority agreements with 
utter dismay. They eroded managerial prerogatives beyond what could be 
tolerated. 
Apart from the disputes over seniority, January and February of 1946 
saw pressure mounting within the A.M.I.E.U. for some progress over the log of 
claims. In mid-January Neumann wrote to T. Lewis, the secretary of the 
Q.M.C.C, suggesting that the conference be resumed on 12 February. Lewis 
asked that further negotiations be postponed until after cases arising out of 
the Lake's Creek disputes had been heard in the industrial court. By the end 
of February, however, the northern district council of the union had lost its 
patience with the delay, and urged that direct action, in accordance with the 
policy of the committee of management, was needed to force the companies' 
hand. By this time the Queensland meat export companies had decided to 
reject the union's request for a resumption of the conference. On 4 March 
1946, Lewis wrote to Neumann: 
I confirm my telephone conversation with you on 
the 28th ult. when I advised you that the Meat 
Export Companies had decided not to meet you in 
conference, and I am now directed to state that in 
view of improvements in better discipline, general 
working and increased productions, etc., not being 
forthcoming from members of your Union at the 
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various works as was indicated would be the case at 
the previous conference..., the Cmnpanies are not 
prepared to resume discussions.... 
For the A.M.I.E.U. this was the last straw. The feelings of many rank and file 
meatworkers and their officials were expressed by Neumann when he wrote 'It 
looks as though we will have to get ready for a brawl'. As a first step, he 
instructed branch secretaries to adopt a '...non-cooperative attitude with the 
Meat Companies...' until such time as the executive had considered the 
position.^^ 
59. T. Lewis to A.J. Neumann, 4 March 1946, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
60. Branch Secretary to W. Quinn, 1 March 1946, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
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By March 1946, wartime manpower controls had been substantially 
relaxed. Traditional rights to hire and fire were largely restored to 
employers. On Monday 4 March, the management of the Queensland Co-
Operative Bacon Association at Murarrie dismissed four of its employees, all 
members of the A.M.I.E.U., each of whom had been with the association for a 
substantial period of time. On the same day, Thomas Borthwicks & Sons 
insisted that A.M.I.E.U. proposals for a seniority scheme similar to that 
adopted at the Brisbane Abattoir were for the industrial court to decide. The 
company refused to discuss any aspect of the matter with the union. Two 
days later, the management of a meat preserving works at Oxley gave a 
week's notice to a number of employees whilst retaining others of 
considerably shorter service. A secret ballot of the A.M.I.E.U. members at 
the works resulted in an overwhelming majority in favour of strike action to 
commence upon the expiry of the dismissal notices. 
While these events were taking place at Oxley, A.M.I.E.U. officials 
were attending a compulsory conference in the industrial court which they had 
initiated in an attempt to resolve the dispute at Murarrie. This failed, and 
later on 6 March, following a majority in a secret ballot of one hundred and 
twelve to seven in favour of strike action, A.M.I.E.U. members withdrew their 
labour from the Murarrie factory. One week later, members of the A.M.I.E.U. 
at Oxley put into effect their decision to strike. 
At the end of the first week in March, the Queensland Co-Operative 
Bacon Association applied to the court for an order directing its employees to 
resume work in accordance with the provisions of their award. The court 
declined because the association refused to furnish reasons for the 
dismissals. It advised the A.M.I.E.U. to bring a case of wrongful dismissal 
against the association.^ The A.M.I.E.U. was, however, reluctant to do this 
since the dismissals provided it with a further opportunity to continue its 
campaign to force the acceptance of seniority in the bacon and meat 
1. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 4 March 1946, deposit D8, Q.M.C.C, W.U.A. 
(Q.M.C.C. Minutes for the duration of the strike are not paginated). 
2. Bacon Manufacturing And Meat Preserving Award-South-Eastern 
Division - Murarrie Bacon Factory Dispute. Judgment Q.I.G., 31 
March 1946, p.l 15. 
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preserving industries, and in those export works where it did not apply. A 
resolution of the conflict over the dismissal of the four men was thus 
essentially an issue of little relevance to the attitude of the A.M.I.E.U. to the 
dispute.-^ To the association, the point at issue was the managerial 
prerogative to hire and fire 'as we think fit'.^ 
With memories of the abattoir and Redbank struggles still very much 
to the fore, these further seniority disputes suggested to the A.M.I.E.U. that 
they were part of a sustained and organised campaign to destroy the seniority 
principle in the Queensland meat industry and to facilitate the dismissal of 
militant workers and replace them from the ranks of returned servicemen 
anxious to obtain civilian employment. The assistance of other unions was 
sought by the A.M.I.E.U. on 13 March when it asked the disputes committee of 
the T.L.C. to assist in placing black bans on the Murarrie and Oxley works. 
The disputes committee enthusiastically endorsed the A.M.I.E.U. policy on 
seniority and, within a week, the black bans had been introduced. Meanwhile 
the branch executive of the A.M.I.E.U. debated the rejection of further 
negotiations over the log of claims by the meat export companies. It was 
decided to redraft the log for presentation and discussion in May. A further 
refusal to confer, or failure to give the union satisfaction, was to be met by 
severe restrictions of output and the elimination of overtime. If these tactics 
failed to produce the desired outcome, then a general strike in the Queensland 
meat export industry would be called. 
The seniority dispute continued through March. Meetings of the 
strikers on 8, 12 and 15 March called for a one day stop-work meeting of the 
entire union in southern Queensland to consider how it could assist the bacon 
factory members obtain recognition of the seniority principle. The bacon 
factory employers, however, were not about to surrender the initiative to 
their striking employees. During the first week of the dispute at Murarrie, 
the employers decided to resume operations as quickly as possible with non-
union labour drawn from the ranks of farmers and their sons who belonged to 
the co-operative association. The management of the Murarrie works 
3. W.W.F. Brisbane Branch Executive. Minutes 4 June 1946, E212/12 
W.W.F. deposit, A.N.U.A.B.L., p.299. 
4. The Courier-Mail 7 March 1946. 
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rejected outright the seniority principle. 
The fight is on the issue of seniority. The 
A.M.I.E.U. want the principle of 'last on first off 
imposed. We maintain that to admit this principle 
would in effect, hand over the selection and 
retention of staff to the Union Officials, and when 
the attitude of this Union to limitation of output is 
kept in mind, it is clear they would have absolute 
control. This we are determined to resist to the 
utmost. 
As events were to prove, this was no idle threat. 
A mass meeting of members of the southern district of the A.M.I.E.U. 
was held in the Brisbane City Hall on 19 March. It was decided that if the 
seniority dispute was not settled within a week then the union would respond 
with a general strike in the Queensland meat industry.° This decision was 
almost certainly initiated by A.J. Neumann.^ Picketing of the Oxley and 
Murarrie factories began immediately after the city hall meeting, but even at 
this early stage the support for the meatworkers suffered a set-back with the 
decision of members of the F.C.U. and the F.E.D.F.A. to remain at work in 
the two factories. On the other hand, the A.M.I.E.U. was greatly encouraged 
5. Ibid. 
If the experience of the export companies was any guide, the bacon 
factory managements had grounds for fearing that their interests 
would be threatened by the introduction of a comprehensive seniority 
scheme to the bacon industry. Part of the A.M.I.E.U. seniority system 
required that union delegates be 'first on'. This virtually guaranteed 
them permanent employment, and they were thus free to extend the 
role and effectiveness of the board of control in each factory. Boards 
of control acted in a way designed to challenge both managerial 
prerogatives and the wider operation of competitive labour markets. 
6. T.L.C Disputes Committee. Minutes 20 March 1946, T.L.C, 
Brisbane, p. l . 
7. Notes in the handwriting of A.J. Neumann deposit Dl, A.M.I.E.U., 
W.U.A. I am sure these were Neumann's speaking notes for the mass 
meeting of 19 March. The last two points in these notes read as 
follows: 
17. All resorces [sic] of Union must be thrown in 
and probably whole trade union movement if 
necessary. 
18. Move motion. 
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by a decision of a number of railway unions to honour the black ban at 
Murarrie. The railway unions promise of support, however, was highly 
qualified as it only involved a decision not to enter the railway siding at the 
Murarrie bacon factory. 
The meat export companies moved quickly to answer the challenge of 
the A.M.I.E.U. They decided to suspend all stock deliveries to the various 
meatworks from 26 March and began to lay off employees in anticipation of 
an industry strike. With this, the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute became a lock-
out as well as a strike. For the meat companies, the threatened strike was 
welcomed as a test of strength with what they saw as a union dominated by 
g 
communists. So keen were the companies for a showdown that they refused 
an invitation from the premier, E.M. Hanlon, to discuss the matters in 
dispute. The companies' initial euphoria at the prospect of a general strike 
was complemented by a more hardheaded realisation that such an event would 
provide them with the opportunity of cancelling all agreements, customs and 
practices which were outside the provisions of the relevant awards.^^ As one 
meat company executive observed: 'If they decide to strike then we have 
something to hang our hats on'.^^ 
From this date, the Queensland government began to play a vital role 
in the meat industry conflict. There is some evidence that the minister for 
Labour and Employment, V.C. Gair, made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade 
the industrial court to conduct a wrongful dismissal hearing while the strike at 
Murarrie and Oxley was in progress. As the deadline set by the city hall mass 
meeting approached, Hanlon and Gair urged Neumann to argue such a case 
before the industrial court. The union refused, arguing that a favourable 
wrongful dismissal decision would not establish the general principle of 
seniority in Queensland industrial relations practice. The A.M.I.E.U. saw the 
8. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 20 March 1946. 
9. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 21 March 1946. 
10. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 25 March 1946. 
11. Ibid. 
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right to hire and fire as a negation of industrial justice:^^ 
...the worker sees no equity in a system that allows 
the employer to take action without consulting the 
Court and forces the employee always to come to 
the Court to get redress.^^ 
Non-union labour commenced work a t Murarrie from late March, the 
management having earlier cleared the decks for this resumption of 
operations by dismissing all of its striking employees. Similar action occurred 
at the Oxley factory. The bacon factory members of the A.M.I.E.U. 
responded by calling for a secret ballot of the entire membership of the union 
in Queensland on the question of a general strike as had been threatened by 
the city hall mass meeting.^^ The secret ballot, however, was never held. 
The action of the meat companies in dismissing employees and generally 
winding down their operations, together with the union's somewhat incomplete 
knowledge of members' addresses, meant that the union's access to its 
membership was severely limited. 
During the week 25 to 29 March, a number of compulsory conferences 
was held in the industrial court . In a conference with the bacon factory 
employers, the A.M.I.E.U. proposed that they accept the abattoir seniority 
agreement. This arrangement between the Q.M.I.B. and the A.M.I.E.U. 
embodied two important principles. It recognised seniority and gave the 
A.M.I.E.U. a positive role in deciding employment policy a t the Brisbane 
Abattoir. The bacon factory employers, however, would have none of this. 
An industrial court compromise, accepted by the employers, was rejected by 
the A.M.I.E.U. on the grounds that it denied the union a direct say in 
employment decisions. The union's continued insistence on playing an active 
part in these decisions drew an angry response from the court. In a 
12. The Meat Industry Journal of Queensland January 1946, p.4. 
13. Transcript case no. 106 of 1946, office of the industrial registrar, 
Brisbane, p.24. 
14. A.M.I.E.U. Meeting of Oxley and Murarrie members on strike. 
Minutes 25 March 1946, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane, p . l . 
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subsequent review of these negotiations, it described the A.M.I.E.U. seniority 
proposals as an 'absurd claim' which was '...calculated to take the control of 
labour out of the hands of those who had to pay for it'. According to the 
court: 
No employer could afford to agree to such a claim 
and the granting of it would merely drive industry 
out of the State. The employees could not possibly 
benefit by such action which would be certain to 
create unemployment in this State.^"^ 
The court's rejection of its seniority proposals came as no surprise to 
the A.M.I.E.U. Such a decision was seen as consistent with the court's 
historic defence of managerial prerogatives. Taken together with its wage 
reductions of the 1930s and the less than generous comments made by 
members of the bench about the A.M.I.E.U. wartime industrial tactics, this 
decision convinced the A.M.I.E.U. that the court would offer it no assistance 
in the dispute over seniority. The A.M.I.E.U. thus had a choice - it could 
either accept this attitude of the court and order its members to resume 
work, or it could attempt to force the employers to agree to its proposals by 
continuing the strike. 
A joint meeting of the branch executive and the southern district 
council of the A.M.I.E.U. was held on the evening of 26 March 1946 to 
consider future tactics in the seniority dispute. One school of thought 
supported an extension of the dispute in view of '...a general weakening of the 
employers...', while another warned that the employers '...may be well 
organised and may be out to make a fight of it...'.^^ The latter assessment 
was correct. Earlier that same day the meat export companies, together with 
the graziers, had accepted a challenge from one of their most senior 
executives: 'Are we going to do as we have done in the past or are we 
prepared to have a real showdown...'. The graziers were avid supporters of 
this call to arms. They promised that if the A.M.I.E.U. carried out its threat 
15. Transcript case nos. 193, 194, 195 and 196 of 1946, p.44. 
16. A.M.I.E.U. Branch Executive and Southern District Council. Minutes 
26 March 1946, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane, p.2. 
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to strike, then they would withhold stock from the various meatworks for a 
period of six weeks. Similar assurances were forthcoming from the cattle 
selling brokers. 
On the afternoon of 28 March, the T.L.C. disputes committee 
gathered to assess reports from the compulsory conference and to consider 
what further support should be extended to the A.M.I.E.U. Against the 
background of a widespread belief in union quarters that the early postwar 
years would see an employer offensive, it was not difficult for Neumann to 
persuade members of the committee that the seniority dispute was but part of 
an overall employer plan to challenge the trade unions on issues of vital 
importance. Later that evening the branch executive and the southern 
district council of the A.M.I.E.U. met in an aggressive and angry mood: many 
favoured a quick and decisive extension of the dispute, especially in view of 
what they believed to be massive rank and file support for a defence of the 
seniority principle.^" The next day, the A.M.I.E.U. departed radically from 
tradition by calling a general strike of its members in the Queensland meat 
industry. 
Early in April, the employers considered their options. The bacon 
factories informed a meeting of meat export representatives that they had 
decided to seek the deletion of the A.M.I.E.U. preference clause from the 
bacon industry awards, but otherwise had decided to sit tight and await 
developments, especially in view of the fact that employees who belonged to 
the A.W.U., F.E.D.F.A.^° and the F.C.U. had remained at work. This meeting 
also discussed the virtues of applying for the deregistration of the A.M.I.E.U., 
while some of the companies announced that they had decided to dismiss all of 
17. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 26 March 1946. 
18. A.M.I.E.U. Branch Executive and Southern District Council. Minutes 
28 March 1946, pp.2,3. 
19. The Murarrie management did not really care if their F.E.D.F.A. 
employees stayed at work or went on strike: plans to deal with this 
latter contingency were well in hand. Commissioner for Railways. 
Memorandum 29 March 1946, 46:7150, batch no. 1, 'Industrial 
Dispute. Meat Works and Bacon Factories', commissioner for 
railways, Brisbane. 
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their employees who were on strike. The question of repudiating 
'objectionable' customs and practices at an appropriate time in the future was 
also debated. While the meat exporters and bacon factory employers were 
reviewing tactics, the initiative in resisting the strike was taken by the 
Queensland Meat Industry Board. In a letter to the A.M.I.E.U., it bluntly 
announced the withdrawal of all agreements with the union and that 
A.M.I.E.U. members would only be re-engaged on the terms laid down in the 
70 Brisbane Abattoir Award. 
In the first week of April the idea that the log of claims be made part 
of the dispute began to gain ground in the minds of the A.M.I.E.U. officials. 
On 8 April, Neumann wrote to his counterparts in the other states on the 
progress of the general strike in support of the bacon factory seniority claim: 
We are hopeful of a speedy and successful ending of 
this dispute, as we have another one to get ready 
for, in the Meat Export Works, on the question of 
annual leave, sick leave, payment for statutory 
holidays when not worked, and the fusion of our 
war loading into the general wage.^^ 
The actual course of events, however, differed somewhat from this 
prediction. A mass meeting of meatworkers in Brisbane on 12 April decided 
to widen the seniority general strike to include the four point log of claims. 
The nature and timing of this decision was largely dictated by developments in 
employer strategy in the early part of April. 
Important decisions concerning their future strategy in the dispute 
were made by the meat export companies during the period 8 to 10 April. 
After consultations with other employers in the meat industry, and with the 
United Graziers' Association (U.G.A.), it was decided to send supplies of sheep 
and lambs to the Brisbane Abattoir for slaughter by volunteer labour. This 
20. Secretary, Queensland Meat Industry Board to A.J. Neumann, 2 April 
1946, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
21. A.J. Neumann to J. Larkin, J. Upton, H. Sharman, W.W. Pirie, 8 April 
1946, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
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partial reversal of the earlier policy to suspend all stock deliveries was 
calculated to show that production could be commenced and maintained 
without union labour, and to enable the Q.M.I.B. to comply with the 
77 government's directive that the public was not to be denied meat supplies. 
An additional element in the strategy of the export companies 
involved the repudiation of certain agreements, customs, practices and 
arrangements which were extraneous to the awards governing the operation of 
73 the meat industry. Plans were laid to ensure that this would be 
implemented once the strikers had returned to work. It was agreed that on 
the first working day after a general resumption, each company would break 
all past customs, practices and agreements. It was further decided that, if 
the A.M.I.E.U. retaliated, a secret ballot, which was required by Queensland 
industrial law to authorise a lock-out, would show all companies in favour of 
such action. The meat export companies also considered a wider agenda of 
demands with which they intended to confront the A.M.I.E.U. upon the 
resumption of work. This included matters relating to discipline, respect for 
foremen, the role of boards of control, the functions of union delegates, the 
75 activities of the union's organisers and the amount of unofficial rest breaks. -^  
Despite this confident planning, the meat export companies suffered 
fears and doubts over what they all regarded as the potential weak spot in the 
united front they were presenting to the A.M.I.E.U. This archilles heel was 
the Brisbane Abattoir. One of the prime concerns of the private companies 
was the likely attitude of the Q.M.I.B. if the contingency plan to lock out 
meatworkers was ever actually implemented: if the abattoir continued 
working, then meat supplies could be maintained and at least some locked-out 
employees could obtain temporary work. Another was whether the Q.M.I.B. 
22. U.G.A. Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Council. Report of 
Executive Council 1946, U.G.A., Brisbane, p.l9. 
23. T. Lewis to A.J. Neumann, 11 April 1946, deposit 1, A.M.I.E.U., 
W.U.A. 
24. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 10 April 1946. 
25. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 9 April 1946. 
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was prepared to implement its letter of 2 April which withdrew all customs 
and agreements and notified the A.M.I.E.U. that work would only be resumed 
on the conditions as laid down in the Brisbane Abattoir Award. The exporters 
believed that if the abattoir would not enforce its letter then this would 
seriously weaken their own position. A significant amount of time was thus 
spent by senior executives of the meat export companies in mid-April in 
attempts to obtain assurances that the abattoir management would support 
their proposed policies. One such attempt involved securing an undertaking 
from the U.G.A. to put what pressure it could on the Q.M.I.B. to honour the 
terms of its letter. The graziers were only too happy to oblige. 
The disputes committee encountered difficulties during April in 
formulating and executing the unions' policy in the dispute. Although the need 
to finance the dispute was recognised shortly after the declaration of the 
general strike, a finance sub-committee did not meet until 18 April, possibly 
because the A.M.I.E.U. believed that some 4,000 of its members were entitled 
to receive commonwealth unemployment benefits which would relieve the 
27 pressure on its funds. Problems were also being encountered in convincing 
the unions in the railways to develop a united policy towards the application 
and enforcement of black bans. There were also signs that members of the 
T.W.U. were becoming increasingly restive over applying these bans ,^ while 
an apparent failure of communication with unions in Toowoomba reduced the 
effectiveness of a black ban on a major bacon factory in that city. By mid-
April a significant set-back to the morale of the strikers came with reports of 
A.M.I.E.U. members returning to work in bacon factories, a meat transport 
firm and in retail butchers shops. Although at no time during the whole 
dispute did more than eight per cent of A.M.I.E.U. members return to work, 
the impact of such action on certain unions progressively weakened their 
support. 
26. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 11 April 1946. 
27. A.J. Neumann to H. Sharman, J.W. Baker, W.W. Pirie, J. Upton, J. 
Larkin, 11 April 1946, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
28. T.W.U. Executive Committee of the Brisbane Sub-branch. Minutes 8 
April 1946, T.W.U., Brisbane, p.3. 
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The gradual return to work of A.M.I.E.U. members in most bacon 
factories, the use of non-union labour, the movement of stock and supplies by 
road which reduced the effectiveness of the railway black bans, the refusal of 
certain unionists to join the strike and the impossibility of preventing the 
distribution and sale of bacon and ham meant that the A.M.I.E.U. could exert 
little or no economic pressure on the bacon factory managements over the 
seniority issue. Consequently from mid-April, the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute 
resolved itself into a struggle between the A.M.I.E.U. and the meat export 
companies. 
The A.M.I.E.U. could not count on the support of the Queensland 
Labor government in the conflict. For decades, the A.L.P. in Queensland had 
proclaimed its faith in arbitration and industrial peace and it was not about to 
compromise this principle by bowing to demands made during a strike that it 
amend the industrial law to require the inclusion of seniority provisions in 
79 State awards. Moreover, the seniority principle as embraced by the 
A.M.I.E.U., which was part of an overall policy of job control, attracted little 
sympathy from a government which had always opposed any extension of the 
managerial powers of Labour. From mid-April 1946, the policy of the 
government came under increasingly virulent attack from militant trade union 
leaders within both the A.M.I.E.U. and the disputes committee. Such 
criticism was particularly severe from those leaders who belonged to the 
Communist party. 
A basic theme of these attacks was that Labor governments were 
elected to further the economic and political interests of the working class, 
and of trade unionists in particular, and that in the meat dispute, the 
government was failing in this duty. Thus, the secretary of the T.L.C, Mick 
Healy, a member of the Communist party, argued that: 
On Labor principles, there can be no doubt that the 
Labor Government should be supporting the 
meatworkers in their struggles. Yet we find, that 
the State Labor Government (with Premier Hanlon 
directing policy) have not only turned their backs 
29. A.J. Neumann to E.M. Hanlon, 9 April 1946, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
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upon the demands of the meatworkers, but are 
actually lined up with the employers and assisting 
them against the meatworkers.. . .The Labor 
Governments are not returned to fight the workers, 
but to help them win their just demands.-^^ 
Criticisms such as these, however, had the effect of convincing Hanlon and his 
cabinet that the meat dispute involved a political challenge to the government 
by the Communist party. 
In the climate of the times (Churchill's formal declaration of the Cold 
War in his Fulton speech had been made but a few weeks earlier), together 
with the traditional fear and hatred of the Communist party in the ranks of 
the A.L.P., it was but a short step from this belief to one which saw the 
dispute as being 'communist-inspired and directed'. Regardless of the intrinsic 
merits of their cause, the government was determined to prevent the 
meatworkers winning the dispute. Apart from challenging the very credibility 
of the industrial peace policy, such a victory would also enhance the views and 
prestige of the Communist party in the labour movement throughout 
Australia. These assessments loomed larger and larger in the government's 
interpretation of events and in its policy decisions as the dispute continued. 
The next move was made by the employers. On 17 April they applied 
to the industrial court for the cancellation of the preference clauses in the 
Brisbane Abattoir and Meat Export Awards. The employers were anxious to 
discover if non-union labour could be obtained in sufficient numbers to enable 
the industry to resume operations. For some weeks, the works manager of the 
Brisbane Abattoir had negotiated with the U.G.A. for assistance in organising 
non-union labour from country areas , and, after some initial resistance 
amongst a few of its constituent associations, the U.G.A. was able to issue an 
urgent call for volunteers on 20 April.^^ Later that day. The Telegraph 
carried what turned out to be extremely well informed reports that non-union 
30. The Meat Strike 16 April 1946, issued by M. Healy, T .L .C , Brisbane, 
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labour would commence work at the abattoir during the following week. 
The A.M.I.E.U. saw the preference hearing as providing it with a 
golden opportunity to put pressure on the government and the court. In the 
period leading up to the hearing, it loudly proclaimed its intention of applying 
for federal award coverage and involving its interstate branches in the 
dispute. This was designed to force the government and the court to ponder a 
situation in which they could lose control of the dispute to the federal 
arbitration authorities and perhaps even to the federal government. The 
A.M.I.E.U. hoped that such considerations might yet persuade the government 
and the court to support its cause. The situation was laced with irony because 
what was essentially a bluff in the last week of April was soon to become a 
37 serious goal of the A.M.I.E.U. and the disputes committee. 
The A.M.I.E.U.'s tactic failed to move the government or the court. 
On 24 April, the court cancelled the preference clauses in the Brisbane 
Abattoir and Meat Export Awards. Immediately afterwards, non-union labour 
began slaughtering sheep at the Brisbane Abattoir. The managements at 
Borthwicks and Lake's Creek invited non-union labour to apply for work. But 
this decline in the fortunes of the meatworkers did not stop there. Members 
of the F.C.U. and F.E.D.F.A. continued their refusal to support the strike 
fully, while many rank and file members of the T.W.U. were in open rebellion 
against their officials' policy of support for the dispute which was evaporating 
rapidly under this pressure. On the evening of 24 April, the Q.C.E. of the 
A.L.P. refused to ask the P.L.P. to explore every avenue of settlement. No 
support for the meatworkers was forthcoming from the organisational wing of 
the A.L.P.^-^ As well, the finances of the union were close to exhaustion. 
One bright spot occurred, however, in an otherwise gloomy day with a decision 
of the Combined Railway Unions (C.R.U.) to endorse all black bans and to give 
consideration to preventing all livestock deliveries to all bacon factories. 
32. A.J. Neumann to W. Quinn, 23 April 1946, deposit Dl, A.M.I.E.U., 
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Two days later, both the disputes committee and the Queensland Meat 
Companies' Committee extended the dispute. The disputes committee 
declared the Brisbane Abattoir black. The employers played another trump 
card by seeking the deregistration of the A.M.I.E.U. This decision to 
challenge the legal existence of the A.M.I.E.U. was part of the strategy to use 
non-union labour to open as many works as possible on the basis of award 
conditions. Deregistration would deny union officials any access to 
meatworks: it might even make possible the formation of a new organisation 
of meatworkers more sympathetic to employer goals. There were those in the 
employers' ranks who believed that this pressure would precipitate a rapid 
collapse of the strike.^^ 
The Communist party supported the general aims of the A.M.I.E.U. It 
saw many parallels between the meat dispute and the 1945 Steel Strike. 
These included the issues of seniority and victimisation, determined efforts by 
large capitalist enterprises to destroy trade union power and an unsympathetic 
attitude of the 'right wing' in the unions and conservative Labor 
governments. The Communist party had few kind words for the A.L.P. in 
Queensland: 
..., the Fallon-led A.W.U. officialdom, linked with 
the Walsh-Gair parliamentary leadership and with 
Catholic Action, represent the most anti-working 
class, bigoted, anti-Communist and rabid 
reactionary grouping working within the 
Queensland Labor Movement.-^ 
By late April, the Communist party in Queensland was distinctly unhappy with 
the tactics of the disputes committee and the A.M.I.E.U. It attacked the 
picketing as incomplete and undisciplined and criticised the apparent lack of 
direction in the conduct of the dispute: 
34. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 26 April 1946. 
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36. The Guardian 15 March 1946. 
154 
The leaders and members alike must overcome the 
present passivity and re-learn how to wage a really 
well-organised and determined struggle.^' 
It recommended a vigorous effort to raise funds and to win union and public 
support throughout Australia. The party cautioned against any 'wild moves' 
for a general stoppage throughout Queensland industry, recommending instead 
a calculated increase in economic pressure, and advised that policy decisions 
ought to be made only by the disputes committee. The Communist party was 
terrified lest the syndicalist enthusiasm of many A.M.I.E.U. leaders result in a 
dispute of uncontrollable magnitude and consequences. 
During the last weekend in April, rumours began to circulate that the 
Brisbane Abattoir was about to re-open on pre-strike conditions. For the 
employers, the possibility of such a break in their ranks posed a major threat 
to the viability of their strategy. Their apprehension heightened when the 
cattle selling brokers informed them they could not prevent a likely 
'stampede' of cattle from drought stricken areas if the abattoir resumed 
operations.-^^ The air of uncertainty was cleared by news that the court had 
decided to conduct hearings on 1 May to terminate the dispute at the 
abattoir. During the course of Tuesday, April 30, the exporters met on five 
separate occasions to decide their policy if work was resumed at the abattoir 
on pre-strike conditions. They discussed proposals to prevent the abattoir 
opening, but each of these seemed difficult to implement. There was also a 
vague suggestion that retail butchers be organised to refuse to sell any meat 
from the abattoir to the public. The day ended on a note of frustration and 
despair - one of the representatives of the export companies succinctly 
summed up the position on behalf of his colleagues: 
The possibility of work now being resumed at the 
Abattoir has placed all of our interests in a very 
awkward position. We are wondering if some 
action can be taken as a whole to nullify that at 
37. The Guardian 26 April 1946. 
38. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 30 April 1946. 
155 
39 least to a certain extent . 
Within the space of two days the employers' fears and misgivings were, 
however, transformed into feelings of triumph. The reasons for this 
remarkable change are to be found in the proceedings of the court which took 
place on 1 and 2 May 1946. 
On 2 May, the court dropped a bombshell. The court saw the meat 
dispute as an opportunity to ensure that the general character of industrial 
relations in the industry was determined by the processes of arbitration.'^^ It 
ordered a resumption of work under the existing awards throughout the entire 
meat industry by 15 May. The employer application for the deregistration of 
the A.M.I.E.U. was stood over until that date . The employers were ecs ta t ic a t 
this decision since it was precisely what they wanted. They redoubled their 
efforts to recruit sufficient labour to enable the meatworks to re-open. 
Throughout the remainder of the dispute the meat companies insisted that any 
resumption must be strictly in accordance with this 2 May court order. 
The A.M.I.E.U. angrily rejected this decision. It argued that the court 
had intervened in a way favourable to the employers by effectively endorsing 
their repudiation of all agreements, customs and practices outside the 
awards. To the A.M.I.E.U., the court was playing its historic role as the 
defender of employer interests . The disputes committee endorsed the 
A.M.I.E.U. rejection of the court's order. It also decided to approach the 
railway unions for an extension of the black bans to all livestock waggons in 
Queensland, to the transportation of coal for use in the meat industry and to 
the handling of any goods to and from all bacon factories and meatworks. Not 
all railway unions would, however, agree to these requests. A number of the 
smaller railway unions had lit t le enthusiasm for the dispute: they gave only 
lukewarm endorsement to the black bans, while some other railway unions 
were loth to become too deeply embroiled in a major dispute which did not 
affect directly the interests of railwaymen. The effectiveness of the existing 
39. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 30 April 1946. 
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black bans was limited to a degree by this reluctant, and often incomplete, 
support. 
A mass meeting of meatworkers considered the court's return to work 
order on 3 May. They were addressed by Neumann, Alex Macdonald, secretary 
of the F.I.A., and Harry Harvey, the president of the T.L.C, all of whom 
advised them not to return to work on the basis of an award from which the 
preference clauses had been deleted, and without the previous agreements, 
customs and practices which existed prior to the onset of the dispute. The 
fact that Harvey offered this advice is significant. By no stretch of the 
imagination could he be tarred with the brush of Syndicalism or Communism, 
yet here was the president of the T.L.C, a friend of Hanlon and destined to 
sit on the bench of the Queensland Industrial Court, telling the meatworkers 
'There should be no resumption unless at least pre-
strike terms are guaranteed. You have sufficient 
strength to be able to resume on pre-strike 
terms'.^^ 
The mass meeting accepted this advice. It decided to stay on strike. 
With rank and file meatworkers and the disputes committee in no 
mood to accept the court's authority, the government began to cast around for 
means of removing the dispute from the control of the disputes committee. 
At the same time, while it remained firmly in control of the coordination of 
the unions' policy, Hanlon had little option but to continue to negotiate with 
its members. On 8 May, the federal minister for Commerce and Agriculture 
appealed to Hanlon to explain to the unions the serious effect the meat 
industry dispute was having on shipments of meat to Britain. As a result, 
Hanlon and Gair met a deputation from the disputes committee. Neumann 
informed them that the A.M.I.E.U. was prepared to resume in the abattoir and 
export works on pre-strike conditions, while it was prepared to 'cut its losses' 
4i . The Courier-Mail 4 May 1946. 
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in the bacon industry and to bring the cases of the four Murarrie employees 
before the court. 
Hanlon conveyed this information to the employers. They were, 
however, not about to compromise. They stressed their commitment to 
arbitration, in particular to the court's 2 May order, and countered Hanlon's 
pleas that 'Men in responsible positions must get things going', and Gair's 
appeals to them to confer with the A.M.I.E.U., with the claim that to do so 
would involve going beyond the order of the court. Writing thirty years later, 
R.G. Krimmer, then learning the business as a bacon factory employee, said: 
It was evident to the employers that the 
Premier...would have liked the employers to make 
some concessions to the Union and so provide a way 
out for a settlement and save face at the same 
time. However, this was one time when the 
employers stood firm.^^ 
The employers' attitude was discussed at a mass meeting of meatworkers on 
10 May. It was decided to continue the general strike over seniority and to 
demand the restoration of pre-strike conditions. There was, however, no 
mention of the log of claims. The A.M.I.E.U. had, in fact, quietly dropped it 
from the terms of settlement it was prepared to accept. 
Late on the afternoon of 10 May, the premier's department conveyed 
the employers' terms in detail to the disputes committee. The employers 
were out to drive a hard bargain. Work was to be resumed in accordance with 
the court's order, all black bans were to be lifted, provided there was no 
discrimination against 'loyal' employees and, if they were given the 
opportunity to take union membership, there would be no opposition to the 
restoration of the preference clauses to the meat industry awards and all 
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outstanding matters could be negotiated or determined by the court.^^ The 
employers decided that unless and until these conditions were accepted, they 
would refuse any discussions with the A.M.I.E.U. or its supporters.^^ 
After considering these proposals, the disputes committee informed 
Hanlon they could not be accepted and urged him to chair a conference to 
explore further the possibilities of settlement on pre-strike conditions. 
Hanlon undertook to endeavour to arrange this but held out little hope that 
the employers would attend. He also promised to ascertain if the court would 
call a compulsory conference should the employers prove recalcitrant. Hanlon 
further warned the unions that, unless the A.M.I.E.U. agreed to the employers' 
demand that those employees currently working in the industry be permitted 
to maintain their union membership, or to join the union, the formation of 
another union with the assistance of the employers, particularly in the bacon 
factories, was highly likely.^° Similar thoughts were entertained by the 
Q.P.P. which called for the deregistration of the striking unions and, in their 
place 'New unions could then be formed and registered, comprising the ex-
servicemen badly in need of remunerative jobs, and the present meatworkers 
willing to work'. The Q.P.P. had no doubts that the prime responsibility for 
the meat dispute was '...the present anarchy of Communism,...'.^'^ 
These suggestions regarding the formation of company unions, the 
rapidly approaching deregistration hearing and the intransigence of the 
employers put great pressure on the A.M.I.E.U. and its supporters. In fact, 
the willingness of officials and rank and file in various unions to support the 
dispute was rapidly reaching its limit in this, the seventh week of the general 
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strike. Their assessment of the situation was not improved when Hanlon 
informed the disputes committee that the employers had refused to negotiate 
further and that the court was not prepared to call the parties together in a 
compulsory conference. 
Both a weakening and strengthening of external support for the 
A.M.I.E.U. occurred during the first fortnight in May. The Labour Council of 
New South Wales refused to hear an appeal from the A.M.I.E.U. for funds and 
general support; those F.C.U. and F.E.D.F.A. members who had joined the 
strike were becoming increasingly anxious to return to work; representatives 
of the Q.C.E.U. were attending few disputes committee meetings; and the 
A.E.U. refused to sanction any further involvement of its members in the 
dispute. Nevertheless, a dramatic increase in material support for the 
meatworkers came from the A.R.U. on 10 May when it decided to declare 
black all livestock waggons and consignments to and from the meatworks and 
bacon factories.^° Vigorous argument for this policy came from the 
representatives of the A.R.U. northern division. The A.R.U. was determined 
to thwart the efforts by the meat companies to open their works with non-
union labour. Other railway unionists in North Queensland also backed the 
A.M.I.E.U. even though their leaders in Brisbane opposed any increased 
49 involvement in the dispute. 
On occasions, this official policy was ignored in the north as some 
railwaymen unilaterally endorsed the extension of the black bans by the 
A.R.U.^^ By 24 May this black ban had begun to have a marked effect on the 
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transport of livestock to, and products from, the meatworks and bacon 
factories throughout Queensland.^^ Indications of increasing support were 
also coming from the W.W.F.,^ but during early May, it had become apparent 
to members of the disputes committee that, despite this significant additional 
assistance, a split in the ranks of the A.M.I.E.U. leadership was gradually 
opening and threatening to become wider. The only thing that kept this in 
check was a series of moves designed to involve the federal government 
directly in the dispute. 
At the beginning of the second week in May, some union officials 
began to take seriously the idea that a favourable settlement could only be 
effected with the assistance of the Chifley government. Statements by 
Hanlon at various Labour Day functions that the government would abide by 
its policy of arbitration in the meat dispute,^-^ and that many unionists '...are 
beginning to realise how a passive acceptance of a spurious leadership from 
the left has led them into serious difficulties,...',^^ indicated only too clearly 
that the A.M.I.E.U. could expect no assistance from the state authorities in 
the struggle with the employers. It was therefore decided to devise a strategy 
to involve the Chifley government directly in the dispute. 
Of equal concern at this time, however, was the impending hearing of 
the employer application for the deregistration of the A.M.I.E.U. This hearing 
took place on 16 May 1946. The extent of managerial prerogatives, the 
relationship between direct action and arbitration and the basis on which the 
state sought to regulate industrial relationships were argued at length. The 
employers supported the deregistration of the A.M.I.E.U. on three grounds: 
registration conferred on unions the right to obtain an award which was 
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inconsistent with the right to indulge in direct action; the refusal of 
A.M.I.E.U. members to offer for work was an illegal strike within the meaning 
of The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act and as such constituted an 
attack on the rule of law; and A.M.I.E.U. officials had used their rights under 
this Act to enter premises at which members of their union were employed in 
order to maintain and extend the strike, thus deregistration was necessary to 
remove this impediment to the engagement of labour and the resumption of 
operations. 
The A.M.I.E.U. argued that employer rights to hire and fire ought to 
be subject to the processes of arbitration - if employees covered by an award 
were to be denied the use of direct action to alter some aspect of their 
industrial relationships, then so should employers be denied the right to make 
unilateral employment decisions. Suggestions from the bench that the Act 
gave the court ample powers to decide cases of alleged wrongful dismissal 
were met by the counter proposition that 
A system that allows the employer to take action 
without consulting the Court and then putls] the 
onus on the worker to come and consult the Court 
is not considered by the worker to be any more 
than purely lopsided.-' 
According to the president of the court, this was not the point at issue, rather 
...the question is whether we should sit back and 
allow your men to break the industrial law and at 
the same time claim the benefit of registration in 
this Court. That is the question - whether you can 
have it both ways.-'' 
The court's answer was equally straightforward: 
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No body of men can expect to have the benefit of 
industrial law if they are going to be industrial 
outlaws:-^ 
...industrial outlaws...cannot be registered in this 
Court.^^ 
The A.M.I.E.U. pressed the court to call a compulsory conference in 
order to explore the basis for a set t lement before any decision was taken on 
the deregistration applications. The court refused to entertain this request -
to have done so would have meant acknowledging the legitimacy of direct 
action: 
It has always been insisted by the Court that the 
Court will not hold a conference such as you 
suggest or order the employers to confer while the 
men are on str ike. If your men resume work, the 
Court will order the conference to be held [the] 
next day. Your men have to show their bona fides 
as far as returning to work is concerned.'^^ 
The employer applications for the deregistration of the A.M.I.E.U. 
were granted. The court noted that early in the dispute it had advised the 
A.M.I.E.U. to bring a case alleging wrongful dismissal of the four bacon 
factory employees or to apply for the insertion of a seniority clause in the 
award, but that such advice had been ignored in favour of the general strike. 
This was not justified by any dispute at the other works and had not been 
authorised in accordance with the secret strike ballot provisions of The 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act . 
The court reminded the A.M.I.E.U. that it had rejected the court's 
seniority proposals which were '...all that any union could reasonably claim... ' 
since the A.M.I.E.U. demands '...would render the efficient management of 
works quite impossible'. The union had ignored the 2 May order and had 
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transferred its authority to the T.L.C. disputes committee, the members of 
which exhibited '...a desire to prolong rather than to terminate the strike'. 
The court made one concession to the A.M.I.E.U. by postponing the 
deregistration date to 23 May in view of the pending negotiations with the 
federal government.^^ With this week of grace, and only too aware of the 
pressure which the deregistration order would place on some of his officials, 
Neumann turned his energies to securing the active support of the federal 
government. 
Neumann and the disputes committee, however, knew only too well 
that a major impediment to the success of this strategy was the 
uncompromising states' rights attitude of the Queensland Labor government, 
especially in matters touching on the jurisdiction of the industrial court. This 
attitude had been confirmed early in April when the Queensland government 
rejected any participation by federal authorities in the meat dispute.^^ On 
the morning of 14 May, the disputes committee decided to request the federal 
ministers for Labour and for Commerce and Agriculture to conduct an 
investigation of all aspects of the dispute with a view to effecting a 
satisfactory settlement. For almost three days, Healy sought unsuccessfully 
to contact both ministers. The effect of this delay, taken in conjunction with 
the decision of the court to deregister the A.M.I.E.U., produced a 
determination within segments of the disputes committee, as well as the 
A.M.I.E.U., to adopt a more aggressive posture in the approach to the federal 
government and to the dispute in general. It was decided at a meeting of all 
senior officials of the A.M.I.E.U. to ask the union's interstate branches to 
threaten E.J. Holloway, the minister for Labour in the Chifley government, 
with an interstate meat industry dispute unless the federal government settled 
the dispute prior to 23 May, the day on which the deregistration of the union 
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The disputes committee met for almost six hours on 17 May during 
which detailed consideration was given to the future direction of the unions' 
policy. A major extension of the dispute through a general coal strike and a 
strike in all power houses was the subject of extensive debate. After much 
discussion and argument, which at times became heated, it was decided to 
concentrate on a number of alternative ways of persuading the federal 
government to intervene. On 20 May, Neumann and Alex Macdonald travelled 
to Melbourne to discuss federal intervention with the A.C.T.U. and the 
government. The union leaders met Holloway on 20 May. He appeared 
prepared to obtain an order under the National Security Regulations for a 
return to work on pre-strike conditions. Holloway, however, also contacted 
Hanlon and the meat companies, as well as the Queensland Industrial Court 
which he hoped could be persuaded to postpone further its deregistration 
order. After these discussions, Holloway's initial enthusiasm waned. His 
unwillingness to take a unilateral decision to involve the federal government 
became obvious to Neumann and Macdonald during their second round of talks 
on 21 May. The decision regarding the extent to which the federal 
government would participate in effecting a settlement of the dispute was 
left to Chifley. 
This attempt to obtain support from the federal government was of 
major concern to the meat export companies. With the aid of their legal 
advisors, a plan was devised to frustrate and delay any federal government 
intervention. Once again, however, the employers did not need to activate 
this contingency plan. On the afternoon of 23 May, the day the deregistration 
of the A.M.I.E.U. came into effect, Neumann, Macdonald and Holloway were 
advised that Chifley had decided the meat industry dispute was a matter for 
the Queensland Industrial Court and that there would be no federal 
government participation.^^ It appears that Chifley was simply not prepared 
to risk a political struggle with Hanlon in a federal election year over a states' 
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rights issue as sensitive as the jurisdiction of the state court. 
Neumann was bitterly disappointed with this decision which he was 
convinced '...was due to Hanlon "standing over" Forde"' and "standing up to 
Holloway" '. In his estimation 'It is clear that both Governments are 
determined, irrespective of who gets hurt, to enforce the policy of 
Arbitration, right or wrong'."'^ Neumann, however, refused to abandon the 
goal of forcing the dispute into the federal arena - what he did was look to the 
second string to his bow, that of widening the meat dispute to interstate 
proportions. But his capacity to formulate and direct the A.M.I.E.U. strike 
tactics was compromised by the split in the ranks of the senior officials of the 
union which had first become apparent during the earlier part of May. 
The divisions within the A.M.I.E.U. leadership over whether the strike 
should be continued were plainly visible at a meeting which began on 13 May 
in the A.M.I.E.U. Brisbane offices. There is no doubt that the principal cause 
of this division was the imminent deregistration of the union. With the 
postponement of the deregistration order until 23 May, the tensions subsided 
temporarily, but the morale of the waverers took another blow when the 
failure of some of the black bans and the difficult financial position became 
clear. A plan to cut off the Brisbane power supply in order to force the state 
government's hand had also received a cool reception from the relevant 
unions. This news, together with falling hopes for federal intervention and the 
rapid approach of the deregistration date, motivated R. Dixon, A.M.I.E.U. 
southern district secretary, and Mick Kearney, one of the union's organisers, 
to seek a mass meeting of Brisbane meatworkers to persuade the men to 
return to work. After obtaining assurances from the court that it would 
rescind the deregistration order if work was resumed, Dixon and his supporters 
decided that the mass meeting would be held on 23 May. On the afternoon of 
22 May, however, Alex Macdonald and D.C. Rountree, federal president of the 
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A.M.I.E.U., sent news to Brisbane that the federal government was about to 
act. Again, the hopes of all A.M.I.E.U. officials rose, and it was decided to 
cancel the mass meeting. 
During this period of feverish union activity to secure federal 
government assistance, the employers were not idle. Apart from their efforts 
to ensure the federal government did not become involved, they also reached 
final agreement on the form their industrial relations policy would assume 
once the strike was defeated. This agreement marked a considerable change 
in the determination of employer industrial relations policy. During the war 
years the meat companies dealt unilaterally with the A.M.I.E.U., but, under 
the pressure of this major dispute, the centralisation of employer industrial 
relations policy-making in the hands of the Queensland Meat Companies' 
Committee occurred rapidly. On 16 May, Lewis sent detailed instructions to 
all meat companies regarding the terms and conditions which were to be 
enforced upon a resumption of work, while on the following day, it was made 
abundantly clear to the various works managers that they had no authority to 
concede to the unions anything outside the letter of the award - consideration 
of union claims was the sole prerogative of the Q.M.C.C.°^ The instructions 
which Lewis issued were designed to ensure that work was conducted strictly 
in accordance with the award and to exclude any union involvement 
whatsoever in the process of plant-level decision-making in the meat 
industry.'^ The existence of this strictly confidential and exhaustive list of 
non-negotiable demands was at odds with employer assurances throughout the 
remainder of the dispute that they would negotiate on all contentious issues 
once the unions complied with the 2 May order of the court. 
Once they had received news that Chifley would not intervene in the 
dispute, the meat companies decided that the circumstances favoured a 
69. T. Lewis to All Companies, 16 May 1946; T. Lewis to All Companies, 
17 May 1946, deposit D8, Q.M.C.C, W.U.A. 
70. Schedule Of Determinations Agreed Upon By Works' Managers In 
Conference And Approved By The Meat Companies' Committee For 
Adoption By All Meat Export Works Before Resumption Of Work 14 
May 1946, deposit D8, Q.M.C.C, W.U.A. 
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determined bid to re-open their works. Agreements had been reached on the 
common front to be presented to the unions upon any resumption of work; the 
A.M.I.E.U. had lost the legal protection of preference and registration; 
neither the federal nor the state government would support the union position; 
the industrial court had ordered a resumption of work in accordance with the 
awards and, of great significance, there were unmistakeable signs that certain 
A.M.I.E.U. officials would lead a breakaway section of the union back to work. 
On 24 May, representatives of the graziers, stock-brokers, bacon 
factories, exporters, wholesalers, retailers and the Brisbane Abattoir waited 
on Hanlon to discuss the decision to resume operations. Certain assurances 
were sought from the premier to the effect that non-union labour would be 
protected against the activities of union pickets, that existing road transport 
arrangements would be maintained, that every effort be made to ensure that 
the railways would carry the stock and supplies necessary for the continuity of 
operations and that the loading of ships would not be impeded. Hanlon's 
assessment of the situation was not promising. He told the deputation that he 
could not guarantee the railways would be able to provide the necessary 
transport, although he thought a major railway strike was unlikely. The coal 
miners were reluctant to support the meatworkers. On the other hand, the 
W.W.F. was fully committed to their cause. Picketing was legal providing 
pickets did not physically interfere with the non-union labour.'^ The meat 
industry employers had good grounds for believing a split in the ranks of the 
A.M.I.E.U. was imminent.'^ Bob Dixon was in contact with certain meat 
industry executives and had told them that a resumption was likely on 
Wednesday, 29 May. Attempts would be made by 'the moderates' to convince 
73 the men to report for work 'en masse'. 
71. Q.M.C.C. Deputation to the premier. Notes 24 May 1946, deposit D8, 
Q.M.C.C, W.U.A. 
72. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 15 May 1946. 
73. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 27 May 1946. 
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In the event, however, Dixon was unable to persuade others in the 
A.M.I.E.U. leadership to support this proposed action.'''^ They had decided to 
place their faith in the plan to force federal government intervention through 
the creation of an interstate dispute.'^ The action by the employers in 
attempting to resume operations with non-union labour was, however, a 
turning point in the dispute. The A.M.I.E.U. and the disputes committee knew 
that their existing policies were doing little to wrest the initiative from the 
employers. They decided that the only way victory could be won was through 
a major escalation of the dispute. 
74. A.M.I.E.U. Executive and Disputes Committee. Minutes 13 May 1946 
to 31 May 1946, pp.14,15. 
75. A.J. Neumann to J. Mitchell and L.G. Haigh, 28 May 1946, deposit Dl, 
A.M.I.E.U., W.U.A. 
CHAPTER 7 
THE 1946 MEAT INDUSTRY DISPUTE 
the June offensive 
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The decision to mount an offensive was presented as a trade union 
response to the widespread employer efforts to engage non-union labour. 
..., the Trade Union Movement is compelled to 
contemplate action that will involve further 
organisations, and consultations are already taking 
place with leading key unions in other industries for 
the purpose of countering the latest move of the 
employers to defeat the unions originally involved 
in the dispute.... 
The large number of employees normally required 
to man the meat industry is an indication of the 
fact that the introduction of scab labor is not 
designed to supply meat for the public, but is 
obviously a propaganda a t tempt by the employers 
to undermine the morale and solidarity of the men 
involved in the dispute. 
The offensive was to be conducted on a number of fronts. The disputes 
committee hoped the creation of an interstate dispute in the meat industry 
would be complemented by a revitalised and extended commitment on the 
part of the railway unions, and by strikes in the Brisbane power houses, on the 
waterfront and in the coal mines. The decision to bring the dispute to a head 
by means of a major escalation in its scope and impact was opposed bitterly 
by certain members of the disputes commit tee . This resistance came 
principally from the A.E.U., the E.T.U. and the F.E.D.F.A., and as these were 
the very unions whose members operated the power stations this part of the 
disputes committee 's blueprint had no chance of being implemented. 
It also failed to ex t rac t from the railway unions a commitment to a 
more rigorous enforcement of the existing black bans and an extension of 
these bans to prevent the transport of stock, supplies, products and personnel 
for the meatworks and bacon factories.^ At a meeting of representatives 
1. T.L.C. Disputes Committee 's Declaration on Meat Strike T .L .C , 
Brisbane, n.d. 
2. T.L.C. Disputes Commit tee . Minutes 29 May 1946, T .L .C , Brisbane, 
p . l . 
3. T.L.C. Disputes Commit tee . Minutes 31 May 1946, pp.1,2. 
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from all railway unions on 5 June, it was decided to reject requests from the 
disputes committee that stop-work meetings be convened in order to discuss 
the measure of additional support which railwaymen were prepared to afford 
the A.M.I.E.U.'^ However, the A.R.U. and the A.F.U.L.E. - the two vital 
unions in deciding whether or not the trains would run - disassociated 
themselves from these decisions, and, in common with the W.W.F. and the 
miners, declared that unless the meat industry dispute was settled to the 
satisfaction of the A.M.I.E.U. by 12 June 1946, meetings would be called on 
that day to discuss what further pressure could be applied to persuade the 
government to ac t in accordance with the wishes of the meatworkers. The 
majority of the disputes committee believed that nothing short of complete 
strikes on the waterfront and in the mines would be sufficient to bring this 
about. 
Neumann was an enthusiastic supporter of this view. He had worked 
extremely hard to win the commitment of other unions to a major extension 
of the dispute, using his considerable powers of persuasion to convince the 
executive of the W.W.F. that , if it and other powerful unions joined the 
dispute, no government could ignore such a challenge and would be bound to 
settle the dispute as a mat te r of urgency. His remarks to the W.W.F. also 
revealed his devotion to a syndicalist perspective on industrial conflict: 
The calling out of every unionist in Australia would 
be grand if it were practicable, but unfortunately 
we have not reached that desirable stage yet and so 
we must be realists. 
Meetings of watersiders, railwaymen and miners were held on 12 
June. Massive support for the A.M.I.E.U. was expressed with the miners 
voting for an immediate strike. The W.W.F., A.R.U., A.F.U.L.E. and the 
4,. T.L.C. Disputes Commit tee . Minutes 5 June 1946, p.2. 
5* T.L.C. Disputes Commit tee . Minutes 5 June 1946, p.3. A resolution 
embodying this belief was carried by ten votes to three. 
6. W.W.F. Special Meeting of the Executive. Minutes 4 June 1946, 
E213/12 W.W.F. deposit, A.N.U.A.B.L., p.299. 
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Queensland Colliery Employees' Union met the following day and agreed that 
a general strike by the four unions would commence at midnight on 
Wednesday, 19 June 1946. The implications of this decision were far-
reaching in the ext reme. If enginemen and watersiders struck, Queensland's 
intrastate and interstate transport would grind to a halt. With the miners out, 
there would be great disruption to the normal pattern of life in a society 
which depended overwhelmingly on coal. This was well appreciated by the 
meat export companies which took legal advice on the possibility of 
prosecuting members of the strike leadership under the Crimes Act. 
There was, therefore, the distinct prospect that these strikes would 
elicit a response from the government. The A.M.I.E.U. hoped Hanlon would 
order that work be resumed on pre-dispute conditions. However, the other 
principal element in the strategy - the creation of an interstate dispute in the 
meat industry - met severe resistance very early in the deliberations of the 
federal executive of the A.M.I.E.U. On the first day of its meeting in 
Brisbane, 4 June 1946, it was apparent that there would be no inters ta te 
dispute. Almost to a man the delegates argued against any action which could 
bring the meat industry under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration. Several delegates also doubted the willingness 
of their members to strike in support of the Queensland meatworkers. The 
majority opinion on the A.M.I.E.U. federal executive was that any inters tate 
Stoppage would be 'suicidal'.^ Neumann's hopes of involving the 
commonwealth court and/or the Chifley government were dashed completely. 
The arrival of the federal executive of the A.M.I.E.U. in Brisbane 
provided the government with a chance of removing control of the meat 
industry dispute from the disputes commit tee . Hanlon met the federal 
executive on 6 June. He suggested that it negotiate with the employers 
7. T.L.C. Disputes Commit tee . Minutes 13 June 1946, pp.1,2. 
8. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 13 June 1946, deposit D8, Q.M.C.C, W.U.A. 
9. A.M.I.E.U. Federal Council. Meeting of Federal Council Executive re. 
Queensland Meat Industry Dispute. Minutes deposit Dl , A.M.I.E.U., 
W.U.A., pp.3,4. 
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directly. Both Hanlon and Gair took great pains to convince the employers to 
agree to such a meeting. Hanlon told an employer delegation that the federal 
executive harbored serious reservations concerning the tact ics of the disputes 
committee: it appreciated the union had lost the dispute and was anxious to 
make peace. Further, if the employers would agree to meet the A.M.I.E.U. 
executive (he was not asking them to make any concessions), this would assist 
in removing the control of the union's strategy from the communist-dominated 
T .L .C, a result which the government and union movement would find 'very 
helpful'. Despite these entreat ies , the employers decided to adhere to their 
policy of refusing discussions before work was resumed. In any event, 
Hanlon's efforts to isolate the disputes committee were doomed to failure 
since majorities of both the A.M.I.E.U. federal executive and the Queensland 
branch executive were unwilling to sever the ties with the commit tee . 
Hanlon, however, evidently thought that his plans had some chance of 
success, and faced with the steadfast refusal by the employers to budge, he 
changed his approach to them. Whereas previously he had at tempted the art 
of gentle persuasion and had appealed to their anti-communist sentiments, 
Hanlon informed the employers that he would publicly blame them for any 
prolongation of the dispute, that he would suggest to the A.M.I.E.U. killing for 
export as well as the retail market be commenced at the Brisbane Abattoir 
1 7 
and that he would investigate the establishment of state meatworks. In 
applying this pressure Hanlon may well have known of the deep-seated fears 
the employers had of the abattoir re-opening. The employers hastily took 
legal advice on what options were open to them should the government decide 
13 to acquire stock for processing a t the Brisbane Abattoir. 
On the afternoon of 7 June, Hanlon told the A.M.I.E.U. federal 
10. Q.M.C.C. Interview with premier. Notes circa 6 June 1946, deposit 
D8, Q.M.C.C, W.U.A. 
11. T.L.C. Disputes Commit tee . Minutes 6 June 1946, p.2. 
12. Q.M.C.C. Conversation with premier. Notes 7 June 1946, deposit D8, 
Q.M.C.C, W.U.A. 
13. Q.M.C.C. Minutes 11 June 1946. 
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executive that , with the union's support, the government was prepared to open 
the Brisbane Abattoir and enter the export trade in the hope of forcing a split 
in the ranks of the meat export companies. He also suggested that the 
A.M.I.E.U. arrange for another union to approach the court to re-open its 
consideration of the dispute. Little enthusiasm could be found in any union 
circles for the proposal to open the abat toir . A resumption at the abattoir 
could not give employment to all striking meatworkers and would only lead to 
a 'second split' in the ranks of the A.M.I.E.U. Although some lip-service was 
paid to the idea of another approach to the court, it was widely recognised 
that it would not be able to effect a set t lement unless the policies of the 
employers and/or the A.M.I.E.U. had undergone substantial prior change.^ 
By the end of the second week in June the stage was set for a major 
escalation of the meat industry dispute. Writing in The Meat Industry Journal 
of Queensland, Neumann argued that the refusal of the meat company 
managements to negotiate with the A.M.I.E.U. federal executive was 
instrumental in bringing about the decisions of the W.W.F., A.R.U., A.F.U.L.E. 
and the miners to strike from midnight 19 June 1946. This action by the 
employers 
...convinced the Unions associated with the 
Disputes Committee of the Trades and Labor 
Council, who were handling the dispute, that the 
employers were determined to smash the Meat 
Industry Union, and that this, if accomplished, 
would be the fore-runner of a t tacks by employers, 
making up the Queensland Employers' Federation, 
on other Unions with a view to smashing those 
Unions also, one by one. Alarmed at this obvious 
damnable plan of the Employers' Federation, those 
Unions who are really strong Unions in the Trade 
Union Movement, finally made their decisions to 
fight this menance to the whole Trade Union 
Movement by making common cause with the Meat 
Industry Union. ^ ^ 
A mass meeting of meatworkers on Friday 14 June endorsed these sentiments 
14. T.L.C. Disputes Commit tee . Minutes 7 June 1946, p . l . 
15. The Meat Industry Journal of Queensland June 1946, p.2. 
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without apparent dissent. This further commitment to the strike was 
influenced by promises of increased support which were made at the mass 
meeting by the disputes committee and the railway, coal and waterside 
unions. As the date for the major extension of the dispute approached, Hanlon 
acted to make sure that this did not convince Chifley and his ministers to 
reassess their at t i tude of non-intervention. Frank Forde, the deputy prime 
minister, informed Chifley that the A.L.P. in Queensland '...hoped that the 
Federal Government would not interfere in any way in the strike up there 
unless asked to do so by Mr. Hanlon and Mr. F a l l o n ' . ^ 
In the week leading up to 20 June, there were several signs that the 
A.F.U.L.E. commitment to the railway strike was less firm than at first 
sight. Throughout the dispute the A.F.U.L.E. had shown some reluctance to 
become involved. The spectre of the traumatic and divisive 1927 South 
Johnstone dispute, during which the McCormack Labor government locked out 
railwaymen in the course of a sugar workers' strike, still haunted many 
officials and members alike. The second thoughts within the A.F.U.L.E. 
were not the only signs that the participation of the major railway unions in 
the proposed escalation of the dispute was not at all certain. On 18 June, four 
small railway unions, prominent amongst those who had little sympathy for 
the dispute in general, and which particularly opposed its extension within the 
railways, applied to the court for an order of mandamus, or an injunction 
restraining the A.R.U. and A.F.U.L.E. from taking part in the proposed 
strike. The court, in granting the applications, left no doubt regarding its 
interpretation of the essential features of the meat industry dispute: 
...the Court is bound to take action when...unions 
registered in the Court appear likely to become 
involved in an illegal strike by illegal methods and 
at the dictation of the strike Committee 
controlled, we believe, by Communists, whose 
policy is opposed to Arbitration... . 
16* F.M. Forde to J.B. Chifley, 18 June 1946, Prime Minister's 
Department , correspondence of J.B. Chifley (subject order), 'A.L.P. 
Old', Canberra Permanent 18/52, item folder I, A.A. 
17. A.F.U.L.E. Circular No. 285 6 June 1946, E212/372 A.F.U.L.E. 
deposit, A.N.U.A.B.L. 
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This is not in any way a fight for bet ter conditions 
for the workers. It is a case of the [Disputes] 
Committee taking advantage of the opportunity 
offered by this unwarranted dispute to discredit 
Arbitration and generally disrupt industry. Those 
are the simple issues and there are no others in this 
c a s e . ^ 
The A.F.U.L.E. executive knew that to ignore the court 's order 
prohibiting strike action 
...unless or until such strike has been authorised by 
all the members of the Industrial Unions of 
Employees who are employees of the Commissioner 
for Railways in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 51 of the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Acts 1932 to 1945^^ 
invited the possibility of heavy penal sanctions. The previous day the 
government had indicated that extensions of the meat dispute to other 
industries, despite the social disruption and industrial dislocation, would never 
persuade it to change its basic policy that a set t lement had to be effected 
70 through the processes of arbitration. ^ But perhaps the greatest pressure 
against participation in the strike came from within the A.F.U.L.E. The 
executive had before it le t ters and telegrams from several branches (including 
most of the larger branches) calling for a secret ballot before engaging in 
71 Strike a c t i o n . ^ 
The A.F.U.L.E. began to look for a face-saving means of extricating 
itself from the dispute. It decided to ask Hanlon to remit all fines imposed on 
railwaymen who honoured the black bans, and to refuse the transportation by 
rail of black products and materials . On 19 June, the A.F.U.L.E. and A.R.U. 
18. Railway Award-State. Judgment Q.I.G., 30 June 1946, p.230. 
19. Ibid. 
20. The Courier-Mail 19 June 1946. 
21. A.F.U.L.E. Special Meeting of the Divisional Executive. Minutes 19 
June 1946, E212/21 A.F.U.L.E. deposit, A.N.U.A.B.L., p.7. 
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conferred with Hanlon, Gair and the minister for Transport, E.J. Walsh. 
Hanlon reiterated the government's determination to defend the arbitration 
77 
system and refused to accede to the unions' requests. After this meeting, 
the A.F.U.L.E. executive withdrew from the proposed strike. 
This was a severe blow to the meatworkers. Without the cooperation 
and participation of the A.F.U.L.E., there was no chance that the A.R.U. 
could unilaterally bring about the cessation of the railway service. 
Recognising this fact, the A.R.U. withdrew from the proposed railway strike 
as well, thus aborting a major part of the disputes committee 's offensive. 
Furthermore, there was no certainty that all the railway unions would be 
prepared to maintain the existing black bans which, although sometimes 
ignored, were of sufficient impact to make impossible anything more than 
token operations in only a few meatworks. Moves were already afoot for the 
73 
railway unions to lift all black bans. A crucial part of the disputes 
committee strategy, however, had been in operation for a full week when the 
major railway unions withdrew their support. This was the strike of the coal 
miners, who were joined by members of the W.W.F. throughout Queensland at 
midnight on June 19. Although the assistance of the watersiders was of 
considerable significance, it was the miners' strike which provided the only 
hope for the A.M.I.E.U. and its supporters that a satisfactory set t lement 
might yet be won. 
The split in the ranks of the A.M.I.E.U. officials widened after the 
promised railway strike failed to materialise. A general flagging of spirits 
provided the background for a heightening of ideological tensions. Officials 
who belonged to the Communist party were accused of initiating policies 
without consulting other members of the A.M.I.E.U. and of converting the 
dispute from an industrial to a political mat te r . The 1946 Meat Industry 
22. The Courier-Mail 20 June 1946. 
23. J .P . Devereux to R. Leggat, 15 June 1946, A.M.F.S.U. files. Trades 
Hall, Ipswich. 
24. A.M.I.E.U. Combined Branch Executive and Southern District 
Council. Minutes 20 June 1946, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane, pp. 1,2,3. 
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Dispute was, however, the type of industrial dispute the Communist party 
dreaded. In the event, communists were bound to support the strike, and to 
make the best of a bad job, but the party regarded the meat dispute as being 
over the wrong issue, tactically immature and potentially damaging to the 
political interests of the labour movement. The Communist party saw the 
meat dispute as being provoked by the meat companies. It agreed that the 
unlimited right to hire and fire had to be challenged, especially when it was 
used to dismiss militant workers with the object of weakening trade unions. 
But it could not accept that a strike of the massive proportions of the meat 
dispute was in any way warranted over the dismissals of the four Murrarie 
bacon factory workers. In such cases, according to Richard Dixon, the 
assistant national secretary of the Communist party. 
...we should aim in the first place to avoid boss-
provoked strikes, if it is possible. Nevertheless, if 
a strike s tar ts around such issues as victimisation 
we should, in the first place, confine it to the 
factory concerned and try to sett le it quickly and 
secondly if extension is necessary it should only be 
done in collaboration with the State Committees or 
the Central Committee and when they consider 
that the extension of the dispute is essential in the 
interests of the trade union m o v e m e n t . ^ 
As the dispute progressed, the performance of members of the 
disputes committee who belonged to the Communist party a t t rac ted severe 
criticism from their colleagues in the party leadership at both the Queensland 
and national levels. At the beginning of June 1946, the Central Trade Union 
Committee of the Communist party complained it was receiving no 
information concerning the progress of the dispute and particularly the tact ics 
being employed. There was particular criticism of the failure of 'the 
comrades in Queensland' to draw on the party's experience and understanding 
of the difficulties associated with a prolonged dispute which had been gained 
during the 1945 Steel Strike. The most scathing criticism of the conduct of 
25 . C.P.A. Central Commit tee Plenum. Speech by R. Dixon 31 May, 1,2 
June 1946, M.S.S.2389 1(8), M.L., p . l 3 . 
26. C.P.A. Central Committee Plenum. Speech by John Hughes 31 May, 
1,2 June 1946, pp.4,5. 
179 
the dispute, however, which did not spare the Communist party members of 
the disputes commit tee , came from J .C. Henry, the leader of the Communist 
party in Queensland. 
Henry vehemently at tacked the decision of the A.M.I.E.U. leadership 
to initiate a state-wide strike. The union was infected with syndicalist 
madness in its desire for a general strike. It foolishly assumed, moreover, a 
quick and easy victory could be won. Henry laid a major share of the blame 
for the implementation of an incorrect policy in the early stages of the 
dispute at the door of Communist party members in the A.M.I.E.U. 
leadership. Whilst conceding that the Communist party did not control the 
A.M.I.E.U., he nevertheless argued that Communist party members in the 
union could have presented more forceful arguments for the adoption of 
different tact ics . Furthermore, certain members of the A.M.I.E.U. executive 
had been able to frustrate and delay the launching of a financial appeal over 
which the disputes commit tee , 'under our leadership', had not taken a strong 
enough stand. The fundamental reason for these failures by communists in the 
A.M.I.E.U. and on the disputes commit tee lay in '...the hang-over from the 
war time policy...' which '...is quite pronounced in a number of trade union 
comrades in Queensland'. ' These remarks referred to the peace in industry 
policy which the Communist party had followed during the Second World War. 
Richard Dixon saw political dangers for the Communist party in the 
dispute. He feared the Queensland government would use it to strike at the 
influence and prestige of the Trades and Labour Council ('...which is under the 
leadership of the Communist Party... ') in Queensland trade union affairs. This 
theme was subsequently developed at length in the communist press in 
Queensland: 
A leading member of the QCE recently flew to 
Melbourne, where he contacted leaders of the 
ACTU [Australian Council of Trade Unions] and 
warned them that the leading body of the 
Queensland Labor Party would not tolerate any 
27. C.P.A. Central Committee Plenum. Speech by J .C. Henry 31 May, 1,2 
June 1946, pp.4,5. 
180 
interference from the Federal Trade Union body. 
Asked by an ACTU Executive member why the 
Queensland Government was adopting such an 
attitude towards the Unions, this great 'labor' 
stalwart replied: 
'Because we want to smash the Communists' 
control of the Queensland Trades and Labor 
Council.' Asked, 'Would not smashing the 
Communists in the Trades and Labor Council mean 
smashing the unions themselves?' the QCE 
representative replied: 'That does not matter so 
long as we smash the Communists.' 
Communist party concern at the political implications of the meat 
dispute extended further than its immediate effect on the fortunes of the 
party in Queensland. The dispute also afforded the non-Labor parties 
opportunities to attack the federal Labor government. ° The disruptive 
effect of large disputes on community life generally was alienating the 
sympathy and support of farmers and the middle classes for the federal 
government and the trade unions: 
We must recognise the dangers that exist for the 
working class in these struggles. The facts are that 
the employers are provoking strikes around 
victimisation that develop into great struggles of 
the workers, dissipate the union strength and 
finances, and result in providing the newspapers 
and reaction with material to attack the labor 
30 movement.-^^ 
Despite all these reservations and criticisms, the 'June offensive' almost 
certainly had the support of the highest echelons in the Communist party. 
The national executive officers of the W.W.F. and the Miners' Federation 
almost without exception belonged to the party. It is inconceivable that they 
did not obtain the imprimatur of the Central Trade Union Committee on the 
28. The Guardian 28 June 1946. 
29. The Guardian 24 May 1946. 
30. C.P.A. Central Committee Plenum. Speech by R. Dixon 31 May, 1,2 
June 1946, p. 12. 
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escalation. The party, with great reluctance, saw this as the only way of 
forcing a victory in a dispute for which, in the final analysis, it had little 
enthusiasm. 
The political leadership of the Communist party was not alone in 
counting the cost of the meat dispute. Two days after the failure of the 
proposed railway strike, the state council of the A.R.U. met to discuss the 
dispute. The state secretary, Frank Nolan, reaffirmed the commitment of the 
A.R.U. to strike action in order to bring the dispute to a head. He warned, 
however, that the A.R.U. faced annihilation if it made any unilateral attempt 
to bring the railways to a standstill. His grim warnings that such action would 
see the immediate deregistration of the A.R.U. and subsequent 'body-
snatching' by the other railway unions provided clear testimony to the 
limitations imposed by the arbitration system and the structure of railway 
unionism in Queensland on the capacity of the A.R.U. to engage in direct 
action. 
Although the A.R.U. stood ready to support the meatworkers, it is 
clear that Nolan had substantial reservations over the extent of the dispute. 
He told the state council that the meatworkers were living in the age of 1914-
18, an age when considerable economic gains, particularly by the A.M.I.E.U., 
had been won by strike action, and that some meat union officials were 
motivated by 'unrestrained syndicalism": 
But I had an idea that in Australia,...we had now 
developed an enlightened political and industrial 
leadership of a militant and class-conscious 
character that held that more unrestrained 
syndicalism, without attention to the political 
position, was more often disastrous than not;...-^^ 
In the struggle against the bacon factories and the Brisbane Abattoir, the 
A.M.I.E.U. was fighting against small farmers '...whom the union movement 
requires as friends, not as enemies...' and against a government 
31. A.R.U. State Council. Special Meeting on Meat Strike. State 
Secretary's Report 22 June 1946, A.R.U., Brisbane, p.3. 
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instrumentality '...at a time when all unionists and progressives are calling for 
more and more State ownership and State control of industry'. Nolan 
emphasised these points: 'In other words, they are fighting the wrong people 
in the wrong way,...' and suggested that '...from a struggle which may finally 
do the meatworkers no good at all' the only ones to gain would be the meat 
32 export companies. 
A form of federal 'intervention' in the meat dispute took place on the 
weekend of 22 and 23 June. The federal meat controller, J.A. Tonkin, 
managed to arrange a conference between the parties to discuss their 
respective terms of se t t lement . It was no ordinary exchange with the 
employers located on one floor, representatives of the A.M.I.E.U., A.E.U. and 
F.E.D.F.A. on another, with Tonkin acting as an intermediary. This 
arrangement occurred at the behest of the employers: before the conference 
opened, the meat export company and bacon factory representatives decided 
that there would be no negotiations with the unions in the conventional sense, 
rather the terms of the employers were to be submitted to the unions without 
33 debate. Over the best part of the next week, the A.M.I.E.U. and the 
disputes committee considered the employers' terms and drafted and re-
drafted their own proposals for set t lement . But all this achieved were 
s tatements in black and white which revealed just how far apart the 
contending parties were. The debate within the A.M.I.E.U. over the 
employers' proposals underlined once again the difference of opinion within its 
leadership over continuing the dispute. One faction wished to fight on in the 
belief that the strikes in the mines and on the waterfront would save the day, 
whilst another was prepared to concede that the capacity of the A.M.I.E.U. to 
force more favourable set t lement terms was exhausted. 
On 25 June the All Service Unions decided to lift all black bans in the 
32, Ibid., p.4. 
33, Meeting of Meat Export and Bacon Factory Representatives. Rough 
Notes 23 June 1946. A copy of these notes is in the possession of the 
author. 
34, A.M.I.E.U. Branch Executive. Minutes 24 June 1946, A.M.I.E.U., 
Brisbane, p . l . 
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railways. More bad news for the meatworkers came from the Newcastle 
36 branch of their union which rejected any inters tate extension of the dispute 
while the New South Wales branch called on the A.M.I.E.U. federal executive 
37 to assume control. The failure of the railwaymen to strike triggered an 
unofficial meeting of some 350 waterside workers the following day which 
considered that the lack of action in the railways relieved them of the 
-30 
obligation to continue support for the A.M.I.E.U.^" This expression of dissent 
amongst segments of the rank and file caused sufficient concern to W.W.F. 
officials for them to seek urgent advice from their national secretary, Jim 
Healy, concerning his a t t i tude towards the meat dispute.-'^ Armed with 
instructions from Sydney that the W.W.F. strike should continue, the 
Queensland branch officials were able to persuade a mass meeting to support 
the strike decision,^^ but the unauthorised mass meeting, together with 
earlier calls for a secret ballot on the question of taking strike action, 
indicated that even within the ranks of the militant and class-conscious 
W.W.F. there existed substantial reservations over the meat dispute. 
According to senior members of the Communist party these reservations were 
the effect of a concerted effort by 'Catholic Action' elements to weaken 
support for the dispute.^ 
To add to the woes of the A.M.I.E.U., a new union. The Central 
Queensland Meat Industry Employees' Union, which covered the non-union 
labour at the Lake's Creek meatworks, applied for registration on 26 June. 
35. T.L.C. Disputes Commit tee . Minutes 26 June 1946, p.2. 
36. J. Larkin to A.J. Neumann, 25 June 1946, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
37. A.J. Neumann to D.C. Rountree, H. Sharman, W. Pirie, J. Larkin, 26 
June 1946, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
38. W.W.F. Mass Meeting. Minutes 21 June 1946, E212/12 W.W.F. 
deposit, A.N.U.A.B.L., p.309. 
39. W.W.F. Executive. Minutes 20 June 1946, E212/12 W.W.F. deposit, 
A.N.U.A.B.L., p.312. 
40. W.W.F. Mass Meeting. Minutes 21 June 1946, pp.309,310. 
4 1 . J .C. Henry, 'The Queensland Meat Strike,' Communist Review, no. 60 
(1946), p.231. 
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Earlier that month, the union's founders, E.A. Thomas and G.R. Snowden, had 
consulted with The Employers' Association of Central Queensland and a senior 
employers' advisor in Brisbane.^ In May, the council of the U.G.A. 
considered a proposal: 
That enquiries be instituted as to the bona fides of 
the sponsors for the registration of a new 
Meatworkers' Union, and if considered wise,... 
support be given to the registration of such new 
Union.^^ 
It seemed that company unions were to be used to destroy the position of the 
A.M.I.E.U. in the meat industry. 
By late June, the miners' strike was having a severe impact especially 
in the railways where the shortage of coal was described officially as 
desperate.^^ A number of other industries were also close to exhausting 
their stocks. On 26 June, the government acted, but not in the way hoped for 
by the meatworkers. It declared a s ta te of emergency throughout those parts 
of Queensland which relied on private companies or public utilities for their 
electricity and/or gas, and imposed severe power restrictions. Two days 
later, the government proclaimed a general s ta te of emergency and ordered 
the industrial registrar to take a postal ballot of all members of the 
A.M.I.E.U. 
...on the question whether they are in favour of all 
42. J.W. Henderson to E.H. Coneybeer, 7 June 1946. A copy of this le t ter 
is in the possession of the author. 
43. U.G.A. Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Council. Minutes 22 May 
1946, U.G.A., Brisbane, p . l2 . 
44. Commissioner for Railways. Memorandum. Necessity for Reduction 
of Train Services because of shortage of coal supplies 20 June 1946, 
46:7150, batch no. 1, 'Industrial Dispute. Meat Works and Bacon 
Factories ' , commissioner for railways, Brisbane. 
45. A Proclamation Q.G.G., 26 June 1946, p. l647. 
46. Order In Council Q.G.G.. 26 June 1946, pp.1649-1651. 
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members of the Union returning to work under 
award conditions and submitting all grievances to 
the Industrial Court for determination. ' 
The rationale for this course of action, which had been urged by 
sr interests and Queensland People's Pa 
times during the dispute, was Hanlon's belief that 
4X 
employe  rty politicians a t various 
'...various officials connected with the dispute lack 
the courage to advise their members to accept the 
decision of the court . 
All know that the men would accept the court 's 
decision if their officials tendered them that 
advice. '^" 
Hanlon counselled rank and file meatworkers '...to take a sane view of the 
position and cease making war on the community'. His use of this military 
metaphor was significant. Hanlon saw many parallels between a breakdown in 
international law and subsequent global conflagrations on the one hand, and a 
lack of respect for industrial law and an outbreak of industrial disputes on the 
other. Peace in the international and industrial spheres could only be 
guaranteed if the rule of law was vigorously upheld and protected. Hanlon 
emphasised this theme in a broadcast on 7 July: 
What was the use of talking platitudes about 
arbitration among the nations of the world if the 
community did not set t le its own industrial disputes 
by arbitration?^^ 
The declaration of the state of emergency and the ordering of the 
secret ballot increased the pressure on the disputes committee and the 
47. Order In Council Q.G.G., 28 June 1946, pp.1659,1660. 
48* The Telegraph 27 June 1946. 
49. The Courier-Mail 27 June 1946. 
50. Ibid. 
51* The Courier-Mail 8 July 1946. 
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A.M.I.E.U. enormously especially on those officials who wished to see a return 
to work. They had seen the failure to secure federal government intervention; 
the incomplete application of the black bans policy in the railways; the loss 
of the dispute with the bacon factories; the refusal of their own federal 
executive to create an inters tate dispute; and the failure of the major 
railway unions to join with the miners and watersiders. They were well aware 
of the wide political differences between the cabinet and the disputes 
commit tee. In the past few days, a company union had applied for 
registration. They had also seen the failure of the Tonkin conference and, 
finally, they had seen the industrial court grant employers the right to stand 
down employees under s tate awards as a result of the power restrictions. This 
stand-down order bore testimony to the serious and widespread effects of the 
coal strike. By the last days of June, thousands of employees were without 
work, the railways and trams were operating skeleton services and power for 
domestic purposes was severely rationed. At night, Brisbane and other 
centres were blacked out and provided an unwelcome reminder of conditions 
experienced during a war which had finished not a year earlier. 
On 28 June the registrar of the Queensland Industrial Court, 
accompanied by police, seized the membership records of the A.M.I.E.U. in 
Brisbane. Similar action also occurred in Rockhampton and Townsville. This 
drew widespread protests from various union quarters which characterised the 
ballot and the confiscation of the A.M.I.E.U. records as an a t tack on trade 
union rights.^ The president of the Queensland Employers' Federation also 
entered the political debate. He at tacked the government for not ordering 
the strikers to resume work prior to the ballot. Had this occurred 
...law abiding citizens could possibly have been 
saved the hardship of dismissals or standing down 
and their womenfolk further hardships in 
endeavouring to maintain the health and welfare of 
their families,... 
52. The Telegraph 28 June 1946. 
53. Ibid. 
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These hardships were the product '...of deliberate flouting of the law by 
militant communists'. Rank and file workers, however, saw things 
differently. A mass meeting of all unions with members engaged in the meat 
dispute decided to reject the employers' terms of set t lement and to support 
the disputes committee 's counter proposals. It was also decided to continue 
the strike and to oppose any ballot which was not under the control of the 
A.M.I.E.U. 
Immediately after this mass meeting, a union deputation met with 
Hanlon. He was asked to cancel the secret ballot, to call a compulsory 
conference of employers and employees and to order a resumption of work on 
pre-strike conditions. The cabinet, however, would not compel a return to 
work on pre-strike conditions. This would conflict with the 2 May order of the 
court. The government was thus not even prepared to assist the A.M.I.E.U. 
to obtain its minimum terms of set t lement . It also refused to cancel the 
ballot. It did agree, however, to a face to face meeting between the meat 
industry employers and the unions. This meeting was set down for Monday, I 
July 1946. 
In the week leading up to the declaration of the state of emergency, 
the press intensified its campaign against the strike. Front page prominence 
was given to reports of public inconvenience, unemployment and 
disagreements within union ranks. Similar exposure was afforded the views of 
women's groups and employer organisations which condemned the strikers, 
while headlines such as 'Reds Fear Outcome Of Ballot'^' left no doubt whom 
the press saw as being responsible for the dispute and its at tendant problems. 
In case his readers missed the point, the editor of The Courier-Mail told them 
58 that the meat dispute was '...a communist a t tack on the State ' . 
54. Ibid. 
55. T.L.C. Disputes Commit tee . Minutes 1 July 1946, p . l . 
56. The Courier-Mail 29 June 1946. 
57. Ibid. 
58. The Courier-Mail 27 June 1946. 
The press presented issues in the dispute in terms of ideological 
perspectives which contained no sympathy for the values espoused by the 
meatworkers: 
If employers were denied any power to dismiss 
employees, except by permission of the employees' 
union, all effective control of their businesses 
would be taken out of their hands. What would be 
the position of employees? Their surety for holding 
a job would no longer be the worth of their work, 
but the favour of a shop committee or a union 
executive. They would have a new boss, a union 
boss. These consequences would not stop at private 
industry. Government and Parliament would lose 
control of all State employees. There would be no 
further use for an Industrial Court or arbitration 
awards. Anarchy would replace public law in 
industry.^" 
The employers' public stance was lauded in the media. Accordingly, the 
employers '...have been resisting an attempt to break arbitration...' and 
'...have been defending the rights of all Queenslanders,...'. Further, the 
employers '...have kept strictly within the law,...'."^ As the evidence has 
shown the employers, however, adhered to the principle of arbitration simply 
because it suited them so to do. Their contingency plans indicate clearly that 
had different circumstances arisen they were quite prepared to adopt a 
different course. The employer plan to lock out meatworkers, for example, 
involved agreement in advance on the result of a secret ballot which was 
required under Queensland industrial legislation. 
Press opposition to the dispute continued unabated during the first 
week of July. Prominent, detailed and constant exposure was given to 
statements which condemned the meatworkers and their allies. Those whose 
views were afforded such generous recognition included church leaders, one of 
whom called on his flock to stand against the communists' goal 'to control the 
59. Ibid. 
60. Ibid. 
61. The Courier-Mail 29 June 1946. 
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nation', and to accept this communist challenge: 
'We shall never re t rea t from this high moment. 
With all our resources we shall resist every a t t empt 
to enslave the human spirit. ' 
Similar attention was given to the views of prominent members of the 
Queensland Country Party who thought that non-union labour should be 
organised to operate the meatworks. 
In order no doubt to assist its readers understand the fundamental 
reasons for industrial conflict. The Courier-Mail presented an analysis by 'The 
Counsellor' which, under the headline 'Major Cause Of Present Unrest 
Psychological', explained that the cause of industrial disputes was to be found 
...in the psychology of the individual citizen which 
makes him apathet ic towards the communal life 
about him and yet rif>e for rebellion when whipped 
up to it by fanatical and determined leaders. 
Rebellion against any authority is as innate a 
function of a frustrated 'ego complex' as is the 
tendency to follow the crowd and its leader, a 
function of the herd. Thus, when there are leaders 
trained to foster revolution, it is only natural that 
the dissatisfied and frustrated will follow with a 
will.^'* 
The Courier-Mail pursued what were the obvious implications of these 
profound revelations with calls on Hanlon to impose fines on the unions and 
individual strikers, and demands that the government convene a special sitting 
of parliament: 
Through Parliament the f)eople can speak, order, 
and compel. Parliament can give the Government 
all the aid and all the power it may need to rescue 
62. The Courier-Mail 1 July 1946. 
63. The Courier-Mail 1 July and 4 July 1946. 
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the State from the stranglehold that a minority of 
communist-led strikers is trying to put on it. 
The people of a large part of Queensland have been 
made to live like blackfellows because the 
organisers of the meat strike did not fear to defy 
and break the law. They thought they were safe 
from punishment. So far events have proved them 
right.^^ 
One striking meatworker, however, did not escape punishment. On 3 
July, a young meatworker was convicted of common assault by a criminal 
court jury. The charge had been laid after a brawl on 14 May at the Hamilton 
Cold Stores between members of the A.M.I.E.U. and some non-unionists who 
were maintaining the Murarrie bacon factory.°^ In passing sentence, Mr 
Justice F.T. Brennan, a member of Labor governments in Queensland in the 
early 1920s, made a series of remarks on the meat dispute, and the postwar 
condition of Australia generally, which was eagerly seized on by the press. 
Australians, claimed Mr Justice Brennan, were a fortunate people who had 
been spared the hunger and hardships experienced in other nations. 
Nevertheless, he continued, certain influences had arisen in postwar Australia 
which aimed at disruption and ruin by overthrowing the normal form of 
government. It was these influences which were responsible for misleading 
the meatworkers in Queensland, and they ' "...should be desperately dealt with 
as early as possible in Australia" '. Warming to his theme, the learned judge 
observed: 
'A strike might be necessary in certain 
65. The Courier-Mail 4 July 1946. 
66. Some of the non-unionists who were involved in the melee on 14 May 
were ex-servicemen. In fact, ex-servicemen constituted a significant 
proportion of the non-union labour which operated the bacon 
factories. The dispute provided a focal point for the expression of 
postwar tensions between men who had fought overseas and those who 
had remained in the civilian workforce. This tension was very real. 
Men who had suffered the privations, risks and sacrifices of overseas 
service resented what they believed were the advantages and 
comforts of those who had remained in Australia. On the other hand, 
those who had contributed to the war effort in a civilian capacity 
feared a loss of jobs to the returned servicemen. 
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circumstances, but where there is an Arbitration 
Court and it is ignored and defied, and they want to 
get to direct action, it means nothing else than 
bloodshed and bloody revolution. 
We do not want that , and we will not have it in 
Australia. The courts will insist it will not 
happen.'^' 
The headline which accompanied the report of this judicial wisdom in The 
Courier-Mail read: 'Direct Action Will Mean Bloodshed, Says Judge'.^^ 
The conference of meat industry employers and unions which Hanlon 
had ordered under the emergency powers broke down over the method of 
hiring labour. Agreement was impossible. The A.M.I.E.U. was determined to 
maintain the labour engagement methods which obtained during the war years 
when men were engaged through the union off ice .°° The companies claimed 
the right to hire and fire independently of any effective union involvement. 
They insisted that the provisions of the meat industry awards be applied in the 
engagement of employees. This meant that the union would become an 
extension of the companies' administrative structure in labour engagement 
mat ters , a role which offended against the deep-seated convictions of the 
A.M.I.E.U. The A.M.I.E.U. would not surrender a hard won and ideologically 
important right to control as far as possible employment in the meat industry. 
With the collapse of Hanlon's compulsory conference, it appeared on 
the surface that a s talemate had arrived. The employers would not budge 
from their insistence that work be resumed under award condit ions. '^ The 
disputes commit tee examined no new initiatives. Hanlon announced that the 
government would wait the result of the secret ballot before taking further 
action. Rank and file meatworkers also seemed prepared to stay on str ike. A 
mass meeting in Brisbane on 2 July instructed union delegates not to accept 
67. The Courier-Mail 4 July 1946. 
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set t lement terms other than pre-strike conditions, and decided not to accept 
the result of the ballot. It called on the disputes commit tee to convene 
meetings throughout the state once the result of the ballot was known '.. .to 
decide when, and under what conditions, a return to work will be made ' . ' 
The mass meeting also expressed concern a t newspaper reports 
...which indicate that a set t lement may be reached 
on terms other than those agreed upon at all mass 
meetings of members . ' 
These decisions were considered by the A.M.I.E.U. on the afternoon of 
73 2 July. ' The next day persistent rumours circulated to the effect that a 
further move from within union circles would be made to sett le the dispute. 
On the morning of 4 July, The Courier-Mail announced that ' ...the Meat Union 
itself was hoping against hope that someone would issue an Order-in-
Council...' and observed that 'They don't care whether it is issued by Holloway, 
Chifley, or Hanlon, so long as it is issued'. This report suggested that the 
significance of the emphasis on being instructed to return to work was so that 
' "...someone can save face" \'^ 
These reports were well informed. At a meeting of the A.M.I.E.U. 
Queensland branch executive on 4 July 1946, also attended by other senior 
officials, it was moved: 
'That we approach the Government to issue an 
order that Companies re-open works and the Union 
supply labour in accordance with past practices and 
in the event of any disagreement with respect to 
the past practice of supplying labour it shall be 
determined by an Industrial Magistrate. 
A Conference to be ordered to s tar t within 
fourteen days as directed by the Industrial Court. 
71. Ibid. 
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Matters not agreed upon in Conference to be 
referred into Cour t . ' ' ^ 
The supporters of the motion argued that the secret ballot would 
return a 'yes' vote, and this would place the government, as well as the 
employers, in a very strong position to dictate terms which would be nowhere 
near as favourable as those contained in the motion. Moreover, a 'yes' vote 
would probably trigger a unilateral return to work by many meatworkers. A 
large proportion of the membership was not willing to carry the fight any 
further and there was a very real risk that the union might disintegrate. The 
union, therefore, had to use its remaining bargaining strength to secure a 
return to work in a disciplined way under union control before the ballot was 
declared. This could be achieved if the government would issue an order that 
labour be supplied according to past pract ice. Such an order would deny the 
employers any opportunity to victimise militant workers, and would allow the 
A.M.I.E.U. to rebuild its organisation within the various works which could 
then be used to initiate 'on-the-job' action to secure the restoration of 
previous customs, practices and agreements . Furthermore, no official of the 
A.M.I.E.U. or the disputes committee could suggest any new strategy to win 
the dispute. The supporters of the motion were confident that the disputes 
76 
committee would submit it to the premier on behalf of the A.M.I.E.U. 
Opponents of the motion doubted whether the government would issue 
such an order. It clearly contravened the court's requirement that work be 
resumed on the terms of the meat industry awards which contained very 
different provisions relating to the engagement of labour. The motion also 
contravened the decision of the mass meeting, reached just two days earlier, 
which had instructed the union's leadership to accept nothing less than pre-
strike conditions. In view of this solidarity, the membership would return a 
'no' vote in the secret ballot, and, with the assistance of the waterside 
workers and the miners, these set t lement terms could still be won. It was 
vitally important to fight on because 'The employers wanted to get back to 
75, A.M.I.E.U. Branch Executive. Minutes 4 July 1946, p . l . 
76, Ibid., pp. 1-7. 
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the old order and prevent any New Order for the workers'. In any event, the 
A.M.I.E.U. owed a responsibility to the other unions not to pass such a motion 
until they were consulted and their views obtained. These arguments, 
however, failed to impress a majority of the officials and the resolution was 
sent to the disputes committee for ratification and approval. ' 
The A.M.I.E.U. decision provoked an emotion-charged and explosive 
meeting of the disputes commit tee . The left and the militants were furious 
with what they saw as a betrayal and base treachery. They believed that the 
rank and file meatworkers did not support the recommendation, and that the 
coal strike would win the day for the meatworkers. On the other hand, men 
like H. Harvey and A.C. Milton (secretary of the T.W.U.), political supporters 
of Hanlon and themselves senior officers in the A.L.P., were not prepared to 
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contest the dispute any further with a Labor government. ' In the course of 
the debate, Milton launched a bitter a t tack on those who opposed the 
A.M.I.E.U. resolution: 
'The real reason behind this objection to the 
recommendation of the butchers is to bring about 
revolution and chaotic conditions that certain 
delegates on this committee have shown they 
desire, by their actions and the way they have 
opposed previous resolut ions. ' ' " 
The A.E.U. delegate, Richard Leggat, another prominent member of 
the Q.C.E. of the A.L.P., also entertained serious misgivings over the policy 
of the disputes commit tee , a 'certain section' of which '...had been at tempting 
to widen the dispute to the extent of a general strike'. He was also not at all 
satisfied 
...with the representation on the Disputes 
Commit tee or the bona fides of some of the 
delegates, as it became apparent very early in the 
77. Ibid. 
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proceedings that the last thing they wanted was a 
settlement of this dispute.°^ 
This heated and passionate debate, which saw many bitter personal exchanges, 
lasted for more than three hours. When the vote was finally taken, those in 
favour of submitting the A.M.I.E.U. resolution to the premier had eight votes, 
those opposed had eleven. 
Hanlon's reaction was immediate. Cabinet met on the evening of 5 
July. After a four hour discussion, it was announced that the secret ballot of 
the meatworkers had been cancelled. In its place, the government issued an 
Order In Council instructing all parties to the meat industry awards to resume 
work by 12 July 1946 on the terms of the then existing awards, save that the 
engagement of labour was to be in accordance with the practice in existence 
at each works on 1 March 1946. The Order further laid down that all matters 
in dispute be the subject of negotiations between the employers and 
representatives of the employees. Disagreements were to be referred to the 
O 1 
industrial court."^ 
Hanlon mounted a major propaganda campaign to ensure the 
meatworkers would obey the government direction. In a state-wide broadcast 
on 7 July, he argued that some union officials in Queensland were bent on 
destroying the arbitration system, and democracy as well, and that the meat 
dispute had allowed them to conduct an experiment to establish how this 
might be achieved: 
'...consequently the meat union has been pressed 
into refusing to accept the service of the 
Arbitration Court and to endeavour to impose its 
will by force. 
If it succeeded, then these officials would take the 
same action with their own unions. If, however, 
the A.M.I.E.U. was wrecked in the fight, then that 
would be too bad for the meat workers, but the 
80. A.E.U. Monthly Journal and Report August 1946, p. 17. 
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196 
other wise chaps would keep their unions out of the 
fight.' 
Hanlon told his radio audience that workers in the meat industry ' "...realise 
©2 
now that they have been used as guinea pigs in an experiment" '. 
The broadcast was a calculated effort to undermine and discredit any 
person who was likely to recommend a continuation of the dispute. Hanlon's 
reference to 'guinea pigs' was directed at the pride and self-esteem of those 
on strike. This, combined with his warnings that a t tempts were being made to 
destroy democratic government, was designed to convince meatworkers that 
they were the victims of false leadership. Hanlon's rhetoric constituted a 
powerful direct appeal to the meatworkers to conclude their strike. Other 
powerful appeals were also made. Members of the roman catholic faith who 
worshipped in St. Stephens Cathedral on 7 July heard Archbishop Duhig preach 
about the evils of disruptors in the community who wished to divide employer 
and employee with the ultimate aim of promoting a revolt against lawful 
authority."-^ The Courier-Mail gave prominent display to a meatworker's 
allegation that 
...the Trades and Labour Council disputes 
committee had 'packed' previous mass meetings of 
meatworkers a t the Stadium to influence 
decisions. 
On the day before a mass meeting of meatworkers was due to discuss the 
governments return to work order, this same source claimed: 
This communist at tack. . .has been engineered by 
men whose allegiance to the foreign doctrine of 
communism makes them sworn foes of Australia's 
democratic way of life. They are out to destroy, if 
they can, everything that maintains democracy in 
this land - its laws, the right to the ballot, free 
82. The Courier-Mail 8 July 1946. 
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speech, and trades unionism itself, except a bastard 
kind that would sell workers to a communist 
dictatorship."^ 
The employers' public reaction to the government's Order In Council 
was mixed. One of their spokespersons described it as 'an absolute sell-out' 
86 
and 'a capitulation to the strikers' . In one sense, he was right. The 
government, despite a welter of official pronouncements that the dispute had 
to be settled by the processes of arbitration, in the end forced work to be 
resumed on terms significantly different to those specified in the 2 May order 
of the court. The meat export companies refused to make any public 
comment regarding the government's action. This dramatic turn of events 
was, however, the subject of private discussions by the employers. Although 
no statements were released, the press reported that they would abide by the 
Order In Council consistent with their dedication to the maintenance of law 
and order ." ' 
The employers were by no means, however, simply content to allow 
events to take their course. As Friday 12 July approached, the works 
managers from the meat export companies met again to review the industrial 
relations policy to be implemented once work was resumed. Their 
recommendations"" were considered by the Queensland Meat Companies' 
Commit tee . On 10 July, Lewis wrote to all companies and works requesting 
that they 'strictly adhere' to a series of resolutions designed to prevent any 
a t tempt by the A.M.I.E.U. to re-establish its organisation and influence within 
the various works. In accordance with these instructions, any discussion with 
union officials would be limited to the engagement of labour and conducted 
away from the works, while a maximum of two employee representatives 
would be recognised at each plant. Representation would also be extended to 
85. The Courier-Mail 9 July 1946. 
86. The Courier-Mail 6 July 1946. 
87. The Telegraph 8 July 1946. 
88. Works Managers' Meeting. Resolutions 9 July 1946, deposit D8, 
Q.M.C.C, W.U.A. 
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the non-union labour which had worked at Lake's Creek during the dispute. 
It was further decided that all employees, and not just those who 
belonged to the A.M.I.E.U., would be employed strictly in accordance with 
award conditions. It appears that, although the companies were prepared to 
engage the labour necessary to re-open the works in accordance with the 
government order, they fully intended to move as quickly as possible to 
establish and enforce the method of hiring employees as specified in the meat 
industry awards. These instructions also contained measures to secure the 
authority of foremen and to establish a disputes settling procedure whereby 
union officials were not to be involved. Disputes were to be settled through 
og 
direct contact between management and aggrieved employees."^ 
The disputes committee met on the morning of 8 July to consider the 
government's order. The A.E.U., E.T.U., T.W.U., F.C.U. and F.E.D.F.A. 
90 intimated that their members would obey the government. Faced with the 
government's order, and the decisions of a number of unions to return to work 
together with the obvious disunity in the A.M.I.E.U. leadership, the disputes 
committee had little alternative but to recommend an end to the strike. 
On the afternoon of Wednesday, 10 July 1946, some 2,500 
meatworkers assembled at the Brisbane Stadium to consider the disputes 
committee recommendation. For a time, the meeting proceeded in an orderly 
fashion, although some sections extended Dixon and M. Kearney (an 
A.M.I.E.U. organiser and mover of the return to work motion) a derisive 
welcome as they entered the building. Speeches were made by Neumann, T. 
Millar (Q.C.E.U.), Alex Macdonald (F.I.A.), H. Field (A.M.I.E.U.), G. Ridsdale 
(A.M.I.E.U.) and A. Graham (W.W.F.).^^ According to press reports, each 
if, T. Lewis to All Companies and Works, 10 July 1946, deposit D8, 
Q.M.C.C, W.U.A. 
90. T.L.C. Disputes Committee. Minutes 8 July 1946, p.l . 
11, I am fairly certain that this is the order in which these speakers 
addressed the meeting. Millar, Macdonald, Field and Ridsdale were 
members of the Communist party. It is possible that Graham was also 
a member. 
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stressed that the return to work resolution was the recommendation of the 
disputes committee. Dixon and Kearney were also on the platform together 
with Bob Wells, the president of the Miners' Federation and a member of the 
Communist party. As the meeting progressed, the chairperson indicated the 
resolution would be put to the vote upon the conclusion of Graham's remarks. 
Kearney, however, apparently angered by the claims that the resolution was 
the creation of the disputes committee, rose to speak. He was greeted with 
further catcalls. What followed was variously described as '...a black page in 
the high standard of conduct at all previous meetings,...', and as '... 
industrially disgraceful events...'. 
Kearney launched into a scathing attack on the previous speakers. He 
accused them of attempting to set up a communist dictatorship, of seeking to 
destroy unionism and of wishing to bring about the defeat of the Labor 
government in Queensland. He accused members of the Communist party of 
sabotaging efforts he had made to settle the dispute and flayed them with 
charges of hypocrisy: 
'Now the Communists come here to-day and get 
down on their hands and knees to try to make out 
they were responsible for persuading the 
Government to issue an order for the men to return 
to work.'"^ 
Sections of the meeting roared their approval of this denunciation. When 
Dixon told the audience that George Ridsdale was '...a traitor to the unionist 
cause...', and acted on orders from the Communist party, his remarks were 
greeted with applause and cheering. Bob Wells then attempted to address the 
meeting, but after uttering one or two sentences blaming Dixon and Kearney 
for the collapse of the strike, his voice was drowned completely by waves of 
abuse and booing which Dixon and Kearney orchestrated from the platform. 
Shortly after this, the meeting voted to return to work. 
92. The Meat Industry Journal of Queensland July 1946, pp.1,2. 
93. The Courier-Mail 11 July 1946. 
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The reception accorded these developments in the dispute by The 
Courier-Mail and The Guardian was an essay in pure contrast. The excitement 
94 
of The Courier-Mail industrial writer^^ knew no bounds. Under the headline 
'Unions Ditch Reds' he wrote 
Queensland unionists have cast Communist control 
aside....The end of the meeting of meat workers at 
the Brisbane Stadium yesterday was terrific, 
devastating; it was better than anything I had 
every imagined possible in industrialism in this 
State.^^ 
His description of the reaction of many meatworkers to the attacks by 
Kearney and Dixon on the members of the official party who belonged to the 
Communist party bordered on the lyrical: 
The cheering was almost horrible. The truth had 
been told. Not one Communist on the platform 
protested. Now not one would have got a 
hearing."^ 
A different interpretation of the events was offered in the Communist 
party newspaper The Guardian. It claimed that the abuse of Ridsdale, Field 
and Wells originated from strategically placed groups of 'youths and anti-union 
elements' which had been organised as a result of a conspiracy between 
certain employers, A.L.P. politicians, and union officials together with 
97 
'Catholic Action'.^' This charge concerning the influence of sectarian groups 
was repeated in other quarters by members of the Communist party. Gerry 
Dawson, a member of the disputes committee, in an article on the meat 
dispute in the Building Workers' Journal asked his readers to ponder '...what 
94. The industrial writer was Bill Thieme, a longstanding member of the 
A.L.P. He harbored political ambitions as well, having stood without 
success for the seat of Oxley in the 1935 and 1938 state elections in 
Queensland. 
95. The Courier-Mail 11 July 1946. 
96. Ibid. 
97. The Guardian 19 July 1946. 
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will happen to Trade Unions if religious bodies are allowed to control them', 
while Bob Wells observed 
'I was howled down by a specially prepared section 
of the meat workers. 
The demonstration showed the lengths to which 
certain sectarian sections of trade union^ts will go 
at the behest of reactionary influences.' 
The refusal to hear him, however, did not represent the feelings of the vast 
bulk of meatworkers who '...are not opposed to the Brisbane disputes 
committee or Communism'.^^^ 
Undoubtedly the most significant dimension of the speeches by 
Kearney and Dixon was their call to unionists to remove members of the 
Communist party from positions of influence within trade unions. This 
rallying cry provided the opening shots in a postwar batt le for power between 
the communists and other militant unionists on the one hand, and the A.L.P. 
industrial groups and the Movement on the other, not only within the 
A.M.I.E.U. but also within many other Queensland trade unions. The clashes 
of personality and ideology which took place in the stadium on that Wednesday 
afternoon were to be repeated often in the next decade in Queensland as well 
as in other parts of Australia, and they contributed in the ultimate to those 
debilitating and destructive internal upheavals which divided the ranks of 
Labour in the 1950s and beyond. 
98. Building Workers' Journal 23 July 1946, not paginated. 
99. The Courier-Mail 11 July 1946. 
100. Ibid. 
101. Ibid. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE 1946 MEAT INDUSTRY DISPUTE 
aftermath 
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The effects of the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute were widespread and 
lasted for many years. For the A.M.I.E.U. perhaps the most important issue -
certainly the most emotional - involved the non-union labour and those of its 
members who scabbed. The passion and hatred over the scab issue burned 
deeply: 
In your area are living two men who are guilty of 
the vilest crime in the working class movement. 
THEY ARE SCABS. 
THEY have consciously and wilfully assisted the 
boss in his endeavour to destroy the Trade Union 
organisation of the Meatworkers.... 
Trade Unions were built in struggle against the boss 
and his agents. Your father and grandfather fought 
and starved to win better conditions. They 
rejected and boycotted scabs as the lowest 
elements of humanity. 
Scabs and their actions have not changed. They aid 
the boss - they are the enemies of the workers. 
They are prepared to sell their principles and their 
mates. 
WORKERS! Refuse to talk to the scabs. Boycott 
them. Treat them for what they are - Traitors to 
their mates! 
There was some disagreement over the policy to be adopted towards 
the scabs. Some officials were prepared to take them back into the union if 
this was the price of preventing the registration of new unions in the industry 
and/or securing the speedy re-registration of the A.M.I.E.U.^ With the 
registration of a new union in the bacon industry, the Bacon Factory 
Employees' Union (B.F.E.U.) in August 1946, and the re-registration of the 
A.M.I.E.U. one month later, however, the rationale for this concilatory 
approach disappeared. Just prior to the commencement of the 1947 
slaughtering season, the A.M.I.E.U. committee of management met to devise 
1. Pamphlet. To The Workers And Their Families. Cannon Hill issued by 
a group of strikers. This pamphlet is in the possession of the author. 
2. A.M.I.E.U. Branch Executive. Minutes 23 July 1946, A.M.I.E.U., 
Brisbane, p. l . 
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a plan to force the scabs out of the industry. There were to be no half 
measures! The committee decided on a policy '...of harrassment, [sic] 
intimidation, sabotage, and even violence to the scabs,...'.-^ The execution of 
this task, however, proved difficult. Years after this original decision, 
A.M.I.E.U. officials were still referring to the scab position at Lake's Creek,'^ 
while in the bacon factories, the Bacon Factories Employees' Union gradually 
gained ascendancy. A.M.I.E.U. officials condemned the B.F.E.U. as a 
company union, a claim vigorously denied by the employers. The employers, 
however, nurtured and encouraged the B.F.E.U.,^ and were anxious to see its 
influence spread throughout the bacon industry. 
Soon after the resumption of work on 12 July 1946, the A.M.I.E.U. 
instituted a policy of employing on-the-job tactics in an attempt to win back 
its pre-strike conditions. Significant success attended this policy in the 
northern meatworks where the A.M.I.E.U. strength and organisation was 
affected little by the dispute. In March 1948, the union told its federal 
council that practically all agreements had been recovered, and that it was 
able to maintain the engagement of labour for the industry through its offices 
in Brisbane, Rockhampton and Townsville. 
A number of important conclusions was drawn by A.J. Neumann from 
the dispute. He believed that it demonstrated unequivocally that the Labor 
government would defend employer rights to hire and fire, and was intent on 
abrogating the right to strike. The government's policy of arbitration meant 
that it was only employees who were expected to have their grievances and 
3. A.M.I.E.U. Committee of Management. Report 10-18 February 1947, 
A.M.I,E,U,, Brisbane, p,21. 
4. A.J. Neumann to L.G. Haigh, 5 October 1948, deposit Dl, A.M.I.E.U., 
W.U.A. 
5. E.H. Coneybeer to F. Petersen, 23 July 1946. A copy of this letter is 
in the possession of the author. 
6. J,H, Holiiday to E,H. Coneybeer, 12 September 1946. A copy of this 
letter is in the possession of the author. 
7. A.M,I.E.U, Federal Council, Queensland Branch Report 15 March 
1948, deposit Dl, A.M.I.E.U., W.U.A., p.2. 
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demands decided in this way, whereas employers were allowed 'unfettered 
direct action'. Neumann argued that if arbitration was to be the only means 
of settling disputes, then the power of employers to make decisions affecting 
employees should be brought under the control of the arbitration system. He 
also finally admitted that his hope, which he never completely abandoned 
throughout the whole dispute, that the government would ultimately support 
the meatworkers against their employers, had been a false hope. He sadly 
conceded that his belief that the Labor government would adopt a 'class' 
perspective had been an illusion all along: 
...the ideology of the workers of the '90's of last 
century, out of which they decided to build a 
political party to secure the control of Parliament 
to assist them against vicious employers, failed the 
workers in 1946. 
The tension between the 'left' and the 'right' within the A.M.I.E.U. 
reached fever pitch in the years after 1946. The battle was fought not only 
during election periods but also at every other available opportunity. Rarely 
did a meeting of A.M.I.E.U. officials pass without recrimination and 
accusations being hurled by opposing factions over their respective actions in 
the dispute." A bitter, and sometimes bloody, power struggle was a 
continuing legacy of the meat dispute which few meatworkers were able to 
ignore or escape. 
The dispute also had a marked impact on other unions. Some saw a 
golden opportunity in the relatively disorganised state of the A.M.I.E.U. after 
the return to work to claim work done previously by the A.M.I.E.U. This 
resulted in a series of sometimes long and acrimonous demarcation 
disputes.^^ Other unions reconsidered their attitude towards lending support 
8. The Meat Industry Journal of Queensland July 1946, p.2. 
9* See, for example: A.M.I.E.U. Southern District Council. Minutes 18 
March 1947, p.4, and 30 March 1948, p.3; A.M.I.E.U. General 
Meeting. Minutes 3 June 1948, pp.1,2; A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
10. A.J, Neumann to W. Hodson, 30 June 1947, and L.G. Haigh to A.J. 
Neumann, 19 August 1947, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
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to disputes outside their industries. The experience of the meat dispute 
continued to influence the policy of the A.R.U. for many years after 1946. On 
occasions it lamented the 'anti-working-class attitude' of the Hanlon 
government. The meat dispute, however, brought home starkly to the 
officers and members of the A.R.U. the costs of a policy which involved 
direct action in support of workers in other industries. 
This was reflected in the reluctance of A.R.U. men to apply black 
bans in support of the miners in the 1949 coal strike, and in the belief of 
senior officers of the A.R.U. in the early 1950s that their previous policy of 
direct action in support of other unions in dispute could not be maintained, 
since, on past occasions, their members had been isolated when other railway 
unions would not support them. This realisation that the A.R.U. was not 
strong enough to sustain a unilateral campaign of direct action was given 
practical effect in 1952 when the A.R.U. rejected a call for black bans in 
support of unionists on strike at Mt. Isa: 
Had the ban been imposed, our members at Mt. Isa 
would have undoubtedly been dealt with as in the 
Meat Strike. We had no assurance that in the event 
of the strike being settled, the terms would have 
covered full restitution to our members, of fines 
imposed and the removal of any victimisation. 
In September and October 1946, the Queensland Industrial Court heard 
applications for reinstatement from the four men whose dismissal had 
precipitated the dispute. In rejecting the applications, the court commented 
on the dispute: 
11. A.R.U. State Conference. Minutes 7-12 June 1948, A.R.U., Brisbane, 
p.28. 
12* A.R.U. State Council. Minutes 20, 21 July 1949, A.R.U., Brisbane, 
p.3. 
13. A.R.U. State Conference. Minutes 16-20 April 1951, A.R.U., 
Brisbane, pp.9,10. 
14, A.R.U. State Council. Minutes 7-9 March 1952, A.R.U., Brisbane, p.2. 
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The dispute developed into the most prolonged and 
senseless strike the State has known. It was 
senseless because success spelt the ultimate 
extinction of the business in which the men were 
employed, while failure meant immediate hardship 
and suffering to a lot of hardworking members of 
the union. It was not a strike to secure 
reinstatement of the dismissed men whose interests 
soon became a matter of very minor importance. 
It was not a strike to enforce any fair and 
reasonable recognition of seniority which was 
offered and rejected. It was a demand for the 
complete control of the engagement and discharge 
of labour. It was a Communist-controlled strike in 
which decent men were forced to suffer for their 
loyalty to unionism. 
The bench clearly weighed the competing claims in the meat dispute against 
certain standards and criteria which differed radically from those embraced 
by the A.M.I.E.U. The court believed that if managerial prerogatives were 
reduced in Queensland to a degree significantly different from the position in 
other states, then private entrepreneurs were likely to transfer their assets 
and/or would refuse to establish new businesses in Queensland. It is, however, 
difficult to read the statements of members of the court without also 
obtaining an overwhelming impression that they accepted traditional 
managerial prerogatives as a matter of firm ideological conviction. 
The employers made strenuous efforts to wrest the control of the 
labour supply from the A.M.I.E.U. in the months after the dispute. They 
employed a variety of tactics the most important of which involved efforts 
to destroy the seasonal seniority principle.^^ Other methods of minimising 
the influence of the A.M.I.E.U. were employed. These included opposition to 
the application by the union for re-registration, a refusal to re-employ certain 
15. Munro & Others v. Queensland Co-Operative Bacon Association Ltd. 
Judgment Q.G.G., 29 October 1946, p.l454. 
16. N. Loder to A.J. Neumann, 28 January 1947, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane; M. 
Hinchcliff to T. Lewis, 19 July 1946, deposit D8, Q.M.C.C, W.U.A. 
17. T. Lewis to All Companies and Works, 28 September 1946, and 19 
October 1946, deposit D8, Q.M.C.C, W.U.A.; T. Lewis to A.J. 
Neumann, 16 May 1947, deposit Dl, A.M.I.E.U., W.U.A. 
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nominated A.M.I.E.U. members,^" the non-recognition of union delegates, 
efforts to weaken the boards of control and constant opposition to A.M.I.E.U. 
claims for the restoration of its preference clause in the Meat Export Award-
I g 
State.^^ The companies also tried to weaken the relationship between certain 
A.M.I.E.U. officials and the rank and file, especially in north Queensland: 
...we are now unfortunately situated with a Union 
governed and controlled by Communists,...and 
with...as their leader we have one with the cunning 
and meanness of a fox and to bind him to any 
agreement would be impossible,.... 
We have for the sake of peace in the Industry to 
find ways and means to rid ourselves of...and his 
lieutenants and what we would suggest and a 
measure successfully adopted by ourselves to 
combat any attacks on production, is to penalise 
severely the finance of the employees of the 
Department involved. 
By this method, you attack the fair and just man as 
well as others but he is the man in the majority and 
the one whose vote will count .^ 
Furthermore, the meat export companies made every effort to ensure work 
was conducted in accordance with award provisions. The method most 
favoured involved the dismissal of employees who offended against this 
21 policy. 
The Communist party drew a series of important conclusions from its 
experience of the dispute. It concluded that the best tactics in a major 
dispute involved attention to organisation, taking the offensive early, quickly 
18. W.M. Shaw to The Secretary, Australasian Meat Industry Employees' 
Union Queensland Branch (Northern Division), 11 December 1946, 
A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
19. T. Lewis to A.J. Neumann, 16 May 1947, deposit Dl, A.M.I.E.U., 
W.U.A. 
20. T. Lewis to All Companies and Works, 30 October 1946, deposit D8, 
Q.M.C.C, W.U.A. 
21. M. Hinchcliff to J. Draper, 12 July 1946, A.M.I.E.U., Brisbane. 
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and decisively, and in ensuring the participation, in appropriate ways, of as 
many affected workers as possible. The meat dispute had a profound effect 
on the party's strategy in subsequent industrial disputes. An early opportunity 
to test the conclusions occurred in October 1946 in the Victorian transport 
strike during which 
..., we applied the lessons that had been learned in 
your dispute, and believe that, armed with the 
valuable experience that the workers in your State 
had been through,...we were able to take certain 
initial steps which brought the transport hold-up to 
a head in a surprisingly short time. 
The Victorian transport strike marked the beginning of a period in 
which the Communist party saw the short, offensive strike, fought on issues of 
major economic concern, as the most appropriate way of winning gains for 
Australian workers. -^  Such action could also assist the party to achieve its 
goal of challenging '...reformist domination of the labor movement'. This 
was an important and urgent goal. The steel and meat disputes simply 
confirmed '...that reformists are the most capable defenders of the rights of 
the ruling class'. The Communist party believed that disputes over major 
economic issues were a distinct possibility. The meat dispute showed '...the 
22. J.J. Brown to M. Healy, 11 November 1946, T.L.C, Brisbane. J.J. 
Brown was the state secretary of the A.R.U. in Victoria and a 
prominent member of the Communist party. According to Cecil 
Sharpley, who left the Communist party in 1949 and subsequently 
wrote a series of newspaper articles 'exposing' its political and 
industrial activity, the political committee of the party decided broad 
principles of future strike conduct on the basis of the experiences of 
the 1945 Steel Strike and the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute. The 
Courier-Mail 20 April 1949. 
23. C.P.A. Central Committee Plenum. Speech by J.C. Henry 20-22 
February 1948, M.S.S.2389 1(8), M.L., p.4. 
24. C.P.A. Central Committee letters to other parties 1946-48. 
Typescript M.S.S.2389 1(8), M.L., p.8. I have identified this typescript 
as notes prepared by J . C Henry for use at a conference of Communist 
parties in London held in October 1946. 
25. J. McPhillips to J. Walker, 25 July 1946, E170/9/119 F.I.A. deposit, 
A.N.U.A.B.L. 
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26 
willingness of the working class to struggle...'. This militancy, however, 
ought to be directed to winning significant gains in wages and working 
conditions, and not dissipated in essentially defensive battles such as the meat 
27 dispute. The party also concluded that in future disputes it would be 
fighting against governments. The meat dispute, and others, had revealed the 
opposition to strike action by '...the Chifleys, McKells, Cains and Hanlons',^^ 
but, given courageous leadership, the power of the working class would render 
'impotent' the '...bosses. Arbitration Courts, the Press and the 
Government...'. " 
The belief that the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute was 'communist 
controlled' became firmly embedded in conservative political culture in the 
years after 1946. In the mid-1960s, B.A. Santamaria claimed that it was part 
of a 'pattern of Communist strike action' during the 1940s.-'^ E.J. Walsh 
described it as '...one of the best examples of a Communist-inspired 
plot...'. The organiser of the industrial groups in Victoria, G. Piera, 
asserted in 1947 that during the meat dispute '...a Communist minority,...was 
able to use the unions in its attempt to overthrow the Government'.^^ 
Similar views were entertained by sections within the A.M.I.E.U. An 
A.L.P. industrial group challenged certain officials in the 1946 A.M.I.E.U. 
elections on the grounds that they had supported '...the Communist policy of 
26. J,C, Henry, 'The Queensland Meat Strike,' p. 233. 
27. Central Committee, Australian Communist Party. Report of the 
Work of the Central Committee from the 14th to 15th National 
Congress (Sydney: Newsletter Print, April 1948), p.12. 
28. The Guardian 31 January 1947. 
29. J.C. Henry, 'The Queensland Meat Strike,' p.233. 
30. B.A. Santamaria, The Price Of Freedom. The Movement - After Ten 
Years (Melbourne; The Hawthorn Press, 1966), p.20. 
31. A,L,P, Official Record of the Twenty-First Labor-in-Politics 
Convention (Brisbane: The Worker Newspaper, 1955), p.60. E.J. Walsh 
was deputy premier in 1946. 
32. The Herald 26 July 1947. 
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disruption,...'. The campaign literature distributed on behalf of this group 
asserted that the purpose of the dispute was to further the communist 
objective of destroying trade unions and promoting '...the overthrow of 
constituted authority'.-'-* A prominent member of this group was W. 
Thornton. His participation in the 1946 A.M.I.E.U. election marked the 
beginning of a long career in union politics and administration. Thornton 
ultimately became the organiser in Queensland for the Movement. He played 
a prominent role in the organisation of A.L.P. industrial groups especially 
within the F.C.U. 
The A.L.P. decided to establish official industrial groups in 
Queensland trade unions as a direct result of the meat dispute. From the 
beginning of 1946, the Movement, through the A.W.U. and various Labor party 
branches, had been pressuring the A.L.P. to take such action. The A.L.P. had 
resisted these advances. It preferred to rely on its traditional methods of 
combating the communists. The meat dispute, however, rocked the party to 
its foundations. To the A.L.P. it revealed a powerful and aggressive 
Communist party ready to use its influence in the unions to wreak havoc on 
the community, to weaken the arbitration system and to create revolutionary 
conditions. The dispute also revealed that a number of unions, which had no 
links with the Communist party, were prepared to challenge the sacred policy 
of industrial peace. This analysis of the dispute shocked the A.L.P. into 
action. On 8 July 1946, the party decided to create an official industrial 
group structure in Queensland trade unions.-^ ^ The role of the groups was to 
prevent any deviation from the Labor party's policy of industrial peace. It 
was the challenge to industrial peace, rather than the issue of Communism per 
se, which explains the A.L.P. decision to establish industrial groups in the 
trade unions. 
This action by the organisational wing of the Labor party to contain 
labour militancy was complemented by legislative changes introduced by the 
33. Pamphlet. Members of the Meat Industry Employees' Union P39/21 
Geoff McDonald Collection, A.N.U.A.B.L. 
34. Executive Committee, Q.C.E., A.L.P. Minutes 8 July 1946, Labor 
House, Brisbane, p.2. 
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35 government in response to the meat dispute. A series of amendments to 
The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act in December 1946 brought the 
internal administration of trade unions under greater control by the industrial 
court. This was designed to ensure the more effective implementation of the 
principle that strikes were illegal unless authorised by a secret ballot of the 
workers concerned. The fundamental objective of the amendments was to 
reduce '...as far as possible the possibility of industrial stoppages in this 
State'.-^^ The historic goal of industrial peace, which all Labor governments 
since T.J. Ryan had asserted, was thus reaffirmed in this first peacetime 
revision of industrial law in Queensland. 
The Communist party responded to these amendments with a fury 
which it reserved for its most hated enemies. The government's abandonment 
of working class principles in the meat dispute was heinous, but the 
amendments, designed '...to convert the Trade Unions into impotent 
instruments of the State-controlled Industrial Court', were nothing short of 
37 treachery. The party was deeply afraid that the Queensland legislation 
would provide both a catalyst and a model for other governments anxious to 
extend state control over trade unions and to crack down hard on working 
class militancy. Such legislation could not go unchallenged. In February 1947, 
the Communist party examined ways of generating industrial and political 
opposition to the amendments. Its policy was unequivocal: it was '..,seeking a 
way to embroil the unions in a struggle against the Act...'. Ultimately, the 
Act, together with other industrial issues, '...may mean pulling on a head-on 
collision with the Queensland Government'.-'^ The Communist party had to 
wait for almost a year, however, until an appropriate industrial relations 
climate developed in which it could settle the score with the Hanlon 
government. Early in February 1948, a strike began in the workshops and 
35. Q.P.D. 189 (1946): 1881, 1934. 
36. Ibid., p.1933 
37. Ron Brown, The Queensland 'Crimes' Act (Brisbane: T.L.C, March 
1947), not paginated. 
SI, C.P.A. Central Committee Plenum. Speech by C Jones 14-16 
February 1947, M.S.S.2389 1(8), M.L., pp.2,3. 
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running sheds in the railway service. The dispute was made to order for the 
Communist party. The immediate issue was one of wage justice, the 
participants included the industrial court and unions affiliated with the A.L.P. 
and, best of all, the employer was none other than the Queensland Labor 
government. Despite the importance of the issues in dispute, few realised 
that the 1948 Railway Dispute would be arguably the most savage, certainly 
the largest, industrial confrontation in Queensland since the great strikes of 
the 1890s. 
CHAPTER 9 
THE 1948 RAILWAY DISPUTE 
background 
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The Queensland Railway Dispute lasted from 3 February to 6 April 
1948. The major participants included the Communist party, the Hanlon 
government, the Queensland Industrial Court and the craft and principal 
transportation unions in the railway service. The dispute brought to the 
surface all of the tensions within the labour movement, and the wider 
community as well, over issues such as the legitimacy of direct industrial 
action, the functions and performance of the arbitration system, the role of 
the Communist party, the quality of life in the early reconstruction years, the 
activities of the industrial groups, the locus of power within the trade union 
movement and the A.L.P., and the extent to which Labor governments ought, 
and could, adopt a 'class' position in matters of legislation and administration. 
The union structure in the Queensland Government Railways 
presented a complex picture. It was the institutional expression of the wide 
range of diverse tasks and occupations characteristic of a large railway 
system, and of the quite profound political and ideological differences which 
existed amongst railway employees in Queensland. The fragmented union 
structure was, furthermore, encouraged by the railway administration since 
this facilitated a 'divide and rule' industrial relations policy. For the purpose 
of analysing the nature of the union structure in the railways, it is useful to 
divide the service into an administrative and clerical section, a workshops' 
section, a transportation section, and a transport services section. The 
administrative and clerical section performed the basic task of railway 
department administration - unionists here typically belonged to the 
Federated Clerks' Union and the Professional Officers' Association. These 
employees were not involved in the events which culminated in the 1948 
Queensland Railway Dispute. 
The workshops' section, on the other hand, was the crucible of the 
dispute. The repair and construction of engines and other rolling stock, as 
well as some of the tools and machinery used in this process, required an 
enormous range of skilled and semi-skilled workers. The array of occupations 
included those of blacksmith, boilermaker, boltmaker, coppersmith, driller, 
fitter, forger, furnaceman, grinder, metal moulder, patternmaker, toolmaker, 
carpenter, carriagemaker, and electrician. Men following such trades, and 
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their semi-skilled assistants, belonged to a variety of craft unions. These 
unions were the Blacksmiths' Society, the Boilermakers' Society, the 
Federated Moulders' (Metals) Union (F.M.U.), the V.B.E.F., the B.W.I.U., the 
E.T.U., the F.I.A., and the A.E.U. A few tradesmen belonged to the A.R.U., a 
union which sought to enrol all employees of the commissioner for railways 
regardless of their position within the service. The A.R.U., however, derived 
most of its members from the transportation section. Engine drivers, 
firemen, guards, cleaners and shunters were responsible for the movement of 
the rolling stock and they formed the backbone of the A.R.U. Coverage of 
workers in the transportation section was not, however, the exclusive preserve 
of the A.R.U. It was subject to a vigorous competition from the A.F.U.L.E., a 
small, specialist union the bulk of whose membership was drawn from engine 
crews. 
The most important union in the workshops' section in terms of the 
skills of its members was the A.E.U. The A.E.U., as described by Tom 
Sheridan, was an old, wealthy and democratic union. It was a craft 
organisation whose members were engaged on all maintenance and production 
work which required machining or fitting.^ In Queensland, the A.E.U. was 
affiliated with the A.L.P. and the T.L.C. Its senior officials in Brisbane, and 
at Ipswich which was the centre of the 1948 Railway Dispute, were almost 
without exception members and keen supporters of the Labor party. Although 
poorly represented in the leadership, members of the Communist party were 
active in building up a rank and file organisation in parts of the A.E.U. 
Members of the A.E.U., conscious of their considerable bargaining strength, 
entertained few inhibitions over the use of direct industrial action when the 
occasion seemed to warrant it. 
Many of the unskilled and semi-skilled employees in the railway 
workshops and running sheds belonged to the F.I.A. Most of the officials in 
the Queensland branch of the F.I.A., as was the case in the national office, 
were members of the Communist party. The secretary of the F.I.A. in 
Queensland was Alex Macdonald, an influential figure in the party and a man 
1. Sheridan, 'Labour V. Labor,' p.187. 
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for whom there was widespread respect across a wide spectrum of ideological 
conviction in the union movement. At the national level, the F.I.A. was ruled 
by E. Thornton and Jack McPhillips, both of whom were high profile 
communists. Together they kept a watchful eye over the activit ies and 
policies of F.I.A. branches, and little in the way of unilateral industrial or 
political action was ever initiated by officials a t the s ta te level. The union 
was not affiliated with the A.L.P., but was a strong supporter of the T.L.C. 
When the communist leadership of the F.I.A. was defeated in the early 1950s 
after a nationwide Movement campaign, Alex Macdonald replaced Mick Healy 
as secretary of the T.L.C. 
The other unions with members in the railway workshops were the 
Boilermakers' Society, the V.B.E.F., the E.T.U., the B.W.I.U., and the F.M.U. 
These were relatively small, craft organisations all of which were affiliated 
with the T.L.C. and all of which were prepared to use direct action in the 
conduct of industrial relations. In terms of political alliegance, the leaders of 
the B.W.I.U. and the F.M.U. typically belonged to the Communist party as did 
some branch officials in the Boilermakers' Society although its senior officers 
were inclined towards the A.L.P. The same could be said about the V.B.E.F., 
while the upper echelons of the E.T.U. were Labor men almost without 
exception. These political preferences were reflected in the relationships 
between the unions and the A.L.P. Both the B.W.I.U. and the F.M.U. were 
beyond the pale as far as the Labor party was concerned, a feeling which was 
reciprocated with equal vigour by the unions' leaders. The Boilermakers' 
Society and the V.B.E.F. affiliated with the A.L.P. in 1945 and 1947 
respectively, while the E.T.U. had enjoyed formal links with the party for a 
considerable t ime. 
In the early postwar years, the leaders of the A.R.U. in Queensland 
vigorously reaffirmed the union's traditional commitment to the values of 
industrial unionism and direct action, as well as its contempt for 'reformist' 
Labor governments. The masthead of its newspaper. The Advocate, often 
proclaimed 'PARLIAMENTS and GOVERNMENTS COME and GO, BUT THE 
STRUGGLES OF THE WORKERS, THROUGH THEIR UNIONS, NEVER 
RELAX'. The A.R.U. remained unaffiliated with the A.L.P. and showed little 
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inclination to sue for peace with the Q.C.E., the events of the 1946 Meat 
Industry Dispute having convinced it all the more that the Hanlon government 
was a traitor to working class principles. All the evidence suggests, 
furthermore, that rank and file members of the A.R.U. by and large supported 
these philosophies and policies of their officials. 
The A.F.U.L.E., on the other hand, was somewhat more complex. Its 
membership and divisional council displayed a range of diverse, and sometimes 
contradictory, at t i tudes towards the use of strikes, support for other workers 
undertaking strike action and the A.L.P. During the Second World War, a 
'militant minority' led by Theo Kissick sought, with some success, to persuade 
the A.F.U.L.E. that a determined policy of direct action would yield 
significant industrial dividends. During this t ime, the union teetered on the 
brink of disaffiliation with the A.L.P., but in the early postwar period opinion 
within the union moved in favour of a more traditional reluctance to initiate 
strike action and in favour of a close association with the Labor party. 
Despite this trend in opinion, A.F.U.L.E. members were, on many occasions 
during the 1940s, prepared to elect Theo Kissick, an active member of the 
Communist party, to the important and influential position of union president. 
There was within the A.F.U.L.E. a consensus over a policy of non-
involvement in disputes outside the railway service. This consensus arose out 
of a recognition by A.F.U.L.E. members that they occupied a vital position in 
the transportation system and that other unions in dispute, particularly in 
major confrontations, would be anxious to enlist their active participation. 
This general perception had been confirmed on a number of occasions, most 
notably in the 1927 South Johnstone Dispute when A.F.U.L.E. members 
suffered the wrath of the McCormack government for their support of the 
striking sugar mill employees. Theo Kissick, although committed to the non-
involvement principle as a general rule, nevertheless had a t tempted to make 
common cause with the A.R.U., the miners and the W.W.F. in support of the 
meatworkers in 1946. For his efforts he earned the considerable displeasure 
of sufficient of his members to lose the presidency in the 1946 annual 
A.F.U.L.E. elections. His actions in the meat dispute gave an A.L.P. 
industrial group within the union enough ammunition to secure his narrow 
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defeat. During 1947, however, Kissick was able to rally his forces and he was 
re-elected president at the end of that year. The events of 1946, particularly 
the refusal of many officials and rank and file to become parties to the meat 
dispute, made it clear that Kissick and his supporters would have great 
difficulty leading the whole of the A.F.U.L.E. into any future industrial 
dispute on behalf of other workers, and might even expect less than unanimous 
approval if strike action in pursuit of long-standing A.F.U.L.E. demands, such 
as significant wage rises, was proposed. 
Unionism in the transport services section of the railways consisted of 
numerous small occupational groups such as the Signalmen's Union, the Traffic 
Employees' Union and the Railway Maintenance Employees' Union. In some 
cases, these organisations were formed out of breakaway sections from the 
A.R.U. whose militant industrial unionism and socialist outlook did not appeal 
to all railwaymen. These unions refused to support industrial disputes in the 
railways, and often took the places of A.R.U. men on strike. The government 
could not, however, defeat the 1948 Railway Dispute by enlisting the 
assistance of these 'loyalist' unions since their members simply lacked the 
skills of the tradesmen and their assistants over whose industrial demands the 
dispute erupted. 
The origins of the dispute were somewhat more complex than the 
2 
crude and misleading 'communist plot' explanations embraced by the press, 
although the Communist party welcomed the opportunity it provided to 
mobilise working class opinion against the Hanlon government. For more than 
a decade there existed a continuous and severe disagreement between the 
Queensland Industrial Court and the unions over wage fixing principles 
embodied in the Railway Award-State. To a significant degree, the direct 
action which erupted in the railway workshops and running sheds on 3 
February 1948 was the culmination of years of increasing frustration in the 
unions with the application of these principles, and was designed to persuade 
the court to abandon them completely. 
2. See, for example: The Sunday Mail 29 February 1948. 
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Two principles particularly irr i tated the unions. In 1941 the court 
decided that the Queensland basic wage was to be the point of departure in 
fixing the rates of pay for all crown employees. Given that this basic wage 
was consistently four shillings higher than the commonwealth basic wage for 
Brisbane, the court argued that margins for skill in Queensland for crown 
employees should be correspondingly lower when compared with those in 
federal awards. This argument was also applied to tradesmen engaged in 
private industry in Queensland. To union arguments that , even allowing for 
basic wage differences, both private and crown employees frequently fared 
worse regarding rates of remuneration under Queensland awards when 
compared with federal awards or awards in other s ta tes , the court replied that 
the lower cost of living in Queensland and the non-monetary provisions in the 
Queensland awards made up for any such differences. The second principle 
was that 'privileges', such as rail passes and leave enti t lements which railway 
employees received, formed part of their remuneration. In 1942, the court 
assessed these as being worth three shillings and eightpence per week. 
These principles affected relativities which were of great significance 
to the tradesmen and their semi-skilled colleagues in the Queensland 
Government Railways. Furthermore, the Railway Award-State covered all 
non-managerial employees in the railways, and these principles therefore 
affected not only workshop employees but also drivers, firemen, guards and all 
other occupations concerned with the movement of rolling stock. In the 
period 1944 to 1948, many of these men, in common with their fellow 
employees in the workshops, voiced increasing annoyance at what they 
claimed were wage rates inferior to those in the southern railway systems. 
This growing discontent was magnified by their failure to obtain any increase 
in margins for skill after mid-1945. 
During 1947 several historic changes were made to the margins in the 
Federal Metal Trades Award as part of the set t lement terms of the 1946-47 
Victorian Metal Trades Dispute. This dispute had been led by the A.E.U. with 
the support of the F.I.A. and the F.M.U. In March 1947, federal conciliation 
commissioner G.A. Mooney varied the Metal Trades Award in an a t t empt to 
set t le the dispute, but the changes were unacceptable to the unions and the 
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conflict continued. In May, when set t lement terms were finally negotiated, it 
was agreed that a Full Bench of the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Court would hear an appeal against the Mooney award. The 
judgment, which was delivered in June 1947, granted the fit ter a marginal 
increase of sixteen shillings per week, but variations in the rates awarded by 
the court to many lower grades of skill were substantially below those which 
had formed part of the understanding reached in May. The F.I.A., with the 
support of other unions, subsequently asked Mooney to reconsider the position 
of the lower paid workers. 
In the meantime, in June 1947, the Queensland Industrial Court heard 
an application from the Boilermakers' Society, the Blacksmiths' Society, the 
F.I.A., the F.M.U. and the A.E.U. to vary the Mechanical Engineering (War 
Loading) Award-State-^ in the light of the changing position in the Federal 
Metal Trades Award. Most workers in private sector employment in the metal 
trades in Queensland were covered by the s ta te award, and, after some weeks* 
reflection on the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court's decision 
on the appeal against the Mooney award, the Queensland Industrial Court 
published its new wage rates on 8 September 1947. 
The court increased the fitter 's weekly rate by twelve shillings and 
fourpence as opposed to the sixteen shillings which had been received by 
fitters working in Queensland under the Federal Metal Trades Award. 
However, the effect of this decision was to equate the actual money rates for 
the fit ter under the two awards. The court had adopted the view that the 
total wage rates in the awards covering metal trades employees in Queensland 
should be equivalent. This approach derived its rationale from the higher 
3. Depending on circumstances, the employment of metal workers in the 
private sector in Queensland could be governed by one of three 
awards: 
The Mechanical Engineering Award-State; 
The Mechanical Engineering (War Loading) Award-State; 
The Federal Metal Trades Award. 
Wage rates in the first award were uniformly six shillings lower than 
those in the second award. To save clumsy repetit ion, reference will 
be made in the text only to the Mechanical Engineering (War Loading) 
Award-State. 
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state basic wage operating in Queensland. The unions again rejected this and 
applied for a further variation so that the fi t ter in Queensland in private 
employment would receive a marginal increase of sixteen shillings. In its 
judgment of 8 September, the court also increased the wage rates for the 
semi-skilled and unskilled classifications in the award. Thus, although the 
unions were clearly dissatisfied with the outcome of the court's deliberations, 
all privately employed metal trades workers in Queensland under state awards 
had received some marginal increases in September 1947. 
The largest employer of metal tradesmen and allied occupations in the 
state was the Queensland Government Railways. In its workshops and running 
sheds, the maintenance and restoration of a sadly depleted and war-ravaged 
rolling stock occupied thousands of skilled men, while the construction of 
locomotives was a major task in the Ipswich Railway Workshops, by far the 
largest single industrial enterprise in Queensland a t the t ime. In June 1947, 
the unions in the railways commenced a campaign to secure the application of 
the Mooney principles to the Railway Award-State. This planning was 
inhibited to a degree owing to the uncertainty regarding the final structure of 
the Federal Metal Trades Award, and the extent to which the Queensland 
Industrial Court was likely to include these changes in its Mechanical 
Engineering (War Loading) Award-State. The result was a measure of 
procrastination by the various groupings of railway unions in filing claims for 
marginal increases with the court . 
No such hesitation, however, marked the efforts of the A.E.U. which 
had already exhibited some disagreement with the claims being considered by 
the other unions, and was plainly annoyed a t their delay in developing a 
case. On 17 September, the A.E.U., with the support of the Blacksmiths' 
Society, filed a claim with the industrial registrar seeking a flow-on of the 
marginal increases under the Mechanical Engineering (War Loading) Award-
State to the metal tradesmen and some other classifications covered by the 
Railway Award-State. The A.E.U. claimed a weekly increase to the fi t ter of 
twelve shillings and fourpence, which if granted, would have given a fi t ter in 
the railways a weekly wage of seven pounds, seventeen shillings and tenpence, 
an amount of one shilling and tenpence above the fit ter in private 
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employment. This differential had existed for some t ime, and the A.E.U. was 
anxious to preserve this particular relative position. However, on 9 October, 
the commissioner for railways notified his opposition to the claim. 
The Ipswich District Committee of the A.E.U. met on 20 October 
1947 to consider an agenda of major importance with W.J. Porter, the 
Queensland delegate to the A.E.U. Commonwealth Council and J.A. Cranwell, 
its chairperson. During a long discussion the policies of wage fixing tribunals, 
the relationship between margins and basic wages in the engineering trades, 
and the Victorian Metal Trades Dispute were the subjects of extensive 
debate. Cranwell urged his Ipswich colleagues to hasten the flow-on of 
marginal increases under the Federal Metal Trades Award to A.E.U. members 
in the Queensland railways. He suggested the outlines of a strategy by which 
this could be achieved.^ 
In the week after Cranwell's visit to Queensland, the A.E.U. asked the 
industrial registrar for an early hearing of its case which, a t this stage, had 
been filed some five weeks earlier. The registrar replied that the court was 
awaiting receipt of claims from the other railway unions before it considered 
changes to the Railway Award-State. Further claims for marginal increases 
for various groups of workers under the Railway Award-State were lodged on 
10 November by the C.R.U., whose claim was based on the full sixteen 
shillings increase for the f i t ter , and by the A.F.U.L.E. on 19 November 1947. 
Thus by this date, all unions with members employed in the railways had 
applied for marginal increases based on the variations to the Federal Metal 
Trades Award which had been finalised a bare two days earlier with the 
decision of Commissioner Mooney to grant marginal increases of thirteen 
shillings and eleven shillings to various classifications below the f i t ter . 
4. A.E.U. Ipswich District Commit tee . Minutes 20 October 1947, 
A.M.F.S.U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich, p.30. 
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Two months after it had filed its application, the A.E.U. again 
contacted the industrial registrar this time pointing out that marginal 
increases under the Federal Metal Trades Award had flowed on quickly to 
workers in the Victorian and New South Wales railways and that the delay in 
Queensland was causing considerable and growing discontent amongst A.E.U. 
members employed in the Queensland railways. The letter went on to urge an 
early hearing of the A.E.U. claims.^ In reply, the registrar told the A.E.U. 
that the court could not hear any Railway Award-State cases until the task of 
adjusting all Queensland awards to provide for the forty hour week was 
completed. He further observed that, in view of the number of claims which 
had been lodged to vary the Railway Award-State, the best procedure would 
be to have a general review as opposed to hearing the A.E.U. claim in 
isolation. 
This response proved unsatisfactory to the unions, especially to the 
A.E.U., as it was now abundantly clear that the court did not intend to 
examine the case before Christmas. Not unless, of course, political and 
industrial pressure could be brought to bear to change the situation. On 20 
November, a meeting attended by officials from the Blacksmiths' Society, the 
Boilermakers' Society, the V.B.E.F., the B.W.I.U., the E.T.U., the F.M.U., the 
A.R.U., the F.I.A. and the A.E.U. was held in the Ipswich Trades Hall to 
consider what might be done to generate this pressure. It was decided to 
approach D.A. Gledson and Jim Donald, A.L.P. members of parliament for the 
state seats of Ipswich and Bremer respectively, to assist in having the railway 
cases heard before 20 December 1947. In the event of this approach failing to 
yield fruit by 28 November, the meeting endorsed a resolution proposed by 
Jack Devereux, the secretary of the Ipswich District Committee of the A.E.U. 
and Mick Brosnan, the state organiser of the E.T.U., that 
5. C Merrell to P.J. Wallace, 17 November 1947, A.M.F.S.U. files. 
Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
6. P.J. Wallace to The Secretary, Amalgamated Engineering Union, 20 
November 1947, A.M.F.S.U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
225 
...the Unions take the necessary action to conduct 
a ballot of their respective members in the Ipswich 
Workshops and Running sheds, for the taking of 
strike action to obtain marginal increases and 
week-end penalty rates. ' 
When the vote on this proposal was taken, there was but one dissenting voice. 
During the following week, this stand by their workshops' sections was 
debated at length by the senior officers of the unions concerned. The A.E.U. 
Ipswich District Committee sought the permission of its Commonwealth 
Council to conduct a strike ballot and, for good measure, determined that this 
would be held regardless of what the other unions decided.^ The engineering 
tradesmen were obviously well aware of their unique position of strength - if 
they withdrew their labour, then the railway system would collapse. The 
other unions were welcome to join the campaign for margins and weekend 
penalty rates, but if they declined, then the A.E.U. would pursue an 
independent course of action consistent with its traditional industrial tactics. 
On 21 November, Devereux and the Ipswich District Committee of the 
A.E.U. decided to test the extent of support for strike action amongst 
members of the union in the railways throughout Queensland. All railway 
branches and district committees were informed of the planning by the 
workshops' unions at Ipswich, and were invited to participate in the proposed 
action which would be 'of far greater value' if taken before Christmas rather 
than after the festive season.° This activity by the unions at Ipswich was 
7. District Secretary, Ipswich District Committee, Amalgamated 
Engineering Union to Secretary, Commonwealth Council 
Amalgamated Engineering Union, 20 November 1947, A.M.F.S.U. files. 
Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
8. A.E.U. Ipswich District Committee. Minutes 21 November 1947, p.45. 
9. Secretary, Ipswich District Committee, Amalgamated Engineering 
Union to all Railway Branches and District Committees, 21 November 
1947, A.M.F.S.U. files, Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
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designed primarily to convince the court to hear their claims before the end 
of 1947: although there is no certainty about this, it is likely that a large 
element of sabre-rattling was a feature of the campaign.^"^ Further planning 
took place over the weekend of 22 and 23 November when tentative 
arrangements were made to conduct and declare the secret strike ballots in 
the first week of December. Again, these proposals were initiated by 
Devereux and Brosnan, and they were ratified and confirmed by the 
Blacksmiths, F.I.A., F.M.U., E.T.U., V.B.E.F. and A.E.U. at a full meeting the 
following Wednesday. The next day, a major conference between represent-
atives of the workshops' unions and the minister for Transport, J.E. Duggan, 
took place. The importance of the meeting was emphasised by the attendance 
of P.R.T. Wills, the commissioner for railways, and V. Hall, the chief 
mechanical engineer and workshops' superintendent. The purpose of the 
meeting was to discuss the minister's request for substantial overtime to be 
worked in the railway workshops and running sheds. 
In his opening remarks, Duggan confirmed what the unions already 
knew - that the railway department was confronted with a progressive 
deterioration in its repair programme, and that it was physically incapable of 
satisfying the current demands placed upon it, let alone having the capacity to 
respond to the government's plans for an expansion of the Queensland coal 
industry. They knew that literally thousands of tons of goods had accumulated 
in railway depots throughout Queensland, and that over twenty per cent of the 
department's engines were either undergoing or awaiting repairs. They 
were well aware that such a situation compounded the already considerable 
10, The wording of a motion carried by the Blacksmiths suggests this: 
That a strike ballot be taken to expedite the 
hearing of our claim, before the court go [sic] into 
recess in December. 
Blacksmiths' Society of Australia. Ipswich Sub-branch. Minutes 24 
November 1947, A.M.F.S.U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
11. District Secretary, Ipswich District Committee to Acting Secretary, 
Commonwealth Council, Amalgamated Engineering Union, 28 July 
1947, A.M.F.S.U. files, Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
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fears of the minister - which he confirmed - that the railways in the postwar 
period would fall easy prey to new forms of air and road transport. This frank 
admission of the railway department's difficulties did not, however, elicit a 
sympathetic response from the assembled unions. On the contrary, official 
after official used the occasion to vent their frustration and anger at many 
aspects of railway administration. The upshot of this angry interlude was an 
emphatic refusal by the unions to take the overtime request to their members 
until such time as the question of margins and weekend penalty rates was 
satisfactorily resolved. 
Clearly Duggan was in no position to antagonise the unions on this, or 
any other issue. According to railway department minutes of the meeting, he 
undertook to do all he could to expedite the hearing of the unions' claims, and 
suggested that they approach the premier, E.M. Hanlon, directly on the 
1 7 
matter of marginal increases for all crown employees.^ Arising out of this 
meeting, the A.E.U. firmly believed the minister at the very least agreed that 
the rate of pay for railway tradesmen should be equivalent to the rate paid to 
similar tradesmen in private employment and, further, that if Hanlon decided 
to allow each minister the freedom to determine the matter unilaterally, then 
another meeting would be held with Duggan on 4 December. On the basis of 
these impressions, the A.E.U. decided to recommend to the other unions the 
suspension of the secret strike ballots until such time as the outcome of 
negotiations with the government was known.^^ This course of action was 
endorsed by them the following day. 
The C.R.U. and the A.E.U. acted immediately on Duggan's advice to 
put their case for increases in margins and weekend penalty rates directly to 
Hanlon. Both organisations wrote to the premier on 27 November with the 
C.R.U. emphasising its desire to '...see the Commonwealth Court's 
12. Conference with the minister for Transport. Subject: Overtime -
Ipswich Workshops. Minutes 27 November 1947, 1948:2621, batch 1, 
'Marginal Rates and Week End Penalty Rates. General 
Correspondence', commissioner for railways, Brisbane, p.7. 
13, A.E.U. Ipswich District Committee. Minutes 27 November 1947, p.47. 
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increases... ' applied throughout the railway service and drawing at tention to 
the fact that employees in all railway systems save Queensland enjoyed 
penalty rates for weekend work. This le t ter suggested to Hanlon that the 
government should follow the precedent set in the other s ta tes by indicating 
to the industrial court its consent to the unions' claims.^^ The A.E.U. told 
Hanlon that the wage increases granted under the Federal Metal Trades 
Award had flowed on completely to all relevant awards in other s ta tes , and 
the fact that this had not happened in Queensland was causing widespread 
discontent, particularly amongst metal tradesmen employed by the crown. 
There was an '...urgent need to have this mat te r expedited as soon as possible 
in the interests of maintaining industrial harmony'. A request for 
retrospectivity in accordance with the judgment of the commonwealth court 
was also made. The A.E.U. urged Hanlon to accept the view that the 
government should agree to the application of the Federal Metal Trades 
Award formula to crown employees in Queensland in a 'spirit of conciliation' 
especially as the principles involved had been determined by a competent 
wage fixing tribunal. ^ ^ 
The unions were confident the government would see the justice and 
virtues of their submissions and would respond favourably to them. Devereux 
told his brother officials throughout Queensland that there were high hopes of 
negotiations with ei ther Hanlon or Duggan in the first week of December, and 
with these prospects in view the Ipswich District Committee had decided not 
16 to proceed with its strike ballot originally proposed for that t ime. But 
Devereux, indeed all officials associated with the margins campaign in 
Queensland, was in for a rude shock. The unions waited in vain for a summons 
from the government to open discussions. A week and a half passed without 
14* Secretary, Combined Railway Unions to the Premier, 27 November 
1947, A.M.F.S.U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
15* Organiser, Amalgamated Engineering Union to E.M. Hanlon, 27 
November 1947, A.M.F.S.U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
16. Ipswich District Secretary, Amalgamated Engineering Union to 
Railway Branches and District Commit tees , 1 December 1947, 
A,M.F.S,U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
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so much as a murmur from Hanlon or his ministers. Finally, on the morning of 
10 December 1947, Devereux received a telephone call from Duggan: cabinet 
had already met, had discussed the margins claim, and had decided that the 
government would not oppose an increase in the weekly rates for tradesmen 
under the Railway Award-State based on a figure of six shillings and tenpence 
for the fitter which, when added to the weekly amount of three shillings and 
eightpence for privileges, would bring the remuneration for railway tradesmen 
into line with that provided in the Federal Metal Trades Award. This offer, 
Duggan went on to say, was confined to tradesmen as the government believed 
that, although it was not opposed to increases for semi-skilled and unskilled 
classifications in the Railway Award-State, the exact amounts ought to be 
decided by the industrial court. Retrospectivity, furthermore, would be 
granted to 18 September 1947, the date on which the registrar had received 
the A.E.U. claim. Duggan concluded by telling Devereux that if this offer was 
unacceptable, then the whole issue would have to be decided by arbitration, in 
which case he would use his best endeavours to secure an early hearing. 
The response of the A.E.U. to this news was predictable. At a hastily 
convened lunchtime meeting on 10 December, the government's package was 
rejected, and it was decided to confer with the other unions with a view to 
taking strike action after Christmas if the marginal rates claim was not 
satisfactorily resolved in the meantime. It was also agreed that there would 
be no resumption of negotiations with the government on its request for 
substantial overtime while the unions' claims were outstanding. As far as the 
A.E.U. was concerned, then, the die was cast. It would rely on overtime bans 
to force the government to improve its offer and if this proved ineffective, 
then the option of an all out strike was still available. In the A.E.U.'s 
estimation, no Queensland government, surely, could sit back and allow an 
asset so politically and economically important as the railways to deteriorate 
to a point beyond salvation! These views were put to a meeting of the All 
Service Unions on the morning of 12 December. The government's offer, 
which by now had been received in writing, was the subject of extensive 
debate. Two members of the Communist party, F. Weigel of the F.M.U., and 
17, A.E.U. Ipswich District Committee. Minutes 10 December 1947, p.51. 
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R. Cobb of the Boilermakers moved the rejection of the government's 
proposal, that the unions proceed on the basis of the several claims already 
lodged with the court, and '...failing a satisfactory decision prior to 31st 
January, 1948 we recommend a cessation of work to secure the granting in 
full of our claims'.^^ This was clearly a call for a general railway strike in 
Queensland since the All Service Unions, as the title implied, was a body 
covering almost without exception all unions with members in the railway 
service. 
A general railway strike, however, was never contemplated 
throughout the whole period from June to December 1947 in which the unions 
in the Queensland railways were endeavouring to secure the fruits of the 
Victorian Metal Trades Dispute with the possible exception of the Communist 
party. As discussed previously, the Communist party, early in 1947, decided 
to seek every opportunity to involve Queensland unions in an overt challenge 
to the 'meat dispute' amendments to The Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act. By the closing months of 1947, however, it had not 
succeeded in this endeavour: on the one or two occasions which had looked 
promising, the unionists involved had shown a distinct reluctance to engage in 
any sustained direct action even though on one of these occasions, of which 
more will be said later, the industrial court punished two senior A.R.U. 
officials for breaches of the very Act which the Communist party was eager 
to challenge. With the rising anger and frustration in the ranks of several 
powerful craft unions over the marginal rates issue, together with the 
pressure for wage rises and the existence of grievances in other parts of the 
railway service, the Communist party may well have seen this as providing the 
opportunity which had eluded it so far during 1947. A serious dispute 
throughout an important industry over major issues associated with arbitration 
seemed to provide all the ingredients. As an added bonus, the employer was 
none other than the 'right wing' and 'reformist' A.L.P. government which was 
responsible for the legislation in the first place. 
18. All Service Unions. Minutes 12 December 1947, A.M.F.S.U. files, 
Trades Hall, Ipswich, p.l . 
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Regardless, however, of whether the motion for a general railway 
strike was inspired in this way, of crucial importance was the fact that it was 
rejected by the All Service Unions. In its place, the meeting of 12 December 
endorsed a resolution proposed by the leaders of the A.E.U. in Ipswich, Jack 
Devereux and W. Keenan: 
That we recommend to all Unions that the offer of 
the Minister for Transport concerning marginal 
increases be rejected and that we proceed on the 
basis of the claim already lodged. Failing a 
satisfactory decision prior to 31st January 1948, we 
recommend a cessation of work of all workshop 
employees to secure the granting in full of our 
claim. 
In view of the subsequent charges that the 1948 Railway Dispute was a 
'communist plot', the failure of the Weigal-Cobb motion for a general railway 
strike needs to be emphasised. So does the point that the initiative for 
proposing a statewide workshops'strike belonged to two A.E.U. men who were 
politically conservative but, at the same time, were industrially militant in 
70 the traditions of 'their esteemed and ancient union'. 
Later that same day, the A.E.U. Ipswich District Committee met to 
determine its tactics in the period leading up to the 31 January 1948 
deadline. It was decided to seek the cooperation of all unions in the 
imposition of an overtime ban at the Ipswich workshops until the marginal 
rates claim was satisfactorily adjusted, and with the subsequent approval of 
the other unions, an overtime ban was imposed from 1 January 1948. From 
this date, the only overtime occurred in connection with shiftwork. The 
A.E.U. at Ipswich also decided to take a ballot of its members early in 
January on the question of banning overtime completely. 
By mid-December 1947, the extent of the differences between the 
19. Ibid. 
to* T. Sheridan, Mindful Militants. The Amalgamated Engineering Union 
in Australia 1920-1972,p.l83. 
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government and the various groups of unions within the railways over the 
extent to which marginal increases under the Federal Metal Trades Award 
ought to flow on to the appropriate Queensland awards was well defined. The 
position is revealed in the following tables. 
TABLE 1: GOVERNMENT OFFER 
Present Railway Fi t ter 's Weekly Rate 
Value of Privileges (Weekly) 
Present Private Enterprise Fi t ter 's 
Weekly Rate 
DIFFERENCE (GOVERNMENT OFFER) 
£ s. d. 
7 6 6 
3 8 
7 10 2 
7 17 0 
6 10 
TABLE 2: A.E.U. CLAIM 
£ s. d. 
Present Railway Fi t ter ' s Weekly Rate 7 6 6 
Present Private Enterprise Fi t ter ' s 
Weekly Rate 
DIFFERENCE 
Relativity in favour of Railway Fi t te r 
TOTAL (A.E.U. CLAIM) 
7 17 0 
10 
1 
12 
6 
10 
4 
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TABLE 3: COMBINED RAILWAY UNIONS' CLAIM 
£ s. d. 
Present Railway Fitter's Weekly Rate 7 6 6 
MARGINAL INCREASE GRANTED TO THE FITTER 
UNDER FEDERAL METAL TRADES AWARD 
(C.R.U. CLAIM) 16 0 
TABLE 4: FITTER'S WEEKLY MONEY WAGE UNDER: 
Government Offer A.E.U. Claim C.R.U. Claim 
£ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d. 
7 13 4 7 18 10 8 2 6 
The union position was based on a recognition that acceptance of the 
government's offer would have meant conceding that the state basic wage was 
to be the key rate for crown employees, and that, in consequence, margins for 
skill in state awards ought to be less than margins for the same skills in 
federal awards to the extent the state basic wage exceeded the federal basic 
wage. Further, it also meant conceding that the value of 'privileges' formed 
part of the wage rate and accepting the elimination of the margin in favour of 
the railway fitter over the fitter in private enterprise. The A.E.U. and the 
other unions were simply not prepared to make these concessions to the 
government, and their mood was certainly not improved when they were 
informed by the registrar on 19 December that the court would not commence 
to hear the Railway Award-State cases until 2 March 1948. 
This announcement clearly indicated that the unions' campaign of 
industrial and political pressure had failed to secure an early hearing of their 
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claims. With this question essentially a dead issue, their attention shifted to 
the likely judgment of the court on marginal rates matters. The prospects did 
not appear promising. The court some months earlier had not permitted a full 
flow-on of the Federal Metal Trades Award increases to tradesmen employed 
in the private sector under the mechanical engineering awards, and relativity 
considerations would more than likely mean the court would adopt a similar 
stance in the case of the Railway Award-State. Furthermore, the 
government's maximum offer of six shillings and tenpence was based on 
principles which the court had developed. The government was clearly 
indicating to the court that these principles ought to be applied in the case of 
the Railway Award-State. The unions therefore had good grounds for sharing 
the view of the railway department industrial officer that '...the court could 
be expected to give the equivalent of the outside rate to the railway fitters 
71 less the value of privileges in the department'. But there were further, 
more tangible grounds for suspicion in the minds of many union officials that 
the court might not view their claims with much sympathy. Some shared the 
views of the president of the A.R.U. (and chairperson of the C.R.U.) Michael 
(Mick) O'Brien that the court had adopted a 'partisan attitude' in a recent 
dispute with the commissioner for railways, and supported the argument that 
...we view with disgust the delay that has taken 
place in the hearing of our claims and note with 
disfavour the speed with which the Court can act 
at the behest of the employers;.... 
These sentiments, which were expressed to a meeting of striking railwaymen 
on 18 November 1947, saw O'Brien cited for contempt of court. He was found 
22 guilty and fined. 
The events of the twenty-four hour stoppage on 18 November also 
resulted in charges being laid, and fines levied on O'Brien, together with Frank 
Nolan, the secretary of the A.R.U. in Queensland, under sections of The 
21. Q.P.D. 192 (1948): 1887. 
22. The King against Michael O'Brien. Judgment Q.G.G. 22 December 
1947, pp.2491,2492. 
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Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act which dealt with unauthorised 
strikes and failure to comply with a court order. This provoked a reaction 
from the federal office of the A.R.U. The general secretary, J.F. Chappie, 
implored Hanlon to examine urgently industrial relationships within the 
railways: 
We believe that you, as Premier, should arrange for 
the Summonses against our officers, Mr. M. O'Brien 
and Mr. F.G. Nolan, to be withdrawn; for the State 
Arbitration Court to be prodded into action, and 
for an investigation to be made into the causes of 
the present unrest in the Railways. If this is not 
done, then we fear that the position will grow from 
bad to worse.... 
Chappie stressed that 'the growing industrial unrest' was not simply over 
economic matters. It was also due to the 
...harsh and unsympathetic treatment meted out to 
Railwaymen who, during the war years, rendered 
such splendid service, but who now appear to be the 
victims of official tyranny and oppression.^-* 
As far as the A.R.U. in Queensland and its supporters were concerned, the 
prosecution of its officials exacerbated the antipathy and distrust which had 
marked relations between it and the court for many years. The effect of this 
latest round, however, paled into relative insignificance when compared with 
the reaction of the All Service Unions to the court's decision regarding how 
the forty hour week was to be worked in the railway service. 
During the last three months of 1947 the industrial court was engaged 
in the process of adjusting all state awards to accommodate the forty hour 
week as from 1 January 1948. The workload imposed by this obligation was 
one reason for the delay in hearing the claims for variations in the Railway 
Award-State. In the event, the unions and the railway department could not 
23. J.F. Chappie to E.M. Hanlon, 1 December 1947, batch 536, 'Industrial 
Matters', premier's department, Brisbane. 
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agree on how the forty hours was to be spread over the working week, and the 
matter was thus left to the court for determination. During the hearings, the 
commissioner for railways put certain proposals, one of which was not 
mentioned in the court's final judgment. The railway industrial officer 
subsequently approached the court through the registrar and, as a result, the 
court varied its judgement to include the commissioner's proposal without 
consulting the unions. This was a clear departure from the normal 
procedure.'^^ 
When the unions were notified of this decision, all hell broke loose. In 
an angry letter to Hanlon, O'Brien, in his capacity as president of the C.R.U., 
protested bitterly at the court's action, his pen no doubt guided by a sense of 
personal indignation and outrage arising out of his recent skirmish with the 
court over statements which now seemed, at least in part, to be vindicated: 
How can any union have respect for the impartial 
attitude of the Court, when we find that Employers' 
representatives are able to use back-door methods to 
have their request granted by the Court? It is all the 
more repulsive to us when we find that in the instance 
under review a Government department was concerned. 
If the Commissioner is dissatisfied with the Award - the 
unions are - he should follow the same procedure as the 
unions are compelled to follow by law, and apply for a 
variation. 
This latest instance does not enhance the prestige of the 
Court, or the Government's policy of arbitration. ^ 
This episode added great weight to the view previously held in certain union 
circles that the court was unduly accommodating to the requirements of the 
commissioner for railways. The pessimism over the fate of the marginal rates 
claim deepened and extended as a result: if the court favoured the 
commissioner over an important issue such as the forty hour week, was it 
likely to do anything different on the equally important question of wage 
24. Minister for Labour and Industry to The Premier, 5 January 1948, 
A/9892, Q.S.A. 
25, M. O'Brien to E.M. Hanlon, 22 December 1947, A/9892, Q.S.A. 
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rates? 
The attitude of the government to the marginal rates claim was part 
of a wider concern at the trend of wages in general during 1947 and the 
implications for the financial requirements of the public sector. In May and 
July 1947, the public service commissioner warned the government that the 
substantial wage increases under the Federal Metal Trades Award would 
greatly increase the crown's financial obligations since the increases would, in 
all probability, flow on to tradesmen in the railways, then to the running staff 
and eventually to the administrative employees. Ultimately, according to the 
public service commissioner, the impact of the decisions in respect of the 
Federal Metal Trades Award would be felt on the wage structure and level 
throughout Queensland. Similar advice was tendered to the government in 
November 1947, when applications for major increases in the state basic wage 
were lodged with the industrial court by the A.W.U. and the T.L.C^^ By 
early December 1947, there were, moreover, several other union claims for 
wage increases and other improvements for public sector employees which had 
been awaiting hearing in the industrial court for periods between three and 
nine months. 
The government's decision to confine its offer of six shillings and 
tenpence to skilled tradesmen was more than likely designed to delay for as 
long as possible the flow on process of wage increases throughout the railway 
service. In his letter to the unions, the minister for Transport, however, 
justified the decision on other grounds: 
Those employees in the semi-skilled trade groups 
would be advised to make application to the Court 
for a determination of their claim. This action is 
taken because of the difficulty in differentiating 
26, Public Service Commissioner to The Honourable The Chief Secretary, 
22 May 1947, 1948: 2621, batch 1, 'Marginal Rates and Week End 
Penalty Rates. General Correspondence', commissioner for railways, 
Brisbane; Public Service Commissioner to The Honourable The Chief 
Secretary, U July 1947, A/9891, Q.S.A.; Public Service 
Commissioner to The Honourable The Chief Secretary, 26 November 
1947, A/9894, Q.S.A. 
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between the various sections of the Railway 
Department and the consequential anomalies which 
might be created by granting increases to labourers 
or semi-skilled men in Workshops, while other 
employees carrying out comparable responsibilities 
in other sections of the Department are denied 
such marginal increases. 
It can be said without a shadow of a doubt, however, that these were not the 
real reasons for the government's action. 
The real reasons were revealed by the minister in a let ter he sent to 
the under secretary of the premier's department the day after he had written 
to the unions: 
The Court has already made a declaration 
concerning marginal rates insofar as outside 
employees are concerned. This declaration is 
embodied in an alteration to the State Mechanical 
Engineering Award. In addition to granting 
marginal increases, the opportunity was taken to 
adjust certain semi-skilled rates of pay. In str ict 
logic, therefore, it would be difficult to contest the 
Union's claim that the same proportionate marginal 
increases should be granted to semi-skilled men in 
the Railway Department. 
In order to make the position bet ter from the 
Government's point of view, I have tried to obscure 
their claim in this regard by directing attention to 
the anomalies and dissatisfactions which would be 
caused if marginal increases for semi-skilled 
workers are confined to Workshops employees.^" 
The government's predicament arose out of the deteriorating financial 
position of the railways and the need to devote massive resources to their 
27. Minister for Transport to Secretary, Combined Railway Unions, 11 
December 1947, A.M.F.S.U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
28, Minister for Transport to Under Secretary, Chief Secretary's 
Department . 12 December 1947, 1948: 2621, batch 1, 'Marginal Rates 
and Week End Penalty Rates . General Correspondence', commissioner 
for railways, Brisbane. 
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rehabilitation after they had been worked to the point of exhaustion during 
the war. After 1942-43, the year of peak railway activity, net railway 
revenue began to fall owing to a combination of declining traffic and 
increasing costs of maintenance and materials. The following table reveals 
the extent of the deterioration in railway finances. 
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By the end of 1947, net railway revenue in Queensland was less than it 
had been in 1938-39. The government was faced with considerable budgetary 
problems as a result since during the war it had come to rely to a large extent 
on buoyant railway revenues to fund other expenditures and to provide 
reserves for postwar reconstruction. The decline in the railways' fortunes was 
placing an increasing burden on the government's capacity to manage its 
budget at a time when urgent postwar demands could not be ignored and in a 
general economic climate which was far from hospitable. It therefore seems 
apparent that questions of public finance decided in no small measure the 
government's policy towards the claims for wage increases in the railway 
service. It also seems that the minister for Transport entertained doubts over 
the intrinsic merits of some of the claims. In 1973, J.E. Duggan told Richard 
Shearman that increases for unskilled workers were excluded from the 
government's offer on the grounds that it was difficult to see why '...some 
fellow pushing a barrowful of coal into the Ipswich workshops should receive 
79 an increase'. ' 
On 16 December 1947, the under secretary of the premier's 
department replied to the request of the A.E.U. for a statement of 
government policy on the matter of increases in margins for crown 
employees. The government's decision, as expressed in this letter, was that 
'...the Railway Department will not oppose the same rates of pay being 
applied to skilled tradesmen as are prescribed in the Commonwealth 
30 Award'.-^^ Some months later, during what became a dispute of monumental 
proportions, the government would make much of these words to support a 
claim that the ultimate settlement terms were those offered at this time in 
mid-December. This claim was false. The letter of 16 December simply did 
not enunciate the full details of the government's policy. The cabinet minute, 
dated 9 December 1947, read as follows: 
29. R, Shearman, 'The Politics of the 1948 Queensland Railway Strike' 
p.45. 
30. Under Secretary, Premier and Chief Secretary's Department to 
Organiser, Amalgamated Engineering Union, 16 December 1947, 
A.M.F.S.U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
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The State Government could not oppose the same 
rates of pay as are payable to tradesmen working 
outside the State Service under Federal Awards, 
regard being had to privileges in rail and other 
services. Where State Awards are higher, no 
reduction to be sought. Date of commencement to 
be decided by Court. Ask for date of application 
by Unions to Court, and if pushed the date the 
decision of Federal Court could be agreed to.-^^ 
The practical interpretation of this policy, which was based on the figure of 
six shillings and tenpence, had been put to the unions in no uncertain terms by 
the minister for Transport some five days earlier. 
The government was, moreover, well aware that its attitude to the 
claims for marginal increases was likely to be unacceptable to the unions. It 
also anticipated that 'industrial trouble' would be the outcome of this offer 
particularly as it excluded all other occupations except skilled tradesmen. On 
12 and 17 December 1947 respectively, the premier's department and the 
minister for Labour and Industry (V.C. Gair) were informed by the minister for 
Transport of the likelihood of significant industrial unrest in the railways, 
with a heavy emphasis being placed on the necessity for an early hearing of 
37 the Railway Award-State claims in order to relieve the mounting tension.^^ 
Despite these warnings by the minister for Transport, the government 
showed little concern at the court's decision not to commence an examination 
of the cases until early March the following year even though senior ministers 
were well aware of the All Service Unions decision to organise a workshops' 
strike if a satisfactory resolution of their claims had not occurred by 31 
31. Marginal note, premier's handwriting. Memorandum re 
communication from the Organiser of the Amalgamated Engineering 
Union under date 27th November 1947, respecting increased rates of 
pay. Public Service Commissioner's Department, 3 December 1947, 
batch 238, 'Margins for Skilled Workers', premier's department, 
Brisbane. 
32. Minister for Transport to Minister for Labour and Industry, 17 
December 1947, 1948: 2621, batch 1, 'Marginal Rates and Week End 
Penalty Rates. General Correspondence', commissioner for railways, 
Brisbane. 
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January. On 22 December, the unions were informed that the premier could 
not receive a deputation to discuss margins and weekend penalty rates until 
early in the new year. This seemingly casual attitude on the part of the 
government suggests, perhaps, either that it was prepared to risk a major 
industrial upheaval over the marginal rates issue, or that it believed the 
unions were bluffing. 
Whatever the explanation, the government's stance on the marginal 
rates issue hardened in the early part of January 1948. This came about after 
the minister for Transport accepted a detailed analysis of the union claims 
prepared by his departmental officers. This review argued at some length the 
relevance to the determination of wage rates under the Railway Award-State 
of differences in the state and federal basic wage, the value of 'privileges' 
enjoyed by railway employees, and the rates of pay received in private 
industry. It was further pointed out that the government had improved 
conditions in the railway service since the court's valuation of 'privileges' at 
three shillings and eightpence per week in 1942. The review also drew 
attention to the allowances granted by the court to employees based in the 
central and northern parts of Queensland, and to a western district allowance 
paid to railwaymen in particular, all of which had no parallel in comparable 
federal awards. Emphasis was placed on the financial repercussions 
throughout the railway service of increases in pay in the engineering and 
associated trades as well as a possible substantial increase in the state basic 
wage. On the question of weekend penalty rates, the review criticised this 
claim as an instance of Queensland railwaymen selecting those parts of the 
awards of other tribunals which suited them while at the same time wishing to 
33 
maintain in many ways a superior Queensland award.-'^ -^  
Against this background, the minister for Transport reiterated the 
33. Memorandum 5 January 1948, 1948: 2621, batch 1, 'Marginal Rates 
and Week End Penalty Rates. General Correspondence', commissioner 
for railways, Brisbane. 
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government's maximum offer of six shillings and tenpence to tradesmen only 
on 9 January 1948. This unequivocal reaffirmation of the government's 
position convinced the unions that they had exhausted the possibilities of 
negotiating any further improvements - it was obvious they had heard the 
government's last word on the matter of marginal rates in the railways. They 
had not, however, heard the last word from within their own ranks. On 22 
December, the Commonwealth Council of the A.E.U. asked Devereux to 
explain what steps were being taken to overcome the delay in securing 
marginal increases for A.E.U. members in the Queensland railways. This 
amounted to a not too subtle hint that the matter be resolved post haste: the 
Commonwealth Council had expected much quicker results from the 
discussions Cranwell and Porter had conducted at Ipswich in October 1947. 
Spurred on by these obvious signs of displeasure from the governing 
body of the union in Australia, the A.E.U. Ipswich District Committee 
conducted a secret ballot amongst its members at the Ipswich railway 
workshops on whether they were prepared to implement a complete overtime 
ban over the marginal rates issue. The result, which favoured the ban by four 
hundred and ten to seventy-one, revealed a depth of feeling which not even 
the most optimistic official could have anticipated. The members of the 
district committee decided that the decision of their rank and file would be 
implemented on 24 January 1948. For this to succeed, however, the railway 
department would have to agree to alter the pattern of shifts in the workshops 
and to reschedule the transport arrangements for the workers concerned! 
By 18 January 1948, some unions had commenced to hold secret 
ballots on the question of strike action over the margins issue. At this stage, 
however, the A.E.U. in Ipswich was uncertain as to the direction it would 
take. It contemplated a number of tactical options which included a strike 
34. Minister for Transport to J. Donald, 9 January 1948, A.M.F.S.U. files, 
Trades Hall, Ipswich, 
35. Acting Secretary, Commonwealth Council, Amalgamated Engineering 
Union to Secretary, Ipswich District Committee, Amalgamated 
Engineering Union, 22 December 1947, A.M,F,S.U. files, Trades Hall, 
Ipswich. 
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confined to the Ipswich workshops, a statewide strike of A.E.U. members in 
the railways, and a statewide overtime ban. This dilemma over strategy was 
quickly resolved by the decisions of other unions to test their members' 
feelings on the All Service Unions call for a statewide workshops' strike, 
together with the predictable refusal of the railway department to al ter the 
duration of the shifts a t Ipswich. 
This refusal by the railway department was the straw which broke the 
camel's back as far as the A.E.U. at t i tude towards strike action was 
concerned. Up to this t ime, the A.E.U. seemed content to threaten the 
government and the court with strike action (initially to secure an early 
hearing and later to influence the government to increase its offer), but to 
rely in practice on overtime bans at Ipswich. There is some evidence that in 
mid-January the A.E.U. thought the other unions might defer strike action 
given the setting of a hearing date, the government agreement to 
retrospectivity, and the commencement of the basic wage case, and thought 
that the most effective way of indicating to the court the wisdom of awarding 
marginal increases substantially in advance of the government's offer would 
3A 
be a statewide overtime ban in all workshops and running sheds. This 
thinking was abandoned once the railway department refused to alter the 
shifts and some other unions commenced their ballots. In the light of these 
developments, the A.E.U. decided to initiate a statewide ballot to test the 
willingness of its members in the workshops and running sheds to take strike 
action over margins and weekend penalty ra tes . This decision received the 
37 
approval of the Commonwealth Council on 23 January 1948. 
If the degree of rank and file support a t Ipswich for overtime bans had 
surprised A.E.U. officials, they were simply overwhelmed by the results of the 
statewide ballot on the question of a complete strike. In the final analysis. 
3 4 Ipswich District Secretary, Amalgamated Engineering Union to Acting 
Secretary, Commonwealth Council, Amalgamated Engineering Union, 
18 January 1948, A.M.F.S.U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
37. A.E.U. Ipswich District Commit tee . Minutes 23 January 1948, 
A.M.F.S.U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich, pp.62,63. 
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A.E.U. members employed in the railway workshops and running sheds 
throughout Queensland supported strike action by 1,064 to 114, a majority of 
nine to one. Jack Devereux, in a classic piece of understatement, noted '...the 
remarkable support received from the members in our fight for wage 
increases on a fair and equitable basis'.^^ The results of the secret ballots 
conducted by the E.T.U., Blacksmiths, Boilermakers and the V.B.E.F. were 
reported to a meeting of the All Service Unions on 30 January. The closest 
vote revealed a nevertheless handsome majority of two to one in favour of 
strike action. 
The intensity of the workshops' employees' support for strike action 
over margins may possibly also be seen as an expression of their 
dissatisfaction with wider dimensions of railway administration and with 
aspects of living conditions in the early postwar years. During the war, they 
had made a heroic effort to maintain a railway system which in no way, shape 
or form was designed to handle the extraordinary demands placed upon it. 
Men in the workshops had to cope with severe shortages of skilled labour and 
materials, long hours and heavy workloads. Praise from politicians and 
railway managers was heaped on their work, but by 1948, almost three years 
after the end of the war, railway employees were looking for rather more 
action on their grievances and rather fewer words. The government's refusal 
to agree to the application of the Mooney principles to state awards 
suggested, however, that when it came to the tangible recognition of their 
sacrifices, and the justice of their economic demands, little would be 
forthcoming. 
The government's attitude to marginal increases exacerbated the 
unions' distrust of the railway department. Initially many union leaders held 
high hopes and feelings of good-will for the new minister of Transport, J.E. 
Duggan. The portfolio had been administered until his defeat in the 1947 
state elections by the deputy premier, E.J. Walsh. Little love was lost 
If, District Secretary, Ipswich District Committee, Amalgamated 
Engineering Union to All Railway Branches and District Committees, 
28 January 1948, A.M.F.S.U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
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between Walsh and the major unions in the railway service, and few lamented 
his electoral demise. The unions also had little time for the commissioner for 
railways, P.R.T. Wills, an authoritarian man who suffered unions with little 
pleasure, and who regarded their efforts to affect the course of railway 
management as an impertinent challenge to his authority. With the collapse 
of the Walsh-Wills axis, the unions anticipated a much more sympathetic 
administration under the direction of Duggan, a young, energetic and 
ambitious man whose political star was clearly rising in the 1940s. 
There were signs, however, that Duggan might re-appoint Wills when 
his position came up for review early in 1948, an act not calculated to win the 
enthusiastic cooperation of the unions in the task of railway reconstruction. 
Of greater importance, however, was the government's rejection of the claims 
for marginal increases. This convinced tradesmen and their assistants, as well 
as many other railwaymen, that the appointment of a new minister had 
heralded but a false dawn in the railway department's attitude towards them. 
Their confidence and morale was probably not improved by the Camp 
Mountain and Tamaree railway disasters which occurred in May and October 
1947 with the loss of twenty-four lives and injuries to fifty-eight passengers. 
Railway employees, it has been argued, in common with other citizens, were, 
moreover, becoming increasingly intolerant of the difficult conditions of life 
associated with rationing, housing shortages, poor quality food and the like 
which were features of the early reconstruction years in Queensland.^" The 
benefits of the new order seemed as far away as they had ever been. 
The massive display of enthusiasm for direct action amongst the 
membership of a wide range of craft unions in the railways as revealed in the 
secret ballots put the seal of approval on All Service Unions' recommendations 
that 
39, See Cribb, 'State In Emergency,' especially pp. 227,237, for an 
argument that 'When the social, political and economic conditions of 
post-war Queensland are assessed for their effect on the 
administration of the Railways Department and on the morale of 
railway workers, the Mooney award emerges not so much as a primary 
cause of the strike but more as a catalyst which set off a major 
reaction', (p.227). 
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As the Government has rejected our claim for 
marginal increases, we decide that all workshops 
employees and tradesmen and their assistants in 
running sheds shall cease work until such time as 
our claims have been granted in full....unless our 
claims are conceded in the meantime, the stoppage 
shall take place as from 12.1 a.m. Tuesday, 3rd 
February, 1948.^ *° 
At this stage, as the storm clouds grew more and more menancing, the 
industrial court summoned parties to the Railway Award-State to a 
compulsory conference. But the government had made it clear some weeks 
earlier that the six shillings and tenpence formula constituted its firm and 
final offer, while the unions had decided that, unless the railway department 
and the court conceded their claims at the compulsory conference, the strike 
would commence at the appointed time regardless of any action the court 
might take. To the unions, a tradesmen's strike during the month before the 
court was to hear the Railway Award-State cases seemed the only thing that 
would bring the government to its senses. 
It must be emphasised that the 1947 wages campaign in Queensland, 
which culminated in the 1948 Railway Dispute, was planned and conducted by 
a loose coalition of union officials whose political attitudes and philosophies 
were, to say the least, diverse. For some, significant wage increases were an 
essential part of the promised postwar new order, for others the federal wage-
pegging regulations had to be challenged, while still others saw increased 
wages as being vitally necessary to protect the workers against the depression 
which they saw as inevitable and close at hand. All agreed that vital 
questions of wage justice were at stake. Senior officials in unions affiliated 
with the A.L.P., union leaders who belonged to the Communist party, and 
union leaders who had no particular political allegiance all worked together in 
the campaign. 
i i . All Service Unions. Minutes 28 January 1948, E212/682 A.F.U.L.E. 
deposit, A.N.U.A.B.L., p. l . 
l i s Central Disputes Committee (C.D.C). Minutes 30 January 1948, 
E212/682 A.F.U.L.E. deposit, A.N.U.A.B.L., p.l . 
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It is important to make these points in view of the accusations made 
in February and March of 1948, and beyond, that the 1948 Railway Dispute 
was a Communist party plot designed to overthrow constitutional government 
and to substitute the rule of the gun and concentration camp in the state of 
Queensland. The available evidence does not support such a view. The 
Communist party, however, did play a vital role in the dispute, and in order to 
appreciate this, developments in its policy during 1947 need to be recalled 
briefly. 
The Communist party believed that a number of changes in political 
attitudes was occuring within the Australian workforce during 1947 which 
could, if handled correctly, be converted into a change in political alliegance 
from the A.L.P. to the Communist party. According to this analysis, the 
strike struggles of the postwar period, and the hostile role played by both 
state Labor governments and the Chifley government, were convincing a 
growing number of people, through first-hand experience, of the superiority of 
communist strategy and tactics in winning the goals of the working class. 
Furthermore, although 'reformism' continued to exercise considerable 
influence, a leftward movement in working class political attitudes was 
clearly apparent. This was not being reflected, however, in increased 
membership of the Communist party. In February 1947, R. Dixon (assistant 
general secretary of the party) proposed a national campaign '...to reveal the 
Communist Party as the alternative to the Labor Party...'.^-^ The pursuit of 
economic objectives would provide a means, as J.B. Miles (the party's general 
secretary) put it, of '...winning the masses to support the Communist Party' 
since in the trade union struggle for improved economic conditions against 
employers and the arbitration system, the role of 'reformists' in the A.L.P. 
would be exposed.^^ It was, of course, necessary for members of the 
Communist party to lead the workers' struggles (a point emphasised by Alex 
42. The Guardian 31 January 1947. 
43. The Guardian 28 January 1947. 
44. The Guardian 21 February 1947. 
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Macdonald, secretary of the F.I.A. in Queensland), since by winning economic 
demands, particularly against the resistance of A.L.P. governments, the 
Communist party would thus win the political support of trade unionists. 
In his address to the Sixth Queensland State Conference of the 
Communist party, Macdonald had also pointed to the united front between 
Communist party and A.L.P. union leaders which had emerged during the 
1946-47 Metal Trades Dispute, and had argued that this unity in sections of 
the trade union movement would provide a firm basis for many of the future 
struggles in Queensland.'^^ In communist circles, it was held that such 
struggles should be waged at every apppropriate opportunity over Hanlon's 
policy of attracting foreign investment to Queensland on the grounds that this 
policy posed a threat to Australian sovereignty. Such an attack needed to be 
directed at the two pillars of the policy which in themselves were 
objectionable in the extreme: in the first place, according to the communist 
analysis, there were the 1946 'meat dispute' amendments to The Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act designed to render the trade unions weak and 
servile in the interests of both foreign and domestic Capital, while secondly, 
these same interests were served by the progressive creation of a 'low wage 
state' in Queensland. 
Action was taken throughout 1947 against what was seen as the 
government's policy of making Queensland a low wage state. During the 
period of the Victorian Metal Trades Dispute, the Communist party in 
Queensland mounted a propaganda campaign over this issue which was 
continued during the latter part of 1947. Efforts were also made to persuade 
the government to legislate for a substantial increase in the basic wage. On 
17 October, a T.L.C. deputation, which included four of the most prominent 
trade union members of the party in Queensland, told V.C. Gair that 
Queensland was a low wage state and that this was causing great discontent 
especially in the metal trades. Gair was further informed that unionists in 
ti5. The Guardian 22 August 1947. 
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Queensland would be forced to join those in other states in a campaign to 
46 improve wages.^° 
Although it was active on several fronts over this general question of 
wages, the Communist party was not alone in pressing the government over 
the matter. There was a widespread endorsement in union circles of the low 
wage indictment, perhaps nowhere was this more evident than in the union 
which covered the public service. In August, September and October 1947, 
the general secretary of the Queensland State Service Union conducted an 
angry correspondence with the P.L.P. over the government's policy of 
opposing wage rises for public servants. The tone of the union's submission 
can be gauged from the observation that 
We do not think...we should gain undue benefits 
because of our affiliation with and support of the 
Labor Party but we do feel that the Government 
should treat us at least as well as our opposite 
numbers in other States, who are unaffiliated, are 
treated.'^^ 
Towards the end of 1947, however, it was becoming increasingly obvious that 
if there was going to be any struggle over the low wage state issue in 
Queensland, it would more than likely occur in the metal trades and related 
sections within the railways. Senior Communist party officials were well 
aware of the mounting discontent over the marginal rates issue as well as the 
stirrings amongst railwaymen in general over matters such as working 
conditions and weekend penalty rates. 
In mid-November 1947, the A.R.U. held a one day stoppage to protest 
certain grievances of railway employees. The Communist party noted the 
effects of this short strike and observed that if all rail unions would 
i i« T.L.C. Deputation to V.C Gair, Notes 17 October 1947, A/9894, 
Q,S,A,, p,4, 
Wm General Secretary, Queensland State Service Union to Secretary, 
Parliamentary Labor Party, 22 August 1947, correspondence files, 
P,L,P,, Parliament House, Brisbane. 
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cooperate, and if proper coordination could be achieved, then '...the united 
strength of the unions will be irresistable in securing the long-overdue needs 
of railmen'.^" The growing discontent within the A.E.U. and other craft 
unions with members in the railways was well understood and appreciated in 
Communist party circles in Queensland since members of the party held office 
in many of these unions, sometimes at a senior level as in the F.I.A. and the 
F.M.U., and were obviously involved in the development of the margins' 
campaign. In January 1948, the party conducted a detailed review of the 
industrial relations position in the railways and likely future 
developments.^" As a result of this analysis. Communist party officials were 
convinced there would be a major dispute in the Queensland railways, that it 
would be one of the 'inevitable wage struggles of 1948', and that the militant 
unions, with communists in the leadership, would be called upon to play the 
decisive part. 
According to union sources, there was no doubt in the mind of the 
president of the industrial court that the inspiration for the threatened 
dispute was to be found in communist political ideology.^^ The same sources 
also had the president warning that if the strike eventuated, the strikers could 
expect no assistance from the court.^^ The compulsory conference held on 2 
February, at which these remarks were made, proved abortive. The railway 
department industrial officer, although offering increases to the 
classifications below the fitter, insisted that the figure of six shillings and 
tenpence be the point of departure in the determination of any and all 
marginal increases under the Railway Award-State. The unions, however. 
48. The Guardian 28 November 1947. 
49. C.P.A. Central Committee Plenum. Speech by J.C. Henry 20-22 
February 1948, M.S.S.2389 1(8), M.L., p.3. 
50. The Guardian 16 January 1948. 
51. A.E.U. Ipswich District Committee. Minutes 2 February 1948, p.66. 
52. District Secretary, Ipswich District Committee, Amalgamated 
Engineering Union to All Railway Branches and District Committees, 
3 February 1948, A.M.F.S.U. files, Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
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would not accept this. 
The unions decided to make one last effort to persuade the 
government to change its mind on the marginal rates issue. Shortly after the 
compulsory conference concluded, a deputation waited on the minister for 
Transport. But this, too, failed to reach any agreement. Duggan argued that 
the offer of six shillings and tenpence was 'a fair and generous one' and that 
'...even at the risk of complete cessation of work, the Government would 
stand by its original decision to abide by arbitration in the matter'.^-^ A 
distinct hardening of the unions' attitude occurred after the failure of these 
meetings with the court and the minister. A strongly worded resolution 
expressed 'resentment at the attitude of the Arbitration Court' and boldly 
asserted 
...that the threats used by the Court are at 
variance with the spirit of Conciliation and 
consequently they will not deter us from 
proceeding to establish for our members the same 
marginal increases and week-end penalty rates as 
are enjoyed by railwaymen in the southern states. 
The minister for Transport came in for similar scathing criticism, but perhaps 
the most significant manifestation of the unions' anger and determination was 
their decision to base their demands on the sixteen, thirteen and eleven 
shillings formula which signified a willingness to fight for a full flow-on of the 
increases granted under the Federal Metal Trades Award.^^ At midnight on 
Tuesday, 3 February 1948, employees in the railway workshops and running 
sheds throughout Queensland ceased work. 
J 3 , Interview between the C,D,C. and the minister for Transport. Notes 2 
February 1948, Railway Dispute 1948 file, T.L.C, Brisbane, pp.1,2. 
Jf, C D . C Minutes 2 February 1948, p,l . 
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THE 1948 RAILWAY DISPUTE 
labour versus a labor government 
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Any expectations that the 1948 Railway Dispute would be a brief and 
tame affair were shattered very early in the piece. The unions' strategy to 
confine the dispute to the workshops and running sheds, and thus concentrate 
their pressure where the railways were most vulnerable, was quickly 
nullified. During the first week of the dispute, the government worked at top 
pace to implement a road transport scheme which had been developed during 
the war to cope with any national emergency. 
By 7 February, this scheme was fully operational. Safe in the 
knowledge that the economic life of the state could be maintained without the 
railways, the government closed the entire railway service. On 9 February, 
the industrial court granted the commissioner for railways permission to stand 
down without pay all employees for whom there was insufficient work. These 
dramatic steps by the government, condemned as a lock-out by the officials of 
many railway unions not involved in the strike action, were calculated to 
precipitate an immediate capitulation of a union leadership suddenly 
overwhelmed by the spectre of an additional 14,000 or so railway unionists 
thrown idle and without any means of support. By the force of economic 
circumstances, the government hoped to generate pressure within union ranks 
for an end to the workshops' strike which the craft unions would find 
impossible to resist. 
Financial and material assistance to maintain the emergency 
transport scheme, which included the use of air force transport planes were 
rendered by the Chifley government. This was maintained for the duration of 
the dispute. The federal authorities also played a part in increasing the 
economic pressure on the unions by announcing that those on strike would not 
be eligible for social service benefits. Throughout the dispute a policy of 
strict enforcement of regulations and a bureaucratic go slow ensured that 
relatively few railwaymen and their families gained any financial support 
from social security payments. Support from state government welfare 
sources was also denied, while the railway department reminded strikers that 
if they took other positions during the dispute, they could well forfeit their 
1, The Courier-Mail 7 April 1948, 
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jobs and accrued leave entitlements. This combination of a complete 
cessation of the railway service and financial pressure on railway employees 
was seen by the opposition parties in the Queensland parliament as '...the 
Government's method of ending an industrial disturbance by starving the rank 
and file of unionists back to work and imposing tremendous losses and 
hardships upon the public'. 
The leaders of the striking unions were outraged and shocked by these 
'strike-breaking' measures taken by a Labor government. Many of them had 
held the view that, once the strike had actually begun, the government would 
see reason quickly and treat the railwaymen's claims in a sympathetic way. 
Thus in the initial stages of the dispute there was a widespread view amongst 
members of the C.D.C. that they would be waging a short, sharp strike. This 
assessment, however, was not shared by members of the Communist party in 
the strike leadership who argued that the government's moves to resist the 
strike indicated its willingness to engage in a prolonged and all out struggle. 
At the beginning of the second week of the dispute, E.J. Rowe and W. 
Porter, members of the A.E.U. Commonwealth Council, arrived in Brisbane. 
Rowe, drawing on his experience of the 1946 Victorian Transport Dispute, lost 
no time in impressing on the C.D.C. the urgency of directing its attention to 
propaganda, to the selection of speakers to carry the message of the strikers 
to workers in other industries, and, above all, to the organisation of extensive 
picketing. The arrival of Rowe, a member of the Communist party, also 
provided The Courier-Mail with ammunition in its already vigorous efforts to 
depict the strike as having been launched and led by 'communist-inspired 
•3 
unions'.-"^ 
Three important meetings took place on 19 February. In Brisbane, the 
industrial court convened a further compulsory conference. According to 
press reports, payment to tradesmen and other workshops' employees of rates 
2. Q,P.D, 192(1948): 1859. 
3. The Courier-Mail 4 February 1948. 
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equivalent to those enjoyed by their counterparts in private industry was 
suggested as a basis of settling the dispute, but the unions, so it seemed, were 
adamant that sixteen shillings was the appropriate amount. As a matter of 
fact, there was little else the unions could do but reject any other proposal 
since their claim for a further revision of the Mechanical Engineering (War 
Loading) Award-State to incorporate a full flow-on of the sixteen, thirteen 
and eleven shillings formula was currently being heard by the court. To have 
accepted any lesser amounts in the case of the Railway Award-State would 
have meant destroying the very rationale of the claim before the court. 
Nevertheless, the suggestion of parity in actual money rates with the private 
sector involved, in effect, conceding to the unions the principle that payments 
in kind (valued at three shillings and eightpence per week) were no longer to 
be included in the wage fixation process for railway employees. The unions' 
objection to the principle that the state basic wage ought to be the point of 
departure in fixing the rates of pay for crown employees, and their desire that 
the railway fitter should receive one shilling and tenpence in excess of the 
fitter in private employment, could only, however, be satisfied by the figure 
of sixteen shillings. 
Meanwhile, in Sydney, the A.E.U. Commonwealth Council, with Rowe 
and Porter in attendance, was planning further tactical moves to bring the 
railway dispute in Queensland to a successful conclusion. A few miles away, 
members of the central committee of the Communist party began arriving for 
a plenum scheduled to sit over the next three days. The events in Queensland 
were, not surprisingly, the subject of extensive debate at the Communist 
party plenum. The consensus of opinion was that the railway dispute not only 
confirmed the accuracy of communist perspectives on present and future 
political and industrial developments in Australia, but also seemed to provide 
additional opportunities for action which would take the party further towards 
its goal of winning the political alliegance of the Australian working class. 
A significant tendency in Australian politics, according to the 
communists, involved a strengthening of the forces of the right. Nowhere was 
this more apparent than within the A.L.P,: one had to look no further than 
Queensland where a right wing Labor government in 1946 had introduced laws 
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to shackle the trade unions, and which even now was fighting wage rises for 
railwaymen in the interests of interstate and overseas Capital, The tasks for 
the party in the railway dispute were thus abundantly clear. By explaining the 
basis of Hanlon's low wage policy, the general antagonism of right wing A.L.P. 
politicians to the workers' interests could be demonstrated and exposed. A 
victory on the wages front would secure the unions' just demands, and could be 
expected to enhance the prestige of the party. Increasing numbers of workers 
could not therefore fail to be attracted to the banner of the Australian 
Communist Party. 
There were further reasons the communists confidently anticipated 
that the railway dispute would assist its emergence as a party of mass 
app)eal. One of the essential prerequisites for this development, according to 
party theoreticians, was the creation of a 'people's front' consisting of 
citizens' groups drawn from the working and middle classes as well as 
farmers. Such an organisation could develop political consciousness and 
sophistication through the conduct of public campaigns on issues of 
community concern. A people's front, however, was not possible without the 
prior existence of unity in the ranks of the working class. This 'united front' 
could, moreover, only be forged in struggle. The railway dispute, which was 
seemingly characterised by unity amongst a politically diverse leadership as 
well as unity between rank and file strikers, was, for the Communist party, a 
textbook example of the concept of a united front.^ 
The events of the railway dispute up until this weekend late in 
February also convinced members of the central committee of the wisdom of 
the policy, adopted in late 1946, of harnessing union militancy for positive 
ends and of resisting the efforts of employers to dissipate union strength over 
essentially defensive matters.^ In this, the railway dispute with all its 
offensive dimensions stood in stark contrast to the defensive struggle in the 
4. C.P.A. Speeches to Central Committee Plenum. Speech by R. Dixon 
20-22 February 1948, M.S.S.2389 1(8), M.L., pp.14,17,21,22. 
5. C.P.A. Speeches to Central Committee Plenum. Speech by J.C. 
Henry pp.3,4,6,7. 
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Queensland meat industry during 1946 with its painful memories of tactical 
blunders and organisational problems. The progress of the railway dispute in 
Queensland appeared to promise much in the way of enhancing Communist 
party policies. 
On 24 February, the industrial court brought down its judgment on the 
claim for a complete application of the sixteen, thirteen and eleven shillings 
formula to the state mechanical engineering awards. The court refused to 
accede to the unions' requests. It reaffirmed its decision of September 1947 
to equate the rates of pay under its awards with those under the Federal 
Metal Trades Award. The effect of this vitally important decision was to 
indicate to the unions that the court would not adjust wage rates in the 
Railway Award-State on the basis of the Mooney principles. It was not 
surprising, therefore, that little progress was made when the court reconvened 
the compulsory conference of parties to the dispute later that day. The 
judgment only served to stiffen the determintion of the unions to continue the 
struggle. 
The level of intensity of the 1948 Railway Dispute increased markedly 
throughout the last week of February. The CD.C. decided to escalate the 
dispute by rendering the Brisbane tramway system inoperative through a 
withdrawal of certain key electrical and mechanical tradesmen. This 
initiative was proposed by J.A. Cranwell, chairperson of the A.E.U. 
Commonwealth Council, as a means of sharpening the dispute which, he 
argued, was showing distinct signs of lagging.^ Cranwell, indeed, urged the 
C.D.C. to adopt any and all measures which would bring the dispute to a 
successful conclusion in the shortest possible time.' By 26 February, it was 
clear to the government that the determination of the strikers to fight on 
remained undiminished, and that the tactics of completely shuting down the 
railway service had not had the desired effect. In the light of these 
6. E.T.U. Special State Executive. Minutes 23 February 1948, E.T.U., 
Brisbane, p. l . 
7. C.D.C Executive. Minutes 23 February 1948, Railway Dispute 1948 
file, T.L.C, Brisbane, p . l . 
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assessments, the government made a strategic about-turn when the 
commissioner for railways sought, and was granted, a court order instructing 
the strikers to return to work no later than Monday 1 March. 
The C D . C responded by announcing that there would be no 
resumption of work until such time as the unions' demands were met in full, 
and by calling statewide mass meetings for the following day to test the 
extent of rank and file support for its rejection of the court order. These 
meetings exhibited overwhelming support for the stand taken by the C.D.C. 
This expression of solidarity, together with the highly efficient picketing and 
growing food shortages in some centres, persuaded Hanlon that the war of 
attrition must come to an end and that the government would need to seize 
the initiative by taking drastic action to force compliance with the court's 
return to work order. 
The government's onslaught was fierce indeed. It proclaimed a state 
of emergency in Queensland on 27 February under which an Order In Council 
was promulgated banning picketing and any other activity designed to 
maintain the strike. The police were empowered to arrest without warrant 
any person who offended against these regulations." The government's action 
was supported by the commissioner for railways who increased the pressure on 
the strikers by announcing that any railwayman who failed to heed the court's 
instruction could consider his employment in the railways terminated. Other 
powerful institutions rallied to the government's side. The roman catholic 
archbishop of Brisbane called on the men to resume work, while the press 
mounted a constant barrage of propaganda over the weekend of 28 and 29 
February directed towards the same end. The Courier-Mail told its readers a 
tale of two cities - Prague and Brisbane: 
In the Czech capital this week democracy died with 
the grabbing of power by a communist minority.... 
And here at the seat of Queensland Government 
8. A Proclamation Q.G.G. Extraordinary, 27 February 1948, p.649; 
Order In Council Q.G.G. Extraordinary, 27 February 1948, p.653. 
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communist-led strikers were defying a Court of the 
land,...and trying to bring the life of the State to 
that chaotic condition in which Red mischief 
thrives. 
For events in the two capitals there is a common 
inspiration.... 
But what has been happening here and in Europe 
differs only in degree. For the people of 
Czechoslovakia it has been armed police and 
violent suppression. For Queenslanders up to this 
week-end it has been inflicted want and discomfort 
and the demand for satisfaction of claims at the 
industrial gunpoint. 
The moral for Australians is: It can happen here. 
It has been happening." 
This height of hysteria was maintained in a major editorial in The Sunday Mail 
which emphasised the 'communist plot' explanation of the dispute, and warned 
that some of the communists were prepared to introduce the concentration 
camp and shootings into the state of Queensland. 
Elsewhere The Sunday Mail published prophesies which its editor no 
doubt hoped would be self-fulfilling: 
Throughout the State yesterday, moderate unionists 
in the 19 unions involved in the rail strike pressed 
for a general resumption. Many of their members -
with or without union instructions - plan to go back 
to work. 
These statements, however, were a complete fabrication. There was no 
evidence to sustain them. There were no mass meetings of railwaymen on the 
day nominated in the report from which rank and file attitudes to the state of 
emergency could have been gauged, while the C.D.C. had condemned out of 
hand the government's action. The motive underlying this type of reporting 
9. The Courier-Mail 28 February 1948. 
10* The Sunday Mail 29 Februry 1948. 
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seems abundantly clear: The Sunday Mail was simply 'flying a kite' designed 
to convince railway employees that the dispute was crumbling and that there 
was little option but to return to work the following day. At least one senior 
union official believed that the press campaign was also attempting to create 
an atmosphere of fear. In what turned out to be a sadly prophetic remark, he 
warned that '...the truncheon will be the next thing used to intimidate workers 
if the advice given by the Press were followed'.^ ^ 
The culmination of the campaign to persuade the strikers and the 
'stood down' or 'locked out' men that the dispute was as good as over occurred 
on the evening of Sunday 29 February. Hanlon broadcast a speech throughout 
Queensland which rivalled the extravagant propaganda of the press in both 
style and substance. He drew a grim picture of a community on the brink of 
civil war with the 'high command' of the Communist party already in 
Queensland and firmly in control of the railway dispute. Any challenge to 
arbitration involved a challenge to the very foundations of democracy, he 
continued, and the government would resist to the utmost the assault on 
1 2 arbitration currently being directed by the 'mimicking Molotovs'.^^ The final 
fling in this extraordinary campaign was made by The Courier-Mail on the 
morning set down by the court for a resumption of work. Echoing the 
sentiments and exhortations of the premier, the paper put an appeal and an 
ominous threat to Queensland railwaymen: 
Those who obey the Government's orders to return 
to work...will free themselves, their unions and the 
whole State from the meshes of a communist plot 
that has become the most serious threat ever 
offered to public law and liberty in Queensland.... 
Any orders given to railwaymen not to resume work 
to-day will come from an illegal power that must 
U . A.F.U.L.E. Special Meeting, Divisional Council. Minutes 29 February 
1948, E212/23 A.F.U.L.E. deposit, A.N.U.A.B.L., p.l . 
12. The Courier-Mail 1 March 1948. 
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be suppressed, if Queensland is not to be plunged 
into civil strife. 
The C.D.C. reacted to the government's declaration of a state of 
emergency with undisguised scorn. In a defiant and angry mood, the disputes 
committee decided to extend the dispute in order to counter the 'Fascist-like 
emergency measures' which it believed would bring the Labor government 
'eternal disgrace in the eyes of the Queensland workers'. Passions, hatred, 
fury, disappointment and determination were all inflamed by the spectre of a 
Labor government indulging in what were seen as nothing less than crude 
strike-breaking methods. Such policies, condemned by the C.D.C. as blatant 
invitations to 'scabbery', would not, could not, be tolerated. If the 
government was prepared to use such weapons against men who were 
overwhelmingly its political supporters, then so be it, but no government 
calling itself Labor could be allowed to behave in such a way: 
As the action taken now constitutes a threat to the 
whole Trade Union Movement, we believe this 
reactionary move must be answered now by 
solidarity actions from the rest of the 
workers...beginning with Watersiders, Seamen and 
Interstate Railwaymen. We therefore appeal to 
those unions to join us now in what has become a 
common struggle. 
We believe, too, that the unions already involved 
should now use whatever additional forces they 
may have at their disposal. 
Our cause is just...our unity unshaken...Victory will 
be ours.^^ 
Did these ringing words mark the beginning of an all out challenge to the basis 
of constitutional government in Queensland, was this the rallying cry of a 
13. Ibid. 
14. C.D.C. Minutes 28 February 1948, Railway Dispute 1948 file, T.L.C, 
Brisbane, p.2. 
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communist revolution so often predicted by the press?^ Perhaps it was, 
after all the words were proposed by a leading union official and prominent 
member of the Communist party. Other facts, however, stand in the way of 
this interpretation. 
Although the motion to extend the dispute was moved by a leading 
light in the Communist party, it was seconded by Claude Merrell, an organiser 
and principal industrial advocate in the A.E.U. The A.E.U. enjoyed a close 
and long affiliation with the A.L.P. in Queensland. The motion was endorsed 
by the C.D.C. with one abstention. Amongst its membership were men who 
belonged to the Communist party. The majority, however, shared a personal 
commitment to the Labor party and represented unions affiliated to it. In the 
case of the A.E.U., the Ipswich District Committee, no haven for members of 
the Communist party, was chaffing at the bit to extend the dispute. If they 
needed any encouragement, it was provided by the chairperson of the 
Commonwealth Council, J.A. Cranwell.^° Indeed, in the other literature on 
the 1948 Railway Dispute, the pivotal role of Cranwell in determining the 
strategy of not only the A.E.U., but also the C.D.C, has not been recognised. 
The Seamen's Union and the W.W.F. joined the strike on 1 March. This 
action was part of an overall strategy to isolate Queensland economically. 
The prime target was fuel supplies for the road transport scheme. A blockade 
of all ports was instituted. As part of the plan to extend the dispute, the 
disputes committee called upon the 'stood down' employees not to heed the 
instructions of the commissioner for railways that they report for work on 1 
March but instead to join those already on strike at mass meetings. This 
meant, however, that the C.D.C. was obliged to extend its list of demands to 
include marginal increases and weekend penalty rates for all railwaymen who 
involved themselves in the dispute. Events had well and truly overtaken the 
original union strategy to limit the dispute to the railway workshops and 
running sheds! 
15, See, for example: The Catholic Leader 11 February 1948, 
16. A,E,U. Ipswich District Committee. Minutes 27 February 1948, 
A.M.F,S,U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich, p.75. 
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Hanlon hoped that the return to work orders issued by the court and 
the commissioner, the state of emergency and the Order In Council, and the 
sustained propaganda campaign over the weekend of 28 and 29 February would 
promote the collapse of the strike. These extravagant efforts, however, 
proved a dismal failure. They stood in stark contrast to the resounding 
success of the tactics of the disputes committee in extending the strike and 
calling mass meetings for the morning of Monday 1 March. In all, about one 
third of the railway department's establishment of enginemen reported for 
duty. Very, very few tradesmen and others employed in the workshops and 
running sheds obeyed the return to work orders. This turnout of enginemen 
was, nevertheless, sufficient to allow the department to implement a skeleton 
service. 
The government's prohibition of picketing was ignored. Some 2,000 
pickets patroled the Ipswich Railway Workshops on the morning of 1 March, 
their presence discouraging those of their fellows who felt inclined to resume 
duties. A similar situation prevailed in all other railway centres. This 
constant and highly organised mass picketing played a vital role in the 
strategy of the disputes committee. Apart from its prime purpose, picketing 
was essential to the maintenance of morale and solidarity in the ranks of the 
strikers and in sustaining their willingness to resist what was increasingly 
heavy pressure from the government and its allies in the press, church and 
elsewhere. 
In the first week of March, an air of supreme confidence was apparent 
in the ranks of the C.D.C. Even fewer men had reported for work on 2 March 
than had returned the previous day, and in an effort to ensure that no member 
of any striking union would resume duties, and to abort the skeleton railway 
service, the C.D.C. declared a black ban on all railway workshops, running 
sheds and locomotive depots.^' This confidence was also reflected in a 
refusal to permit the A.C.T.U. any role in the formulation of union policy 
despite its attempts to take control of the dispute on the grounds that the 
involvement of the W.W.F., seamen and members of the A.R.U. and 
17. C,D,C, Minutes 2 March 1948, p. l . 
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A.F.U.L.E. in other states had transformed it into an interstate dispute. 
Leading members of the C.D.C. believed the A.C.T.U. was simply out to break 
the dispute.^" The view that the unions held the whip hand was reinforced 
even further when the miners in the Ipswich district, although by only a 
relatively small majority, agreed not to mine coal for trains working without 
the unions' approval, and as the ranks of the pickets were strengthened by the 
addition of large numbers of enthusiastic and disciplined members of the 
W.W.F. It also appeared that the legal advisors to the strikers, Fred Paterson 
(member of the Legislative Assembly for Bowen and member of the 
Communist party) and Max Julius (also a member of the party) had devised 
methods of circumventing legally the ban on picketing which the government 
had imposed under the state of emergency. 
There was, however, one effect of the state of emergency which the 
C.D.C. could not so easily overcome. From its date of imposition, any 
statement in favour of the unions' case in the dispute which could have been 
construed as contributing to the continuation of the strike was prohibited 
from the press and radio. This limitation of information contributed in no 
small measure to the isolation of strikers in the non-metropolitan areas, and 
meant that the news and published arguments to which they had access almost 
exclusively put the government's point of view. But a more insidious form of 
censorship than this was practised in the 1948 Railway Dispute. In addition to 
the ideological hostility towards the strike which graced the editorials, the 
people of Queensland were denied information on the dispute by the policy of 
some working journalists who '...sacrificing news values,...repeatedly refrained 
from giving normal emphasis to aspects that might have had an inflammatory 
effect'.^" News values were obviously not the only values sacrificed in the 
reporting of the railway dispute. 
18. Telephone conversation between Mr P. Clarey (A.C.T.U. Melbourne), 
Mr M. O'Brien (Brisbane), and Mr Macdonald (Brisbane). Notes 2 
March 1948, file 48/67(B)2, A.R.U., Brisbane. 
19, Roy A. Hansen to A. Jones, 17 March 1948, correspondence files, 
P.L.P., Parliament House, Brisbane. 
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A major initiative was taken by the government in the early days of 
March which involved a decision to pay a full week's wages to all railwaymen 
who reported for duty on 1 March but who were subsequently stood down or 
granted only part-time work. This action was condemned in the A.R.U. 
journal The Advocate as a '...spectacle of men paid to "scab" by a "Labour" 
70 Government,...'. There seems little doubt that the government hoped that 
this policy would split the railwaymen. It was aimed particularly at those men 
the commissioner had stood down early in the dispute, many of whom were 
feeling the pinch financially since there was little, sometimes nothing, in the 
way of strike pay, and only few were eligible for social security benefits under 
Chifley's regulations designed to counter 'key man' disputes. 
The actions by the government to defeat the strike produced a 
reaction of extreme hostility and bitterness much of which was aimed directly 
at Hanlon. As far as the Communist party was concerned, this was a 
deliberate policy. Members of the party on the C.D.C, on local disputes 
committees, indeed, at all places in the strike front where the party had any 
influence were instructed to mount a 'remove Hanlon to save Labor' 
campaign. All avenues of propaganda open to the party were directed towards 
this end by calling for Hanlon's dismissal, while the communist press accused 
him, amongst other things, of using food as a political weapon against the 
77 Strike by denying adequate supplies to certain parts of Queensland.^'' 
There were four reasons the Communist party chose Hanlon as the 
focal point of an attack on government policy towards the dispute. In the 
first place, the communists believed that Hanlon was located firmly in the 
camp of the right wing of the A.L.P. in Queensland. By concentrating on 
Hanlon, they sought to isolate and expose this element as enemies of the 
unions and responsible for the anti-working class policies being implemented 
20. The Advocate 10 March 1948. 
21. By 3 March 1948, 1,300 out of the 8,206 railwaymen who applied for 
social service relief had been granted assistance. 
22. The Guardian 5 March 1948. 
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against the strike. This approach was clearly consistent with the policy 
developed at the February meeting of the central committee of the party in 
Sydney. In the second place, by singling out the man who, as the communists 
saw it, led the extreme right wing group in the P.L.P., they hoped to intensify 
any differences of opinion within the caucus over the government's handling of 
the dispute and thus weaken its capacity to continue its opposition to the 
strike. 
The communists also hoped to involve traditional supporters and 
members of the A.L.P. in the criticism of the government's policy. In order to 
overcome the reluctance of such people to engage in public attacks on a Labor 
government _m toto, the technique of attacking Hanlon in the interests of 
preserving the Labor government was adopted. The fourth reason the 
communist reaction to the declaration of the state of emergency was directed 
at Hanlon in person, and not at the government as a collective entity, is 
related to the third. The reluctance of Labor supporters to attack the 
government as a whole arose, in part at least, out of a fear that such 
sustained criticism could do serious electoral damage to the A.L.P. 
Communist tacticians were well aware of this fear, indeed, they shared it. 
They saw a right wing Labor government as infinitely preferable to a 
government drawn from the Country and Liberal parties. 
They were thus confronted with a profound dilemma: attacks on the 
government's policy obviously could not be abandoned, and yet such criticism 
ran the grave risk of contributing ultimately to the unintended and undesired 
electoral defeat of the Labor government. The non-Labor parties would be 
certain to make as much political capital as they could out of the spectacle of 
widespread condemnation of the government, and the Communist party was 
not about to hand such political gifts to its sworn enemies as the outcome of 
its struggle with the A.L.P. government. The way out of this dilemma was to 
sheet home the responsibility for the opposition to the strike to Hanlon as an 
individual. In this way, the Communist party hoped to have its cake and eat it 
too: it hoped to promote a widespread criticism of the steps taken to defeat 
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the strike whilst at the same time minimising the advantages such attacks 
might yield to the Country party and the Liberal party.^-^ 
The reaction of the A.R.U. to the promulgation of the state of 
emergency was equally ferocious. The Advocate branded Hanlon as a 'neo-
fascist', a 'scab-herder', a servant of 'big business interests', a reactionary and 
a traitor motivated by a spirit of contempt for the working class. But there 
was still more to the indictment: 
Hanlon's shocking action has united the workers as 
never before. By this action he has betrayed the 
Labour Movement with a callousness and 
shamelessness unprecedented in the history of our 
time. 
He has entered into an alliance with the enemies of 
Labour - all those who so rabidly detest the 
common people.... 
He must go!. 
He has allied himself with the people's enemies, for 
the assassination of the Trades Unions. 
Let all remember that Hanlon, and those who 
supported him, are guilty of an act of treachery as 
base as the betrayal of Christ himself. 
Attacks such as these played no small part in the growing conviction of 
Hanlon and much of the P.L.P. that the railway dispute, by the end of the first 
week in March, was no longer over economic issues, but was, when stripped to 
the bare essentials, a struggle between the A.L.P. government and the forces 
of the far left. 
During this week, nevertheless, feelers emanating from within the 
23. The analysis of the 'remove Hanlon to save Labor' campaign is based 
on the following source: Australian Communist Party. Speeches and 
Documents relating to the 15th National Congress. Speech by D. 
Olive 7-10 May 1948, M.S.S.2389 2(8), M.L., p.2. 
24* The Advocate 1 March 1948. 
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P.L.P. regarding possible settlement terms were put to the A.E.U. in 
Ipswich. Members of the Ipswich District Committee were encouraged to 
believe that if the unions met the premier, an offer of not less than twelve 
shillings and fourpence was on the cards. As a result, a deputation from the 
C.D.C. waited on Hanlon on 4 March. Evidence concerning the details of this 
meeting suggests that, although Hanlon conceded six shillings and tenpence 
was 'a low figure', and had calculated the cost to the state of alternative 
higher offers, one of which was twelve shillings and fourpence, no firm 
proposal was forthcoming from the government. Hanlon's sole objective in 
meeting the unions was, it seems, to put his assessment of the wage increases 
the court was likely to award once it was given the opportunity to examine 
75 the claims for variations to the Railway Award-State. It also appears 
Hanlon made it abundantly plain that the government would not concede the 
justice of the union argument that the sixteen, thirteen and eleven shillings 
formula should be applied to the Queensland basic wage. There is, indeed, 
strong evidence he told the deputation that the Mooney formula would only be 
accepted if the unions in turn were prepared to adopt the relevant federal 
awards in their entirety. ° This hard line position adopted by the government 
strengthened the determination of the C.D.C. to maintain the strike until its 
demands were satisfied completely. A firm - some might even say savage -
commitment to this policy was shared alike by communist and non-communist 
members of the disputes committee. 
On the morning of 5 March, mass meetings throughout Queensland 
decided to continue the dispute until all claims were satisfied in full. In 
Brisbane, some 3,000 railwaymen and waterside workers marched on 
parliament house, and attempted to persuade the Labor caucus to receive a 
deputation. This was refused and the caucus settled down to a long, and 
25. Electrical Trades Journal 31 March 1948, E.T.U., Brisbane, p.8; 
A.E.U. Ipswich District Committee. Minutes 5 March 1948, p.78; 
C.D.C. Minutes 4 March 1948, p.2. 
26. P.L.P. Rough Minutes 5 March 1948, P.L.P., Parliament House, 
Brisbane, p.l 16. In places, the rough minutes are impossible to read. 
They are often in pencil and, for obvious reasons, have been written in 
haste. 
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sometimes acrimonious, exchange over the railway dispute. The records of 
this debate provide a partial explanation for the unbending attitude of the 
cabinet towards the demands of the unions. The government believed its own 
political survival, and the survival of other Labor governments, depended on 
its actions and responses in the railway dispute. Hanlon held firmly to the 
view that if the government agreed to a consent award, the non-Labor parties 
in Queensland, in the other states, and federally as well, would have a field 
day exploiting such an obvious departure from the arbitration policy which 
successive Labor governments had espoused ever since 1916. 
Hanlon had some grounds for fearing a decline in electoral support for 
Labor throughout Australia. Barely a year earlier his own government had 
been returned to office, but with a minority of the popular vote, while Labor 
governments in South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia were not so 
fortunate. With Labor in the federal arena under sustained and organised 
attack from powerful financial and medical interests, Hanlon saw himself as 
an embattled protector of the Labor cause against assault not only from the 
extreme left, but also from the right. Under such circumstances, he was not 
about to make any concessions to unionists in a major industrial dispute which 
the political enemies of Labor could use to discredit the A.L.P. throughout the 
length and breadth of the commonwealth. 
Hanlon was convinced, moreover, that the survival of Labor as a 
political force was threatened by a growing community impatience and 
intolerance with strikes. ' A strong display of resistance to union demands 
in the railway dispute therefore appealed to him as a way of demonstrating to 
the country at large that Labor governments were not 'soft' on industrial 
disputes, especially those 'dominated' by communists. The actions of the 
Hanlon government in the railway dispute must thus be understood within a 
broad political context. This is not, however, sufficient to explain fully the 
nature of its response to the dispute which, from 1 March, became more and 
more extreme. The essential ingredient in the explanation was the conviction 
that the dispute was less over the issues of marginal increases and weekend 
27. Ibid. 
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penalty rates but was primarily a contest between differing political 
28 ideologies. 
The Hanlon government was determined to enter this crusade against 
Communism fully armed. The weapon it chose was The Industrial Law 
Amendment Act which was introduced into the Legislative Assembly on 
Tuesday 9 March 1948, and received royal assent the following day. The Act 
was 
.. .directed against illegal strikes, and to prevent a 
type of picketing and the intimidation of the 
families of workers, introduced by those trained in 
foreign revolutionary methods, and quite alien to 
the traditional Australian industrial methods. " 
The Act made illegal on the pain of a fine up to one hundred pounds and/or six 
months imprisonment all activities designed to prolong the strike. Any 
argument or advice in favour of the str ike, any physical presence of people in 
any location which the police believed could in any way assist the continuation 
of the dispute, any display of whatever type, all were outlawed by the Act. 
Exceptional powers of enforcement were conferred on the police, and included 
the authority to arrest without warrant, to issue instructions to any person to 
prevent a breach of the Act, and, in the case of officers of the rank of 
sergeant or above, the right of forcible entry to any place. 
One basic premise underlying this legislation was a belief within the 
government that members of the Communist party used various forms of 
intimidation to prevent large numbers of railwaymen returning to work. On 2 
March, Hanlon had blamed the poor response to the return to work orders on 
'black balling' and intimidation, and had warned that such activit ies would be 
met by the full force of the law.-^^ This theme was taken up by the press. 
28. P.L.P. Minutes 5 March 1948, P.L.P., Parliament House, Brisbane, 
pp.2-6. 
29. V.C. Gair to A.L. Graham, 1 April 1948, A/9886, Q.S.A. 
30. The Telegraph 2 March 1948. 
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The Sunday Mail of 7 March reached new heights of hysteria when it asserted 
that communists had threatened railwaymen and their families with 
retribution in order to keep them on strike, and counselled its readers that 
such activity: 
...is only the story, over again, of things which 
happened in ill-fated Czechoslovakia a few weeks 
ago. For there is not much difference between the 
Brisbane events and the quiet disappearance, to 
death or concentration camps, of Czechs whose 
political beliefs did not coincide with those of their 31 
new masters. 
The press also sought to represent the extensive picketing as an exclusive 
preserve of the communists.-^ This, too, was an exaggeration, even though 
members of the Communist party were heavily involved. Members of the 
Eureka Youth League were active, and Fred Paterson's contribution to the 
success of the picketing has already been noted. The Industrial Law 
Amendment Act involved, amongst other things, an effort to plug the 
loopholes in the regulations to contain picketing issued under the state of 
emergency: the legislation, according to Hanlon, could well have been titled 
'the Paterson Bill'.^^ 
From the government's point of view, the need to suppress the mass 
picketing was becoming urgent since it was threatening to disrupt the 
preparation and distribution of the fuel supplies essential for the operation of 
the emergency road transport scheme. The integrity of this scheme was the 
sine qua non of the government's ability to resist the strike. On 6 March, a 
tanker managed to run a blockade of incoming cargoes imposed by the seamen 
and watersiders and discharged petroleum products at the Newstead depot of 
the Shell Company. The C.D.C. tried to persuade members of the S.P.U. 
employed at the depot to join the strike, but at a meeting at the Trades Hall 
31. The Sunday Mail 7 March 1948. 
32. The Telegraph 2 March 1948. 
33. Q.P,D. 192(1948): 1896. 
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on 8 March, they rejected this call by eighty-six votes to sixty-one. This was 
a severe blow to the cause of the railwaymen. At the conclusion of this 
meeting, a series of fights broke out, and these disturbances were seized upon 
with relish by a press ever on the lookout for evidence of 'communist' violence 
and intimidation against law-abiding workers. 
The Industrial Law Amendment Bill was put before the P.L.P. on 9 
March for a full dress rehearsal before it was submitted to the parliament 
later that day. The legislation was presented to the caucus wrapped in anti-
communist rhetoric. Hanlon told his colleagues that '...the fight with the 
Communists had to come', and that 'It would be unforgiveable to retreat 
before the communist'. His remarks echoed the sentiments of most of the 
P.L.P., although Johnno Mann and Fred Graham opposed the measure and 
attempted to have it postponed. However, the mood of the large majority of 
the Labor politicians was accurately expressed in Frank Roberts' argument 
that '...it did not matter now who was right, or...wrong, the fight was on, the 
Government had been challenged, the challenge had to be accepted, and the 
Government must win'.^^ 
The parliamentary debate on The Industrial Law Amendment Bill 
makes revealing and in some ways extraordinary reading. Many important 
statements on the dispute made by Hanlon, Gair and Duggan are flatly 
contradicted by other evidence. Both Hanlon and Duggan argued that the 
figure of six shillings and tenpence was merely a negotiating figure, a curious 
claim in view of the fact that Duggan's telephone call to Devereux on the 
morning of 10 December 1947, and his subsequent correspondence with the 
unions and with other ministers, stressed that the six shillings and tenpence 
offer represented the maximum concession the government was prepared to 
make. Hanlon also criticised the unions for rejecting this offer 'without 
further attempt at negotiation',-^^ but this was surely a reasonable response in 
view of Duggan's policy. On the question of negotiations, furthermore, it was 
34. P.L.P. Minutes 9 March 1948, pp.4,5. 
35. Q.P.D. 192 (1948): 1877,1887. 
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Hanlon who told the C.R.U. on 22 December 1947, in response to a letter 
written some three weeks earlier, that he could not discuss marginal rates and 
weekend penalty rates until early in the new year. No evidence was 
discovered, however, which suggests that the premier ever sought to convene 
the promised meeting. 
Hanlon also claimed that, up until the end of 1947, he '...had never 
met an officer of the...[A.E.U.] that had the slightest complaint about the 
court's deferring the hearing of their claim until the 40-hour week rush was 
over'.-'" Yet in its letter to him on 27 November 1947, the A.E.U. went to 
some pains to stress the rising discontent '...as a result of claims lodged in the 
Court for these marginal increases not yet being finalised'. Both Hanlon and 
Gair tried to create the impression that the demand for increases based on 
sixteen shillings for the fitter was raised only at the beginning of the 
37 dispute."^' It was certainly true that the A.E.U. claim of 18 September 
specified marginal increases corresponding to twelve shillings and fourpence 
for the fitter, but in its letter to Hanlon of 27 November, the A.E.U. made it 
clear beyond any possibility of confusion that its ultimate objective involved 
marginal increases in accordance with the figure of sixteen shillings. 
Furthermore, the A.E.U. claim was not the only one before the court. The 
C.R.U., in early November, had also lodged a claim which specified in black 
and white the amount of sixteen shillings. 
In parliament on 9 March, Hanlon continued a campaign to convince 
the striking unionists, as well as the public at large, that the definitive 
statement of the government's policy on the marginal rates issue was 
contained in the letter dated 16 December 1947, from the under secretary of 
his department to the A.E.U.^^ This letter was released to the press, and a 
facsimile was published in The Courier-Mail on 4 March 1948. The letter said 
that the government would not oppose '...the same rates of pay being applied 
36. Q.P.D. 192(1948): 1877. 
37. Q.P.D. 192 (1948): 1924. 
38. Q.P.D. 192 (1948): 1877. 
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to skilled tradesmen as are prescribed in the Commonwealth Award'. By 
making this letter public, Hanlon hoped to convey the impression that the 
strike was futile and unnecessary: surely it showed that the same rates of pay 
as enjoyed by metal tradesmen in the private sector had been conceded by the 
government in December 1947! 
Several points need to be made in connection with this matter. 
Accepting for the moment that the under secretary's letter contained the 
definitive expression of government policy, in terms of hard cash, it meant at 
the most an increase of ten shillings and sixpence per week to the fitter. In 
other words, it meant that the government wished to remove the amount of 
one shilling and tenpence which the railway fitter enjoyed over his 
counterpart in private enterprise, and that it was not prepared to accept the 
principle that federal margins should be applied to the Queensland basic 
wage. For these reasons, in terms of the unions' objectives, the dispute was 
certainly not futile. 
In any event, however, there is substantial evidence that the 16 
December letter was, as suggested earlier, merely a broad statement of 
principle which left out details of the government's policy. The interpretation 
of the principle by the government was as consistently enunciated by the 
minister for Transport. The day after the under secretary wrote to the 
A.E.U., Duggan made it perfectly clear to the deputy premier and minister for 
Labour, V.C. Gair, that the maximum offer was six shillings and tenpence. If, 
as Hanlon suggested,-^" the cabinet had reconsidered the six shillings and 
tenpence offer, and had increased it along the lines contained in the 16 
December letter, it simply strains belief beyond acceptable bounds that the 
minister for Transport, the man who would have to administer the wage 
increases, knew nothing about any increased offer. And yet, if Hanlon's 
argument was accepted, this is the inescapable conclusion. It would also be 
exceptionally difficult to explain why Duggan repeated the six shillings and 
tenpence offer on 9 January, and again on 2 February when the unions met 
him in a last ditch effort to extract an improved offer from the government. 
39. Q.P.D. 192 (1948): 1923. 
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The alleged role of the Communist party in the 1948 Railway Dispute 
received considerable attention in the parliamentary debate on 9 March. Two 
points made by Hanlon in this regard deserve some attention here. In the first 
place, he argued that after the government had sent the letter of 16 
December to the A.E.U., communist union officials urged an immediate 
cessation of work. This, however, was simply not true. What they did, in 
fact, was to propose a general railway strike if the claims were not 
satisfactorily adjusted prior to 31 January 1948. In the second place, Hanlon 
asserted that after the cessation of work on 3 February '...the Communist-
controlled Central Disputes Committee was set up in Brisbane'. This, 
again, was completely inaccurate. While not denying for one moment the 
powerful influence on decisions of the C.D.C. of union officials who belonged 
to the Communist party, it nevertheless remained the case that six of the ten 
unions represented on the committee were affiliated with the A.L.P. One 
wonders if Hanlon had to resort to the same perverted reasoning to sustain his 
charge as did The Courier-Mail in a special article published on 4 March: 
Of 22 members of the Central Disputes Committee 
controlling the strike, eight are known 
Communists, four are Communist stooges or 
suspects, three are doubtful, and seven are 
moderate. 
Furthermore, the C.D.C. was established before, not after, the strike began 
and was set up on the initiative of Jack Devereux. 
Throughout the railway dispute, one embarrassing fact stood in the 
way of government efforts to depict the dispute as an affair staged and 
managed by the communists. This was the grim determination of union 
officials who had nothing to do with the Communist party to force the 
adoption of the sixteen, thirteen and eleven shillings formula. Many of these 
40. Q.P.D. 192(1948): 1877. 
41* Ibid. 
42. All Service Unions. Minutes 28 January 1948, Railway Dispute 1948 
file, T.L.C, Brisbane, pp.1,2. 
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officials belonged to unions affiliated with the A.L.P., and while the press and 
the government emphasised the visits to Queensland of prominent members of 
the Communist party such as E.J. Rowe, J. McPhillips, J. Healy and E.V. 
Elliott, they failed to give the same weight to the visits of men such as J.A. 
Cranwell, J.F. Chappie, general secretary of the A.R.U., and Jack Ferguson, 
president of the New South Wales branch of the A.L.P., who addressed 
meeting after meeting in support of the railwaymen's demands. In an effort 
to explain away these rather inconvenient facts, Duggan assured the 
parliament on 9 March that men like Devereux and W. McNamara of the 
V.B.E.F., had been excluded from the mainstream of decision-making in the 
dispute. This assertion was false. McNamara was the liaison officer between 
the C.D.C. based in Brisbane and the unions at Ipswich, the focal point of the 
dispute, while Hanlon must have squirmed in his seat as he listened to 
Duggan's remarks concerning Devereux's role, knowing full well that a few 
days earlier Devereux, with three others from the C.D.C, had argued the 
railwaymen's case with him for over two hours. 
A theme which dominated much of Hanlon's extensive remarks in the 
parliament on 9 March 1948 was whether industrial disputes were to be 
resolved by overt direct action or through the processes of arbitration. In 
pressing home this interpretation of the essential issue in the dispute, he made 
much of the argument that the government would abide by any decision the 
court reached on the union claims for marginal increases and weekend penalty 
rates. Hanlon stressed that the government was defending a principle: as 
long as the railway dispute was resolved according to the industrial law it did 
not matter'...what the decision of the Industrial Court will be, whether it will 
be 16s. or £16,...'. The government was not, however, as indifferent to the 
quantum of wage increases under the Railway Award-State as these remarks 
tended to convey. As already argued, throughout 1947 the government 
displayed an increasing concern over the extent to which wage increases 
granted under the Federal Metal Trades Award would flow on to Queensland 
awards. It will also be recalled that Hanlon had said the government would 
only agree to increases based on sixteen shillings for the fitter if the unions 
43. Q.P.D. 192 (1948): 1876. 
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were prepared to adopt the federal award in its entirety. It also seems 
possible that, towards the end of the dispute, Hanlon told a union deputation 
that if the court applied the Mooney formula, the government would legislate 
to revoke this decision.^* The evidence on this, it must be stressed, is not 
conclusive, but it nevertheless contains more than just a mere hint that such a 
threat was made. If it was made, then Hanlon's public statements that the 
government would accept any decision of the court were less than frank. 
Despite the unions' confidence in the first week of March, a 
potentially serious weak spot in the strike front was becoming more and more 
obvious. This concerned the position of the A.F.U.L.E. whose members in 
Toowoomba, an important railway centre, had consistently refused to join the 
strike, and were responsible for assisting the commissioner for railways to 
maintain and improve the skeleton railway service. This action had a telling 
effect on the morale and solidarity of many A.F.U.L.E. men, particularly in 
the south-eastern part of Queensland, which gradually began to weaken as 
they saw their Toowoomba mates defying the union's instructions by 
continuing to work trains, often into the very centre of Brisbane. The 
relatively unenthusiastic commitment by the Ipswich miners to assist the 
railwaymen also held some dangers for the C.D.C. A considerable degree of 
resentment at the action of the railway unions in the meat dispute was felt by 
many miners who believed they had been 'dumped' and sold out in 1946, and 
these feelings were reflected in a relatively small majority of miners 
supporting the railwaymen's cause. 
In the ten days between 6 and 16 March, groups of railwaymen 
especially in isolated centres such as Alpha, Roma, Bundaberg, Gympie, 
Emerald, Hughenden and Gladstone, either decided to return to work or were 
showing unmistakeable signs of increasing restlessness at the continuation of 
the dispute. This process culminated on 15 March, when the A.F.U.L.E. 
instructed its members throughout Queensland to resume duties. The C.D.C. 
44. C.D.C. Handwritten Notes 1 April 1948, A.R.U., Brisbane, pp.5,6. 
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put on a brave face at this turn of events, and claimed that the inevitable 
increase in the train service was in no way decisive in a workshops' dispute,^^ 
but many an experienced union official knew that a necessary condition for 
success in any railway dispute - unity of action between the A.F.U.L.E. and 
the A.R.U. - could no longer be fulfilled. 
By far the largest problem, however, for the C.D.C. was The 
Industrial Law Amendment Act. Whether by accident or design, one effect of 
this legislation was to force the C.D.C. to extend even further its settlement 
terms to include demands for its repeal. The government also wasted no time 
in using the legislation to disrupt the activities of prominent members of the 
Communist party in the organisation of picketing. Within three days of the 
Act receiving royal assent, charges were laid against leading figures such as 
Mick Healy, secretary of the T.L.C, Ted Englart of the W.W.F. and Max 
Julius. 
Despite all its efforts to defeat the strike, a clear indication that the 
government was prepared to concede some ground over the railwaymen's 
margins demands came on Wednesday 10 March, in the sixth week of the 
dispute. The chairperson of the C.D.C, Mick O'Brien, was sounded out by Jim 
Donald on the prospects of a meeting between the C.D.C. and the newly 
appointed commissioner for railways, T.E. Maloney, to discuss the 
commissioner's interpretation of the letter of 16 December 1947 from the 
under secretary of the premier's department to the A.E.U. In his conversation 
with Donald, O'Brien indicated that the C.D.C. regarded the union position as 
solid, and would do all in its power to win the active support of all coalminers 
in New South Wales and, if necessary, to close every port in Australia. There 
was also the suggestion in O'Brien's remarks that the C.D.C. might attempt to 
argue its case within other state branches of the A.L.P. For his part, Jim 
45. C.D.C. Executive. Minutes 16 March 1948, p. l . 
46. Jim Donald was the secretary of the P.L.P. His seat of Bremer 
contained the homes of many Ipswich railwaymen. 
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Donald told O'Brien that he was 'over-anxious' regarding the dispute and 
thought that the state of affairs was 'pretty drastic'.'^'^ If Jim Donald's 
observations can be taken as a guide to the general feeling within the senior 
ranks of the P.L.P., then despite its air of public confidence reflected in its 
propaganda campaign, its holy war against the communists, and its legislation 
which imposed savage limitations on civil liberties, the government must have 
been sorely concerned at the continued resistance of the overwhelming bulk of 
the railwaymen. 
A deputation from the C.D.C. waited on Maloney on the morning of 11 
March. The commissioner argued that the letter of 16 December 1947 meant 
that wage increases of twelve shillings and fourpence per week were offered 
to skilled tradesmen, and guaranteed the railway department would not oppose 
this. Nor would it oppose retrospectivity to 18 September 1947, but the 
railway department would insist that increases for lower grades of skill, and 
for purely railway classifications, together with the question of weekend 
penalty rates, were for the court to determine. One point needs to be re-
emphasised at this juncture. Even taking the letter of 16 December at its 
face value, there is no way it could have implied an increase of twelve 
shillings and fourpence. At the time, the weekly rate for a fitter under the 
Mechanical Engineering (War Loading) Award-State was seven pounds and 
seventeen shillings, the same as contained in the Federal Metal Trades 
Award. The corresponding rate under the Railway Award-State was seven 
pounds, six shillings and sixpence, thus a promise to raise this to the rate in 
the relevant commonwealth award meant an increase of ten shillings and 
sixpence. Leaving aside the mathematics of the situation, the offer of twelve 
shillings and fourpence may have been a cleverly calculated device to drive a 
wedge between the skilled and unskilled strikers by conceding further ground 
to the claims of the skilled tradesmen. 
The CD.C. rejected the package proposed by the commissioner, and 
47. Conversation between Mr Donald and Mr O'Brien, Notes n.d., file 
48/67(B)2 "Railway Strike. 2 February, 1948 to 5 April, 1948 for 
Marginal Increases', A.R.U., Brisbane. 
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again called on railwaymen to 'continue the fight' until the government 
conceded their complete demands. " The Ipswich District Committee of the 
A.E.U. endorsed this decision without reservation, and it appeared on the 
surface that a settlement was as far away as it had been some six weeks 
earlier. The offer of twelve shillings and fourpence was, however, a turning 
point in the dispute. It was instrumental in creating at first a faint crack, and 
then an ever widening gap, in the strikers' ranks particularly amongst A.E.U. 
men in outlying areas such as Bundaberg and Rockhampton. The only thing 
which arrested the growth of this split was a series of events in Brisbane 
which took place on St. Patrick's Day, 17 March 1948. 
From the weekend of 13/14 March, police efforts to apply The 
Industrial Law Amendment Act were marked by an increased willingness to 
use force. On 15 March, batons were used by police in the process of seizing 
placards from a procession of pickets marching to the Trades Hall. The 
Telegraph was sure the marchers got what they deserved since '...Communist 
factions today staged a march in the city, waved banners, and provoked the 
police' as part of '...a desperate move to try to whip up rapidly waning ardour 
for the rail strike,...'. On the following day pickets outside the Shell depot 
at Newstead were manhandled by police officers. Shortly after 9 a.m. on 17 
March 1948, some 200 men and women assembled to take part in a march 
from the Trades Hall in Brisbane towards the centre of the city. A twenty-
four hour statewide strike in protest against The Industrial Law Amendment 
Act had originally been set down for this day by the T.L.C, but was 
subsequently cancelled because, according to Dick Shearman: 
...the C.D.C. could not afford to put the trade 
union movement to the test given the weakening in 
the strike front highlighted by the decision of the 
A.F.U.L.E. to return to work. 
48. C.D.C. Minutes 11 March 1948, p. l . 
49. The Telegraph 15 March 1948. 
50. R. Shearman, 'The Politics of the 1948 Queensland Railway Strike' 
p*91. 
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The procession of 200 people consisted largely of members of the 
Communist party anxious to make at least a token gesture of defiance 
towards The Industrial Law Amendment Act in particular, and the tendency of 
the Hanlon government to pass legislation designed to increase state control 
over the trade unions in general. At 9.15 a.m., as the procession approached 
the central railway station, it was confronted by 100 uniformed and 
plainclothed police. A commissioned officer ordered the marchers to 
disperse, but this was ignored whereupon the police began to seize banners and 
to break up the procession. Many in the march retal iated, and a wild brawl 
ensued. 
In what otherwise might have passed as police officers taking an 
opportunity of literally kicking the communist can, the political significance 
of this fracas was multiplied by the action of a detective of police, so it 
seems, in striking Fred Paterson from behind and felling him. Both Paterson 
and Max Julius were observing the march from the footpath in their capacity 
as legal advisors to the strikers. The effect of this assault on a member of 
parliament was paradoxical since it helped consolidate the strike position in 
Brisbane and Ipswich, the very areas in which support for a continuation of the 
dispute was at its highest while at the same time doing relatively little to 
stem the growing tide of disillusionment with the dispute in many other areas 
throughout Queensland. 
As news of the St. Patrick's Day altercation spread throughout 
Australia, an avalanche of protests was made to Hanlon over the action of the 
police. The communist press called on the workers of Queensland to stop the 
growth of 'Fascism' in their country: 
St Patrick's Day 1948 in Brisbane marked a new 
point in the dangerous drift towards Fascism in 
Australia. 
Hanlon's dictatorial Emergency Powers and Nazi-
type Industrial Law Amendment Act have already 
carried Queensland further even than Tory-
governed southern States towards police-state rule 
of the type now tyrannizing the unfortunate people 
of Greece, Spain and South American countries. 
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These anti-working class Acts logically followed 
the 1946 Amended Arbitration Act. Hanlon needed 
them to try to keep Queensland a low-wage State 
for the benefit of foreign capitalist investors, he 
needed them as part of his plan to provide a 
disorganised, subservient working population as 
wage slaves in the mills and mines of these gentry. 
Those people who still foolishly imagined that 
Hanlon's Fascist laws were designed only to 
frighten pickets had their dreams rudely shattered. 
According to The Guardian report, the attack on Paterson was a deliberate 
attempt to murder him, while the violent dispersal of the march was a 
'planned assault' by 'Hanlon's thugs...acting under definite orders'.^ 
The government offered a completely opposite version of the events. 
Hanlon charged that the marchers had set out with the deliberate intention of 
provoking a violent clash with the police. In support of these allegations, he 
quoted the police report of the incident: 
...the Communists...are determined to persist in 
committing breaches of the law of the State, 
particularly breaches of such a nature as might be 
likely everitually to lead to serious disturbances of 
the peace.-
Such were the circumstances of the time that the police felt able to offer 
political judgments to the government. 
In Melbourne, the A.C.T.U. called on Hanlon to repeal The Industrial 
Law Amendment Act, and decided to send a deputation of its senior officers 
to Chifley and Hanlon to discuss the dispute. In Brisbane, the T.L.C. 
organised a demonstration to protest at the St. Patrick's Day acts of violence 
and at the government's overall attitude to the dispute. Many thousands 
attended this rally, for which a police permit had been refused, on 19 March. 
51. The Guardian 19 March 1948. 
52. The Telegraph 18 March 1948. 
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Some 1,600 members of the W.W.F. marched to the rally in clear defiance of 
the government: there was no police attempt to disperse this somewhat more 
formidable group of strikers. These acts of defiance and protest in Brisbane, 
together with similar demonstrations in other centres throughout Queensland, 
did not, however, signify a reversal of the growing strike-weariness which 
more and more railwaymen were feeling in this the seventh week of the 
dispute. Despite the initial outburst of shock, anger and disappointment at 
the events of St. Patrick's Day, this was insufficient to sustain their 
enthusiasm in the face of a combination of difficult economic circumstances 
and a seemingly ever increasing list of settlement terms which had risen again 
with a C.D.C. demand for a public enquiry into the police action on 17 March. 
The effect of government and press propaganda was also beginning to 
be felt. This concentrated on the theme that law and order was under 
challenge from the Communist party. While the churches prayed for 
industrial peace, many unionists were subjected to more intense religious 
pressures to return to work. Rockhampton, for example, had long been a 
major centre of 'Catholic Action' activity in many local union branches, 
members of the Catholic Social Studies Movement were active in arguing for 
a return to work in many railway centres, while the claims of an impending 
revolution and the calls to defend constitutional government appealed to many 
of a masonic persuasion. 
A few hours after the protest rally on 19 March, the Ipswich District 
Committee of the A.E.U., in the company of Cranwell, Rowe and Merrell, met 
senior officers of the A.E.U. from Rockhampton. The Rockhampton officials 
reported that the position in that centre was becoming difficult to hold, and 
that their members were willing to resume work on the basis of the 
government's twelve shillings and fourpence offer. It was further reported 
that a similar situation obtained at Bundaberg. Devereux, having just arrived 
from Toowoomba, told the gathering that the A.E.U. men in that city could 
only be expected to stay in dispute for a further week, perhaps ten days at the 
outside. The position in Ipswich, on the other hand, was not in doubt, nor. 
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according to Merrell, were there any signs of a break in the ranks of the 
A.E.U. in the running sheds, tramway workshops and Shell depot in Brisbane.^-^ 
The A.E.U. members in central Queensland were clearly willing to 
accept an offer based on their union's original claim of 18 September 1947. 
This was a consistent position since they had informed the Ipswich District 
Committee in December 1947 that they would be satisfied with an increase in 
margins based on twelve shillings and fourpence for the fitter.^^ They were, 
therefore, being asked to continue the dispute to secure the extended demands 
of the C.D.C, and this they were becoming less and less inclined to do.^^ 
Thus, at the beginning of the third week in March, it was obvious that there 
was no longer complete unity of purpose in the ranks of arguably the most 
significant union in the railway dispute. 
On the morning of 22 March, a deputation from the A.C.T.U. 
discussed the dispute with Hanlon who insisted that the industrial court 
determine the questions of margins and weekend penalty rates although the 
government would not oppose increases for skilled tradesmen based on twelve 
shillings and fourpence for the fitter. The following afternoon, the A.C.T.U. 
representatives met with the C.D.C. together with Cranwell, Rowe, Jim 
Healy (W.W.F.), E.V. Elliott (Seamen's Union) and J. McPhillips (F.I.A.). At 
this gathering, the C.D.C reaffirmed its settlement terms which required the 
acceptance of the Mooney margins formula as the basic principle in 
determining wage increases throughout the railway service, weekend penalty 
rates, the repeal of The Industrial Law Amendment Act, the withdrawal of 
prosecutions against strike leaders and an enquiry into the action of the police 
at the St. Patrick's Day procession. 
The prime concern of Healy and Elliott was The Industrial Law 
53. A.E.U. Ipswich District Committee. Minutes 19 March 1948, pp. 
81,82. 
54. Secretary, Railway Workshops Federation, Rockhampton to J.P. 
Devereux, 12 December 1947, A.M.F.S.U. files. Trades Hall, Ipswich. 
55. A.E.U. Ipswich District Committee. Minutes 25 March 1948, p.85. 
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Amendment Act and the urgent necessity of having it repealed. Cranwell 
continued to push a very hard line on the margins issue, and, it seems, was 
prepared to fight this matter to the bitter end with the government: 'If Mr. 
Hanlon gets away with this it would be a weapon to use against the Unions by 
the Tory Governments and Employers in other States'.^^ Both Rowe and 
McPhillips argued that the unions still possessed sufficient bargaining strength 
to guarantee victory on all points, a position eventually endorsed by the 
C.D.C. when it decided to reaffirm its determination to continue the dispute. 
A further reduction in this strength, however, occurred the next day 
when the coal miners decided to lift all restrictions. At the same time, the 
central council of the Miner's Federation rejected any suggestion of a national 
coal strike in support of the Queensland railwaymen, while the A.F.U.L.E. 
decided not to support any further the black bans imposed by the CD.C. On 
Easter eve, a relatively minor event took place which was to dent the 
confidence and previously unshakeable solidarity of A.E.U. members in 
Ipswich, Brisbane and in north Queensland. E.J. Rowe was tried in the 
industrial court on a charge of contempt arising out of his action in destroying 
ballot papers which the registrar had issued to test the willingness of the 
A.E.U. men at the Shell depot to remain on strike. Rowe did not appear in the 
court, whereupon a warrant for his arrest was issued. Rowe disappeared, 
claiming that, as an officer of a federal union carrying out its instructions, he 
was unwilling to submit to a state industrial tribunal. 
Heaven only knows where the authorities thought Rowe was, but the 
chief bailiff and deputy marshall of the Supreme Court, and the sheriff of 
Queensland, together with numerous police officers, spent their Easter in an 
uncomfortable and fruitless search for the fugitive Rowe. A plan to break 
into the Trades Hall on Easter Saturday was contemplated but ultimately 
abandoned, while frequent late night and early morning searches were 
conducted. According to the sheriff, who was more than a little put out by 
this necessity to uphold the course of justice at the expense of his family's 
Easter holiday, 'Some of the places visited incurred personal risks and in many 
56. C.D.C. Minutes 23 March 1948, p.2. 
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instances the surroundings were most unpleasant'.^' 
The significance of this escapade, however, did not end with this 
disruption to the plans and comfort of these officers. The press seized on the 
opportunity to brand Rowe as a 'runaway' and, by adding an implication of 
cowardice to its previous abuse of him as a southerner and a communist, 
hoped to discredit him in the eyes of his Queensland members. In Jack 
Devereux's opinion, this campaign had the desired effect. He believed Rowe 
made a tactical mistake in not remaining to face the music and, as a result, 
this error '...was having a serious effect on the dispute, and the position had 
deteriorated through his action'."^" Devereux's remarks were made to a 
conference of the A.E.U. in Brisbane on 31 March attended by representatives 
from Brisbane, Ipswich, Maryborough, Rockhampton, Townsville and the 
Commonwealth Council. Over the Easter weekend, Devereux had discussed 
the A.E.U. position in the dispute with Cranwell and it was agreed to hold this 
meeting to assess the future course of events. 
The position was not encouraging. The splits which had become 
apparent some twelve days earlier had widened. Apart from the impact of 
Rowe's disappearance on the members' morale, delegates argued that the 
A.L.P.-Communist party dimension of the dispute was instrumental in 
reducing the willingness of many A.E.U. members to continue the struggle. 
Pressure for a statewide ballot on the government's offer of twelve shillings 
and fourpence was particularly strong in Toowoomba and Rockhampton, while 
some delegates thought that even the Ipswich men would accept the offer. In 
the days leading up to the Easter break and over the holiday period itself, 
members of other unions in several centres showed unmistakeable signs of 
being prepared to return to work. Frank Nolan, the state secretary of the 
A.R.U., made a rushed trip to Rockhampton on Easter Monday to argue 
against any resumption, but the writing was on the wall. On the afternoon of 
57. Sheriff of Queensland to The Industrial Registrar, 10 September 1948, 
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Thursday 1 April 1948, the C.D.C. met for three hours to determine the 
possibility of continuing the dispute and the chances of any further 
concessions from the government. Official and unofficial minutes of this 
meeting allow a partial reconstruction of the principal features of the debate. 
Nolan reported that the strike front in Rockhampton was on the verge 
of collapse and estimated that the position could be held for no longer than a 
week. A similar situation obtained in Toowoomba according to Jack 
Devereux. The C.D.C. was thus faced with the prospect of losing control of 
the dispute if railwaymen at these two important centres resumed duties since 
such action could well trigger a general return to work. Moreover, it seems 
possible, but by no means certain, that further pressure to open negotiations 
with the government came from the Ipswich disputes committee: there is 
some evidence to suggest it was prepared to commence talks with Hanlon if 
the C.D.C. was unwilling to take this initiative. 
The C.D.C. also considered detailed reports from Jim Healy and J.A. 
Cranwell concerning a recent discussion they had conducted with Hanlon 
which indicated that wage increases based on twelve shillings and fourpence 
for the fitter constituted a firm but final offer, that the government was 
sympathetic to the payment of weekend penalty rates, and that the purely 
railway grades could expect marginal increases in proportion to those for 
tradesmen. According to Cranwell and Healy, Hanlon had made it clear, 
however, that the government would oppose what he described as attempts by 
the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court to superimpose 
margins on state awards even to the extent of mounting a challenge to its 
jurisdiction. Cranwell and Healy also recounted Hanlon's remarks to the 
effect that the government was prepared to continue to fight the union 
blockade of Queensland, and that it would keep the emergency legislation in 
force as long as it judged it necessary to protect those railwaymen who wished 
to return to work. There is also a very vague hint in the evidence that Hanlon 
may have threatened to make The Industrial Law Amendment Act a 
permanent feature of the industrial code. 
The situation thus facing the C.D.C. on the afternoon of 1 April was 
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one in which it had very little time to sit down with a government which, so it 
seemed, was prepared to make concessions. It was now or never! At 4.45 
p.m. Hanlon was contacted and agreed to meet a delegation from the C.D.C. 
immediately.^° The meeting lasted almost three hours during which time 
settlement terms were decided. On the matter of wages, the government 
conceded marginal increases to all workshops' employees based on twelve 
shillings and fourpence for the fitter with retrospectivity to 18 September 
1947. The justice of penalty rates for weekend work was also admitted 
although the government insisted that the actual amount, together with any 
retrospectivity, was for the court to determine. Hanlon also gave the 
deputation an undertaking that, once claims for the purely railway grades 
were lodged with the court, the government would negotiate with the unions 
concerned. Furthermore, railwaymen who participated in the dispute would 
not lose their long service leave, sick leave and extended leave rights, nor 
would they be subjected to any discrimination. No action would be taken 
against apprentices who had taken strike action. 
There was one matter, however, on which the government would not 
yield. Requests for the repeal of The Industrial Law Amendment Act, and the 
withdrawal of prosecutions under it, were flatly rejected. Hanlon argued that 
decisions to repeal legislation would be taken by the P.L.P., and the P.L.P. 
alone, and informed the delegation that the caucus would not meet until late 
July or early August. Furthermore, Hanlon continued, there was a threat by 
certain federal unions to continue direct action against the Queensland 
government unless the legislation was withdrawn from the statute book, and 
under no circumstances would the government cave in to such blatant 
60 pressure. 
The C.D.C. reconvened at the Trades Hall after this meeting and 
59. This discussion of the CD.C. meeting on the afternoon of 1 April 1948 
is based on: C.D.C. Minutes 1 April 1948, pp.1-3; C.D.C 
Handwritten Notes 1 April 1948, A.R.U., Brisbane. This file has no 
title, and in places the notes are impossible to decipher. 
60. C.D.C. Delegation to the premier. Notes 1 April 1948, Railway 
Dispute 1948 file, T.L.C, Brisbane, p.2. 
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decided to recommend to railwaymen that they accept the terms negotiated 
with the government. At mass meetings held throughout Queensland on 
Friday 2 April this recommendation was endorsed. Perhaps the most 
spectacular meeting was that held in Brisbane at which E.J. Rowe made a 
dramatic reappearance during which he was arrested and subsequently 
incarcerated in Boggo Road Gaol to purge his contempt of the industrial 
court. Thus the 1948 Railway Dispute drew to a close. The overt conflict 
ended at midnight on Monday 5 April 1948. 
Within the space of ten days, however, it seemed likely that the 
dispute could flare once again. On 13 April, members of the C.D.C. met with 
the commissioner for railways to confirm his agreement with their 
interpretation of the settlement terms negotiated with Hanlon. The unions 
believed that this exchange would be a mere formality since the railway 
department's industrial officer had endorsed their calculations the previous 
day. A less than vivid imagination would be more than sufficient to anticipate 
the unions' reaction when the commissioner informed them that they had, 
unfortunately, misunderstood the premier's formula. In the commissioner's 
view, the settlement terms negotiated with the government meant a 
graduated scale of wage increases beginning at four shillings and two pence 
per week for a labourer and rising to twelve shillings and four pence per week 
for the fitter and all higher classifications. At this point, not surprisingly, the 
union deputation angrily walked out of the meeting. 
The following morning, Hanlon confirmed that he had offered 
proportionate wage increases to workshops' and related employees based on 
the figure of twelve shillings and four pence for the fitter. One can only 
guess at the reasons for the earlier efforts by the commissioner for railways 
to impose less favourable terms on the unions. Perhaps it was a 'try on' 
designed to exploit what some railway administrators believed was resentment 
in the ranks of the skilled tradesmen at the success of unskilled men in 
obtaining an increase of ten shillings and a penny under the premier's terms, a 
figure extremely close to their full claim of eleven shillings, whereas the 
increase of twelve shillings and four pence fell far short of the tradesmen's 
goal of sixteen shillings. Perhaps the commissioner saw an opportunity to 
292 
drive a hard bargain now that the strike was over, or perhaps he was acting at 
the behest of certain sections in the P.L.P. and Q.C.E. who held that Hanlon 
had conceded far more to the unions than had ever been intended. 
In the final analysis, the settlement terms of the dispute meant that 
the railway fitter's weekly wage in Queensland was some 43.71 per cent above 
the state basic wage, a figure slightly in excess of that consistent with the 
A.E.U.'s cherished three-sevenths Harvester margins principle. By May 1948, 
moreover, the wage increases secured by the unions in the dispute were well 
on the way to flowing-on to all members of the railway service. As they 
contemplated these and the other gains, it was understandable that the unions 
would claim a victory in the 1948 Railway Dispute. It was also understandable 
that few, if any, realised that the costs would have to be accounted for far 
into the future. 
CHAPTER 11 
THE 1948 RAILWAY DISPUTE 
aftermath 
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The reverberations from the 1948 Railway Dispute continued to be 
felt for many years, so much so that the dispute has become part of industrial 
relations legend in Queensland. Men who scabbed in '48 are still remembered 
(and are occasionally reminded of this) while many contemporary union 
leaders in Queensland can vividly recall their participation as young men in 
this their first industrial dispute, or as children joining the queues for food and 
clothing in the various relief centres. Some thirty-three years after the 
dispute, the state secretary of the A.R.U. felt that he could still appeal to the 
force of the legend of '48 in support of a wage claim based on interstate 
relativities when he warned that '...the feeling is running so strongly on this 
question that circumstances similar to 1948 are developing rapidly'.^ 
In the months immediately after the dispute, the A.L.P. continued its 
efforts to convince the public that the settlement terms ultimately accepted 
by the C.D.C. had been offered by the government in December 1947. The 
purpose of this campaign was to encourage the belief that the decision to go 
on strike was unwarranted and had only resulted in an unnecessary loss of pay 
by thousands of railwaymen. If the A.L.P. indulged in a little myth-making 
after the dispute, then so did some of the other participants. In The Guardian 
of 9 April 1948 the chairperson of the C.D.C said it recommended a return to 
work because the government was prepared to make concessions which it was 
unwilling to make earlier in the dispute, and not because of any weakening in 
the strike front. This was, however, less than frank. 
The crucial development which drove the C.D.C. to settle with the 
government on 1 April 1948 was the severe splits which had emerged in the 
ranks of the A.E.U. in various centres outside Brisbane. Late in 1948, the 
Eureka Youth League (a youth organisation affiliated with the Communist 
party) in a commentary on developments after the railway dispute, praised 
1, The Courier-Mail 29 September 1981. 
% At least one historian has uncritically accepted the falsehood 
disseminated by the government and the media. See J. Guyatt, 'Trade 
Unions and the Australian Labor Party in Queensland 1947-1957' (M.A. 
diss., University of Queensland, 1971), p.214. 
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Queensland workers for having forced the repeal of The Industrial Law 
Amendment Act and the release of men put in prison for offences against this 
statute.-^ The actual situation, however, was rather different to this version. 
The period after the dispute saw a heated difference of opinion 
between C.G. Fallon^ and E.M. Hanlon over The Industrial Law Amendment 
Act. This angry clash was a result of proceedings taken under the 
legislation. Throughout April 1948, a series of charges laid during the dispute 
under the Traffic Act and The Industrial Law Amendment Act was heard in 
the courts. Those charged were convicted and fined. On 8 June, Hanlon 
announced that the cabinet had decided to repeal The Industrial Law 
Amendment Act. This decision was supported by the A.W.U. and other unions 
affiliated with the A.L.P. on the grounds that the legislation was too drastic. 
The government had a number of reasons for deciding to repeal the 
Act. These included a desire to deny the Communist party justification for a 
continued propaganda campaign against 'repressive legislation'; a desire to 
restore the right of peaceful picketing during industrial disputes; a belief that 
the Act had served its purpose; and a fear that a continuation of the 
legislation could well provoke industrial action to force its removal. Hanlon 
was the guiding light in persuading the cabinet to take this action. This was 
also part of a plan to repair any damage the emergency legislation may have 
caused within the ranks of traditional Labor supporters. A majority of the 
P.L.P. supported the moves towards reconciliation: one senior minister 
captured this sentiment when he told the caucus 'Nothing has been more 
distasteful to workers than our passing of [the] anti-picketing ac t . We did 
what no other labor government has done in the world'.-' 
This 'olive branch' interpretation of the government's policy receives 
3. Audrey Blake, The Way to the Future (Melbourne: Eureka Youth 
League, 1948), E218/644 F.I.A. deposit, A.N.U.A.B.L., not paginated. 
4. The chairperson of the Q.C.E. and s tate secretary of the A.W.U. 
5. P.L.P. Rough Minutes 1 September 1948, P.L.P., Parliament House, 
Brisbane, p . l36. 
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additional support from the actions it took in respect of certain prosecutions 
under the Act. On 4 August, Mick Healy, Max Julius and Ted Englart 
(Brisbane branch secretary of the W.W.F.), all members of the Communist 
party, were arrested and lodged in Boggo Road Gaol for their failure to pay 
fines levied for breaches of the anti-picketing legislation. Within two days, J. 
Esler and A. Graham were similarly arrested and jailed. Two weeks later, the 
fines levied on Healy, Englart and Julius were anonymously paid whereupon 
they were released. No such benefactor appeared to secure the freedom of 
the hapless Esler and Graham and they, therefore, continued to languish in 
prison. In the weeks following, a somewhat amusing spectacle was played out 
in Queensland political circles over who had paid the fines. The police were 
called to investigate, both the communists and the Liberal party said the 
government paid the fines, the government said the communists or the Liberal 
party were the guilty parties, while the Country party thought Hanlon had 
financed the whole deal out of his slush funds. 
It is impossible, of course, to say who paid the fines. V.C. Gair, the 
deputy premier, was one of those who held the Communist party responsible 
for the deed, but, many years later, he claimed that Hanlon had arranged for 
them to be paid.^ The Communist party probably didn't pay the fines. At the 
time, the imprisonment of three of its most senior members provided a 
rallying cry for their campaign against the government's policies in the 
dispute. Moreover, they had lost an earlier martyr to the cause when E.J. 
Rowe was released from prison on 7 April after having paid his fine and costs 
and having apologised to the industrial court for his contempt of its authority. 
The Communist party did not wish Rowe to take this action. He was 
under instructions from the Queensland state committee of the party, as well 
as L.L. Sharkey and R. Dixon, that, under no circumstances was he to 
apologise to the court. The party regarded the court as representing the 
6. The Courier-Mail 21 August 1948. 
7. The Telegraph 10 January 1977. It is difficult to know just how much 
weight to place on Gair's claim especially in view of the fact that he 
had a personal dislike for Hanlon. 
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'capitalist state' and would not consent to one of its senior members humbling 
himself before it. As far as the Communist party was concerned, Rowe could 
remain in jail as a living reminder of the oppressive nature of the arbitration 
system. Rowe, however, was also a senior official in the A.E.U., and Cranwell 
insisted to Rowe that he make the required apology. The dilemma for Rowe 
was obvious. In the end, he decided not to place at risk his position and 
influence within the A.E.U. which defiance of Cranwell would surely have 
meant. It could be argued, therefore, that when Healy, Julius and Englart 
were jailed, the Communist party was not about to give up this further 
opportunity to make political capital as it had been forced to do in the case of 
E.J. Rowe. 
Regardless of who paid the fines and why, the cabinet was apparently 
satisfied that the fifteen days spent in prison by what it regarded as the 
communist ringleaders in the field during the dispute had more than made an 
example of them and had served as a warning for the future. It was not, 
therefore, unhappy to see their release which event was accompanied by press 
speculation that the government would not attempt to collect any other 
outstanding fines." The government, however, decided to go much further 
than suggested by this speculation. On the morning of 1 September, Hanlon 
introduced The Industrial Law Amendment Act Of 1948 Repeal Bill. During 
his remarks, he made it clear that the cabinet had agreed not to proceed any 
further with prosecutions, not to collect any outstanding fines and to release 
Esler and Graham from prison.^^ 
The reaction of C.G. Fallon to these announcements was one of 
sustained fury. He threatened that the 'anti-communist' unions affiliated with 
the A.L.P. might openly display resentment at the government's action which 
8. C.P.A. Speeches and Documents relating to 15th National Congress. 
Speech by L.L. Sharkey. Reply to Discussion 7-10 May 1948, 
M.S.S.2389 2(8), M.L., p.6. 
9. The Courier-Mail 20. 21 August 1948, 
10. Q.P.D. 193 (1948-49): 201, 202; The Courier-Mail 2 September 1948. 
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...might take the form of reorganisation within the 
party for a more determined lead in support of 
anti-communist policy, a change of leadership of 
the Parliamentary party, or establishment of a 
political party more vigorously opposed to 
communism or any other anti-democratic party 
than indicated by the Labour Party's decision. ^ ^ 
Fallon's anger was echoed by his supporters in the P.L.P. which met on the 
afternoon of 1 September to consider the cabinet decisions. The whole party 
had, of course, been presented with a fait accompli by Hanlon's 
announcements in the parliament earlier in the day. Nevertheless, prominent 
1 7 
members of the 'A.W.U. section' in the caucus such as George Devries and 
Paul Hilton sought to persuade their colleagues to overturn the policy of 
cabinet, but without success. Hanlon urged the party to accept that the 
cabinet decisions were necessary if the A.L.P. was to maintain the respect 
and support of the workers: the communist leaders had been humbled and 
punished, and it was desirable that the whole affair be 'cleaned up'. On the 
eve of his departure for a series of conferences in London, Hanlon was anxious 
to remove the bitter taste left by the legislative actions of the government 
1 3 during the dispute. 
Fallon again publicly criticised the government on 2 September, 
although by this time he had withdrawn his call for a change in leadership of 
the P.L.P. He did, however, made two observations which provide clues to the 
explanation of his bitter outbursts. As a matter of principle, Fallon argued, 
the cabinet should not be the source of decisions in matters directly affecting 
unions, rather these should be the result of joint discussions between the 
P.L.P. and affiliated unions.^^ One interpretation of this is that Fallon was 
11. The Courier-Mail 2 September 1948. 
12. In a caucus of thirty-five members, some thirteen could be counted as 
strong A.W.U. supporters. 
13. P.L.P. Minutes 1 September 1948, P.L.P., Parliament House, Brisbane, 
p.4. 
14. The Courier-Mail 3 September 1948. 
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seeking a means whereby the degree of influence enjoyed by the A.W.U. in 
Labor party affairs in pre-war days might be re-established. Although the 
position of the A.W.U. in 1948 was of extreme importance, this was nowhere 
near the dominance of previous years. In the words of The Courier-Mail 'The 
A.W.U. finds itself, at the moment, far from the throne'. Acceptance of 
the principle of consultation could only have enhanced the influence of the 
A.W.U. on government policies, and it was possibly advanced with this in 
mind. 
Fallon also claimed that the government's actions in remitting fines, 
releasing Esler and Graham and in quashing further prosecutions had given the 
Communist party a heaven sent opportunity to claim a victory which, in fact, 
it subsequently did. Fallon may well have regarded these decisions as 
compromising and weakening the drive against the communists and other 
'militants' in various unions which had been intensified by the establishment in 
July 1948, of a Q.C.E. committee to extend the A.L.P. industrial group 
structure throughout Queensland. Two of the three members of this 
committee were A.W.U. men and the A.W.U. was independently devoting 
considerable funds to the campaign to dislodge communist and other 'militant' 
union officials from their positions. Fallon may well have seen this industrial 
group structure as providing a further means by which the A.W.U. could 
extend its influence over the destiny of the A.L.P. in Queensland. He would 
not, therefore, have welcomed actions by the government which could be seen 
as making concessions to members of the Communist party. 
The most significant long-term consequence of the railway dispute 
was the undoubted stimulus it gave to the extension of the industrial group 
structure in Queensland. At the height of the dispute, which the A.L.P. firmly 
believed was 'inspired' and directed by the Communist party, Fallon warned 
delegates to the Q.C.E. of '...the danger that confronted the Trade Union 
Movement in this country through Communist infiltration', and appealed to 
15. Ibid. 
16. The Courier-Mail 9 July and 3 September 1948. 
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them to do all in their power to prevent the destruction of 'the great Labor 
Movement' by the 'Communist menance'.^' In terms of the A.L.P. 
conventional wisdom, the railway dispute provided a classic example of 
Communism in action. According to this analysis, the dispute grew into an 
attempt by the communists to immobilise all transport and other services to 
the people of Queensland, even to the point of using intimidation and mass 
picketing in an effort to force certain workers crucial to the maintenance of 
the emergency transport system to join the dispute. 
The A.L.P. firmly believed that the government's actions during the 
dispute had reduced Communist party prestige and that, as a result, a renewal 
I X of rank and file interest in unions would occur throughout Queensland.^" This 
theme dominated the lessons which the Q.C.E. told Labor supporters they 
ought to learn from the railway dispute: 
The surest way to lose our democratic freedom is 
to allow the Communists,...whose self-confessed 
goal is the destruction of democratic institutions, 
to seize control of the Trade Union Movement, 
from which political Labor has always drawn its 
inspiration and strength. It is because of the 
inertia of the workers and the lack of interest in 
the domestic affairs of their respective unions 
shown by so many of them that the Communists 
have been able to worm their way into dominant 
key posts in Australian trades unionism.^" 
Unionists were exhorted to strike while the iron was hot: 'Now is the time to 
20 fight this alien menance, this un-Australian creed,...'. 
The importance placed by the executive committee of the Q.C.E. on 
17. Q.C.E., A.L.P. Minutes 17 March 1948, Labor House, Brisbane, p.4. 
18. Q.P.D. 193 (1948-49): 198,199,223,224. 
19. The Worker 12 April 1948. 
20. The Worker 12 April 1948. See also: The Worker 19 April and 16 
August 1948. 
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this anti-communist crusade can be measured by the fact that the committee 
which it appointed in July 1948 to coordinate the activities of the industrial 
groups consisted of three of its own members. They were R.J. Bukowski, the 
southern district secretary of the A.W.U., E.J. Walsh, the A.L.P. state 
organiser and a former deputy premier, and T. Rasey, an alderman in the 
Brisbane City Council who had close ties with the T.W.U. The committee 
lost no time in launching an assault on what it saw as citadels of communist 
power in Queensland trade unions while E.J. Walsh toured the state to advise 
71 A.L.P. branches of the proposed extended activities of the industrial groups.'^^ 
The nature of this anti-communism, which was so central to the 
government's policy towards the railway dispute, was best depicted by 
Hollywood. Some four months after its release in the United States in May 
1948, 'The Iron Curtain', with Dana Andrews and Gene Tierney, premiered in 
Brisbane to a select audience of civil, political and military leaders. 
According to the film critic in the New York Times, 'The Iron Curtain': 
...is the 1948 version of 'Confessions of a Nazi Spy' 
- perhaps not as bristling and suspenseful as that 
memorable pre-war film but every bit as blunt in 
its arraignment of the Russian people and their 
ideology. Only this time, of course, the arch-
villians are not the ambitious lords of the 
Wilhelmstrasse; they are the silent men of the 
Kremlin who command rings of spies and borers-
from-within and whose obviously evil intention is to 
destroy capitalism and rule a Communist world. 
From all accounts, this message was well received by the dignitaries at the 
opening night in Brisbane.^-^ It confirmed and reinforced all their worst fears. 
21. Secretary, Collinsville Branch, Australian Labor Party to C.G. Fallon, 
29 July 1948, correspondence files, P.L.P., Parliament House, 
Brisbane. 
22. Bosley Crowther, Review of 'The Iron Curtain' in The New York Times 
Film Reviews 1913-1968, vol. 3, 1939-1948 (New York: New York 
Times and Arno Press, 1970), p.2253. 
23. The Courier-Mail 25 September 1948, 
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In the wake of the railway dispute, delegates to the 15th National 
Congress of the Communist party met in Sydney in a confident, optimistic and 
assertive mood. This atmosphere bordered on the euphoric, and was due to 
what the party saw as many favourable signs for the future arising out of the 
dispute. According to Claude Jones, a Queensland member of the central 
committee, members of the party throughout Queensland passed the test of 
their courage and organising ability with flying colours: in all centres they 
were responsible for putting backbone into the struggle, for isolating 'the 
scabs, dogs and villians [sic]', for organising entertainment, food and clothing 
for railwaymen and their families, and for ensuring the C.D.C. decisions were 
implemented. This augured well for the future since 'What other results can 
such leadership have among the masses but to inspire them also into action, to 
show them the strength and the capacity of our Party to give leadership to the 
75 working class in battle'?''^ 
Communist party tacticians believed the railway dispute revealed a 
shift to the left in working class attitudes as well as providing clear evidence 
that workers generally were willing to engage in further sustained direct 
action and, what was more to the point, were willing to do so under the 
leadership of the Communist party.^° It was also believed that the railway 
dispute had increased markedly the degree of unity in the ranks of the working 
class. The solidarity exhibited by both union leaders and railwaymen generally, 
together with the support offered by other workers throughout Australia, 
24. For a discussion of the relationship between the railway dispute and 
Communist party tactics in the 1949 Coal Strike, see: Phillip Deery, 
ed., Labour in Conflict. The 1949 Coal Strike (Canberra: Australian 
Society for the Study of Labour History, 1978), pp.33-38. For an 
analysis of the significance placed by the Communist party on the 
railway dispute, see: R.A. Gollan, Revolutionaries and Reformists. 
Communism and the Australian Labour Movement, 1920-1955 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1975), pp.233-235. 
25. C.P.A. Speeches and Documents relating to 15th National Congress. 
Speech by Claude Jones p. l . 
26. CP.A. Speeches and Documents relating to 15th National Congress, 
Speech by Adam Ogston p. 3; Speech by A. Macdonald p.3; Speech by 
R. Dixon p.8; Speech by L.L. Sharkey p.l2. 
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convinced communist analysts of the practical efficacy of united front 
27 concepts and tactics. 
Under such seemingly favourable circumstances, the Communist party 
thought the stage was set for it to become the political representative of the 
Australian working class. The party believed the working class offensive 
which had begun in late 1946, of which the railway dispute was an important 
part, would carry it to political influence and power.'^" It confidently 
expected to replace the A.L.P., with its history of compromise with, and 
concessions to Capitalism, as the party of the people. It was clearly 
recognised that efforts to effect such a radical alteration in political 
alignments and loyalties would elicit a bitter reaction. The A.L.P. was 
obviously not going to surrender its political constituency without a fight, nor 
would such changes be welcomed by the non-Labor parties and the interests 
they represented. They could, therefore, be expected to do all in their power 
to prevent the communists from achieving their historic mission. 
The Communist party was convinced, however, that the railway 
dispute, by revealing both the nature of future major industrial disputes in 
Australia and how to conduct them, had given it a decided advantage over its 
79 opponents.•^^ The party confidently predicted many significant disputes over 
essentially economic issues: this was even more likely in view of what many 
leading thinkers in the party saw as the imminent collapse of the postwar 
boom and a return to the dark days of the Depression. The nature of such 
disputes would be determined by the responses of governments, which, as the 
railway dispute had shown in the case of a Labor government, would involve 
severe repression,-^^ and by the actions of the communists themselves which. 
27. CP.A. Speeches and Documents relating to 15th National Congress. 
Speech by A. Robinson p.3. 
28. C.P.A. Speeches and Documents relating to 15th National Congress. 
Speech by R. Dixon pp. 8-10. 
29* Ibid., pp. 10,11. 
30. D. Olive, The Queensland Railway Strike (Brisbane: Coronation 
Printery, circa April 1948), p.4. 
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again as had happened in the railway dispute, would require emphasis on the 
political dimensions of the disputes: 
We must aim in strike struggles not only to achieve 
economic gains, but also to draw the masses into 
the fight against reaction and to the side of the 
Communist Party. In every strike we must, in 
addition to the economic gains, strive to strengthen 
the union and win recruits to the Communist 
Party. Every strike should contribute to the 
strengthening of the people's movement, to the 
building of fighting committees of the people.-^^ 
Furthermore, in order to secure these objectives. Communist party planners 
were convinced it would be essential to apply certain organisational and 
tactical principles which were tested and refined in the railway dispute. 
These principles covered picketing, publicity, finance, relief committees and 
37 the mass demonstration.-^'^ 
The Communist party therefore interpreted the 1948 Railway Dispute 
as revealing a set of circumstances which, if handled with intelligence and 
understanding, would greatly assist its emergence as a mass working class 
party. Few disagreed with Dixon's argument that: 
The strike wave is not only beginning to embrace 
new sections of the working class and drawing them 
into active political life, but is also resulting in 
exposing the role of the capitalist state, the Labor 
Party and reformist leaders and is opening the way 
to the passing of the masses over to the side of the 
Communist Party.-^-^ 
A similar optimism and assertiveness was exhibited by Jack Henry as he 
31. C.P.A. Speeches and Documents relating to 15th National Congress. 
Speech by R. Dixon p. 11. 
32. D. Olive, The Queensland Railway Strike,p. 30. 
33* C.P.A. Speeches and Documents relating to 15th National Congress. 
Speech by R. Dixon pp.9,10. 
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explored the implications of following the path the party had decided to tread: 
...let us be clear that when we set ourselves the 
perspective of developing a People's Front in 
Australia in the present international conditions, 
we are setting our course for political power. Not 
less than this. We do this...in the way of working 
to develop the struggles, leading the struggles 
around all the immediate needs of the people, 
preservation of peace, independence, expansion of 
economic and political democracy.... 
Henry harboured few if any illusions over what this policy would mean. He 
was well aware that he was calling for '...a head on struggle against the 
capitalist system itself, the development of the struggle in the direction of 
final power'. 
In several crucial respects, however, the Communist party misread 
the significance of the railway dispute. The dispute had revealed the dangers 
for the party in seeking to follow Lenin's dictum that economic struggles 
should be converted into political confrontations with the forces of 
Capitalism. During the dispute, once the party began to emphasise what it 
saw as the political dimensions, many unionists who were previously prepared 
to follow its tactics in the pursuit of economic objectives were either 
apathetic or actively opposed to these efforts to alter the character of the 
conflict. Contrary to the party's analysis, the events of the railway dispute 
did not reveal a widespread willingness by workers to indulge in overt 
industrial conflict under communist leadership. What it did reveal was a 
willingness to accept any leadership which appeared capable of achieving 
economic goals. The party also chose to downplay the signs which pointed to 
a growing disenchantment on the part of many workers with long industrial 
disputes. They were, however, there for all to see: in the months after the 
dispute, workers throughout Queensland showed a distinct lack of interest in 
proposals for strike action in support of demands for the repeal of The 
Industrial Law Amendment Act and for the release of strike leaders (most of 
34. C.P.A. Speeches and Documents relating to 15th National Congress. 
Speech by J . C Henry p.4. 
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whom were Communist party members) s t i l l in j a i l . 
The communists also preferred to emphasise the importance of the 
high degree of unity which existed amongst union of f ic ia ls and rank and f i le 
unionists during the dispute. In the communist analysis, this boded well for 
future united f ront ac t i v i t y . This emphasis was again misplaced. Admi t ted ly , 
in the f i rs t month or so of the dispute when the issues were clearly economic, 
a remarkable degree of unity did prevai l . The unions were forced, however, to 
come to terms wi th the government at the end of March 1948 precisely 
because of the signif icant and increasing degree of disunity in their ranks. 
In the longer t e rm , the divisive ef fects of the rai lway dispute far 
outweighed any unifying influences i t may have had in the ranks of Labour. 
The tensions and pressures generated during the rai lway dispute exacerbated, 
if that were possible, the long-standing divisions between the A .R .U . and the 
small sectional rai lway unions. They engaged in a sometimes no-holds-barred 
body-snatching contest in the months af ter the dispute, wi th the A . R . U . 
hopeful that the t ime had at last arr ived for the fu l f i lment of i ts long 
ambit ion to destroy the sectional organisations.-^^ For the A .R .U. , alas, this 
did not happen. The closest i t got was to promote the collapse of the C.R.U. 
which, before the dispute, had included representatives of the smal l , specialist 
unions in i ts ranks. This and the impetus the dispute gave to the extension of 
an A.L .P. industr ial group structure throughout Queensland clearly indicate 
the extent of the disunity. What the communists saw as a strengthening of 
working class sol idari ty as a result of the dispute was an i l lusion resting on a 
foundation of wishful th inking. 
The dispute also provided a pract ical test for the communist view that 
in industr ial struggle workers would learn pol i t ica l lessons concerning mat ters 
such as the role of the state in a capi ta l is t society, and the extent to which 
the A .L .P . was prepared to defend working class interests. Such lessons could 
35. General Secretary to General President, Members of the Austral ian 
Counci l , and State Secretaries, 27 Apr i l 1948, E197/8(316) A . R . U . 
South Austral ian Branch deposit, A .N.U.A.B.L . 
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not but convince working class men and women to abandon their traditional 
attachments to the A.L.P. in favour of the alternative offered by the 
Communist party. But there was little evidence of this in the wake of the 
dispute. There was no rush of new applicants for membership of the party, in 
fact, the decline in its membership which had begun in 1945 continued 
uninterrupted. Even sales of The Guardian remained static. 
Perhaps the most serious mistake in the communist interpretation of 
the significance of the railway dispute was the belief that a knowledge of the 
tactics which a Labor government would employ in a major industrial dispute 
would somehow give the party the edge in any such future contests. 
Certainly, to be forewarned is to be forearmed, but the communists greatly 
overstated the advantages of being forearmed. The communists had seen in 
the railway dispute some of the awesome power of the state in industrial 
disputes. The widespread use of the police, the arrest of communist 
organisers in the field, the use of severe legislation and the enormous 
propaganda resources available to the government had no small impact in the 
termination of the dispute. And yet despite this display of state power, and 
despite the evidence that workers were tiring of major disputes and were 
showing distinct signs of disunity, the party, according to Phillip Deery, based 
its tactics in the 1949 Coal Strike on the conclusions it drew from the railway 
dispute.-^^ In the final analysis, the coal strike proved the communist 
interpretation of the railway dispute correct in at least one area: the Chifley 
government reacted in a similar, but more severe, fashion to the manner in 
which Hanlon had responded in 1948. This, of course, did not surprise the 
37 Communist party but the price of this accuracy was high indeed. The 
events of the railway dispute surely, at the very least, had indicated caution 
in industrial disputes where a government was the employer, or where a 
government was vitally interested in the outcome. In 1949, however, the 
communists seemed not to have learned this most fundamental lesson of their 
Queensland experience the previous year. 
36. Phillip Deery, ed.. Labour in Conflict. The 1949 Coal Strike^p.36. 
37. Ibid. 
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In the longer term, the Labor party also suffered the consequences of 
the railway dispute. The dispute began over wage fixing principles, and, for 
many, it retained this essential character throughout its nine week duration. 
For others, however, it became a matter of overwhelming political 
significance in which vital issues of principle, power and personality were at 
stake. Its principal significance for industrial relations and Labor politics in 
Queensland was the impetus it gave to the extension of a formal A.L.P. 
industrial group structure throughout the state. In reflecting on this 
development, the president of the A.F.U.L.E., Theo Kissick, forecast '...that 
there will be a split in the labor machine with a consequent disadvantage to 
the political labor movement'.-'" In just a few short years, Kissick saw his 
prophecy fulfilled. 
38. A.F.U.L.E. Divisional Council. Minutes 6 September 1948, E212/23 
A.F.U.L.E. deposit, A.N.U.A.B.L., p.16. 
CHAPTER 12 
INDUSTRIAL PEACE IN QUEENSLAND. 
CHALLENGE AND RESPONSES 
310 
Both the meat dispute and the railway dispute constituted a gross 
affront to the Labor party's policy of industrial peace. A four-pronged 
counterattack was mounted. It consisted of the development of an official 
industrial group structure in Queensland trade unions, changes to The 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, strong political support for the 
anti-strike policies of the industrial court and the maintenance of an 
unyielding states' rights policy in matters affecting industrial relations. Even 
the party's decentralisation policy was justified partly on the grounds that the 
concentration of industry was responsible for conditions which bred industrial 
conflict, while a special bureau was established within the Criminal 
Investigation Branch of the Queensland police force in the wake of the railway 
2 dispute to gather intelligence on union activity. 
In the initial stages, however, the development of what ultimately 
became the A.L.P. industrial groups had little to do with the Labor party's 
industrial peace policy. For almost a year prior to the meat dispute, there 
had been considerable pressure within the A.L.P. for it to sponsor industrial 
groups in selected trade unions as a means of defeating their communist 
office holders. This pressure came from the Catholic Social Studies 
Movement which since 1943 had established cells within certain trade unions 
and Labor party branches. 
The events of the 1945 A.C.T.U. Congress convinced the Movement 
that it would have to engineer official A.L.P. involvement in the organisation 
of industrial groups in the trade unions. The Movement was shocked at what 
it saw was success after success by the forces of the 'left' at the congress. Its 
sense of dismay was compounded by a belief that the Movement groups in the 
unions would be fatally handicapped in their efforts to halt and reverse the 
communist advance in Australia by the ease with which they could be 
1. Department of Labour and Industry. Typescript 12 May 1950, A/9853, 
Q.S.A. 
2. An example of such activity is contained in: Special Bureau, Criminal 
Investigation Branch to The Officer In Charge, Criminal Investigation 
Branch, 11 March 1949, batch 67, 'Salaries and Basic Wage Increases', 
premier's department, Brisbane. 
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discredited as agents of the roman catholic church. The only way the 
Movement could see out of this impasse was to strive to convert the terms of 
the battle into a struggle between the A.L.P. and the Communist party. 
The Movement's tacticians believed that this required the 
establishment of A.L.P. cadres in the unions through which the existing 
Movement cells could direct the anti-communist assault. Under such 
circumstances, the cells could operate secure in the knowledge that their 
concealment within official Labor party bodies insulated them from any 
sectarian backlash. To achieve this the Movement had to draw on all its 
resources of influence and support within the A.L.P. to gain acceptance for 
the idea that the party establish official industrial groups in the trade unions 
to further the struggle against Communism.-' 
The campaign in Queensland began with Movement pressure being put 
on the A.L.P. hierarchy to establish official Labor party industrial groups in 
trade unions considered to be under communist 'influence' or 'control'. It 
appears that this pressure began to be exerted early in 1946 through 
Movement members and supporters in the upper echelons of the Australian 
Workers' Union, and in the Merthyr branch of the A.L.P. which drew its 
membership from some of the inner Brisbane working class suburbs. The 
A.L.P. leadership was not unsympathetic to the general idea of a crusade 
against the communists. It enjoyed a well deserved reputation for imposing a 
virulent anti-communist orthodoxy on affiliated unions and branch 
membership alike. Nevertheless, the inner executive of the Q.C.E. remained 
unmoved by the appeals to its anti-communist sentiments throughout the early 
months of 1946. Rather than create an official fighting force within the trade 
unions, it seemed content to rely on its traditional policy of urging trade union 
supporters of the Labor party to at tend their union meetings regularly, 
expelling suspected members or 'associates' of the Communist party and 
conducting a propaganda campaign against Communism in general. The 
3. B.A. Santamaria interviewed by Malcolm Long. Australian 
Broadcasting Commission radio, 5 April 1981. A tape recording of 
this interview is held by the author. 
SI 2 
Movement was thus finding it difficult to persuade the Labor party to adopt 
the industrial group concept. 
The 1946 Meat Industry Dispute abruptly changed the at t i tude of the 
A.L.P. to the formation of industrial groups. The meat dispute saw several 
unions reject the policy of industrial peace. This act of defiance led the 
A.L.P. to abandon whatever reservations it may have had about intervention 
in the internal affairs of trade unions. Intervention was now an urgent 
priority. Union leaders who supported direct industrial action, regardless of 
their political affiliation, would have to be removed from office in the cause 
of industrial peace. In June and July 1946, the A.W.U. and the Merthyr branch 
of the A.L.P. again urged the creation of an official industrial group structure 
within the unions. They argued that the meat dispute had revealed the 
Communist party as the principal enemy of industrial peace and had exposed 
serious inadequacies in previous policies designed to combat Communism and 
to guarantee peace in industry. This time the response of the inner executive 
of the Q.C.E. was both enthusiastic and immediate. Not surprisingly, the 
initial efforts to develop and consolidate industrial groups were concentrated 
in the Brisbane branch of the W.W.F. and in the A.M.I.E.U., two of the most 
important unions involved in the meat industry dispute. 
The 1947 Labor-in-Politics Convention gave its blessing to the plans 
placed in train by the inner executive in mid-1946 for the creation of A.L.P. 
industrial groups in selected unions. Labor party folklore had it that the meat 
dispute was a 'communist plot' designed to wreck havoc on the Queensland 
economy, to weaken the arbitration system and to challenge the very 
existence of the A.L.P. s ta te government. In this atmosphere of suspicion of 
any views even marginally out of sympathy with the conventional Labor party 
wisdom there was little resistance to the call for new weapons to be forged in 
order to eliminate all t races of Communism and any other form of dissent 
4. Executive Commit tee , Q.C.E., A.L.P. Minutes 13 June 1946, pp.2,3; 
and 8 July 1946, p.2. Labor House, Brisbane. 
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from the labour movement. 
If the meat industry dispute had sent Shockwaves through the A.L.P., 
and had precipitated the birth of the official industrial groups, the effect of 
the 1948 Railway Dispute on the party was nothing short of cataclysmic. The 
A.L.P. in Queensland believed as a matter of utmost conviction that the 
railway dispute was orchestrated by the Communist party. It did not take 
the Labor leadership long to conclude therefore that its efforts since 1946 to 
guarantee industrial peace and to eliminate the influence of the communists 
in the labour movement through the agency of industrial groups in selected 
trade unions had proven spectacularly ineffective. The A.L.P. hierarchy 
wasted little time in seeking to repair this deficiency: it decided that the 
time had well and truly arrived to take the gloves off in preparation for what 
it believed would be a fight to the finish with the communists and anybody 
else who would not accept the Labor party's industrial peace policy. On 8 July 
1948, the inner executive decided to place the responsibility for the creation, 
maintenance, advancement and control of A.L.P. industrial groups throughout 
Queensland in the hands of a special committee. The committee, which 
became known as the Industrial Group Committee, was given a blank cheque 
in deciding how the crusade against dissenters from Labor party policies was 
to be fought.^ 
Support for the policy and activities of the industrial groups came 
from the highest levels in the P.L.P. Vince Gair, heir apparent to the 
premier's mantle, was an enthusiastic supporter of the political and industrial 
line advocated in the Movement's newspaper Freedom (later News Weekly).' 
Jack Duggan, the rising star in the Labor party in the 1940s, publicly urged 
'loyal' trade unionists to '...see that industrial control of unions is not by men 
5. Q.C.E., A.L.P. Minutes 17 March 1948, Labor House, Brisbane, p.4. 
6. Executive Committee, Q.C.E., A.L.P. Minutes 8 July 1948, p.l . 
7. C Byrne to C.J. Murphy, 20 May 1947, A/9865, Q.S.A. 
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trying to get political objectives through union control'. The premier, E.M. 
g 
Hanlon, lent his enormous prestige and authority to the cause of the groups.-^ 
Apart from a determination to contain labour militancy, there were 
other reasons which help explain the formation of A.L.P. industrial groups in 
Queensland. In the early postwar years, the Communist party was intent on 
furthering its ambition to replace the A.L.P. as the political representative of 
the Australian working class. This became more pronounced in the months 
immediately after the railway dispute as the Communist party continued its 
'leftward' movement which had begun in early 1947. Not surprisingly, the 
A.L.P. would not consent to go quietly to political oblivion, preferring instead 
to organise a counterattack in the shape of the industrial groups. This was 
designed to expose and eliminate communist cells in trade unions and 
members of the A.L.P. who were clandestine members of the Communist 
party. By destroying these avenues of subversion from within, the A.L.P. 
hoped to deny the communists any opportunity to influence Labor policies and 
to remove the risk that union officials who belonged to the Communist party 
might ultimately seek to break the affiliation between their unions and the 
A.L.P. As an added incentive, the hierarchy of the A.L.P. firmly believed 
that, in the event of war between Russia and the West, members of the 
Communist party in Australia would seek to protect Soviet interests. A 
nationalist dimension was thus added to the reasons of self-interest and self-
preservation which drove the A.L.P. into a bitter confrontation with the 
Communist party. 
In trade union elections in Queensland the A.L.P. industrial groups 
won a number of significant victories, experienced a few near misses and 
suffered some important defeats. The campaign which began in 1946 to 
unseat communist and left-wing office bearers in the A.M.I.E.U. finally bore 
sufficient fruit in 1949 to give the 'groupers' a majority on the Queensland 
branch executive as well as in the southern and central district councils. In 
8. The Courier-Mail 21 November 1947. 
9. E.M. Hanlon to R.P. Hutcheon, 20 May 1948, A/4707, Q.S.A. 
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1950, the Federated Clerks' Union returned a grouper majority to its 
governing body, as did the Queensland branch of the F.I.A. in 1951 after a 
Movement coordinated campaign throughout the commonwealth. In its report 
to the 1953 Labor-in-Politics Convention, the A.L.P. Industrial Group 
Committee claimed additional victories in the Federated Liquor and Allied 
Trades Employees' Union and the Queensland Colliery Employees' Union. The 
report also claimed the industrial groups were successful in resisting attempts 
by members of the Communist party and 'fellow travellers' to gain (or regain) 
office in a variety of other Queensland unions. 
Apart from the W.W.F. and the A.M.I.E.U., the unions which attracted 
the most attention in the early stages of the industrial groups in Queensland 
included the A.F.U.L.E. and the T.W.U. The communist president of the 
A.F.U.L.E., Theo Kissick, was defeated in the 1946 union elections, while in 
December 1947, the few honorary officials in the T.W.U. who belonged to the 
Communist party were completely routed by an industrial group under 
substantial Movement influence. The groupers were unable to dislodge their 
communist opponents from office in the W.W.F. even though they fought a 
persistent battle from 1945. On occasions they came within a handful of 
votes of securing some important positions, but the dream of seizing part of 
Big Jim Healy's empire did not materialise. Another failure occurred in the 
Building Workers' Industrial Union shortly after the 1948 Railway Dispute. 
Although the Movement was able to organise sufficient support to depose the 
president of the union, the scalp of the communist secretary, Gerry Dawson, 
was the real prize it sought, but again it was disappointed. 
Despite the organisation of A.L.P. industrial groups in the Australian 
Railways' Union and the Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union (A.P.W.U.), the 
security of their left-wing officials was never in doubt. In the case of the 
A.P.W.U., industrial group activity was sporadic. After an initial flurry of 
activity in 1948, enthusiasm amongst the groupers waned only to be revived 
10. Pamphlet. A.L.P. Industrial Group Executive Committee's Report To 
Convention circa February 1953, signed by J. Bukowski, T.W. Rasey, 
M.T. Brosnan, Labor House, Brisbane, not paginated. 
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in 1952 when the Movement sought to re-establish a group to assist the 
election campaign of C McGrane, one of its members, for the position of 
assistant federal secretary. There was no effective assault on the positions 
of the executive officers of the T.L.C. who belonged to the Communist 
party. Some rather deft footwork by T.L.C. officials in 1949 saw changes to 
the council's rules which aborted a determined bid by a number of unions to 
I 2 gain control by affiliation. Despite constant prodding by the Federated 
Clerks' Union, -^  in which Movement influence was most pervasive, 'right 
wing' unions in Queensland could never agree subsequently on the efficacy of 
this tactic with the result that the positions of the T.L.C. officials were 
preserved from any serious challenge. 
The tenor of much of the propaganda issued by the industrial groups 
reflected their concern over communist efforts to win working class support, 
over the communist challenge to the sanctity of arbitration and over the 
allegations of potential treachery by the Communist party in the event of a 
third global war. Against the background of this general propaganda, some of 
which consisted of material prepared by the House Un-American Activities 
Committee,^-' industrial group campaigns in trade union elections emphasised 
issues oriented more to the specific concerns and interests of trade 
11. Harry Hurrell to M. Brosnan, 30 May 1952. A copy of this letter is 
held by the author. I am indebted to Mr Frank Waters, member of the 
Legislative Assembly in Queensland from 1932 to 1938, and 
Queensland branch secretary of the A.P.W.U. from 1946 to 1972, for 
making available a copy of this, and other, correspondence. 
12. J. Guyatt, 'Trade Unions and the Australian Labor Party in Queensland 
1947-1957'p.232. 
13. D. Hamill, 'Industrial Group Activity in Queensland. A Case-Study of 
the Electrical Trades Union' (B.A. diss.. University of Queensland, 
1978), pp.87,88. 
14. In the early 1950s, W. Thornton was chairperson of the A.L.P. 
industrial group operating in the Federated Clerks' Union. He was 
also one of the full-time officers of the Movement in Queensland. In 
1946 and 1947 he was engaged in industrial group activity in the 
A.M.I.E.U. 
15. The Worker 13 June 1949. 
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unionists. The communists were accused of seeking office merely so they 
could exploit the unions in the interests of their party, while unfavourable 
comparisons between the industrial gains won by unions under grouper 
leadership and those controlled by communists were often made. Other such 
comparisons stressed the alleged prowess of industrial group administrations 
in financial matters and in promoting an expansion of union membership. The 
stock in trade of grouper propaganda also included support for arbitration as 
opposed to direct action with particular emphasis being placed on the use of 
secret ballots in the conduct of union affairs. 
The industrial groups were not, it must be emphasised, merely the 
instruments of a crusade which was uniquely anti-communist. Their efforts to 
ensure that the union movement adhered to the policy of industrial peace 
were directed at non-communists and communists alike. By the end of 1952, 
when the battle with the communists seemed on the brink of a devastating and 
permanent victory, voices in the Queensland branch of the A.L.P. were raised 
concerning the future of the industrial groups. Given the often stated anti-
communist raison d'etre of the groups, it is surprising that there was no 
suggestion that they be disbanded. Rather it was proposed that the groups 
concentrate on the role of an A.L.P. 'thought police' within the trade unions. 
Many influential figures within the A.L.P. hoped the groups could continue to 
be employed as a means by which diversity of opinion within the trade unions, 
1 6 and the party as a whole, could be contained within manageable bounds. 
Apart from establishing official industrial groups in the interests of 
industrial peace, the Labor party sought to contain labour militancy by 
legislative means. After the meat dispute, the mood of the government 
towards dissent within the union movement made it highly receptive to 
representations from the A.W.U. for legislation to assist it to crush a 'rank 
and file committee' which had operated in western Queensland (and New South 
Wales) in opposition to the A.W.U. officialdom for some years. According to 
certain sources, the committee was 'a Communistic inspired organisation'. In 
16. A.L.P. Official Record of the Twenty-First Labor-in-Politics 
Convention (Brisbane: The Worker Newspaper, 1953), pp.71,72. 
318 
November and December 1946, the minister for Labour and Employment, the 
attorney general, the solicitor general and the industrial registrar spent 
considerable time in an attempt to formulate appropriate legislation. The 
possibilities under the Criminal Code, the Trade Union Act and The Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act were explored in some depth. It was not for 
the want of effort, however, that the enterprise was ultimately abandoned. 
Seemingly intractable difficulties with the wording of the bill meant that it 
did not proceed past the stage of a preliminary draft. ' Other legislative 
proposals by the government, however, did not meet the same fate. 
The 1946 Meat Industry Dispute shattered a comfortable conventional 
wisdom in A.L.P. circles that the postwar upsurge in industrial conflict in 
Australia was a 'southern' phenomenon unlikely to affect Queensland 
directly. This view was held despite public service advice in November 1945 
that an elevated level of industrial conflict would persist for some time and 
that a certain amount of industrial disputation was inevitable: 
There are times when disputes between employer 
and employee, like disputes between nations, can 
only be settled after a trial of strength. While this 
is regrettable, it would be foolish to shut our eyes 
to the fact that such a condition exists, and,... 
always will exist. 
It took a dispute of the magnitude of the meat dispute, however, to get the 
government to appreciate that industrial relationships in Queensland 
contained a conflict potential similar to that which existed in the other 
states. A shocked and angry government concluded that the dispute had 
exposed major flaws in The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. The 
institutional protection against strikes on which the government had based its 
17. G. Ridal to T.A. Foley, 9 October 1946; C Fallon to T.A. Foley, 22 
October 1946; P.J. Wallace to The Acting Under Secretary, 
Department of Labour and Employment, 4 November 1946; Solicitor 
General to the Attorney General, 13 December 1946; A/9896, Q.S.A. 
18. Industrial Registrar to The Minister for Labour and Employment, 27 
November 1945, A/9896, Q.S.A. 
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belief that major disputes would not occur in Queensland had apparently 
failed. It moved quickly to repair what it saw were the faults. The 
government's assessment of the wave of postwar strikes, and the meat dispute 
in particular, convinced it that industrial conflict was a product of the work 
of 'agitators', human attitudes and individual 'maladjustment' to changing 
I 9 
social circumstances.^ The government knew there was little it could do to 
change matters of individual psychology at least in the short term. It could, 
however, invoke legislative means to assist neutralise the work of agitators 
and to effect institutional changes in the interests of 'harmony in industry'.^^ 
The 'meat dispute' amendments to The Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act were designed to give the court greater flexibility in 
deregistration matters, to guarantee the existence of an accurate electoral 
roll for the proper conduct of ballots amongst union members, to bring such 
ballots under the control of the court and to ensure that it exercised 
jurisdiction over any industrial dispute at the earliest possible moment. 
Provision was made for heavy fines in cases of breaches of the new sections of 
21 
the Act. These amendments to the industrial law involved a major 
extension by the state of its influence over the internal affairs of trade 
unions. The legislation in respect of membership records, ballots and 
deregistration substantially increased the power of the court. The 
centrepiece of the legislation concerned secret strike ballots and the 
development of a supporting information system. The government was 
anxious to avoid a repeat performance of the fiasco which occurred when it 
attempted to conduct a ballot of meatworkers under the authority of its 
emergency powers in June and July 1946. 
19. Q.P.D. 184 (1946): 1880. The government also believed that a high 
incidence of strikes occurred in societies with an educated, socially 
advanced population in which trade union organisation was strong. 
E.M. Hanlon to The Senior Trade Commissioner, The Canadian 
Government Trade Commissioner's Office, 10 April 1947, batch 536, 
'Industrial Matters', premier's department, Brisbane. 
20. Q.P.D. 189 (1946): 1933. 
21. Breaches of the meat dispute amendments by unions could attract 
fines of up to $900 (approximate figure in 1983 values). 
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The 1946 amendments thus instructed unions and employers to 
maintain highly specified membership and employment records under the 
general supervision of the court. The government also armed it with the 
power to order court-controlled compulsory secret postal ballots in mat ters 
associated with strikes or lock-outs. It was determined that in future no union 
would fail to conduct secret ballots in the case of proposed strikes. Prior to 
these amendments. The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act prohibited 
strikes and lock-outs unless they were authorised by majority support in a 
secret ballot in which all union members were given the opportunity of 
participating. Responsibility for conducting the actual ballots was vested in 
the unions. Although the Act required the results of these ballots to be 
notified to the industrial registrar, and although it gave the court the power 
to decide any dispute over the process of authorisation, the court possessed 
little capacity to influence the timing and conduct of ballots. The 1946 
amendments changed this situation. Unions still retained the responsibility to 
initiate and conduct a ballot, but the court was specifically empowered to 
take over the whole proceedings if it believed a ballot had not commenced 
within a reasonable t ime, or if it considered any aspect of a ballot was 
improper or irregular. The amendments specified the form such intervention 
was to take. The court was instructed to conduct a secret postal ballot in 
which voting was compulsory. 
The government also moved to ensure that the processes of 
arbitration would be automatically act ivated in the early stages of a dispute. 
A further amendment made it compulsory for employers, unions, employer 
organisations and individual employees to report immediately to the 
arbitration authorities industrial disputes, or any disagreement likely to lead 
to an industrial dispute. The court was instructed to hear and determine these 
77 disputes without delay. Many quarters within the labour movement were 
22. This limitation on the court 's discretion did not, however, survive for 
long. Strong pressure from the president of the court secured an 
amendment to the Act in 1947 which restored the court 's freedom to 
decide how it would respond to actual or potential industrial 
disputes. Working Paper on a draft of A Bill To Amend 'The Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Acts, 1932 to 1946', in certain particulars 
A/9884, Q.S.A. 
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bitterly opposed to these amendments. They were variously described as 
73 
'penal, destructive, and anti-union' "^  and as part of an assault on the right to 
strike by the government.^ The Communist party, in particular, was 
outraged. 
The 1946 amendments also provided for improvements in various 
working conditions. Many union officials argued that these were merely a 
'sugar coating' designed to make the stringent meat dispute sections more 
palatable. There is some evidence, far from conclusive however, that this 
75 accusation contained some substance. Work on drafting the amendments 
began in August 1946. The initial rough draft of the bill addressed exclusively 
the task of expanding the court's power to control ballots in respect of strikes 
and lock-outs. According to a subsequent department of Labour and Industry 
document the government was concerned with legislating '...to protect 
unionists against unscrupulous exploitation at the hands of the minority who 
76 had a political and not an industrial objective'. Attention continued to be 
focused on this matter as the amending bill continued through the drafting 
process. It was not until the sixth draft, completed on 28 November 1946, 
that advances in conditions of work were included in the proposed 
legislation. Whatever the inspiration for these additions, they were obviously 
decided upon very quickly. The fifth draft, dated 25 November 1946, 
27 contained no reference to them. 
The government and its supporters in the unions dismissed all 
23. The Meat Industry Journal of Queensland January 1947, p.7. 
24. A.F.U.L.E. Report of Queensland Division of A.F.U.L.E. to Federal 
Conference l o r Year 1946 30 September 1946, E212/447 A.F.U.L.E. 
deposit, A.N.U.A.B.L., pp. 6,7. 
25. The bill papers relating to the 1946 amendments to The Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act cannot be located despite long and 
comprehensive searches in the Queensland State Archives and in 
several government departments. 
26. Department of Labour and Industry. Typescript 12 May 1950, p.8. 
27. Premier's Department. Labour A/6625, Q.S.A. 
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• • 79. 
opposition to the legislation as communist propaganda. In response to 
public criticism by the secretary of the T.L.C. (a member of the Communist 
party), and the announcement of a meeting of T.L.C. affiliated unions to 
discuss the amendments, counterclaims were circulated amongst trade unions 
in Brisbane: 
It is hoped that representatives of all unions will 
attend and let Mr. Healy and his gang of Black 
Australian supporters know that White Australia 
Labour supports the Queensland Labour 
Government and that Healy and his anti labour 
clique should leave the Trades Hall and clear out 
with their Chinese and Indonesian cobbers. 
As the date for the 1947 state elections approached, however, the various 
factions in the labour movement decided to mute their public attacks on the 
government's industrial legislation and on each other. A plan by several 
unions to boycott sections of the Act was abandoned. It was obvious that 
further public slanging matches could only provide the non-Labor parties with 
much needed electoral ammunition.^^ As the events of the railway dispute 
revealed, however, as far as the Communist party was concerned this was but 
a strategic retreat. 
Before a year had elapsed, the amendment designed to 'nip in the bud' 
impending industrial disputes was put to the test. It was a test which 
measured the extent to which the Labor party was prepared to implement its 
own legislation. It was a test comprehensively failed by the government. By 
mid-December 1947 it was apparent that the level of tension in the railway 
service over the margins issue was rising rapidly. On 12 December the 
railway unions had decided to conduct a workshops' strike if the matter was 
28. The Worker 13 January 1947. 
29. Typescript. Communist Anti Labour Propaganda n.d.. Arbitration and 
Conciliation 1947 file, T.L.C, Brisbane, not paginated. 
30. Meeting of union officials to discuss the recently amended Arbitration 
Act. Minutes 8 April 1947, Arbitration and Conciliation 1947 file, 
T.L.C, Brisbane, p.l . 
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not satisfactorily resolved by the end of January 1948. Had the government 
and the unions complied with the 1946 amendments to The Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act, both would have notified the industrial court 
of a potential dispute in the railways immediately. The government did not, 
however, inform the court officially in accordance with the Act until 29 
January 1948, two days before the union deadline, even though the minister 
for Transport had urged the premier's department on 12 December, and the 
minister for Labour on 17 December 1947, to prevail upon the court to 
conduct an early hearing of the Railway Award-State cases. 
There was support in the premier's department for the minister for 
Transport's desire for an early hearing, although there was apparently some 
confusion over who should approach the court. On 16 December, the under 
secretary of the premier's department finally asked the public service 
commissioner to assume this responsibility. Two days later the court 
announced that it would commence examining the cases ten weeks hence on 2 
March 1948. Whether the court made this decsion unilaterally or in 
consultation with the public service commissioner is impossible to say. 
Whatever the explanation, the announcement did little to pacify the unions. 
The unions informed the court in mid-January of a likely dispute. This 
action was, however, irrelevant to the situation. Even if the unions had 
notified an impending dispute a month earlier, the court would have done 
nothing to expedite the hearings of the claims. As a mat te r of policy the 
court would not take the initiative in resolving a dispute to which the 
government was a party unless the government specifically asked it to do 
31 
so.-^^ The government, and the government alone, therefore had the power to 
secure action by the court to address the railway dispute in its infancy. The 
government chose, however, not to notify the court of a possible dispute in 
the railways in accordance with its own legislation until the situation had gone 
well beyond the point of no return. In view of this, it is difficult to believe 
31 . Commissioner for Railways. Memorandum 29 January 1948, 2621, 
batch 14A, 'Information supplied Industrial Registrar. Industrial 
Action. Strike. Marginal Increases', commissioner for railways, 
Brisbane. 
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that V.C. Gair was completely serious when, in the month after the railway 
dispute, he told a senior union official that his 1946 amendment, designed to 
bring disputes before the court as quickly as possible, had operated 'very 
37 successfully'.-^ 
The establishment of official industrial groups and changes to the 
industrial code were but two of the four elements in the grand design for 
industrial peace in Queensland. The industrial court also had a role to play. 
The court entertained few doubts that its fundamental purpose was to prevent 
'industrial strife'. On philosophical occasions, members of the bench looked to 
a future in which state intervention in industrial relationships would diminish 
and ultimately wither away on account of '...a better understanding and co-
operation between employer and employee'.-'-' But the contemporary reality 
was one in which the press referred to strikes as 'crimes' and senior Labor 
politicians declared without reservation that there was no merit in industrial 
35 stoppages. 
With government support, the Queensland Industrial Court 
administered an uncompromising anti-strike policy. By removing the 
preference clauses in the meat industry awards in 1946, the court indicated in 
no uncertain terms it was prepared to withdraw this guarantee of a union's 
capacity to organise employees if that union failed to check any tendency of 
its members to engage in direct action. Pressure from a number of unions 
failed to persuade the government to remove the court's discretion in granting 
preference. The meat dispute also revealed that the court was prepared to 
register a new union despite the prior existence of a union to which employees 
could conveniently belong. This was a warning to unions that by participating 
in major industrial disputes, they could expect not only to lose their 
preference clause (and possibly their registration) but also the right to include 
32* V.C. Gair to H.L. Edmonds, 24 May 1948, A/9892, Q.S.A. 
33, The Telegraph 18 February 1947. 
34, The Courier-Mail 7 May 1947. 
35, The Courier-Mail 16 April 1947. 
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certain callings in their membership. Union representations asking that this 
36 power also be curtailed received short shrift from the government. 
Queensland unions were reminded by the court in the 1947 Nolan-
37 O'Brien cases-" of its powers to discipline union officials who supported 
strikes and/or who refused to comply with court orders restraining strike 
action. The court issued a dire warning to all officials not to offend in the 
38 future. It also moved to prevent the widespread dissemination of opinions 
and s tatements by union leaders which it held contravened the industrial 
code. The media were left in no doubt that the act of broadcasting any 
material which was potentially in breach of the industrial law was in itself an 
39 
offence. 
During the 1947 O'Brien contempt hearings, counsel for the industrial 
registrar (instructed by the crown solicitor) argued that s ta tements allegedly 
made by O'Brien at a mass meeting of railwaymen concerning the 
performance of the court had to be evaluated against the criterion that 
'Never,...in our time has there been greater need for industrial peace and 
consequently greater need for the public to repose the utmost confidence in 
the Court ' . Without such confidence, he continued, the court may have 
difficulty in enforcing its orders.^ This was the crux of the issue in the 
action brought against O'Brien. The court was determined that nothing stand 
in the way of its historic mission to promote industrial peace. 
36. Minister for Labour and Employment and Mines to J .J . Healy, 5 
November 1946, correspondence files, P.L.P., Parliament House, 
Brisbane. 
37. See Chapter 9. 
38. Transcript case no. 791 of 1947, office of the industrial registrar, 
Brisbane, p . l . 
39. Transcript case no. 790 of 1947, office of the industrial registrar, 
Brisbane, p . l . 
40. Transcript case no. 796 of 1947, office of the industrial registrar, 
Brisbane, p.3. 
41 . Ibid., p.5. 
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Two important court decisions in 1946 and 1949 made the conduct of a 
legal strike in Queensland a virtual impossibility. During the meat dispute, 
the court's action in restraining the proposed strikes by the A.F.U.L.E. and the 
A.R.U. involved a controversial interpretation of The Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act. The Act prohibited 'unauthorised' strikes and lock-outs. 
The method of authorisation specified that: 
A strike shall not be deemed to have been 
authorised until all the members of the industrial 
union who are engaged in the calling and in the 
district affected have had an opportunity of 
participating in a secret ballot taken at a general 
meeting duly constituted in accordance with the 
rules of the union, and a majority have voted in 
favour of such strike. 
In the case of the proposed A.R.U. and A.F.U.L.E. strike, the court directed 
all unions in the railways - not just the two unions contemplating strike action 
- to participate in a secret ballot. Unions other than those proposing strike 
action were to be given a voice in deciding whether or not the strike was 
authorised. -^  The court was attempting to introduce a principle that strikes 
had to be authorised on an industry-wide basis. This decision shocked many 
quarters of union opinion in Queensland. A typical response came from the 
A.F.U.L.E. It accused the court of wishing to prevent any union using 
industrial strength to combat '...any or all injustices perpetrated against its 
members,...'. The Hanlon government was not spared in this denunciation: 
'...the Government is challenging the right of members to "strike", no matter 
how justifiable such course of action may be. That is reaction in its most 
virulent form'. 
In 1949 the court reaffirmed a judgment it had made seven years 
42. The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts, 1932 to 1946 
(Brisbane: Government Printer, 1947), p.55. 
43. Railway Award-State. Judgment Q.I.G., 30 June 1946, p.230. 
44. A.F.U.L.E. Report of Queensland Division of A.F.U.L.E. to Federal 
Conference for Year 1946 pp.6,7. 
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earlier on the status of strikes which had been authorised as a result of 
majorities in secret ballots as required by The Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act. Such ballots, the court decided in 1942, only meant those 
involved were not subject to the pecuniary penalties in the industrial code for 
participation in an unauthorised strike. Expressions of majority support for 
strike action did not, however, prevent the court deregistering the relevant 
unions, cancelling their awards or taking whatever action it chose if the 
decision to strike was put into effect . When in 1949 after a secret ballot, 
Brisbane tramwaymen conducted a series of rolling strikes, the court 
reminded them that the ballot did not preclude it from ordering them to 
resume their duties and from imposing punishment on those who refused to 
obey such orders. The court also made it clear that , even in the case of an 
authorised strike, it would not hear any of the unions involved on any mat te r 
before it . The court saw access to arbitration and any form of direct action, 
authorised or not, as being totally incompatible. 
Despite this, the official political rhetoric suggested that there was, 
in fact, ample scope for workers to influence the pattern of industrial 
relations through direct action, as long as such action was decided upon in the 
appropriate way: 
That the arbitration system does not envisage the 
elimination of strikes, or the abolition of industrial 
unrest, is borne out by the provisions in 'The 
Industrial and Conciliation .Act' for legal 
s t r ikes. . . .^ ' 
Unionists on the shop floor, however, knew the truth of the mat ter only too 
well: 
45. The Courier-Mail 6 October 1942. 
46. Transcript case no. 87 of 1949, office of the industrial registrar , 
pp.3,15. 
47. E.M. Hanlon to The Senior Trade Commissioner, The Canadian 
Government Trade Commissioner's Office, 10 April 1947. 
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It is...felt that the present Act as it stands, which 
provides for a Ballot to be taken to decide on 
Strike Action, and then allows the Arbitration 
Court Judge to order men back to work, is 
dishonest.^" 
The court's policies in general, and in the tramway dispute in 
particular, were the subject of angry debates within the P.L.P. A substantial 
minority condemned the court's performance: 'The Court has been dictatorial 
in its action for some years now, it was not the conciliatory body we expected 
49 it to be'. The cabinet, however, was not prepared to overrule the court's 
refusal to hear representatives of striking unions or to reduce the court's 
power to order the termination of authorised strikes.^^ 
The court's decisions in the tramway strike and the government's 
unqualified support for its policies produced some fiery debates at the 1950 
Labor-in-Politics Convention. The convention debate revealed the deep 
concern within mainstream A.L.P. thought in Queensland at the performance 
of the court. The court was accused of adopting an 'arbitrary' attitude in 
ordering strikers to resume work without attempting conciliation. The 
convention was called upon to 
...sound the deathknell of the present attitude of 
the Court. When we go to the Court conciliation 
seems to be the last thing. In recent years the 
Court seems to be draping around it a great chain 
of legality. 
Criticism such as this came from a convention firmly under the control of 
48. V.J. Cooper to E.M. Hanlon, 4 March 1948, batch 536, 'Industrial 
Matters', premier's department, Brisbane. 
49. P.L.P. Minutes 16 March 1949, Parliament House, Brisbane, pp.l-3. 
50. Minister for Labour and Industry to F. Roberts, 11 July 1949, A/9886, 
Q.S.A. 
51. A.L.P. Official Record of the Twentieth Queensland Labor-in-Politics 
Convention February 1950. Typescript. Labor House, Brisbane, p.279. 
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delegates identified with the A.L.P. industrial groups. They had no ideological 
axe to grind with the industrial court . The convention was, nevertheless, 
outraged a t the court 's interpretations of an 'authorised strike'. It adopted as 
Labor party policy a resolution: 
That the Arbitration Act be amended so that when 
a union has taken a secret ballot of its members for 
a strike and such ballot is carried it should not be 
liable to have any further legal action taken and 
the decision to strike be carried into effect.^ 
Despite this clear instruction, the government maintained its refusal to 
reduce the court 's authority. Legislative endorsement of the proposal would 
have meant a government re t rea t from seeking all avenues of containing 
industrial conflict. The government would not acknowledge the legitimacy of 
any direct industrial action. The convention decision was ignored.^^ 
If The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act, the industrial court 
and, to a lesser extent , the industrial groups were to function effectively in 
containing industrial disputes, it was essential that a very high proportion of 
the Queensland workforce remain subject to s ta te law. A fourth element in 
the Labor party's programme for industrial peace thus involved stiffening a 
traditional s tates ' rights policy in mat ters affecting industrial relations. The 
Hanlon government identified a number of centralising tendencies in 
Australian industrial relations as threatening its ability to maintain industrial 
peace: an extension of the influence of the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Court, the growth of federal unions, and efforts to expand the 
federal government's industrial relations powers. In the early postwar years, 
for example, union pressure for legislation on the forty hour week was 
staunchly resisted by the Queensland government for fear that such unilateral 
action might encourage employers to seek federal as opposed to state award 
52. A.L.P. Official Record of the Twentieth Queensland Labor-in-Politics 
Convention (Brisbane: The Worker Newspaper, 1950), p.71. 
53. Minister for Labour and Industry to E.M. Hanlon, circa July 1951, 
A/9887, Q.S.A. 
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coverage. Had the employers succeeded in such an endeavour, the capacity of 
the Queensland government and the industrial court to influence industrial 
relationships across a broad spectrum of Queensland industry would have all 
but disappeared. 
The Hanlon government realised that the growth of powerful federal 
unions meant an ever increasing possibility that more and more unionists in 
Queensland would become involved in industrial disputes which were not 
purely local in origin. The coal industry provided a classic example of the 
government's attitudes. It was determined to shield the industry from 
disputes which arose as a result of '...an undesirable concentration of power in 
the Central Council of the Miners' Federation...'.^^ For this reason steps 
taken by Chifley between 1947 and 1949 for the establishment of a national 
authority to regulate industrial relationships throughout the coal industry 
were quickly and completely rejected by the Queensland government. The 
Hanlon government jealously guarded its constitutional rights in industrial 
relations matters. Proposals during the late 1940s that the national 
parliament assume more responsibility for the regulation of industrial 
relations through devices which included constitutional changes, reference of 
state powers or concurrent legislation were received with scorn. Even milder 
approaches failed to elicit a positive response. The Hanlon government 
refused point blank to have anything to do with Chifley's efforts to develop 
closer cooperation and consultation between governments in the area of 
55 industrial relations. 
54. Draft Letter from Premier to Prime Minister circa September 1949, 
A/9897, Q.S.A. 
55. Acting Under Secretary, Department of Labour and Industry to The 
Minister. Memorandum 2 September 1947, A/9898, Q.S.A. 
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In common with Labor governments, employers in Queensland were 
committed to the goal of industrial peace. Both, moreover, defined industrial 
peace in terms of the same ideological cr i ter ia . They believed that top 
priority should be given to the prevention, and ideally, the elimination of 
labour strikes, and that whatever conflict existed in industry ought to be 
managed within the arbitration system. Both held that legitimate industrial 
demands by Labour were confined to mat ters pertaining to wages and 
conditions. They also shared common definitions, and stressed the importance 
of, concepts such as efficiency and economic development. 
As the Second World War drew to a close, many employers in 
Queensland were apprehensive over likely developments in industrial 
relations. The circumstances of the war years had wrought profound changes 
to the previous pattern of industrial relationships. Many workers who had 
served their employers in apparent 'peace and harmony' for decades were now 
increasingly willing to engage in direct industrial action. Asked to account 
for this, one employee probably spoke for thousands of his fellows as he 
replied disarmingly ' "Boss, the simple fact is that it is our innings" '.^ All of 
this suggested that industrial relations in the postwar period would be 
markedly different to previous decades and that perhaps even fundamental 
change in the structure of Australian society was not out of the question. 
Employers saw much in these possibilities which was detrimental to 
their interests . With the Australian Labor Party in government in Canberra, 
as well as in five out of the six s ta tes , employers feared that the workforce 
had the political resources to realise many of its ambitions. Moreover, they 
were confronted by a confident and vocal Communist party, whose 
membership had grown from some 4,000 in 1941 to in excess of 20,000 in 
1945. Members of the Communist party figured prominently in the leadership 
of a number of significant trade unions. In Queensland, Fred Paterson's 
Discussion of P.J. Clarey, 'Industrial Relations After The War,' in L.G. 
Melville, S.M. Wadham, Hon. J .P . Abbott, Sir Herbert Gepp, P.J . 
Clarey, Australia's Post-War Economy (Sydney: Australasian 
Publishing Co. Pty Ltd in conjunction with the Australian Institute of 
Political Science, 1945), p.269. 
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election to the state parliament in 1944 and communist successes in local 
government elections in the north only confirmed and intensified employer 
misgivings over what they believed was the growing strength of the 
Communist party in political as well as industrial affairs. The programme of 
the Communist party emphasised widespread nationalisation, a government-
directed plan for postwar reconstruction, public investment, wage increases, 
reduced hours of work and other improvements in working conditions. The 
situation offered little comfort to employers apprehensive over the survival of 
a capitalist market economy in postwar Australia. 
Employers were determined, however, not to submit meekly to the 
labour movement's demands. They decided to fight to guarantee that the 
values and institutions of a private enterprise economy were maintained and 
strengthened in the postwar Australian society. In Queensland employers 
were warned that the postwar years would be '...a period of adjustments in our 
social, economic and political structure, with great potential effects upon 
2 
employers'. In order to ensure that these adjustments did not threaten their 
essential interests, employer bodies sought to implement an organisational, 
ideological and political programme which gave a high ranking to industrial 
relations issues. 
During the Second World War a small number of businessmen 
prominent in the activities of the Queensland Employers' Federation 
attempted to encourage closer unity in employer ranks. Such efforts had a 
long and generally unsuccessful history in Queensland, and between 1942 and 
1944 it appeared that the same fate would greet these latest proposals. Their 
sponsors were under no illusions as to the profound difficulties in such an 
enterprise. They were, nevertheless, motivated to embark once again on this 
apparently fruitless quest by a belief that the material and ideological 
interests of employers could encounter some very real dangers in the period of 
postwar reconstruction. This reflection on the likely nature of the peace was 
stimulated, in part, by a consideration of reports emanating from British 
2, Q.E.F. Circular 13 June 1945, Q.E.F. deposit, Oxley Library, 
Brisbane. 
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employer sources on postwar prospects especially in the area of employment 
-3 
policy. On the ideological front, although a tighter and more complete 
organisation could be expected to influence public opinion, it was hoped that 
the Institute of Public Affairs would assume the major role in explaining 
employer philosophies to the wider community.^ 
In October 1943 the executive of the Q.E.F. decided to establish a 
committee to assess the likely postwar situation and to define the range of 
appropriate employer responses and initiatives. The extraordinary difficulty 
experienced in creating this committee bore stark testimony to the 
monumental lack of interest in employer ranks on matters of postwar 
reconstruction. It took over six months before the committee was 
constituted. In the meantime, the Q.E.F. office bearers could only stand idly 
by and express anger and disappointment at the apathy and short-sightedness 
of employers which seemed to be Australia-wide.^ Gradually, however, the 
message began to influence a wider circle of employer opinion in 
Queensland. From June 1944 members of the Q.E.F. were aware of concern in 
employer ranks in other states, especially in Victoria, over possible 
developments in peacetime Australia, while later that year overseas and 
domestic employer documents on issues of postwar reconstruction were 
considered by the Q.E.F. and some other employer bodies. By mid-1945, with 
the reality of the outbreak of peace staring them in the face, a considerably 
wider number of employer organisations was prepared to give some serious 
consideration to the challenges of postwar reconstruction. 
Representatives of some eighty Queensland employer organisations 
attended a meeting in Brisbane on 10 July 1945 convened by the Q.E.F. to 
consider establishing an employers' united front. Reaction to the concept was 
3. Q.E.F. Annual Report. 1942-1943 Q.E.F. deposit, Oxley Library, 
Brisbane, p.l . 
4. Q.E.F. Executive Committee. Minutes 17 December 1942, Q.E.F. 
deposit, Oxley Library, Brisbane, p.l . 
5. Q,E.F. Secretary's Report to Council 15 May 1944, Q.E.F. deposit, 
Oxley Library, Brisbane, p.l . 
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generally favourable. It appealed to those who saw in it the potential to 
counter a 'swing towards the left wing' in Australia and to act as a bulwark 
against Communism. To those who feared the 'growth of democracy', to those 
who wished to put 'aggressive' trade union leaders back where they belonged, 
and to those who saw closer unity in the form of a 'Trades and Labor Council 
of Employers' as an indispensible prerequisite for effective lobbying of 
governments, the creation of a united front was a necessary step in defending 
general employer interests . 
The outcome of these deliberations was a decision to revamp the rules 
of the Q.E.F. to enable it to assume the mantle of the peak council of 
Queensland employers. The committee appointed to carry out the revision 
consisted of representatives of the Metal Trades Employers' Association, the 
Queensland Cane Growers' Council, the Australian Sugar Producers' 
Association, the Brisbane Merchants' Association, the Queensland Chamber of 
Manufactures, the United Graziers' Association, the United Retailers ' 
Institute, the Western and South-Western Retailers ' Association, the 
Queensland Timber Stabilisation Board, the North Queensland Employers' 
Association, the Central Queensland Employers' Association, the Mackay 
Employers' Association and the Queensland Employers' Federation. In less 
than a year the task was completed. On 1 July 1946, the employers' united 
front was formally proclaimed when the Q.E.F. commenced operations under a 
new constitution. This reconstruction of the Q.E.F. was a means by which it 
was hoped to achieve a range of important goals. One of these goals, crucial 
to the realisation of the employers' ultimate ambitions, was the centralisation 
of their industrial relations policy. 
During the reconstruction years, the Q.E.F. had mixed success as it 
strove to persuade the specialist employer organisations to accept its policy 
on major issues and to concede that it should be the sole voice on mat te r s of 
general employer concern in Queensland. It often managed to forge a 
common employer policy on important wage cases, it was able to secure 
6. Conference of representatives of employers' organisations. Minutes 
10 July 1945, Q.E.F. deposit, Oxley Library, Brisbane, pp.2,3,7,9. 
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agreement on the content of submissions to the minister for Labour and it 
cajoled employers to speak as one on matters such as weekend penalty rates. 
In a number of cases, however, old habits died hard. There was more than a 
drop of blood spilt as the Q.E.F. sought to curb the anarchistic industrial 
practices of the Master Builders' Association as it solemnly promised to 
consult with its brother employers on the one hand, while on the other, it 
treated them in a manner bordering on the cavalier as it negotiated 
unilaterally with the various unions in the building industry.' 
Attempts by individual employer organisations to effect a 
centralisation of industrial relations policy met with varying degrees of 
success. With bouyant markets the order of the day, there was the constant 
risk that certain of their members would fail to 'hold the line' as they 
scrambled to attract what was very often scarce labour from their 
competitors, or as deals were done with unions in order to guarantee 
continuity of production. Despite this, employer organisations showed great 
tenacity of purpose as they conducted a never ending propaganda campaign 
amongst their members designed to inculcate a sense of 'responsibility' to 
their fellow employers. This campaign was waged by specialist employer 
associations as well as at the peak council level by the Q.E.F. Individual 
employers were urged to seek the prior advice of their employer association if 
they were contemplating making any unilateral concessions to the unions, they 
were counselled to attend conferences to plan coordinated responses to those 
union claims submitted to arbitration and they were warned that, above all 
else, major matters of principle ought to be determined by arbitration and not 
by consent. 
7. Q.E.F. Secretary's Report to Executive Committee 22 August 1946, 
p.2; Meeting of employers' representatives re application to vary 
Building Trades Award. Notes 31 October 1949, p.l; Secretary's 
Report to Council 1 December 1949, pp.1,2; Q.E.F. deposit, Oxley 
Library, Brisbane. 
8, Queensland Chamber of Manufactures (Q.C.M.). Council. Minutes 25 
October 1949, p.2; Industrial Committee's Report 31 August 1949, 
p.2; Queensland Chamber of Manufactures Service Bulletin 4 
February 1946, p.5; Queensland Confederation of Industry (Q.C.I.), 
Brisbane. 
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So concerned were the employer organistions with this campaign to 
present a united front to the unions that some of their efforts flew in the face 
of contemporary economic reality. Over-award payments were a case in 
point. Despite the fact that over-award payments were an important fact of 
economic life in Queensland in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Q.C.M. still 
felt it worthwhile to lecture its members regularly on the evils of such 
concessions. According to the chamber, the indiscriminate practice of paying 
employees in excess of award rates was unethical and was 
...particularly objectionable when employers adopt 
it as a means of attracting employees from other 
employment. It does nothing whatever to increase 
the total number of employees in industry and only 
succeeds in creating a wage spiral, to the ultimate 
detriment of all. 
As the Second World War drew to a close, various employer interests, 
albeit slowly, recognised a need to participate fully in the public debate over 
what constituted the most appropriate character and structure of Australian 
society in the postwar years. Although public comment came from a wide 
variety of employer sources, it was the I.P.A. which developed a considered, 
coherent and integrated statement of employer philosophy which it believed 
ought to guide the process of postwar reconstruction.^^ In Queensland, as in 
the other states, the I.P.A. had close links with business.^ ^ The membership 
of its governing body and the councils of major employer organisations 
1 7 
overlapped. One of its chief functions was the preparation and distribution 
of anti-communist propaganda as well as material extolling the virtues of a 
9, Queensland Chamber of Manufactures Service Bulletin 22 June 1951, 
p.7. 
10, J,R, Hay, 'The Institute Of Public Affairs And Social Policy In World 
War II,' Historical Studies 20 (October 1982):209. 
11. Connell and Irving, Class Structure, p.290. 
12. T.L,C. Here is a Close-Up of the Institute of Public Affairs 
(Queensland) radio scripts file, T.L.C, Brisbane. 
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private enterprise economy.^-' The Victorian I.P.A. published a document in 
1944 entitled Looking Forward. A Post-War Policy For Australian 
Industry.^^ In the following year, the New South Wales I.P.A. published What 
Is Ahead For Australia?^^ Both documents enjoyed considerable press 
attention and wide circulation throughout Australia, including Queensland 
where copies were distributed by the Queensland I.P.A. In each document 
principles and policies were enunciated which amounted to a carefully 
considered social, economic and political blueprint. This programme, which 
placed considerable emphasis on industrial relations matters, reiterated many 
of the traditional employer responses to past threats, real or imagined, to 
labour discipline and commitment, and to the survival of private enterprise 
institutions and values. 
The I.P.A. blueprint assured Australians that if they desired rising 
material standards of living, an expanding economy was vital.^^ Economic 
growth, moreover, could best be achieved by the development of both internal 
and external markets by private firms since only in a private enterprise 
economy could competitive efficiency be achieved.^' Competitive 
efficiency, however, depended above all else on 'industrial harmony'.^" 
Without this, everything would be lost. The analysis presented in What Is 
Ahead For Australia? entertained no doubts on who was supposed to harmonise 
with whom: it was the workforce - Labour - which was to do the 
harmonising. Industrial harmony, moreover, required members of the 
workforce to give certain ideological guarantees to employers by accepting 
the existence of competitive labour markets, private property rights and the 
13. Communists in Unions Press for Misery, Chaos and Revolution! 
(Brisbane: I.P.A., circa April 1946), not paginated. 
14, Looking Forward, A Post-War Policy For Australian Industry 
(Melbourne: I.P,A., Victoria, 1944). 
15. What Is Ahead For Australia? (Sydney: I.P.A., New South Wales, 1945). 
16, Ibid., p.58. 
17. Ibid., pp.18,20,25,26,44. 
18, Ibid., p.20. 
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1 9 right to an investment profit^^ as well as conceding that economic growth 
70 was the right and proper purpose of economic activity.''^ 'Industrial harmony' 
thus meant harmony with employer values and objectives. 
According to the I.P.A., workers could be assured that the call for 
industrial peace did not necessarily mean that they were being asked to 
abandon their resistance to any industrial injustice. It was perfectly possible 
to reconcile industrial peace and industrial justice, and to secure justice in a 
manner which would not disrupt production. The way to this promised land 
was adherence to the principle that all disputes be resolved through the 
processes of compulsory arbitration. There were, however, elements in the 
workforce who, so the I.P.A. believed, had been seduced by the teachings of 
those on the far left and had rejected arbitration. They posed a major threat 
73 to industrial harmony and therefore to competitive efficiency. ^ So did those 
workers whose rejection of arbitration on occasions in favour of direct action 
was designed to take advantage of labour shortages. To counter such 
excesses, the I.P.A. saw no alternative but for governments to use legislation 
to contain labour strikes and for those trade unionists who supported 
arbitration to oppose those who did not. 
The recipe for industrial peace contained several further elements. 
Demarcation and jurisdictional disputes between unions were seen as issues 
19. Ibid., p.52. 
20. Ibid., p.26. 
21. Logically industrial harmony could equally well have meant employers 
harmonising with the values and interests of Labour. The authors of 
What Is Ahead For Australia? did not, however, intend that their 
concept of industrial harmony be invested with this meaning. 
22. What Is Ahead For Australia? p.51. 
23. Ibid. 
24. Ibid., p.53. 
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which ought not affect employers, certainly not to the extent of being decided 
on the shop floor. Rather they were appropriately managed within the trade 
union movement. Schemes such as profit-sharing, bonus plans and certain 
types of employee participation, all of which were designed to extract greater 
productivity from workers,^^ and to increase their commitment to employer 
objectives, were also recommended as being worth a try in the interests of 
industrial peace and competitive efficiency.^^ 
Competitive efficiency could only be advanced if wage increases were 
linked to improvements in productivity. The I.P.A. stressed that the rate of 
advance towards material abundance was limited by the capacity of the 
private sector. Australians ought to have realistic expectations as opposed to 
some of the wilder flights of fancy which accompanied many prescriptions for 
a postwar new order.^' The expectations, however, which employers strove 
above all else to dampen were those which concerned full employment. As 
the Second World War approached its final battle, the minds of employers in 
Australia were less exercised by Communism, or the possibility that the 
A.L.P. federal government might lead the country towards Socialism, than by 
the immediate prosfject of a peacetime economy in which labour in general 
would be at a premium. 
The prospects of a full employment economy posed something of a 
dilemma for employer ideologists. On the one hand, they were well aware 
that community support for the continuation of a capitalist market economy 
depended on its capacity to provide continuous work for all those seeking 
28 it. One the other hand, they feared the implications for industrial 
25. Ibid., pp.21,54,55. 
26. Q.E.F. Special Convention. Minutes 19 May 1949, Q.E.F. deposit, 
Oxley Library, Brisbane, pp.2,3. 
27. What Is Ahead For Australia? pp.21,22.56.57. 
28. Connell and Irving, Class Structure, p.334. 
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discipline, the existence of a pool of labour to facilitate the rapid expansion 
79 30 
of new industries'^ and the relative bargaining strength of the trade unions-"^  
if the goals of the 1945 white paper on employment were to be realised.-'^ 
The dilemma was resolved, at least in principle, by the argument that 
'high' employment was a natural concomitant of private employers being 
allowed free rein to get on with the job of developing markets. If private 
enterprise was not held back by 'restrictive' labour practices or by 
'inappropriate' government activity, and if the unions contributed positively to 
what ought to be a common goal of enhancing production, then there should be 
37 
no fear of mass unemployment. The federal government, nevertheless, 
ought to assume the ultimate responsibility for the maintenance of high 
employment levels.-^^ High levels of employment were attainable. 'Full' 
employment, on the other hand, was an impossible dream, an illusion conjured 
up by an unpatriotic and dishonest political leadership. Even high 
employment, however, would disappear if unions took advantage of such 
conditions to press for wage increases and other benefits by direct industrial 
35 action.'^-' 
Employers hoped that discipline and commitment would be 
forthcoming from the vast majority of the workforce: 'Indiscipline and 
slackness are not characteristic of the great body of Australian workers,...'. 
However, 
29. Discussion of P.J. Clarey, 'Industrial Relations After The War,' p.268. 
30. What Is Ahead For Australia? p.50. 
31. Full Employment in Australia (Canberra: Commonwealth Government 
Printer, 30 May 1945). 
32. What Is Ahead For Australia? pp.10,11,58. 
33. Ibid., pp.59,60. 
34. Ibid., p.57. 
35. Ibid., pp.49,50. 
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...a minority, irresponsible, neglectful of its duties, 
and deliberately fomenting unrest and disorder, can 
have a disastrous influence on industrial morale and 
efficiency. Under conditions of full employment, 
where a man knows that there is probably another 
job around the corner, a fertile ground is provided 
for the activities of the irresponsible. There must 
be available, therefore, adequate sanctions to be 
applied against those who will not observe the 
ordinary decencies of human conduct, and who tend 
to weaken the moral fibre of the community.-'^ 
Amongst the sanctions sought by employers was the unrestricted 
power of direct dismissal, a power which was severely limited under the 
National Security Regulations. The danger was, however, that this could 
prove less than effective if people so dismissed could fall back on 
unemployment benefits. A cardinal feature of any postwar scheme of social 
security thus ought to be '...that a person dismissed for gross misconduct 
forgoes [sic] the right to draw unemployment benefits'. Personal security 
ought to depend on cooperative and diligent performance of work. 
Consultative councils, apart from their therapeutic function in improving the 
quality of intra-firm communications, could also be used as a means of 
applying peer group pressure against those workers who would not conform to 
the required standards of discipline and commitment.-'' 
Capital thus offered Labour a choice. If Labour would concede to 
employers the unchallenged right to decide the ends and means of economic 
activity, then a measure of economic security would be forthcoming as would, 
eventually, a state of material grace for almost everybody. If, however. 
Labour sought to effect any fundamental change in Australian society, or, on 
a less grand scale, decided to exploit its new-found bargaining strength by 
engaging in direct industrial action, then economic growth would suffer, and 
without economic growth 
..., the objective of high employment, the adequate 
36, Looking Forward p.63. 
37. Ibid., p.64. 
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relief of the unemployment likely to exist from 
time to time, the bettering of the living standards 
of all, and the adequate defence of the nation will 
all alike suffer. To challenge that statement is to 
live in a world of make-believe.-'" 
To what extent could this model for postwar reconstruction be defined 
as 'a new ideology'?-'" It certainly did not amount to a complete reshaping of 
ideological principles. To reiterate an earlier point, many of the ideas 
contained in both Looking Forward and What Is Ahead For Australia? were not 
new. For many years before the Second World War employers had, for 
example, espoused with varying intensity 'harmony and partnership' 
sentiments, profit-sharing and other incentive schemes, and the virtues of 
private enterprise. Connell and Irving, and J.R. Hay, seem to agree that the 
new element in the I.P.A. statement of philosophy was a 'growth-and-welfare 
social programme'. Their assessments of the industrial relations significance 
of the programme, however, differ to a degree. Connell and Irving explain it 
in terms of 'investment in a contented workforce'.^^ Hay, on the other hand, 
whilst conceding this is an attractive hypothesis, is less certain that it can be 
sustained by the available evidence.^^ 
In many respects, employer organisations in Queensland in the early 
postwar years pursued a policy consistent with the I.P.A. model. On a wide 
range of issues, this involved nothing more than adherence to traditional 
policies. Employer spokespersons took every opportunity to argue that the 
future welfare of the people of Queensland depended on a positive attitude to 
hard work,^^ on an acceptance that an essential prerequisite for economic 
38. What Is Ahead For Australia? pp.58.59. 
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growth was the continuation of a private capitalist organisation of 
production^-' and on the maintenance of industrial peace.'^'^ A community 
commitment to Capitalism required a 'constructive' attitude to the profit 
motive. This involved a realisation and acceptance of the necessity for a 'fair' 
return to the private investor.^^ It involved, furthermore, no interference 
with traditional managerial prerogatives. Any proposals for 'worker 
participation' in enterprise decision-making which trespassed on this sacred 
ground would be resisted to the utmost. 
The means of achieving industrial peace advocated by Queensland 
employers owed much to their views on the causes of industrial conflict. 
Employers saw industrial conflict in terms of the labour strike or some 
variation on this theme such as a go-slow. Inter-, as well as intra-union 
struggles, could be manifested in this way, although conflict could also occur 
as the result of the work of agitators, particularly members of the Communist 
party, and as the consequence of union leaders seeking to satisfy a 
psychological need to say 'Stand and Deliver'. Union leaders, furthermore, so 
employers believed sought to manipulate, with considerable success, a 
fundamentally unwilling rank and file to take direct industrial action. False 
leadership could account for a significant amount of industrial conflict. 
Industrial conflict, therefore, did not arise out of the fundamental character 
of industrial relationships in a capitalist market economy. It was thus 
susceptible to management: it was capable of being suppressed or contained in 
ways which would pose no threat to the basic structure of a private enterprise 
economy. 
In practical terms, this meant the destruction of the influence and 
position of false prophets, and their replacement by new leaders and a new 
43. The Queensland Chamber of Manufactures Yearbook 1948. p.l83. 
44. Q.E.F. Press Statement president of the Q.E.F. 28 March 1946, 
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philosophy. Success in these endeavours would make a major contribution to 
the goal of industrial peace. The first and urgent priority was the need to 
eliminate all traces of Communism, not only in industrial affairs, but also in 
all aspects of Australian society.^' With the destruction of Communism, 
employers hoped that workers would accept 'responsible' trade union leaders 
and would embrace the harmony and partnership model of industry and 
industrial relationships which employers themselves found so attractive. One 
of the principal methods used by employers in Queensland to help bring about 
changes in the leadership of the trade unions was to encourage and support the 
A.L.P. industrial groups. A labour movement under their control would not 
challenge employer prerogatives and status in Australian society. Employers 
helped the cause of the industrial groups by providing them with financial 
assistance,*" by distributing anti-communist propaganda in the workplace'^^ 
and by encouraging their employees to vote for grouper candidates in trade 
union elections. Employer organisations kept their member companies 
informed of the dates of various union elections and provided details of 
relevant industrial group tickets.^^ 
Queensland employers knew that the elimination of Communism as a 
political force would not be sufficient to protect their position in society. 
They appreciated the I.P.A. emphasis on the need for an alternative to 
Marxism and other left-wing doctrines which would help convince Labour of 
the legitimacy and value of private enterprise economic relationships. The 
harmony and partnership model, reinvigorated by the I.P.A. in the mid-1940s, 
was their answer to the intellectual challenge of the communists and 
47. The Queensland Chamber of Manufactures Yearbook 1948, p.183. 
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socialists. The interests of Capital were clearly also the interests of Labour: 
The 19th century attitude towards industrial 
relations still maintained by some unions presumes 
that employees and employers live in separate 
worlds. Nothing could be further from reality. 
Eighty per cent, of the income of our country is 
earned by private enterprise and employees and 
employers are complementary units of our 
society. The battle fought by unionists against 
unscrupulous employers ended long ago. We have 
now reached the state of industrial relationships 
where it can be said 'united we stand, divided we 
fall'; and the spectacle of unionists keeping alive 
their outmoded attitude...is a tragic 
anachronism.^ 
The partnership model was meant to be applied at the macro level as 
well as at the level of the individual enterprise. There was a tripartite 
responsibility for Australia's economic future which ought to be accepted and 
shared by government, business and Labour.^ In 1950 employer 
representatives sought to institutionalise this 'responsibility' by means of a 
submission to the new prime minister and the state premiers favouring the 
foundation of a National Joint Advisory Council consisting of representatives 
of Capital and Labour with the function of advising the federal government 
...on matters of common concern, on economic 
policy which impinges on the interests of employers 
and employees and on measures designed to 
improve industrial relations and productive 
efficiency.^-' 
Employers, however, did not place their faith exclusively in harmony and 
partnership rhetoric. They were ever on the lookout for effective practical 
51. Queensland Industry February 1953, p.4. 
52. What Is Ahead For Australia? p.59; Q.E.F. President's Address to 
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means of enforcing discipline and providing incentives. Full employment and 
high wages had reduced the effectiveness of the traditional ways of securing 
these. Replacements were therefore urgently required. 
In such a climate some employers were increasingly attracted by the 
apparent appeal of the techniques of personnel management which, although 
in a fledgling state of development, seemed to promise much. Indicative of 
this trend was a resolution adopted at a Melbourne meeting on 'Management-
Employee Relations' in May 1950 that governments cooperate to establish a 
research organisation '...for the purpose of developing and publicising essential 
factual information that will aid in the promotion of improved human 
relations'.^^ By late 1952, Elton Mayo had well and truly replaced F.W. 
Taylor as the man of ideas many employers wished to hear.-'" Mayo, 
according to an editorial in Queensland Industry, the journal of the Queensland 
Chamber of Manufactures, 
...realised that, perhaps more than anything else, it 
is necessary for the worker to have a sense of self-
respect, of usefulness and importance. He must be 
made to feel that he is not a mere cog in a great 
machine which he does not understand and 
therefore fears, but an important part of the 
whole; that he is doing a good job, and what he 
does is aporeciated by his fellow workers and 
employers.-' 
The moral of the story was clear: 'Unhappy and dissatisfied workers 
cannot and will not produce'. Queensland employers would have to abandon 
Taylor while unionists would have to abandon their class perspective: 
54. Robert C Wilson to The Acting President, Australian Council of 
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Hard-headed, hard-fisted management on the one 
hand, working with the idea that 'a coddled worker 
will loaf; militant unionists, on the other hand, 
working with the idea that anything that 
management does is wrong, cannot produce a 
working atmosphere suitable for efficient industry. 
If all parties would adopt this advice, the outcome would be security for 
employers and employees, reasonable profits and wages and a 'chance to 
advance'. The required atmosphere could, however, only be created if the new 
commandments were obeyed, if 'wholesome human relationships' were 
maintained in industry.^" A new messiah had arrived. Mayo had given the 
partnership model an aura of intellectual respectability. What was equally 
important, however, was that a means of implementing it successfully had 
been promised to the faithful by the emergent science of personnel 
management. 
Some employers were nevertheless skeptical of the claims and 
methods of the human relations school of industrial psychology. They found 
it difficult to foresake a firmly entrenched belief that money made the world 
go round and held to a long-standing view that incentive payments could be 
sufficient to encourage employees to put their best foot forward in matters of 
discipline and commitment. Incentive payments were seen as an important 
way of increasing productivity and in encouraging workers to undertake 
unpleasant tasks. If they decided to implement these schemes, however, 
employers were warned by their organisations that under no circumstances 
should they agree to the establishment of joint management-worker 
committees to administer incentive payment schemes. Such employee 
participation was seen as the thin end of the wedge as far as 'job control' was 
concerned.^^ 
58. Ibid. 
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Employers believed that a powerful means of managing industrial 
conflict was to institutionalise it: support for conciliation and arbitration was 
a feature of both employer word and deed. They argued that the state ought 
to maintain industrial peace: government had the responsibility to enforce 
'...a reasonable degree of discipline in industry'.^^ When it came to 
formulating desired principles in more precise terms, there was some 
ambivalence over a range of issues associated with conciliation and 
arbitration. A state system of compulsory arbitration clearly required the 
organisation of the workforce into trade unions. The risk was that such 
organisations might refuse to play by the rules and might seek to alter the 
distribution of income and power by means of direct action and/or political 
lobbying. Employers were thus confronted with a dilemma over the extent to 
which they ought to support the principle of compulsory unionism. 
Views on this matter differed considerably ranging from total 
opposition"'^ from the Metal Trades Employers' Association to qualified 
support by many small employers who saw in unions a means of disciplining 
their employees."^ Others were prepared to accept compulsory unionism 
provided the unions were subject to strict legal controls, their financial 
records were open for inspection and matters of union policy were decided by 
secret ballot."* On balance, employers rejected compulsory unionism, 
although they accepted the 'preference in employment to unionists' provisions 
of the Queensland industrial code as constituting the most acceptable 
compromise between the need to organise the workforce to facilitate its 
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effective control and the potential for organised Labour to act outside the 
arbitration system. 
One way employers hoped the arbitration system could assist in 
preventing direct action was through compulsory court-controlled secret 
ballots on strikes. A new lease of life was thus given to an idea which had 
been touted at various times since at least 1917. Proposals designed to 
strengthen The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act in this area were 
floated by the Q.E.F. during 1946. This prescription for involving the 
arbitration system in the search for industrial peace was consistent with 
employer beliefs on the causes of industrial conflict: 
...the workers, many of whom are entirely out of 
sympathy with extremism, do not, or cannot, exert 
any influence in their own unions....The union 
officers are in full control." 
It seemed obvious to many employers that a compulsory court-controlled 
secret ballot would, by insulating rank and file workers from their 
manipulative leaders, result in majorities on most, if not all, occasions against 
direct action. The added advantage of seeking to prevent strikes in this way 
was that such a policy could be justified in terms of an extension of 
democratic practice thus avoiding any odium it might otherwise at tract . 
Increasingly throughout the late 1940s, however, Queensland 
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employers entertained doubts on whether compulsory court-controlled secret 
ballots were likely to produce the desirable results confidently anticipated by 
their supporters."" Their initial attractiveness as a panacea for employer 
difficulties with labour militancy began to wane. In late 1948, senior officers 
in the Q.E.F. realised that the administrative requirements for the successful 
conduct of such ballots could well include compulsory unionism '...which we 
can ill-afford at a time when many important Federal Unions are under 
Communist domination'. By February 1950, these early misgivings had 
hardened into complete opposition to the idea. Pre-strike secret ballots under 
state legislation in Queensland in the late 1940s had generally revealed 
overwhelming rank and file support for strike action, a result which was 
clearly the opposite to that confidently anticipated by many employers. They 
thus abandoned their support for the ballot principle and instead turned to 
69 advocating a complete legislative prohibition of labour strikes. 
Employers also explored other legislative avenues with the object of 
containing organised Labour. They called on the government to outlaw the 
union practice of declaring a particular job or an industry black and to require 
unions to disclose publicly the source and use of their funds.'^ Employers also 
privately considered a requirement that the rules of registered industrial 
unions ought to conform to a model to be specified in The Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act and that unions be forced to lodge a 
substantial sum of money with the government from which fines and penalties 
could be extracted. It was also suggested that union officials be made 
personally liable for any financial penalties incurred by their union and that, 
in addition to fines, union officials who breached that part of The Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act which prohibited unauthorised strikes ought 
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to be disqualified from holding office. 
Two further areas were investigated. Early in 1948 the Institute of 
Public Affairs sought the advice of counsel regarding common law actions for 
damages against 'strike agitators'. On the basis of this, and other research, 
the Q.E.F. decided later that year to approach the minister for Labour 
requesting the removal of the immunity enjoyed by unions and union officials 
against civil actions for damages arising out of an illegal strike.^^ Employers 
also sought to persuade the minister to make annual leave entitlements 
dependent on non-participation in strikes and on a satisfactory attendance at 
work. Such legislative support would, so employers believed, prove invaluable 
in assisting them to maintain discipline, and to minimise strikes, stop-work 
meetings and other forms of withdrawal of labour such as absenteeism. •' 
Employers also saw the arbitration system as providing a means of 
containing improvements in wages and conditions within the bounds of what 
industry held it could afford to pay. They conceded that judgments on this 
matter might at times prove unsatisfactory to employers. This was always a 
possibility given the imprecise and subjective nature of the notion of 'capacity 
to pay'. However, under compulsory arbitration, all parties at least had the 
opportunity to argue certain principles which, if accepted, would have an 
ultimate bearing on the interpretation of the meaning assigned to capacity to 
pay. In any event, experience had shown the Queensland Industrial Court 
would never knowingly place additional costs on any industry to the extent 
that its economic viability was threatened. Queensland employers 
consequently saw arbitration as infinitely preferable to direct negotiation 
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with trade unions as a means of regulating industrial relationships. 
There were several important matters of principle submitted by 
employers to the Queensland Industrial Court in the early postwar years. In 
1950, employers decided to oppose the continuation of a state basic wage 
which was some four shillings higher than the corresponding federal basic 
wage.'* A year earlier they had resisted union attempts to persuade the 
court to make a general ruling on the matter of weekend penalty rates, but 
perhaps the issue in the area of wages which caused most concern in employer 
circles was that of wage rates for females. In the late 1940s, unions 
attempted to secure improvements in the relative position of women workers 
by urging the implementation of the principle of equal pay for equal work. 
Faced with the resolute opposition to this by both employers and the court, 
the unions pushed hard for the retention, and extension, under state awards of 
the wage rates paid to female workers in various industries as decreed under 
the National Security (Female Minimum Rates) Regulations. The basic 
principle in these regulations was that women in certain occupations were to 
be paid seventy-five per cent of the award rate for males. 
The employers' reasons for sustained resistance to this were both 
economic and sociological. Some employers did not accept that increases in 
the relative wages of females would encourage more women to enter the paid 
workforce, nor did they believe that higher wages would improve the 
productivity of women already in industry. They also knew that the viability 
of certain industries depended on access to relatively cheap female labour: 
with price control setting an upper limit on the prices which these industries 
could charge, the use of relatively inexpensive female workers was the only 
way profitability could be maintained.'^ Employers also feared that an 
extension of the seventy-five per cent principle under Queensland state 
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awards could furnish the unions with ammunition in a campaign to raise the 
female basic wage relative to that for males. 
Employers saw the pressures for improvements in the remuneration of 
women (with equal pay being the ultimate outcome) as threatening 
fundamental social principles. The rapid escalation of wage rates paid to 
women in certain occupations under the National Security Regulations, 
according to an influential employer spokesperson, '...has resulted in females 
in some industries receiving more than was ever considered appropriate for a 
women doing a woman's job' . '" As well as promising to subvert this notion 
which saw varieties of work as intrinsically female, and undeserving of 
anything more than a certain level of remuneration, employers feared the 
movement towards equal pay would undermine the social foundations of the 
basic wage concept and would weaken the existence of the nuclear family' ' 
if, contrary to expectations in certain quarters, it stimulated more women to 
seek paid work. Some employer representatives had no reservations about the 
effect of wage increases for women: 
If female wages became very high they are very 
likely to become an incentive for some married 
[women] to neglect their home as a mother and 
take on such lucrative employment. " 
In employer eyes, the maintenance of the institution of the family 
was, above all else, vital to the future of Australia. The nuclear family stood 
as a bulwark against '...the disintegrating influences of modern social trends'. 
The employers' view, by implication, was that women, who bore children, were 
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thus responsible for rearing them. Nothing should be done that would disturb 
this situation: 
To award women workers the full male rates, or to 
allow them any substantial increase in their rate in 
relation to the wages of men, must have serious 
repercussions on the wage that industry will be able 
to afford for men. A generally higher wage for 
men than for women finds its justification in the 
elemental fact that the man must always be the 
79 
natural breadwinner of the family. 
By and large, Queensland employers endorsed the structure and mode 
of operation of the Queensland Industrial Court. Their most serious 
reservations concerned the lack of appeal to the Full Supreme Court on 
matters of law and interpretation and the vesting of both judicial and arbitral 
functions in the one body."^ Other suggestions made from time to time to the 
state government included the provision of a comprehensive library for the 
court and parties to proceedings and the appointment of equal numbers of lay 
members to the court from trade union and employer backgrounds. 
Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, employers were afraid that 
the foundations of the arbitration system in Queensland were about to 
crumble. In their estimation, the growth in the influence of the 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration and a tendency of the 
A.L.P. state government to legislate on industrial matters threatened the 
authority and influence of the Queensland Industrial Court. The preservation 
of this authority and influence was of paramount importance to Queensland 
employers. They saw federal industrial law and court procedure as complex, 
and with hearings typically conducted in Sydney or Melbourne were concerned 
at the increased expenditure greater participation in federal arbitration would 
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involve. They also disliked the federal Labor government's changes to the 
structure of the commonwealth system of conciliation and arbitration with 
the appointment of conciliation commissioners. Commonwealth conciliation 
commissioners, they felt, did not apply time-tested principles on important 
matters, were inclined to overturn principles established by the Court of 
Conciliation and Arbitration and, what was worse, attempted to set 
precedents and to establish alternative principles which could not be made the 
subject of an appeal.*^^ Queensland employers looked aghast at this picture. 
They feared its consequences for industrial peace: 
In these days when the Commonwealth Government 
has watered down its arbitration system by the 
appointment of conciliation commissioners, 
Queensland stands as an example of the stricter 
arbitration system founded on the Courts. It has 
paid dividends i n ^ relatively large share of 
industrial harmony. 
The superiority of the Queensland Industrial Court in the maintenance 
of peace in industry, according to the employers, also arose out of its practice 
of inserting preference clauses in its awards which had the effect of 
establishing clear lines of demarcation between the relevant unions. With 
federal conciliation commissioners reluctant to grant preference, this 
institutional protection against demarcation disputes was absent in federal 
awards. A bitter harvest, employers lamented, of confusion and friction was 
the inevitable result. Worse still, this was compounded when the provisions of 
a federal award were inconsistent with state law and industrial standards. 
With the constitutionally superior federal award prevailing to the extent of 
the inconsistency, this created anomalies which produced further discontent. 
Industrial peace was also placed in jeopardy by the encroachment of federal 
awards in Queensland since it was more likely, under these circumstances, 
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82. The Queensland Chamber of Manufactures Yearbook 1949, p.37. 
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that industrial disputes over award matters would be national in character and 
83 thus more difficult to contain and prevent."^ 
This general desire to limit the influence of the commonwealth court 
and to defend states' rights in the regulation of industrial relationships had a 
long history. Ever since 1903 employers in Queensland had pointed to what 
they argued was the unconstitutional extension of the court's jurisdiction and 
on several occasions had demanded legislative action to limit the jurisdiction 
to clearly defined areas. On the matter of principle, they took no objection to 
intervention by the state in industrial relationships by means of compulsory 
arbitration. Their prime concern was a purely pragmatic desire to ensure that 
an 'appropriate' relationship existed between federal and state arbitration 
systems. 
If employers in Queensland looked at the increasing importance of 
decisions made in the federal industrial jurisdiction with a jaundiced eye, this 
reception was mild by comparison with the paroxysm of rage with which they 
greeted each occasion on which the state A.L.P. government of E.M. Hanlon 
gave legislative guidance or instruction to the Queensland Industrial Court. 
This paralleled the fury with which they had received a previous Labor 
government's decision to fix the basic wage by act of parliament in 1925. The 
policy of the Hanlon government was to allow the court discretion to exercise 
its jurisdiction as long as the government approved of the result. If the court 
strayed from the path of industrial righteousness, then it would be returned to 
the fold by whatever degree of legislative pressure the cabinet thought 
necessary. 
Employers condemned this means of effecting change in conditions of 
83. Q.E.F. Notice to members of the council circular 73/49, 20 July 
1949, p.l; Report of Queensland Delegates to Australian Council of 
Employers' Federations Executive 11 August 1949, p.l; Q.E.F. deposit, 
Oxley Library, Brisbane. 
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employment as nothing more than political grandstanding by the A.L.P. 
designed to attract electoral kudos at the ultimate expense of business. They 
felt that more often than not it produced anomalies, confusion and discontent 
amongst workers under federal awards who felt aggrieved at not sharing this 
manna from the political heaven.** By legislating in this way, so the 
employers argued, the Labor government was undermining the very 
foundations of justice and individual liberty."^ There was a warning here for 
those who would advocate altering the Constitution to clothe the federal 
parliament with power to legislate directly on the terms and conditions of 
employment. Only knaves and fools could ignore the lessons of the 
Queensland experience where a Labor government abused its legislative 
power. Constitutional restraint was the only protection against such 
irresponsibility: the risks in removing this from the national parliament were 
86 too great to bear. 
Although Queensland employers lobbied state and federal A.L.P. 
governments, their main political thrust was through the non-Labor parties 
where they developed an intelligence service to facilitate advance warning of 
likely changes in industrial relations legislation, equipped non-Labor 
politicians with information to be used in parliamentary debates on industrial 
relations matters and were active in the development of the industrial 
relations policy of the Liberal party."^ By the middle of 1948 Queensland 
employers could feel happy that stronger ties with the Liberal party were 
84. Queensland Industry January 1953, p.7; Q.E.F. Statement for 
Submission to The Honourable The Minister for Labour <5c Industry & 
Employment by the Queensland Employers' Federation 24 August 
1951, file 1.2, 'I.C.A.A. Employers' Submission. 1951-1955', p.2. 
85. Queensland Industry February 1953, pp.4,9,10,11. 
86. Queensland Industry January 1953, p.7; Queensland Industry February 
1953, pp.9,10. 
87. A.C.E.F. Executive. Report 9,10 July 1946, p.2; Q.E.F. Secretary's 
Report on Visit to North Queensland July 1947, p.l; Q.E.F. Report re 
40-Hour Week and other Matters to Convention September 1947, p.2; 
Q.E.F. Report of Queensland Delegates to A.C.E.F. Meeting 21 July 
1948, p.3; Q.E.F. deposit, Oxley Library, Brisbane, p.3. 
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developing smoothly. Earlier in the year formal consultations with non-Labor 
politicians in the state parliament had been initiated by the Q.E.F. and the 
Q.C.M. while in July, Q.E.F. delegates to a meeting of the Australian Council 
of Employers' Federations had participated in discussions with R.G. Casey, the 
federal president of the Liberal party. Casey invited the various state 
employer federations to assist in the development of the party's industrial 
relations policy. The Q.E.F. was subsequently given the opportunity to supply 
the Queensland division of the Liberal party with its evaluation of several of 
Casey's speeches on industrial relations issues."" 
In October 1948, the New South Wales Employers' Federation 
submitted a draft paper to the executive council of the A.C.E.F. The paper 
sought to define the mutual interests of employers and the Liberal party. 
Heavy emphasis was placed on industrial relations matters. It was decided 
that each federation would submit comments on the draft after which a final 
statement setting out A.C.E.F. industrial relations policy would be drawn up 
for submission to both the Liberal party and the Country party to guide them 
in framing their policy speeches for the 1949 federal elections."" 
Although it entertained serious reservations over certain matters of 
detail, the Q.E.F. did not cavil at the broad thrust of the draft paper which 
explored how industry and the Liberal party could cooperate '...in the 
reorientation of non-Labour political policy in a manner designed to influence 
a large body of voters away from the Labour Party'. The paper stressed that 
the Liberal party could not hope to gain power without at least a certain 
measure of working class support. The party suffered, however, by being 
identified with business whose reputation with working and middle class men 
88* Q.E.F. Report of Queensland Delegates to A.C.E.F. Meeting 5-7 July 
1948, Q.E.F. deposit, Oxley Library, Brisbane, p.3. 
89. A.CE.F. Executive Council. Draft Statement re Industrial Policy 19 
October 1948; Q.E.F. Report of Queensland Delegates re A.C.E.F. 
Executive Council Meeting 18-21 October 1948, p.2; Q.E.F. deposit, 
Oxley Library, Brisbane. In the event, objections by the Q.E.F. to 
certain aspects of the draft paper meant that a final A.C.E.F. 
submission to the non-Labor parties was not ready in time for the 
1949 elections. 
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and women was poor. While this low esteem for business continued, the 
political problem would remain. The situation, however, was eminently 
retrievable if only employers would recognise the political dimension of 
industrial relationships and the role their industrial relations rhetoric could 
play in producing political dividends. 
This meant that business should undertake a sustained public relations 
campaign to alter its image. It should emphasise a changed attitude towards 
industrial relations by acknowledging Labour as an integral and important 
partner, by showing that industry had a human face, by giving workers 'a sense 
of real responsibility' and by entering into a firm commitment to advance the 
economic and social standards of the workforce. This effort by employers 
would have to be supported by a complementary campaign by the Liberal 
party: 
...the declared policy of the Liberal Party, on 
Industrial Relations, must be coincidental with 
public statements by Employer Leaders, and such 
statements must be repeated time and again, per 
various media, and must be hammered home to the 90 general public. 
If the Liberal party could persuade women in particular that husbands and sons 
(and daughters too?) could find congenial, well paid employment in the private 
sector coupled with guaranteed security at retirement,"^ then the low esteem 
in which business was held would disappear and the Liberal party could claim a 
great deal of the credit for the new and enlightened attitude of employers 
with a consequent boost to its political fortunes which could well prove 
decisive. 
A notable feature of employer industrial relations policies in the 
90. A.C.E.F. Executive Council. Draft Statement re Industrial Policy 
pp.1,2. 
91. The Q.E.F. thought that private employers could not give this 
guarantee. It believed that the state ought to organise a national 
superannuation scheme. 
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period of postwar reconstruction is that, by and large, most of them had been 
advocated previously. There was little in the way of innovative responses to a 
postwar world in which full employment, new order idealism and an 
industrially significant Communist party had changed the industrial relations 
pattern of earlier decades. Policies calling for a stand against 'militant 
unionism', for employer unity, for 'better' relations between employer and 
employee, and for Labor governments to eschew 'socialist' legislation, for 
example, were enunciated in an earlier postwar period after 1918. Indeed, 
some of these policies could be traced to the very beginnings of organised 
Capital in Queensland. 
CONCLUSION 
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This analysis of industrial relations in Queensland during the period of 
postwar reconstruction has addressed four principal matters. Considerable 
emphasis has been placed on explaining the dynamics and the significance of 
two of the largest industrial disputes in Australian industrial relations history 
which occurred in Queensland in the reconstruction years. An explanation of 
the Hanlon government's reaction to these challenges to the traditional 
labourist emphasis on industrial peace has commanded a high priority. The 
performance of the Labor party's alternative to direct industrial action, which 
involved a blend of arbitration and legislation, has been scrutinised as have 
the industrial relations policies and philosophy of organised Capital. 
Apart from questions of ideological preference, the Labor party 
commitment to industrial peace reflected the industrial interests of the 
A.W.U. Given its size, wealth and presence throughout Queensland, the 
A.W.U. had an enormous impact on all facets of A.L.P. administration, 
membership and policy. Whilst it controlled considerable political resources, 
the A.W.U. was industrially weak. The political resources were thus used to 
secure the intervention by the state in determining the pattern of industrial 
relations through a process of favourable industrial legislation, sympathetic 
administration and compulsory arbitration. Other sections of the workforce 
also lacked industrial strength. Unions of clerks, shop assistants and 
miscellaneous workers, for example, were also attracted to this method of 
securing gains for their members. The implications of this means of deciding 
the nature of industrial relationships was that neither Capital nor Labour 
should employ direct industrial action. Changes in industrial relationships 
should only occur through mutual agreement and/or the decisions of the 
industrial court. 
This plan for industrial peace could, however, only accommodate a 
limited range of industrial relations pressures. As long as unions and 
employees were prepared to accept the basic logic of industrial relations in a 
capitalist market economy and would abide by the court's decisions, industrial 
conflict was relatively easy to resolve. When, however, employees believed 
they had the power, and were concerned, to challenge this logic; when their 
claims on the arbitration authorities included questions of control over 
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workplace decisions, for example, arbitrators were unable to construct 
satisfactory compromises. 
The analysis of the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute brings these, as well as 
many other issues into sharp focus. It justifiably emphasises the importance 
of the ideological dimension of the dispute. There could be few more 
fundamental challenges to the very essence of a capitalist market society 
than workers rejecting the rationale and existence of competitive labour 
markets as occurred in the meat dispute. The historical perspective employed 
to understand the dispute reveals that a continuing contest over the extent 
and exercise of managerial prerogatives was a feature of industrial 
relationships in the meat industry. What accounts for the outbreak of a 
prolonged and bitter battle over issues of labour supply and workplace control 
in 1946 are several developments which were produced by the circumstances 
of the Second World War. 
The economic strength of the meatworkers was enhanced considerably 
during this t ime. The importance of the industry to the war effort, its 
consequent declaration as a protected industry and the impact of certain 
national security regulations created conditions favourable to an extension 
and consolidation of the organs of workers' control in various meatworks. 
Members of the A.M.I.E.U. thus believed they were bet ter placed to contest 
issues with their employers than had been the case in the 1930s. Expectations 
by both employer and employee in the meat industry also played a major part 
in the outbreak of the dispute. Hopes and fears over the prospects of both a 
postwar new order and a struggle between Socialism and Capitalism for 
dominance in peacetime stiffened the resolve on the part of Capital and 
Labour alike to defend and advance their interests . This resolve was hardened 
even further in the case of the meatworkers by a popular belief that a postwar 
employer offensive would seek to eliminate the gains made by the workers 
during the war period. For many unionists, the 1945 Steel Strike in New South 
Wales heralded the onslaught. 
The meat dispute was over issues which rendered it incapable of being 
accommodated by the arbitration process. Members of the Queensland 
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Industrial Court viewed a t tempts by workers to erode managerial prerogatives 
as illegitimate activities and therefore inappropriate for inclusion within the 
new province for law and order. The Hanlon government expected the 
A.M.I.E.U. to abide by the Labor party's policy of industrial peace even though 
the instrument of this policy, the industrial court, would not address 
fundamental questions associated with the operation of competitive labour 
markets which the A.M.I.E.U. was determined to raise. Adherence by the 
A.M.I.E.U. to the policy of industrial peace would have meant abandoning all 
objectives the pursuit of which threatened the foundations of the existing 
society. 
As well as accepting private property rights as a mat te r of 
philosophical conviction, members of the industrial court were unwilling to 
disturb managerial prerogatives for fear that such action could provoke 
retaliation in the form of a Capital strike. The court believed that it had to 
give an ideological guarantee to employers that the rights claimed by 
management would, as far as possible, be protected. Concepts of 'industrial 
justice' were clearly interpreted by the court in the light of its perceptions of 
the power available to the parties to industrial relations. 
The Hanlon government ultimately acted to force the meatworkers to 
return to work. This only occurred relatively late in the dispute. Before this 
the government was content to do what it could to have the dispute 
terminated through the industrial court . This action, given the court 's 
philosophies and policies, was tantamount to opposition to the meatworkers ' 
position. When it became clear that the court had exhausted its power to no 
avail; when the coal strike was threatening the normal pattern of domestic 
and industrial life; and when it seemed a major ideological split had opened in 
the meatworkers ' ranks with the left wishing to continue the conflict and the 
right prepared to call it quits, the government abandoned any pretence of 
neutrality. The power of the s ta te was used to secure an end to the dispute on 
terms which were, ironically, different to those laid down by the court . The 
meat dispute showed, in no uncertain terms, that there were very real limits 
to the institutionalisation of industrial conflict. 
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The 1948 Railway Dispute revealed that these limits applied even 
when the dispute was over such basic issues as wage rates which posed no 
threat to existing social and economic institutions. The strike action of the 
tradesmen and other workshops' employees was designed to put pressure on 
the government, and particularly the court, to agree to greater increases in 
margins than appeared likely under the court's wage fixing principles. The 
unions, in this case, were seeking to persuade the court to apply its concepts 
of industrial justice in a way which recognised the considerable power of 
strategically placed workers in a railway service urgently in need of their 
skills. 
Perhaps even more than the meat dispute, the railway dispute rapidly 
became a lock-out as well as a strike. The employer in this case was the 
Queensland Labor government. Its action in closing the entire railway 
service, and its subsequent extreme measures to force the railwaymen to 
capitulate, converted what may well have been a relatively ordinary dispute 
of two, perhaps three, and at the outside, four weeks' duration into an eight 
week struggle of extreme bitterness and some physical violence in which civil 
liberties and truth were among the casualties. 
The government's decision to turn the enormous resources of the state 
against a strike of its own employees, a large majority of whom were its 
political supporters, can be explained largely in terms of its conviction that 
responsibility for the outbreak and subsequent conduct of the dispute rested 
principally with its sworn enemy, the Australian Communist Party. This 
conviction was held against the background of growing Cold War tensions in 
international affairs, especially over events in Czechoslovakia. The 
government was also motivated by a desire to make the political point to the 
Australian electorate at large that Labor governments were determined to 
enforce a policy of industrial peace even if this meant a knock-down, drag-out 
confrontation with trade unions. Labor politicians wished to show that they 
were men for all classes. 
This thesis may claim to have made a major contribution to the 
understanding of Australian industrial relations history by explaining the 
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Australian Communist Party's role in, and reaction to, both the meat and 
railway disputes. Contrary to many contemporary views, the Communist 
party was distinctly unhappy with virtually every feature of the meat 
dispute. The party saw the dispute as an example of rampant Syndicalism. 
One of its priorities was to curb, rather than assist, any ambitions on the part 
of some A.M.I.E.U. officials for a general strike. The party thought that a 
massive dispute over the seniority issue was the height of folly. It was 
appalled at the poor organisation of the unions' campaign, and ultimately 
reluctantly agreed to the June offensive in the hope that the dispute could be 
brought to a head hopefully with something for the meatworkers salvaged 
from the situation. The communists saw the meat dispute as an object lesson 
in how not to conduct a major strike. 
From the Communist party perspective, the railway dispute was an 
entirely different story. Without a shadow of a doubt, the party welcomed 
this contest with undisguised pleasure. The reasons for this were to be found 
in the aftermath of the meat dispute. In the wake of this dispute, the Labor 
party instituted an organisational and legislative attack on those whom it saw 
as threats to the sacred policy of industrial peace. This took the form of 
intervention in the internal affairs of trade unions through official A.L.P. 
industrial groups and amendments to The Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act designed to increase the capacity of the state to 
institutionalise labour strikes. 
It was this legislative activity which, in the short term at least, the 
Communist party believed posed the greatest threat to organised Labour in 
Queensland. If it needed any further convincing, these amendments set the 
seal on the Communist party's strongly held belief that the A.L.P. was a party 
actively opposed to the interests of working class men and women. It set as 
its highest political priority the need to challenge and expose the government 
over this legislation. Throughout 1947 no suitable industrial opportunities 
arose around which the Communist party could generate pressure for the 
repeal of the amended Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. This 
occurred, however, in 1948 with the outbreak of the railway dispute in early 
February. 
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Only by a herculean distortion of both logic and fact, however, could 
this be taken as evidence that the Communist party somehow was responsible 
for the circumstances which produced the dispute. To welcome an event, to 
become ultimately heavily involved in it obviously does not consti tute 
evidence of causation. The material debated at length in the chapters on the 
railway dispute shows beyond doubt that economic factors were of prime 
importance in explaining the decision of the workshops' employees to strike. 
It was a traditional tact ic by the A.E.U. to exert a little industrial pressure 
prior to important arbitration tribunal hearings. Such a gentle reminder was 
all the unions intended in the early days of the railway dispute. They had, in 
fact, decided against a complete shutdown of the railway service as suggested 
by the Communist party officials in their ranks in favour of confining their 
protest to a workshops' strike. 
Apart from a deep discontent over the flow-on of marginal increases 
granted under the Federal Metal Trades Award, there was a belief that the 
Queensland Industrial Court was less than impartial when it came to 
railwaymen's claims; there was a widespread view in union circles that the 
government was actively concerned to make Queensland a low wage s ta te ; 
there was anger with what was seen as an authoritarian railway 
administration; and many railwaymen thought that politicians and others 
were long on words when it came to recognising their wartime sacrifices but 
sadly short on deeds when it came to ameloriating their genuine grievances. 
These circumstances, rather than crude contemporary and subsequent 
conspiracy theories about the influence of the Communist party, explain the 
origins of the railway dispute. Its character , moreover, as the evidence has 
shown, depended on a complex and dynamic interaction between the policies 
and activit ies of members of the Communist party, the media, the church, the 
Labor party both as an organisation and in government, the A.C.T.U., trade 
unions, the industrial court, the Chifley government as well as other organised 
interests . 
The discussions of both the meat and railway disputes have made a 
significant contribution to the definition of an appropriate methodology for 
the analysis of industrial disputes. The absolutely crucial requirement that 
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such studies employ a historical perspective has been established beyond 
contention. Analyses which are ahistorical, which in effect are nothing more 
than snapshots, do not possess the same explanatory power. They fail to 
account adequately, or at all, for the outbreak of overt conflict, and they are 
unable to allocate the proper weight to the elements in an explanation. An 
historical approach facilitates an evaluation of the relative significance of 
different factors in an overall explanation, and is more likely to capture all of 
the relevant features of a dynamic situation. 
An historical perspective is also essential for a proper assessment of 
the significance of any industrial dispute. The responses to both the meat and 
railway disputes which were of greatest consequence for Queensland industrial 
relations history were those of the Communist and Labor parties. The 
Communist party believed that the meat dispute had exposed what could 
happen in a major dispute in the absence of proper planning and if workers 
simply followed a policy of passive resistance. It determined that the same 
mistakes would not be repeated in future disputes in which it had any 
influence over tact ics and policy. The Communist party also saw its belief 
that the Labor party was nothing more than a defender of the rights of 
Capital confirmed by the events of the meat dispute, and especially by the 
subsequent legislation designed by the Labor party to contain expressions of 
working class militancy. This interpretation of the character of the Labor 
party played no small part in the leftward shift in Communist party policy 
throughout 1947, and in the party's conviction that it was becoming urgent for 
it to challenge the reformist A.L.P. for the political leadership of the 
Australian working class. 
The experience of the railway dispute reinforced these views. There 
were, moreover, other conclusions drawn by the Communist party from this 
dispute. It believed that its organisational methods, tact ics and personnel had 
passed the test of the railway dispute with distinction. The dispute had also 
shown that workers, whose political a t t i tudes were shifting to the left, would 
accept communist leadership. It had revealed a heightening in working class 
unity. Lessons had also been learned regarding likely government tact ics in 
future disputes and the best means of responding to them. The party decided. 
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furthermore, that it was essential to demonstrate to workers in dispute the 
political significance of contests which began over essentially economic 
issues. On the basis of these conclusions, the Communist party built its 
strategy in the 1949 Coal Strike. 
It does not involve an unjustified use of hindsight to argue, however, 
that the Communist party's reading of the significance of the railway dispute 
was seriously mistaken in several important respects. Even during the dispute 
it was clear that many of those involved were not prepared to accept the 
political implications as defined by the Communist party. Far from signaling 
greater unity in working class ranks, furthermore, the railway dispute 
highlighted some fragile areas . The dispute ended when disunity in a number 
of unions threatened a rapid collapse in certain centres . In the immediate 
period after the dispute, relationships between the railway unions deteriorated 
even further, if that were possible, than was normally the case, while in both 
the short and longer term the cause of labour unity was not assisted by the 
dedicated efforts made by the A.L.P. to expand its industrial group 
organisation. 
There were also signs that workers were tiring of industrial 
disputation. A distinct lack of enthusiasm met Communist party suggestions 
that Queensland workers would strike again unless party members jailed under 
The Industrial Law Amendment Act were released. There was, moreover, no 
concerted move by working class men and women to join the Communist 
party. Membership of the Queensland branch of the party continued its 
decline from its wartime peak without interruption. Arguably the greatest 
error made by the communists in their assessment of the railway dispute was 
to underestimate the power of the s ta te in industrial disputes. The Hanlon 
government had given them more than a mere taste of this power, but it 
seemed in 1949 that the Communist party had ignored, forgotten or played 
down this particular lesson of its participation in the railway dispute. 
Several superficially unrelated but major features of Queensland 
industrial relations history in the reconstruction years in fact shared a 
common dimension in that they can be explained as Labor party responses to 
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the meat and railway disputes. This is not to imply that there was an ex-ante 
masterplan in the Labor party's top drawer just waiting to be implemented if 
ever serious challenges to the policy of industrial peace actually eventuated. 
There is, however, abundant evidence that the establishment of official A.L.P. 
industrial groups; certain significant amendments to The Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act; determined government support for the 
industrial court 's anti-strike policies; and a stiffening of a traditional s tates ' 
rights perspective by the Hanlon government on industrial relations mat te rs 
were all reactions to the events of 1946 and/or 1948 which were designed to 
contain any future expressions of labour militancy. On the basis of its 
experience in the railway dispute, the government also decided to strengthen 
its sources of intelligence on trade union activit ies by establishing a special 
bureau within the Criminal Investigation Branch of the police force. 
The argument in this thesis concerning the origins of the industrial 
groups in Queensland corrects previously published research and comment on 
this issue. This earlier work is mistaken as to both the timing and 
circumstances of the groups' establishment in Queensland. On the question of 
timing, the 1947 Labor-in-Politics Convention or the 8 July 1948 decision of 
the Q.C.E. inner executive are nominated as marking the formal beginning of 
the Queensland industrial groups. Neither is correct . Nor is the view that the 
rise of the groups in Queensland can be seen simply as part of an Australia-
wide Labor party assault upon the Communist party. None of the previously 
published l i terature has addressed the basic question: why did the A.L.P. in 
Queensland establish industrial groups? A failure to ask this fundamental 
question has meant that the linkages between the meat dispute, the railway 
dispute, and the birth and development of the groups have not previously been 
detected. 
The Labor party's commitment to the principle of intervention in the 
affairs of trade unions by means of industrial groups was made on 8 July 
1946. Soon after official A.L.P. groups were established in selected trade 
unions. The decision to extend the industrial group organisation throughout 
Queensland was made on 8 July 1948. The groups in Queensland, moreover, 
were aimed at those Labor party members and trade unionists, communist or 
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not, who refused to abide by the Labor party's absolute determination to 
ensure a state of industrial peace. The communists, seen by the Labor party 
as the prime movers in labour unrest, were, of course, obvious targets in this 
campaign. There was also a specific anti-communist put'pose in some of the 
industrial groups' activities, but their role in enforcing industrial peace across 
the whole spectrum of the labour movement has not, however, been 
recognised in the earlier literature. 
The meat dispute amendments to The Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act in December 1946 were designed to make more effective the 
institutionalisation of labour strikes. This legislative action complemented 
the organisational response which saw the establishment of the groups. Prior 
to the 1946 amendments, the section of The Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act which provided for secret ballots in the case of strikes was 
expressed in rather general terms. It required unions to authorise strikes by 
secret ballots of members attending a general meeting; to report the result 
of the vote to the industrial registrar; and it gave the industrial court power 
to adjudicate disputes over whether any strike or lock-out was in fact 
authorised. 
A much more positive and interventionist role for the court was 
provided in the 1946 amendments. The court was empowered to order a ballot 
to be held under its control if it believed a union was not moving quickly 
enough to conduct its own ballot, or if the court objected to any aspect of a 
ballot actually held. In the case of such court-controlled ballots, the 
amending legislation made participation by union members compulsory. It 
also established procedures to define precisely those eligible to vote. The 
Labor party's experience of the meat dispute thus did not diminish its faith in 
the possibility and desirability of the state controlling certain manifestations 
of industrial conflict through the processes of compulsory arbitration. If 
anything, the meat dispute led the government to construct increasingly 
powerful means of containment. 
The government's determination to defend the industrial court's 
historic anti-strike posture was intensified by both the meat and railway 
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disputes. It might be argued that this was nothing more than a Labor 
government implementing a traditional policy. Unlike other Labor 
governments in the previous twenty years, the Hanlon government had to 
contend with the reality of major industrial disputation and with pressure 
from within the mainstream of the labour movement for it to loosen the 
institutional shackles on expressions of industrial conflict. Hanlon, however, 
staunchly resisted demands that the government remove the court 's discretion 
over the granting of preference in employment to unionists; that the 
government remove the court 's power to exclude certain occupations from a 
union's list of callings; and that it revoke the court's policy of not hearing 
union officials while any of their members were on strike. The government, 
furthermore, refused to abrogate the court's authority to order the 
termination of authorised strikes even to the extent of ignoring a decision of 
the 1950 Labor-in-Politics Convention instructing it to do so. 
Ever since it first occupied the treasury benches in its own right, the 
Labor party in Queensland offered workers an alternative to direct industrial 
action. In practical terms, this meant that the state would, where necessary, 
adjust industrial relationships by means of both an industrial court and 
government legislation. The government, however, reserved the right to have 
the final say on the pace and direction of change in industrial relations 
mat ters despite all the rhetoric about the paramount role of the court . 
There is abundant evidence to support the argument that the Hanlon 
government used a variety of legislative pressures on the industrial court to 
ensure that its industrial relations policy was implemented. These pressures 
ranged from outright instruction to the court, as in the case of long service 
leave, to rather gentle legislative indications of the government's desires as in 
the case of rest pauses. The government also had few inhibitions when it 
came to legislating to overturn certain court decisions. This fate greeted 
some of the court 's judgments in the area of sick leave, together with its 
decisions on employer Christmas standdown practices, on long service leave, 
and on the calculation of holiday pay. 
There seems to have been few principles which guided the degree to 
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which the government gave legislative guidance to the court on specific 
issues. It can, nevertheless, be said with confidence that Hanlon and his 
cabinet would not entertain any suggestions that the parliament instruct the 
court in the area of wage fixation. This is not to say that the court was 
unaware of the government's at t i tude in major wage cases. Far from it, since 
the public service commissioner invariably appeared at hearings to tender 
statistical evidence and to explain the government's policy. But it appears 
that government intervention generally depended on the amount of pressure 
those advocating it could generate, or when to intervene suited other 
government objectives such as may well have occurred in the case of certain 
amendments to The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act in 1946. 
There were, nevertheless, many important court decisions affecting 
wages and working conditions which were not in any way challenged by the 
government. In the area of wages, the most important of these was the 
court 's gradual implementation between 1947 and 1950 of a policy designed to 
reduce the advantage enjoyed by real wages in Queensland over those in other 
s ta tes . This was complemented by a real basic wage freeze which lasted from 
1947 to late 1950. The court's views on equal pay were supported by the 
government. Both subscribed to concepts such as 'women's work' which 
traditionally informed the dominant at t i tudes towards equal pay in 
Queensland. 
In drawing conclusions about the Hanlon government's industrial 
relations legislation, it is important to distinguish between those amendments 
to The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act which were designed to 
improve and extend the institutional protection against strikes and lock-outs, 
and those which provided directly for improvements in working conditions. 
This is easier said than done when the 1946 amendments are considered. Some 
suggestive evidence has been presented which supports contemporary claims 
that certain improvements in working conditions were included in the 
legislation to render more acceptable other amendments which increased 
markedly state control of the internal affairs of Queensland trade unions. The 
Hanlon government could, however, certainly claim without reservation the 
forty hour week and long service leave as two of its principal legislative 
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achievements. 
By early 1952, the Queensland labour movement looked on at least 
certain features of Hanlon's industrial relations legislation with some 
satisfaction. The same could not be said, however, about its assessment of 
the industrial court's performance. Throughout the Hanlon years the central 
institution in the Labor party's alternative to the direct action model was 
subject to mounting criticism from those who, almost without exception, were 
ideologically sympathetic to the concept of compulsory arbitration. 
The railway dispute precipitated a significant heightening of concern 
in the labour movement over the speed with which the industrial court 
determined union claims. In the reconstruction period, strong disapproval of 
certain of the court 's policies was added to this original dissatisfaction. This 
discontent, particularly over the court's spseed, was perceptible in the 1930s, 
but was of relatively minor importance in that it did not threaten union 
respect for the performance of the arbitration process. This changed in the 
postwar period. Throughout the railway dispute, and for many months after . 
Labor party branches expressed great sympathy with union criticism of the 
court's speed in discharging many of its duties. The government received an 
impressive stream of correspondence from units within the Labor party which, 
while endorsing the government's general policy towards the railway dispute, 
at the same time called for action to overcome what for many Labor people 
were serious deficiencies in the court 's performance. Rank and file members 
of the A.L.P. believed (mistakenly) that the origins of the dispute were to be 
found in these shortcomings. 
The full significance of this disquiet, which continued to grow in the 
years after the railway dispute, was realised only after the Hanlon years. It 
became an important ingredient in the chain of events which culminated in 
the expulsion from the A.L.P. of the premier, V.C. Gair, and the subsequent 
Labor party split in 1957. Writing about the period 1952 to 1956, during which 
union anger with the government and the court over industrial mat te rs was 
approaching boiling point, D.J. Murphy has argued that 
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...unions had long waits for decisions and the 
government seemed oblivious to union requests to 
act ivate the court. When W.J. Riordan retired 
from the Industrial Court in 1952, it was expected 
that Boland or Bukowski or at least another 
unionist would replace him. However, no new 
appointment was made until January 1956 when, 
instead of a unionist, the ailing public service 
commissioner,...was promoted sideways on to the 
bench.^ 
None of this was surprising: the evidence discussed in this thesis of Gair's 
at t i tudes whilst minister for Labour and Industry suggests it was rather 
predictable. 
Gair, as minister, simply did not accept that union complaints over 
the industrial court 's speed were justified. He believed, moreover, that more 
often than not they were part of a communist campaign to discredit the 
arbitration system. The 1948 legislation increasing the maximum permissable 
size of the court was initiated by Hanlon over Gair's opposition. Gair thought 
the appointment of a fourth member to the bench in 1949 was a sop to 
unjustified union arguments that the court 's workload was too great for its 
existing personnel. The evidence has also revealed Gair's private assurances 
to Queensland employers in 1950 that , in the event of a further appointment 
to the court, the person so favoured would have no links whatsoever with the 
trade union movement. To the extent that Gair continued to hold these views 
when premier, the reponses of his government to union pressures for changes 
in the court 's composition and mode of operation pose few puzzles. 
The policies and actions of the owners and/or managers of Capital are 
integral components of industrial relations history. This thesis has assessed 
the industrial relations objectives and activit ies of private employers in a 
particular industry during a major industrial confrontation (the meat industry 
dispute); the role of the s ta te as an employer under similar circumstances 
(the railway dispute); and has also sought to identify and to explain the 
1* Murphy, 'The 1957 Split: "A Drop in the Ocean in Political History",' 
p.491. 
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philosophies which guided these, as well as other, policies and actions. 
The perspectives and policies of the Hanlon Labor government as an 
employer have already been examined in this review. In the case of private 
employers in the meat industry, their objectives were no less ideological than 
those of the A.M.I.E.U. The meat companies saw the 1946 Meat Industry 
Dispute as a means of eliminating all practices and conditions not expressly 
contained in awards; as providing opportunities to replace the direct 
negotiation methods of the A.M.I.E.U. with compulsory arbitration; to 
enforce managerial definitions of efficiency; to regain areas of managerial 
prerogative held by the A.M.I.E.U.; to make a stand against Communism; and 
to convert the A.M.I.E.U. into a body sympathetic to corporate goals. The 
pursuit of these ambitions by the meat companies has not been examined in 
isolation. A fundamental methodological principle followed in this thesis is 
that, when the Capital-Labour dimension of industrial relationships is under 
scrutiny, the often complex interaction between the strategies and aims of 
the various parties must be the chief object of analysis. 
The examination of issues other than employer participation in 
industrial disputes has been conducted at a more aggregate level. Some pains 
have been taken, however, to avoid treating employers as some monolithic, 
united entity. On the other hand, it has been assumed that views expressed on 
behalf of employer bodies were reasonably representative of a significant 
cross-section of employer opinion on several industrial relations matters. The 
evidence shows little dissent in employer ranks on a number of industrial 
relations questions. There was general support for the view that industrial 
conflict could and should be institutionalised through the apparatus of the 
state. Not surprisingly, therefore, there were widespread expressions of faith 
in the industrial court from virtually all quarters of employer opinion. The 
same enthusiasm was not lavished on government efforts to alter industrial 
standards through legislation. Queensland employers, almost without 
exception, saw Labor governments legislating in this way as an unmitigated 
evil. They welcomed, however, the efforts of the A.L.P. organisation to 
eliminate dissent in the labour movement by means of the industrial groups 
which they encouraged and assisted. 
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The linkages asserted by the I.P.A. between rising material living 
standards, private enterprise, and industrial peace on employer terms were 
generally accepted. Employers on the whole also shared common views over 
the industrial relations implications of full employment. This did not, 
however, stop them from competing fiercely in many labour markets despite 
employer organisation pleas for solidarity in the face of the enhanced 
bargaining strength of the unions. The prospects of increasing and large 
profits in the booming postwar economy meant that individual employers were 
frequently prepared to make unilateral concessions to Labour to the extent 
this was consistent with their profit goals. 
Those who argued employer philosophies, particularly the I.P.A., were 
forced to perform some rather demanding ideological gymnastics over full 
employment. They argued that the public debate on this issue should be 
conducted, not in terms of full employment, but rather in terms of a 
somewhat less ambitious goal of high employment. Having fudged the 
objective by this definitional agility, the I.P.A. and others advocated, on the 
one hand, the neo-classical view that high levels of employment must occur if 
economic decisions were made in unregulated private markets . Unregulated, 
that is, not only in the sense that governments ought to restr ict their role to 
certain activit ies, but also that trade unions abandon any and all ' restrictive 
practices' . (Employers, publicly at least, never pushed this lat ter point to the 
logical conclusion that unions themselves ought not exist.) On the other hand, 
it was proposed that governments really ought assume the final responsibility 
for employment levels in the community just in case, presumably, the invisible 
hand failed to deliver the desired result. 
This thesis has shown that the industrial relations policy of 
Queensland employer organisations was consistent to a significant degree with 
the I.P.A. blueprint for postwar Australian society in which so much emphasis 
was placed on the concept of industrial peace. The I.P.A. model was 
important for a number of reasons. The establishment of the I.P.A. in 1942 
signified a concern in certain employer circles at the likely nature of postwar 
Australian society, and a belief that employers would need to take the 
initiative in the public debate on this mat te r . It is also noteworthy that one 
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of the I.P.A.'s achievements was the production of a coherent and integrated 
statement of philosophy which it hoped would guide the postwar development 
of Australia. Although it cannot be taken as the definitive statement for all 
Australian employers, it nevertheless both reflected, and was designed to 
influence, economic, social and political views across a wide spectrum of 
employer opinion. 
The I.P.A. programme recognised that employer goals would have to 
be achieved in the context of abundant employment and great expectations, a 
situation which, if not unique in Australian experience, certainly had not 
occurred for many years. Much of the blueprint was directed towards what 
employers thought would be their most pressing postwar industrial relations 
problem: a workforce prepared to use direct action, based on its increased 
economic strength, to secure rapid and significant material improvements. In 
defining this as their main concern, Queensland employers had much in 
common with the A.L.P. under E.M. Hanlon. 
It is contended that the principal contributions made in this thesis to 
Australian industrial relations history consist of an original and scholarly 
analysis of the 1946 Meat Industry Dispute; an interpretation of the 1948 
Railway Dispute which uses heretofore unexamined sources and which extends 
and revises the previous literature; an explanation of the rise of the A.L.P. 
industrial groups in Queensland which corrects in a fundamental way earlier 
work; an examination of the performance of the Labor party's alternative to 
the direct industrial action model; one of the few detailed explorations of the 
Communist party's attitude to, and participation in, labour strikes; and an 
investigation of employer industrial relations policies from both practical and 
philosophical perspectives. On the basis of the evidence adduced on all of 
these matters, a powerful argument can be made for proposing that future 
research into Australian industrial relations generally, and under Labor 
governments in particular, ought be conducted in terms of the industrial peace 
paradigm as defined in this thesis. 
The thesis in itself constitutes an attempt to write industrial relations 
history. What I believe to be a fruitful and creative methodology is implicit in 
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all aspects of the thesis. There is also a plea for more industrial relations 
history. For as long as work remains a central feature of human experience, 
an increasingly sophisticated and penetrating industrial relations history will 
be essential if this fundamental dimension of social relationships is to be 
explained and understood. 
* * * * * * 
APPENDIX 1 
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE STATISTICS 
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TABLE 1 
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES, BY INDUSTRY AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUP, 
QUEENSLAND, 1946-1952 
Working days lost in each industry as a percentage 
of total working days lost through industrial disputes 
Industry 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 
Wood, Furniture, Sawmills, 
Timber-works 
Engineering, Metal Works 
Food, Drink, Tobacco: 
Manufacture and 
Distribution 
Clothing, Textiles 
Books, Printing, Book-
binding 
Other Manufacturing 
Building 
Mining, Quarrying 
Railway and Tramway 
Services 
Other Land Transport 
Shipping, Wharf Labour 
Pastoral , Agricultural, 
Rural, Horticultural 
Domestic, Hotels 
Miscellaneous 
77 13 
27 89 
8 26 
8 12 1 76 17 34 36 
37 
47 10 17 37 26 53 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: The figures in this table are calculated on the basis of 
information contained in: The Queensland Year Book 
various issues, (Brisbane: Government Statistician's 
Office). 
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TABLE 2 
WORKER INVOLVEMENT IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES, 
AUSTRALIA^ AND STATES, 1917 TO 1957^ 
Year 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
Workei 
N.S.W. 
400 
177 
243 
195 
203 
258 
274 
279 
287 
267 
319 
306 
326 
298 
241 
194 
248 
283 
234 
269 
285 
342 
361 
517 
rs direc 
Vic. 
307 
128 
245 
288 
206 
201 
217 
321 
286 
192 
372 
205 
808 
77 
402 
540 
596 
425 
383 
160 
343 
404 
199 
436 
tly involved per di; 
Qld. 
310 
105 
132 
69 
102 
69 
109 
116 
929 
71 
986 
247 
423 
156 
339 
106 
240 
350 
138 
88 
79 
531 
75 
753 
S.A. 
165 
93 
139 
118 
114 
121 
81 
110 
102 
118 
343 
282 
266 
410 
32 
55 
50 
44 
113 
101 
210 
37 
85 
549 
jpute (to 
W.A. 
104 
153 
276 
202 
159 
80 
209 
164 
332 
58 
167 
191 
207 
234 
298 
316 
364 
331 
327 
341 
120 
428 
158 
684 
nearest whole number) 
Tas. 
133 
42 
220 
134 
15 
76 
66 
54 
56 
66 
59 
93 
56 
90 
78 
582 
75 
* 
70 
92 
94 
1100 
13 
108 
Australia 
347 
143 
218 
185 
193 
225 
241 
263 
310 
224 
357 
287 
338 
284 
258 
231 
300 
303 
245 
243 
269 
352 
344 
511 
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Year 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
Workers direc 
N.S.W. 
416 
268 
364 
266 
291 
286 
276 
220 
267 
281 
266 
254 
280 
204 
243 
250 
333 
Vic. 
900 
599 
476 
252 
858 
2120 
353 
1987 
1101 
1793 
664 
1841 
1245 
559 
504 
659 
186 
tly invol 
Qld. 
200 
62 
450 
360 
579 
1060 
919 
1145 
689 
164 
271 
202 
332 
277 
303 
418 
195 
ved per di; 
S.A. 
337 
278 
317 
608 
294 
497 
284 
281 
325 
475 
471 
763 
771 
317 
557 
882 
483 
jpute (to 
W.A. 
101 
225 
159 
239 
197 
246 
251 
262 
348 
130 
418 
912 
333 
360 
594 
699 
382 
nearest whole 
Tas. A 
-
26 
23 
133 
157 
209 
192 
117 
234 
163 
221 
396 
282 
192 
275 
355 
201 
number) 
ustralia 
425 
276 
367 
277 
317 
382 
286 
264 
307 
307 
283 
300 
332 
239 
277 
317 
296 
1. Includes figures for the Northern Territory and the Australian 
Capital Territory. 
2. Owing to definitional changes, the figures for 1917 to 1921 are not 
comparable with the figures for 1922 to 1957. 
Source: The figures in this table are calculated on the basis of 
information contained in: Labour Report various issues, 
(Canberra: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics). 
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TABLE 3 
WORKER INVOLVEMENT IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN 
QUEENSLAND AS A PROPORTION OF WORKER INVOLVEMENT 
IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN AUSTRALIA, 1917 TO 1957^ 
Workers directly involved per dispute in Queensland as a 
proportion of workers directly involved per dispute 
in Australia 
Year 
1917 
1918 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
Per cent* 
89 
73 
31 
M^ 
m 
300 
32 
276 
86 
125 
53 
131 
46 
80 
Year 
1919 
1920 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
Per cent* 
61 
37 
116 
57 
36 
29 
151 
22 
147 
47 
23 
123 
130 
183 
Year 
1921 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
Per cent* 
53 
278 
321 
434 
224 
53 
96 
67 
100 
116 
109 
132 
66 
1. Owing to definitional changes, the figures for 1917 to 1921 are 
not comparable with the figures for 1922 to 1957. 
Source: The figures in this table are calculated on the basis of the 
data contained in Table 2. 
* Percentage to nearest whole number 
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TABLE 4 
WORKING DAYS LOST IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN QUEENSLAND 
AS A PROPORTION OF WORKING DAYS LOST IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 
IN AUSTRALIA, 1917-1957^ 
Year 
1917 
1918 
Working 
Per cent* 
7 
M 
days lost in Queensland as a proportion of 
working days lost in Australia 
Year 
1919 
1920 
Per cent* 
9 
Year 
1921 
Per cent* 
10 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
4 
$ 
1 
If 
t 
m 
•f 
«, 
I 
21 
10 
12 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
8 
15 
3 
I 
7 
-H 
9 
5 
J 
fi 
7 
10 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
32 
2 
49 
14 
4 
11 
7 
15 
20 
10 
21 
15 
1, Owing to definitional changes, the figures for 1917 to 1921 are not 
comparable with the figures for 1922 to 1957. 
Source: The figures in this table are calculated on the basis of 
information contained in: Labour Report various issues, 
(Canberra: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
Statistics). 
* Percentage to nearest whole number 
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TABLE 5 
WORKING DAYS LOST PER WORKER 
INVOLVED, DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY, 
Year 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
BY STATE AND AUSTRALIA 
Working day 
in industrial 
N.S.W. Vic. 
25 
6 
43 
7 
4 
6 
15 
5 
5 
12 
8 
6 
40 
30 
6 
3 
4 
6 
9 
8 
5 
8 
3 
42 
29 
32 
20 
18 
11 
14 
7 
15 
12 
6 
i i 
M 
19 
6 
15 
4 
11 
i 
? 
If 
l i 
.13 
s lost pe 
disputes 
Qld. 
24 
17 
38 
12 
20 
11 
18 
15 
10 
12 
14 
20 
2 
6 
9 
10 
4 
10 
37 
12 
16 
33 
5 
IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES, 
^ 1917--1957^ 
r worker involved (directly 
(to nearest whole number) 
S.A. 
14 
9 
30 
40 
18 
36 
15 
12 
14 
8 
7 
16 
U 
8 
4 
9 
2 
-
7 
5 
3 
2 
11 
W.A. 
35 
7 
36 
12 
12 
54 
18 
19 
24 
15 
7 
22 
3 
58 
6 
4 
4 
5 
20-
7 
9 
12 
11 
Tas. 
31 
11 
38 
11 
7 
m 
£ 
M 
13 
6 
19 
I I 
f 
t 
34 
13 
16 
-
2 
10 
45 
33 
3 
and indirectly) 
Australia 
26 
10 
36 
12 
6 
7 
15 
6 
6 
12 
9 
8 
44 
28 
7 
7 
# 
7 
A l 
« 
S 
f 
1 
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Year 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
Working day 
in industrial 
N.S.W. 
7 
4 
2 
3 
3 
7 
3 
3 
3 
5 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
Vic. 
13 
7 
3 
4 
5 
2 
7 
42 
4 
3 
16 
2 
2 
1 
3 
4 
3 
2 
s lost pe 
disputes 
Qld. 
44 
13 
6 
6 
7 
13 
26 
3 
38 
7 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
r worker 
(to neare 
S.A. 
3 
5 
3 
2 
4 
8 
3 
7 
4 
.5 
9 
3 
3 
3 
4 
3' 
4 
1 
involved (directly 
St whole number) 
W.A. 
2 
3 
5 
15 
8 
9 
11 
3 
3 
5 
3 
1 
7 
1 
4 
1 
3 
1 
Tas. 
4.& 
„ 
I 
I 
67 
4 
4 
4 
2 
8 
3 
2 
I 
4 
4 
2 
3 
1 
and indirectly) 
Australia 
8 
4 
2 
3 
3 
7 
6 
4 
5 
5 
5 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1. Includes figures for the Northern Territory and the Australian 
Capital Territory. 
2. Owing to definitional changes, the figures for 1917 to 1921 are not 
comparable with the figures for 1922 to 1957. 
Source: The figures in this table are calculated on the basis of 
information contained in: Labour Report various issues, 
(Canberra: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
Statistics). 
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TABLE 6 
WORKING DAYS LOST PER WORKER INVOLVED, DIRECTLY AND 
INDIRECTLY, IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN QUEENSLAND AS A 
PROPORTION OF WORKING DAYS LOST PER WORKER INVOLVED, 
DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY, IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN 
AUSTRALIA, 1917-1957^ 
Working days lost per worker involved (directly and indirectly) in 
industrial disputes in Queensland as a proportion of working days 
lost per worker involved (directly and indirectly) in industrial 
disputes in Australia 
Year 
1917 
1918 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
Per cent* 
92 
167 
154 
120 
252 
161 
106 
167 
241 
5 
22 
137 
146 
105 
Year 
1919 
1920 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
Per cent* 
106 
98 
141 
351 
144 
272 
358 
167 
558 
325 
291 
191 
224 
197 
Year 
1921 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
Per cent* 
338 
423 
63 
729 
140 
58 
82 
83 
81 
92 
48 
81 
105 
1. Owing to definitional changes, the figures for 1917 to 1921 are not 
comparable with the figures for 1922 to 1957. 
Source: The figures in this table are calculated on the basis of the 
data (correct to one decimal place) used to prepare Table 
5. 
* Percentage to nearest whole number 
APPENDIX 2 
UNION, POPULATION AND 
ECONOMIC STATISTICS 
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TABLE 1 
PROPORTION OF THE QUEENSLAND WORKFORCE BELONGING TO 
TRADE UNIONS. 1939 and 1945-1952 
Year Ending 
31 December 
Percentage of workforce belonging to trade unions 
Males Females Total 
1939 70.6 51.3 66.8 
1945 62.5 66.6 63.3 
1946 69.4 67.9 69.1 
1947 78.8 71.5 77.2 
1948 84.5 69.6 81.1 
1949 71.9 55.2 67.7 
1950 70.1 55.2 66.4 
1951 75.0 59.0 71.0 
1952 76.0 60.0 72.0 
Source: D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce, Colin A. Hughes, eds.. Labour In 
Power. The Labor Party and Government in Queensland 
1915-57 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 
1980), p.550. 
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TABLE 3 
STRUCTURE OF EMPLOYMENT, QUEENSLAND, BY INDUSTRY, 
AS AT 30 JUNE 1947. 
Industry Percentage of the 
workforce in each 
industry 
Primary Production (include 
Quarrying) 
Manufacturing 
Building 6c Construction 
Transport (5c Storage 
Communication 
Finance & Property 
Commerce 
s Mining and 
Public Authority, n.e.i., and Professional 
Amusement, Hotels, Cafes, 
Service, etc. 
Other 
Total 
Personal 
25.13 
20.78 
9.32 
8.82 
1.64 
2.19 
13.07 
11.18 
7.87 
-
100.00 
Source: Calculated from figures contained in: The Queensland 
Year Book 1953 (Brisbane: Government Statistician's 
Office, May 1954), pp.312,313. 
397 
TABLE 4 
QUEENSLAND AND AUSTRALIA, URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION, 1947 
Location Percentage of Total Population 
Queensland Australia 
Urban 
Metropolitan 
Provincial 
Rural 
Migratory 
36.34 
23.40 
40.09 
0.17 
100.00 
50.72 
17.98 
31.06 
0.24 
100.00 
Source: Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia No. 
39 - 1953 (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer), 
pp.522,523. 
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'Meatworks' Strike. 29 March-12 July 1946.' 
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File 66. 'Companies - A.M.I.E.U. Conference. 26 July - 8 
August 1946.' 
File 67. 'Meat Export Award-Concessions. 1946.' 
File 68. 'Works Managers' Conferences. 15 April 1946, 4 
October 1946, 25 November 1946, 24 February 
1947.' 
File 75. 'Companies - A.M.I.E.U. Conference 14-16 June 
1946.' 
File 88. 'Strike. 1946.' 
Research Service (Mitchell Library, Sydney) 
Communist Initiated Disputes in Australia in the Post-War 
Period. April 1950. 
The Pattern of Industrial Disputes in Australia, the United States 
and Great Britain. February 1950. 
United Graziers' Association (Brisbane) 
Executive Council. Minutes. 1946-47. 
Executive Commit tee . Minutes. 1945-46. 
Fifty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Council of the United Graziers' 
Association of Queensland. Minutes. May 1946. 
POLITICAL PARTY RECORDS 
Australian Communist Party (Mitchell Library, Sydney) 
MSS.2389. 1(8) Communist Party of Australia: 
Central Committee Let ters to other Parties. 1946-48. 
Central Committee Plenum. 15, 16, 17 February 1945. 
Political Committee Meeting. 14, 15, 16 March 1946. 
Central Committee Plenum. 31 May, 1, 2 June 1946. 
Central Committee Plenum. 14, 15, 16 February 1947. 
Political Committee Meeting. 10, 11 January 1948. 
415 
Central Committee Plenum. 20, 21, 22 February 1948. 
MSS.2389. 2(8) Communist Party of Australia: 
Australian Communist Party. 15th National Congress. 7-10 
May, 1948. Speeches and Documents Relating To 15th 
National Congress. 
Australian Labor Party (Labor House, Brisbane) 
Federal Labor Advisory Commit tee . Minutes. 1948-50. 
File. Industrial Groups 1946 and 1952. 
File. 1952-54 Industrial Groupism. 
Official Record of the Sixteenth Queensland Labor-in-Politics 
Convention. Brisbane: The Worker Newspaper Pty Ltd, 1939. 
Official Record of the Seventeenth Queensland Labor-in-Politics 
Convention. Brisbane: The Worker Newspaper Pty Ltd, 1942. 
Official Record of the Eighteenth Queensland Labor-in-Politics 
Convention. Brisbane: The Worker Newspaper Pty Ltd, 1944. 
Official Record of the Nineteenth Queensland Labor-in-Politics 
Convention. Brisbane: The Worker Newspaper Pty Ltd, 1947. 
Official Record of the Twentieth Queensland Labor-in-Politics 
Convention. Brisbane: The Worker Newspaper Pty Ltd, 1950. 
Official Record of the Twenty-First Labor-in-Politics 
Convention. Brisbane: The Worker Newspaper Pty Ltd, 1955. 
Labor-in-Politics Conventions. Official Record. Typescripts. 
1938, 1944, 1950, 1953. 
Labor-in-Politics Conventions. Agendas. 1916-50. 
Files. Labor-in-Politics Convention. 1953. 
Queensland Central Executive. Minutes. 1939-54. 
Rockhampton Trades Hall Branch. Minutes. 1948-54. 
Parliamentary Labor Party, Queensland (Parliament House) 
Minutes. 1935-53. 
Rough Minute Books. 1946-49. 
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Correspondence files. 1941-57. 
Record of Events in the Meat Industry Dispute 1946. Prepared at 
the direction of the premier for the information of ministers and 
members of the Parliamentary Labor Party. 
QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL COURT 
Office of the Industrial Registrar (Brisbane) 
Newspaper cutting books. 
Transcripts of cases. 
GOVERNMENT RECORDS - COMMONWEALTH 
Attorney-General's Department (Australian Archives, Canberra) 
A467. Special file no. 42. Bundle 89, Item 90. 'Industrial Unrest 
a t Queensland Meat Export Co. Ltd. Townsville.' 
A467. Special file no. 42. Bundle 89, Item 103. 'Activities of 
Communist Party - Premier's Correspondence.' 
A467. Special file no. 42. Bundle 92, Item 37. 'Queensland 
Political Rights Committee - Alleged Occurances At A Public 
Meeting Held on 10/12/41.' 
Prime Minister's Department (Australian Archives, Canberra) 
A461. AL.351/1/7. 'Re-Employment of Soldiers on Completion of 
Defence Service.' 
A461. B.I. 351/1/4. 'Industrial. Butchers' Strike-Brisbane.' 
A461. B.X. 351/1/4. 'Industrial Disputes. Bacon Factories Strike 
Southern Queensland.' 
A461. E351/1/4. 'Industrial Disputes in Meat Industry.' 
A461. A.B. 351/1/7. 'Industrial Conditions After The War.' 
Canberra Permanent. 18/1, 18/2 Correspondence of J.B. Chifley, 
1946-47. 
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Cabinet Secretariat (Australian Archives, Canberra) 
Commonwealth Record Series. A2703fXM. Curtin, Forde and 
Chifley Ministries. Folders of Cabinet Minutes (with Indexes) 
1914-1949. 
Cabinet Minutes. 17 January 1946 - 19 December 1946. 
Index to Full Cabinet Minutes. January 1945 - December 1946. 
Volume IIl(B). 
Department of Labour and National Service (Australian Archives, 
Victoria) 
Accession Series, MP574, correspondence files, multiple number 
series, 1940-50. File: 420/17/36. 'Disputes and Grievances -
Meat Industry, Queensland.' 
GOVERNMENT RECORDS - STATE 
Queensland Commissioner for Railways, Brisbane 
46:7150. Batch 1. 'Industrial Dispute. Meatworks and Bacon 
Factories. ' 
46:7150. Batch 1 A. 'Meat Industry Dispute.' 
1948:2621. Batch 1. 'Railway Strike. 2 February 1948. Marginal 
Rates and Weekend Penalty Rates . General Correspondence.' 
1948. 2621. Batch lA. 'Railway Strike. 2 February 1948. 
Marginal and Weekend Penalty Rates . General Correspondence.' 
1948. 2621. Batch lA. 'Strike. 2 February 1948. General 
Correspondence.' 
1948. 2621. Batch IB. 'Strike. 2 February 1948. General 
Correspondence.' 
1948. 2621. Batch No. 3. 'Sick and Annual Leave - Strike 2 
February 1948.' 
S48. 2621. Batch 9. 'Railway Strike. 3 February 1948 - 5 April 
1948. Marginal and Weekend Penalty Rates . Court's Return to 
Work and Commissioner's Instructions.' 
GS48/2621/1. Batch 14. 'Information Supplied Commonwealth 
Statistician Return relating to Dispute - Q.G. Railways. 3 
February 1948 to 6 April 1948.' 
41i 
2621. Batch 14A. 'Information supplied Industrial Registrar. 
Industrial Action-Strike-Marginal Increases.' 
48:2621. 'Railway Strike - 3 February 1948 - 6 April 1948. "Day 
to Day" Histories of Strike Supplied by Heads of Branches.' 
Premier's Department, Brisbane 
Batch 67. 'Salaries and Basic Wage Increases.' 
Batch 67A 'Salaries (Increases). Public Service Award-State. ' 
Batch 165. '40 Hour Week.' 
Batch 165A. 'Standard of Living and Shorter Working Week.' 
Batch 165B. 'Five Day Week.' 
Batch 180. 'Preference to Unionists.' 
Batch 230. 'Labour Day Procession.' 
Batch 238. 'Margins for Skilled Workers.' 
Batch 259. 'Status of Women.' 
Batch 259A. 'Equal Pay for Equal Work.' 
Batch 365. 'Control of Prices and Prevention of Profiteering.' 
Batch 367. 'Public Service Commissioner's Department. ' 
Batch 443. 'Postwar Reconstruction.' 
Batch 468B. 'Sick Leave.' 
Batch 468C. '3 Weeks Annual Leave.' 
Batch 498. 'Smithsonian Institution Publications.' 
Batch 500C. 'Emergency Food Supplies owing to Rail Strike 
1948.' 
Batch 536. 'Industrial Matters. ' 
Batch 57Z. 'Extended Leave in the Public Service and Long 
Service Leave generally.' 
Batch 606. 'Australian Institute of Management.' 
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Queensland Executive Council (State Archives, Brisbane) 
A28821. Index to Minutes. 1945-49. 
A42229-A42239. Minutes. 1946-49. 
Queensland Home Secretary's Department (State Archives, Brisbane) 
A4707. Correspondence with the Police Commissioner. 1929-51. 
Queensland Labour and Industry Department (State Archives, Brisbane) 
A25898-A25902. Bill Papers. 1943-46. 
A25903. Bill Papers. 1947-48. 
A9810-A9902. General Correspondence. 
A18998-A19237. General Correspondence. 
A19625. Index to General Correspondence. 
A25926. Instruction Book. 
Queensland Police Department (State Archives, Brisbane) 
A36283. Circular, Memoranda, and General Order Book. 1940-48. 
Queensland Premier and Chief Secretary's Department (State Archives, 
Brisbane) 
A6596. Constitution. 1929-54. 
A42681-A42687. In Let ter Register. 1946-52. 
A6624-A6628. Labour. 1916-54. 
A23414. Register of Bundles, nos. 1-294. 1887-1969. 
State Transport Commission 
Dl-32, 444/7-38. Minute Books. 1939-47. 
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TRADE UNION RECORDS 
NOTE: Items are listed according to generating 
organisations and further divided according to 
depository. Where available, file numbers are 
indicated. 
Amalgamated Engineering Union 
Amalgamated Metals, Foundry and Shipwrights' Union, Sydney 
Commonwealth Council. Minutes. 1947-48. 
Australian National University Archives of Business and Labour, 
Canberra 
E162/23/2. Brisbane No. 2 Branch. Minutes. 1945-49. 
E162/28/11. Ipswich No. 1 Branch. Minutes. 1945-48. 
E162/31/1. Nambour Branch. Minutes. 1945-48. 
El62/33/2. Rockhampton Branch. Minutes. 1947-48. 
E209/24. Roma Branch. Minutes. 1947-48. 
Ipswich Trades Hall 
(a) Nimbered files 
File 9A. 'Trades and Labor Council.' 
File 9B. 'Trades and Labor Council.' 
File 9C. 'Trades and Labor Council, Maryborough.' 
File lOA. 'Remodelling Ipswich Worshops.' 
File 12. 'Fines.' 
File 14G. 'Shop Stewards - Circulars. ' 
File 14H. 'Shop Stewards.' 
File 14J. 'Shop Stewards.' 
File 16. 'Circulars from C . C 
File 22K. 'Shift Work Dispute. February 1946.' 
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File 34. ' Interstate Conference. Requests from 
D.C.'s. Requests to C C 
File 34A. 'State Railway Conference. ' 
File 34B. 'State Conference. A.E.U.' 
File 34D. 'Dilution. (I) Interstate Conference (II) 
Introduction of dilution to Ipswich 
Workshops.' 
File 34E. 'State Conference. A.E.U. March, June 
1940.' 
File 34F. 'State Conference.' 
File 41 . 'Approval of D.C. Minutes and Expenses.' 
File 42A1. 'Application by A.E.U. for variation. 
Railway Award.' 
File 42B. 'Railway Award. Anomalies.' 
File 42B1. 'Application to Court. 17 September 1947. 
Increased Wages.' 
File 42F. 'Railway Award.' 
File 42G. 'Railway Award.' 
File 42J. 'Railway Award Sta te . Dirty Engines.' 
File 42K. 'Railway Award. State. ' 
File 42L. 'Railway Award. State. ' 
File 42N. 'Railway Award State . Payment in 
Department 's t ime. Time for washing 
hands. Meat Industry Dispute 1946.' 
File 44A. 'Combined Railway Unions. Affiliation.' 
File 44B. 'Combined Railway Unions. General. ' 
File 49. 'Claims.' 
File 51A. 'Shop and Job Commit tee . General. ' 
File 5IB. 'Trades and Labor Council. Ipswich.' 
File 51C. 'Shop Committee. ' 
File 51D. 'Production Committee. ' 
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'Shop and Job Committee Reports. ' 
'Donations.' 
'War Loading.' 
'Minutes. Metal Trades Federation. ' 
'Sydney District Commit tee . Minutes of 
D.C. Meetings.' 
'Control of Railway Matters. ' 
'Metal Trades Group. 24 Hour Strike. 14 
February 1945.' 
'Mechanical Engineering Award. Court 
Judgments. ' 
'Mechanical Engineering Award Sta te . 
General. ' 
'S.S. Reports. ' 
'Seniority. General.' 
'Seniority. Refusal of C.C. to grant 
permission to take strike ballot.' 
'Seniority. Correspondence with S. and J. 
Committee. ' 
'Ballots. Permission of C.C. to conduct. ' 
'Balance Sheets.' 
'Court Controlled Ballots.' 
File 72C(1) 'Court Controlled Ballots.' 
File 75. 'Organising. Ipswich District. ' 
File 79. 'Soldier-Worker Unity.' 
File 82B. 'Disputes Railway Service. Proposal to 
establish central control. ' 
File 90. 'Queensland Central Executive. 
Representation on Q.C.E.' 
File 94. 'Running Shed. Ipswich.' 
File 94A. 'Running Shed. Ipswich.' 
File 51E. 
File 53. 
File 54. 
File 57. 
File 58. 
File 64. 
File 67. 
File 67B. 
File 67C. 
File 69. 
File 71A. 
File 71D. 
File 71E. 
File 72A. 
File 72B. 
File 72C. 
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File 94B. 'Running Shed. Ipswich.' 
File 97. 'Overtime. Decision. Rockhampton D.C. 
19 September 1944.' 
File 97A. 'Overtime. General. ' 
File 97C. 'Overtime. Proposal by Railway 
Department and Decision of Membership. 
16 July 1947.' 
'Petitions to D.C. Reduction of Hours 
before further Dismissals.' 
'Ipswich Railway Workshops. Conditions.' 
'Post War Reconstruction.' 
'Basic Wage.' 
'Labor Day and Trades Hall Committee. ' 
'Visit of Bro. Gardiner. 6 and 8 October 
1944.' 
'Trades' Union Congress. Queensland.' 
'Trades' Union Congress.' 
'General. Maryborough Branch.' 
'General. Cairns Branch.' 
'Miscellaneous. Ipswich District. ' 
'Members. Ipswich District. ' 
'General. Ipswich Branch.' 
'General. Ipswich 2nd. Branch.' 
'General. Ipswich and Ipswich 2nd 
Branches.' 
'General. Mt. Morgan Branch.' 
'General. Rockhampton Branch.' 
'General. Rockhampton D . C 
'General. Bundaberg Branch.' 
'General. Gympie.' 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
File 
105. 
116. 
119. 
126. 
127. 
131. 
138. 
138A 
139A 
139B. 
139C 
139D 
139E. 
139F. 
139G 
139H 
139J. 
139K 
139L. 
139M 
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File 139N. 'General. Toowoomba Branch.' 
File 139P. 'General. Townsville Branch.' 
File 139Q. 'General. Townsville D . C 
File 139R. 'General. Warwick Branch.' 
File 139S. 'General. Brisbane D . C 
File 139T. 'General. South Coast D . C 
File 139U. 'General. Sydney D . C 
File 139V. 'General. Organiser Bro. Willett.' 
File 139W. 'General. Organiser Bro. Leggat. ' 
File 139Y. 'General Commissioner.' 
File 139X. ' C . C General. ' 
File 139Z. 'General. C.M.E.' 
File 139A1. 'Melbourne D.C. Miscellaneous.' 
File 139B1. 'Miscellaneous. Innisfail Branch.' 
File 139C1. 'Miscellaneous. General. ' 
File 140. 'Production Committee. ' 
File 145. 'Australian Labor Party. General. ' 
File 145A. 'Political Committees. ' 
File 149. 'Delegations.' 
File 149A. 'Delegations and Deputations.' 
File 151. 'Rulings from C . C 
File 160. 'All Service Unions. Minutes of 
Conferences 1944-45 re Immediate and 
Post War Demands and Salary and Wage 
Increase. ' 
File 160A. 'AH Service Unions Reports of Delegates 
re Wage Increase Negotiations.' 
File 160B. 'All Service Unions. Ballot re Strike 
Action to Enforce Demands.' 
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File 161. 'Works Organization. Ipswich Workshop.' 
File 167. 'Anti-Picketing Act. Jailing: Healy, 
Julius, Englart. ' 
File 168. 'Compulsory Conference. Refusal to 
supply Transcripts. ' 
File 179. 'Democratic Rights Committee. ' 
File 185. 'State Award. Claims. Mechanical 
Engineering.' 
(b) Untitled files 
File 44. 
File 270. 
(c) Unnimbered files 
'Bulletins issued by C.C. 1946.' 
'Bulletins issued by C.C. 1947.' 
'Correspondence. 1943-45.' 
'1948 Margins.' 
'Mechanical Engineering Award.' 
'Railway Award Variations. 1948-49.' 
'S.S. Report. Quarter ending 30 September 1947.' 
'Shop Steward Quarterly Reports. Quarter ending 31 
December 1947.' 
'Shop Stewards. 1947-48.' 
'Shop and Job Committee Reports. ' 
(d) Minute books 
Ipswich District Commit tee . Minutes. 1940-49. 
426 
Amalgamated Metal Workers' Union (Queensland) 
Australian National University Archives of Business and Labour, 
Canberra 
E220/288. File 38. 'Negotiations with Railway 
Commissioner re marginal rates and 
National Security Regulations.' 1941. 
E220/301. File 51. 'Union v Commissioner for 
Railways refund of £ l fine imposed on 
employee during strike 15 September 
1941.' September 1941. 
E220/302. File 52. 'Strike Ipswich Railway 
Workshops. Compulsory conference. ' 
October 1941. 
E220/304. File 54. 'Mechanical Engineering Award. 
Application for variation "war loading".' 
May 1941. 
E220/305. File 55. 'Railway Award-State -
variation.' July 1941. 
E220/306. File 56. 'Application. Variation Electrical 
Trades Award.' May 1941. 
E220/307. File 57. 'Railway Award-State. 
Application for increased margins.' 
November-December 1941. 
E220/311. File 61. 'Combined Unions meat industry 
dispute.' July 1941. 
E220/323. File 73. 'Application. Variation Railway 
Award-State. ' April 1942. 
E220/329. File 79. 'Application. Railway Award-
State - variation.' September 1942.' 
E220/336. File 86. 'Application by A.A.E.S.D.A for 
registration under the Commonwealth 
Court. Objection by Bro. Mundy.' May 
1943. 
E220/356. File 107. 'Application. Variation Railway 
Award-State. ' July 1943. 
E220/372. File 124. 'Application. Brisbane Abattoir 
Award - variation. Also Meat Export 
Award.' June-February 1944. 
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E220/375. File 127. 'Application Railway Award -
annual leave and sick leave.' February 
1944. 
E220/379. File 131. 'Draughtsmen - assistant 
mechanical engineers. Railway Dept. 
Case presented to commissioner for 
railways & chief mechanical engineer.' 
September 1944. 
E220/383. File 135. 'Railway conference. ' July 1944. 
E220/428. A.C.T.U. Congress. Minutes. 1945. 
Amalgamated Postal Workers' Union of Australia (Queensland Branch) 
Australian National University Archives of Business and Labour, 
Canberra 
E178/1. 'Correspondence.' 
E178/2. 'Correspondence with South Australian 
Branch Secretary. ' 
E178/3. 'Correspondence with officials of A.L.P. 
and some ministers of State and Federal 
Government.' 
El 78/18. 'Correspondence with ministers and 
members of Federal Parliament (1946-
1961).' 
Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union 
Australasian Meat Industry Employees' Union, Brisbane 
Northern District Council. Minutes. 1942-46. 
Branch Executive. Minutes. 1942-47. 
General Correspondence. 1945. 
District Council Minutes. 1945-46. 
Correspondence. Southern District . 1945-46. 
Correspondence. Central District . 1945-47. 
Southern District Council. Minutes. 1945-49. 
District Council Minutes. 1945-49. 
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Correspondence. Southern District. 1946. 
Conference called as provided for in Order in Council 5 
July 1946 between A.M.I.E.U. and Q.M.I.B. Minutes. 
Correspondence. Northern District. 1946-47. 
Federal Correspondence. 1946. 
Correspondence. New South Wales. 1946. 
Correspondence. South Australia. 1946. 
Correspondence. Victoria. 1946. 
Committee of Management. Report. February 1947. 
Committee of Management. Minutes. December 1947. 
Correspondence. 1947. 
Wollongong University Archives, Wollongong 
Deposit Dl : Australasian Meat Industry Employees' 
Union. 
Queensland Branch. Boxes 106, 108, 109, 112, 113, 115-
122. 
Northern District Sub-Branch. Boxes 124, 125, 127, 129-
131, 134. 
Federal Council. Boxes 151, 160, 163, 164, 171. 
Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (Federal Council) 
Australian National University Archives of Business and Labour, 
Canberra 
T60/40. 'Queensland Strike Material. 1945.' 
T60/59. 'Divisional Material. Queensland Division.' 
Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (Queensland 
Division) 
Australian National University Archives of Business and Labour, 
Canberra 
E212/9-21. Executive Council. Minutes. 1933-46. 
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E212/22-27. Divisional Council. Minutes. 1947-52. 
E212/39. Deputations to Commissioner for 
Railways. Minutes. 1946-53. 
E212/56. 'Deregistration of Traffic Employees 
Union.' 1933-34. 
E212/62. 'Employees representatives on Enquiry 
Boards.' 1938-45. 
E212/63. 'Australian Labor Party. ' 1934,1941-58. 
E212/73. 'Newsclippings on A.L.P. Split (Qld).' 1957. 
E212/82. 'Deputations to Minister for Transport. ' 
1934-49. 
E212/92 
and 93. 'Demarcation. ' 1924-65. 
E212/192. 'Strike Ballot.' 1948-49. 
E212/205. 'President. ' 1920-57. 
E212/206 
and 207. 'Registrar of Trade Unions.' 1920-61. 
E212/211. 'Suggested modifications, locomotives.' 
1922-45. 
E212/218 'Basic wage declaration.' 1930-58. 
E212/219. 'Basic Wage.' 1931-64. 
E212/244. 'Forty-hour week.' 1937-59. 
E212/278. 'Combined Railway Unions.' 1938-68. 
E212/296. 'Legal Opinions.' 1934-52. 
E212/325, 
326,327. 'Federal conferences: correspondence.' 
1943-52. 
E212/330. •18th Federal Conference (Perth).' 1945. 
E212/334. '20th Australian Council Convention 
(Hobart).' 1947. 
E212/335. '2 l s t . Australian Council Convention 
(Melbourne).' 1948. 
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E212/354. 
E212/356. 
E212/357. 
E212/362. 
E212/372 
and 373. 
E212/374. 
E212/375. 
E212/393. 
E212/447. 
E212/453. 
E212/467. 
E212/473. 
E212/513. 
E212/576. 
E212/588. 
E2121/593. 
E212/594. 
E212/614. 
E212/615-
617. 
E212/626. 
E212/633. 
E212/648. 
'A.C.T.U. correspondence.' 1941-58. 
'Executive Reports.' 1940-50. 
'Victimisation and branch disputes.' 1946-
63. 
'Incompetent railway administration.' 
1937-47. 
'Disputes.' 1944-47, 1943-45. 
'Meat workers dispute.' 1946. 
'A.R.U. stoppage.' 1947-48. 
'Attitude of departmental officers.' 1947-
61. 
'State Conference.' 1946. 
'Arbitration and award matters . ' 1948-62. 
'Railway Award (State).' 1925-59. 
'Fines. Stopwork meetings.' 1939-53. 
'Numbered correspondence files, File 269 
"Union Auditor".' 
'Federal Executive.' 1938-63. 
'Request for Royal Commission to enquire 
into condition of rolling stock and 
permanent way.' 1941. 
'Aid to Russia movement.' 1941-42. 
'War measures. ' 1939-45. 
'Variation of awards.' 1938-54. 
'Garrat t engines.' 1945-63. 
'Mass meetings. ' 1939-59. 
'Northern and Central 
Committee. ' 1938-62. 
District 
'Deputations to General Manager.' 1944-
57. 
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E212/655. 'Nationalisation of banks and airways.' 
1945-48. 
E212/675. 'Indonesian dispute.' 1947-48. 
E212/679. 'Queensland Rail Strike levy.' 1948-51. 
E212/681. 'Strike pay distribution.' 1948-51. 
E212/682. 'Workshops'dispute.' 1948. 
Australian Railways Union (South Australian Branch) 
Australian National University Archives of Business and Labour, 
Canberra 
El97/8(316) South Australian Branch. Correspondence 
files. 
Australian Railways Union (Queensland Branch) 
Australian Railways Union, Brisbane 
File 48/67(B)2. 'Railway Strike 2 February 1948 to 
5 April 1948 for Marginal 
Increases.' 
File 48/67(B)6. 'Marginal Increases following 
Strike.' 
File 48/67(B)7. 'Marginal Increases Claim following 
Strike. Awards - Old and New. Mr. 
O'Brien's Notes.' 
Untitled file: File on the 1948 Railway Dispute. 
Special Australian Council. Report. 3 April 1947. 
State Council. Minutes. 1945-52. 
Australian Workers' Union 
Australian National University Archives of Business and Labour, 
Canberra 
M50,M51. Queensland Branch Executive. Minutes. 
1945-57. 
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State Library of New South Wales 
Sixty-Nineth Annual Convention. Official Report. 
Sydney: The Worker Newspaper, 1955. 
Boilermakers' and Blacksmiths' Society of Australia (Queensland Branch) 
Australian National University Archives of Business and Labour, 
Canberra 
E220/524. Queensland District Commit tee . 
Minutes. December 1943 - September 
1953. 
E220/588. 'Margins.' 1947-54. 
E220/622. '1948 Railway Strike.' 
E220/631. 'Sick pay (and provident & superannuation 
funds).' 1944-61. 
E220/633-4. 'Stand-downs.' 1946-58. 
E220/649. 'Wash hands, smoko and time cards. ' 1944-
64. 
E220/669. 'Material collected and compiled by J. 
Egerton.' 
Electrical Trades Union 
Electrical Trades Union, Brisbane 
Brisbane Sub-Branch No. 1. Minutes. 1948-51. 
State Council Executive. Minutes. 1942-54. 
Federated Coopers of Australia (Queensland Branch) 
Australian National University Archives of Business and Labour, 
Canberra 
T50/1/10. Monthly Meeting. Minutes. 1946. 
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Federated Ironworkers' Association of Australia (National Council) 
Australian National University Archives of Business and Labour, 
Canberra 
El 70/9. General Secretary, National Council. 
General Corresponclence. 1936-51: 
E170/9/108. 'Queensland Branch 1946.' 
El 70/9/116. 'Commonwealth and State Arbitration 
Courts. ' 
E170/9/119. 'Trade Union. A-Z. 1946.' 
E170/9/120. 'Miscellaneous. A-G. 1946.' 
E170/9/126. 'Queensland and Sydney. 1947.' 
El 70/9/130. 'Commonwealth and State Government 
Departments. 1947.' 
E170/9/131. 'Trade Union. A-Z. 1947.' 
E170/9/136. 'Queensland and Sydney. 1948.' 
E170/9/141. 'A.C.T.U., Metal Trades Federation, 
N.S.V/. Labor Council. 1947, 1948.' 
E170/9/143. 'Trade Union. A-Z. 1948.' 
E170/9/147. 'Telegrams. Inward. 1948.' 
E170/9/148. 'Telegrams. Outward. 1948.' 
El70/28. Office Records, F.I.A. National Office: 
El70/28/2. 'Folder "Dispute Pay".' 
E170/48. F.I.A. Adelaide Branch. General 
correspondence files: 
E170/48/26. 'National Council. 1946.' 
E170/48/27. 'Government Departments, Trade Unions, 
A.L.P., T .L .C , Trades Hall Managing 
Commit tee , Miscellaneous. 1946.' 
E170/48/34. 'National Council. 1948.' 
E170/48/37. 'Leaflets and Pamphlets. ' 
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E175/12. Branch and Management Commit tee , 
Queensland Branch. Minutes. 1949-56. 
E218/111. National Council. Minutes. 1945-48. 
Federated Ironworkers' Association of Australia (Queensland Branch) 
Australian National University Archives of Business and Labour, 
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